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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
4. Procedure
The interrelationship between the courts and administrative agencies is
one of the most frequently debated issues in North Carolina law today. Specif-
ically, the standard of review to be used by North Carolina courts when exam-ining the decisions and actions of the various state agencies is unclear in many
situations. Complexity arises when the express provisions for court review
contained in some statutes are juxtaposed to the general standard of review
found in the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act.' The appropriate
standard of judicial review was the main issue in the highly publicized case of
Warren County v. State.2 The case stemmed from efforts of the citizens of
Warren County to stop the state's construction of a PCB dump in their midst.3
After dispensing with several issues of general civil procedure, 4 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina considered the
novel question of how North Carolina courts should review an allegedly de-
fective environmental impact statement (EIS) filed under the state Environ-
mental Policy Act (EPA).5 The court presumed North Carolina policy to
require that state EPA decisions be reviewe&using standards similar to those
used in review of federal EPA actions.6 Federal policy, as articulated by the
fifth circuit in Sierra Club v. Morton,7 was found to be "the rule of reason."
That is, courts should not impose impossible standards upon agency action
affecting the environment; rather, "[t]he court's task is to determine whether
the EIS was compiled with objective good faith and whether the resulting
statement would permit a decisionmaker to fully consider and balance the en-
vironmental factors."9 After fully considering each of the allegations of defec-
tiveness, the district court found all statutory and regulatory requirements
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (1983). Specifically exempted from the North Caro-
lina Administrative Procedure Act are the Employment Security Commission, the Industrial
Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Board, the Department of Correction,
and the Utilities Commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-l(a) (1983). See Powell, Pressing the
NCA4P,4 Paradignv Too Much Form for Ad Hoc Adjudicatory Rulemaking, 61 N.C.L. REV. 67
(1982).
2. 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
3. "PCB" is an acronym used for polychlorinated biphenyls. Laboratory tests have indi-
cated that PCB's are highly carcinogenic. Id. at 281 n.9.
4. Id. at 282-84.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -20 (1978). The court first ruled that Warren County had
standing to sue under this statute. This was an issue of first impression in North Carolina case
law. 528 F. Supp. at 284-85. The court considered the plaintiff county's allegations that the state's
proposed PCB landfill created a nuisance. Under the precedent of Ferris v. Wilbur, 27 F.2d 262
(4th Cir. 1928), the district court held, "[t]he use by the State of North Carolina of its own prop-
erty in a manner authorized by valid legislative authority may not be enjoined by the courts as a
nuisance." 528 F. Supp. at 285-86.
6. 528 F. Supp. at 291 (citing Orange County v. Dept. of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265
S.E.2d 890, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 94, 273 S.E.2d 299 (1980)).
7. 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975).
8. 528 F. Supp. at 291.
9. Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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fulfilled by the state in preparing and filing the final EIS. l0
In a separate cause of action, Warren County alleged that the construc-
tion of the PCB dump violated a county ordinance banning PCB dumps
within the county.II The court held that the ordinance "clearly stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress under the Toxic Substances Control Act. .... ,,12 The court
reasoned that if local governments have the power to legislate bans on PCB
dumping, the entire PCB disposal program would be halted; therefore, despite
authority allowing local governments to impose more restrictive requirements
than those imposed by federal law,' 3 the district court held the Warren County
ban void. 14
In In re Vandf/ord'5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the
express provisions of G.S. 143-166.4, which state that decisions of the the In-
dustrial Commission are "final and conclusive and not subject to judicial re-
view .... -16 override the general provisions for review found in the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.17 This result is in accord with prior
North Carolina case law holding that a specific statutory provision prevails
over a more general one.18 In North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont,19 the
North Carolina Supreme Court found that the standard for judicial review
contained in the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, i.e., the
"whole record" test,20 should be used by courts reviewing decisions of the
North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission. Finally, the
principle that administrative remedies must be exhausted before obtaining ju-
dicial review was reiterated by the fourth circuit in Sandhill Motors, Inc. v.
American Motors Sales Corp.21 and by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
10. Id. at 291-95.
11. Id. at 288.
12. Id. at 290, (discussing 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2605(a)(6)(B) (1976)).
13. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Pacific Legal Found. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
14. 528 F. Supp. at 290.
15. 56 N.C. App. 224, 287 S.E.2d 912 (1982).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-166.4 (1978).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-29 (1981). Decisions ofthe Industrial Commission are specifically
exempted from the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, N.C GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -
64 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Food Stores v. Board of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 151 S.E.2d 582 (1966);
State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Union Elec. Membership Corp., 3 N.C. App. 309, 164 S.E.2d 889
(1968).
19. 304 N.C. 627, 641-42, 286 S.E.2d 89, 98 (1982).
20. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 150A-43 (1983). The reviewing court must determine whether there
was a rational basis for the agency's decision. As the United States Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment. [citations omitted]
Although inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of
review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
21. 667 F.2d 1112 (4th Cir. 1981) (lack of determination by motor vehicle commissioner of
facts committed soley to his jurisdiction precluded plaintiffs bringing suit in federal district court).
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Cianfarra v. Dept. of Transportation.22
B. State and Local Government
1. Annexations
During 1982 the North Carolina courts decided several cases construing
the state's annexation statutes. The most important decision was that of the
supreme court in Greene v. Town of Valdese.23 At issue in Greene was the
proper construction of G.S. 160A-36, 24 the provision governing the character
of areas that may be annexed by municipalities with populations of five thou-
sand or less. Subsection (a) of the statute states that municipalities "may"
extend their corporate limits to areas that meet the requirements of subsections
(b) and (c).25 G.S. 160A-36(d) provides that "[i]n fixing new municipal
boundaries, a municipal governing board shall, wherever practical, use natural
topographic features such as ridge lines and streams and creeks as bounda-
ries .... "26 The North Carolina Supreme Court in Greene was called upon
to decide whether an area had to comply with subsections (b), (c), and (d) to
be ripe for annexation, or whether compliance with only subsections (b) and
(c) would suffice when compliance with subsection (d) was not "practical." In
a question of statutory construction in which case law was not instructive,27
the supreme court adopted the latter interpretation and held that subsection
(d) did not contain mandatory requirements for annexation.28
Plaintiffs in Greene challenged an annexation by the Town of Valdese on
the grounds that the town planner and municipal governing board violated
G.S. 160A-36. Conceding that the annexed area met the subdivision and use
tests of subsections (a), (b), and (c), plaintiffs argued that the town's failure to
draw the boundaries in accordance with "natural topographical features" de-
feated the annexation.29 Agreeing with plaintiffs that treelines do not consti-
tute such features, the supreme court found that the annexation area failed to
comply with subsection (d).30 This failure alone, however, was found not to
22. 306 N.C. 737, 295 S.E.2d 457 (1982) (lack of finding by Employment Security Commis-
sion precluded judicial review of the issue of misconduct under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-4(m)
(1981)).
23. 306 N.C. 79, 291 S.E.2d 630 (1982).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-36 (1982).
25. Id. § 160A-36(a). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-36(b) provides that the area to be annexed
must be adjacent or contiguous to the annexing municipality, that "[alt least one eighth of the
aggregate external boundaries of the area must coincide with the municipal boundary," and that
the area must not already be part of another municipality. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-36(c) provides
that the area must be developed for "urban purposes," and defines what those purposes are. For a
discussion of the "urban purposes" requirement, see ScoviU Mfg. Co. v. Town of Wake Forest, 58
N.C. App. 15, 293 S.E.2d 240 (1982).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-36(d) (1982).
27. Greene, 306 N.C. at 88, 291 S.E.2d at 636 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 85, 291 S.E.2d at 634.
29. Id. at 82, 291 S.E.2d at 632.
30. Id. at 83-84, 291 S.E.2d at 633-34. Distinguishing tree lines from ridge lines, streams, and
creeks because tree lines neither affect natural drainage boundaries nor limit the ability of a mu-
nicipality to extend its services, the court concluded that 90% of the annexation area's boundary
did not follow natural topographic features. Id.
1983]
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invalidate the annexation. The court also required that plaintiffs demonstrate
that drawing the boundary along ridge lines, creeks, and streams was practi-
cal.3 l Finding that subsections (b) and (c) were mandatory provisions while
subsection (d) was merely prescriptive, the supreme court stated that following
natural topographic features was practical only where it would not defeat a
"proposed annexation which otherwise met the mandatory provisions of G.S.
160A-36. ''3 2 Affirming the court of appeals, the supreme court upheld the an-
nexation by the town because plaintiffs "failed to carry their burden of show-
ing that the boundary of the annexed area couldpraetically have been drawn
along ridge lines, creeks, and streams. 33
In a strident dissent, Justice Carlton attacked the majority for "in es-
sence" writing G.S. 160A-36(d) out of the annexation statutes.3 4 Arguing that
subsection (d) is "a provision of limitation," the dissent asserted that noncom-
pliance generally should prevent an area from being ripe for annexation.35
Justice Carlton did acknowledge that there could be "compelling reasons" that
would make it "simply impracticable to comply with the topographic require-
ment." No such reasons, however, were present in Greene, in which the record
showed that the town followed property lines primarily in order to avoid "ad-
ministrative and tax problems. '36
In 1981 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the scope of review
for annexations by municipalities with populations of greater than five thou-
sand was limited to the standards enumerated in G.S. 160A-50(f). 3 7 In Baldwin
v. City of Winston-Salem3 8 and Raintree Homeowners Association v. City of
Charlotte3 9 property owners contended that this statutory construction vio-
lated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution because it precluded an inquiry into the reasonableness of an
annexation ordinance.40 Rejecting this argument, the United States District
Courts for both the Western and Middle Districts held that the North Carolina
Supreme Court's construction of scope of review provided for by G.S. 160A-
31. Id. at 82, 291 S.E.2d at 633. Adopting the South Carolina Supreme Court's definition of
"practical," the court held that the term means "'that which is possible of reasonable perform-
ance."' Id. at 84, 291 S.E.2d at 634 (quoting Woody v. South Carolina Power Co., 202 S.C. 73,
81, 24 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1943)).
32. Greene, 306 N.C. at 85, 291 S.E.2d at 634.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 89, 291 S.E.2d at 636 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. In re Annexation Ordinance, 303 N.C. 220, 278 S.E.2d 224 (1981) (rejecting challenges to
a City of Winston-Salem annexation ordinance). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-50(f) (1982) authorizes
the reviewing court to hear evidence designed to show: (1) That the statutory procedure was not
followed, or (2) That the provisions of G.S. 160A-47 were not met, or (3) That the provisions of
G.S. 160A-48 have not been met. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49 (1982) sets forth the procedure for
annexation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-47 (1982) establishes the preannexation disclosure require-
ments for municipalities, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48 (1982) defines the character an area
must have in order to be eligible for annexation.
38. 544 F. Supp. 123 (M.D.N.C. 1982)'(annexation by the City of Winston-Salem),
39. 543 F. Supp. 625 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (annexation by the City of Charlotte).
40. Baldwin, 544 F. Supp. at 123-24; Raintree, 543 F. Supp. at 627.
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50(f) was constitutional. 4 1
In Raintree the Western District found two bases for upholding G.S.
160A-50(f). First, the court sought to determine whether the judicial review
statute withstood constitutional scrutiny.42 Answering this question affirma-
tively, the Western District concluded that the Constitution does not require a
separate reasonableness inquiry because G.S. 160A-50(f) does give "substan-
tial protection against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable acts" by a mu-
nicipality.43 Second, the court noted that the general rule established by the
Supreme Court" and recently emphasized by the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals45 is that challenges in annexation cases are not actionable under the
fourteenth amendment 6 Because none of the limited exceptions to this rule
was applicable, the court in Raintree rejected the property owners' due process
claim.47 Following the Fourth Circuit, the Middle District in Baldwin reached
the same result without repeating the preliminary reasonableness analysis con-
ducted by the Western District in Raintree.
48
Raintree amd Baldwin are sound expositions of the principle that annexa-
tions are not subject to attack on due process grounds. While the Middle Dis-
trict exhibited proper respect for principles of stare decisis in reaching this
result, its decision in Raintree can be criticized because the court's preliminary
holding on reasonableness was unnecessary in disposing of the case.4 9 Such a
reasonableness analysis would be appropriate only if a court disregarded pre-
cedent and first found that due process chall-nges to annexations were action-
able.50 If presented with a similar challenge to the constitutionality of G.S.
160A-50(f), therefore, North Carolina courts should ignore the Raintree rea-
sonableness analysis and should uphold the judicial review statute based upon
the general rule that was dispositive in Raintree and Baldwin. That rule, sub-
ject to limited exceptions, is that annexations are not susceptible to challenge
under the fourteenth amendment.5 1
In Moore v. Swinson5 2 the North Carolina Court of Appeals defined when
the right to vote in municipal bond referenda vests in the registered voters of a
newly annexed area. At issue in Moore was an apparent conflict between G.S.
160A-49(f)5 3 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.54 G.S. 160A-49(f) provides
that citizens of the annexed territory become citizens of the annexing munici-
41. Baldwin, 544 F. Supp. at 124; Raintree. 543 F. Supp. at 629.
42. Raintree, 543 F. Supp. at 628
43. Id. at 629. For analysis of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-50(f) (1982), see supra note 37.
44. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
45. Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir. 1978).
46. Raintree, 543 F. Supp. at 629.
47. Id. at 629-30. Two exceptional situations in which challenges to annexations lie under
the fourteenth amendment are when a city has manipulated its boundaries for a racially discrimi-
natory purpose, and when freeholders but not nonfreeholders are given the right to vote. Id.
48. Baldwin, 544 F. Supp. at 123-24.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
51. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
52. 58 N.C. App. 714, 294 S.E.2d 381 (1982).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(f) (1982).
19831
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pality on the effective date of the annexation ordinance.55 The natural reading
of the statute is that all such qualified voters are enfranchised by the munici-
pality as of the effective date.56 The Voting Rights Act, however, runs counter
to this interpretation. Under section 5 of that Act, annexations by municipali-
ties in subject counties that expand the electorate are not effective for the pur-
pose of voting until the expiration of the sixty-day period for preclearance by
the Attorney General of the United States. 57 Because the preclearance period
is tolled when the proposed change is submitted to the Attorney General, the
right to vote in municipal elections may not vest until as much as sixty days
after the effective date of the annexation ordinance.5 8
Plaintiffs in Moore were qualified voters who lived in an area of Beaufort
County that was annexed by the City of Washington.59 As a result of the
annexation, plaintiffs became subject to Washington ad valorem taxes. Plain-
tiffs feared that the levy would be increased if a sewer bond referendum,
scheduled for forty-three days after the effective date of the annexation ordi-
nance, was approved. 60 Relying on G.S. 160A-49(f), plaintiffs sued the
Beaufort County elections board for a declaratory judgment of their right to
vote in that referendum.6' While conceding that they could be properly ex-
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (1976), as amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
55. See Moore, 58 N.C. App. at 718, 294 S.E.2d at 383. The pertinent statutory language is
"[flrom and after the effective date of the annexation ordinance, the territory and its citizens and
property shall be subject to all debts, laws, ordinances and regulations in force in such municipal-
ity and shall be entitled to the same privileges and benefits as other parts of such municipality."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(f) (1982).
56. The right to vote presumably is one of the "privileges and benefits" that G.S. 160A-49(f)
confers upon citizens of an area annexed as of the effective date. The court of appeals in Moore
agreed with that interpretation, but held that the Voting Rights Act nevertheless controlled. 58
N.C. App. at 718, 294 S.E.2d at 383. See infra text accompanying notes 64-66.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). The annexation is effective for voting purposes after sixty days
unless the Attorney General has objected. Id. While an objection prevents the annexed territory
from holding elections, it does not affect the validity of the annexation itself. See City of Peters-
burg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 n.2 (D.D.C. 1972) (per curiam), af 'd, 410 U.S. 962
(1973).
The standard of review under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is whether the proposed
change has a discriminatory purpose or effect. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). For a comprehensive
analysis of section 5 annexation cases, see Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of/he Vol-
ing RightsAct, 61 N.C.L. Rv. 189, 221-32 (1983).
It should be noted that section 5 provides an alternative to the Attorney General's
preclearance procedure. That alternative is to submit the proposegl change in the composition of
the electorate to a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. 42 U.S.C § 1973c (1976). This course, however, is seldom followed. Because seeking a de-
claratory judgment from the district court involves substantial expense and delay, "almost all
covered jurisdictions first seek preclearance for their changes from the Attorney General."
Motomura, supra, at 191.
58. Annexations by municipalities in subject jurisdictions that expand the electorate must be
submitted for preclearance before the effective date of the annexation ordinance. See Sperry
Rand Corp. v. City of Jackson, 248 So. 2d 810, 812 (Miss. 1971). Assuming that the Attorney
General neither approves nor objects to an annexation during the preclearance period, those an-
nexed will not be enfranchised by the annexing municipality until sixty days after the effective
date.
59. Moore, 58 N.C. App. at 715, 294 S.E.2d at 381.
60. Id. at 715, 294 S.E.2d at 381-82.
61. Id. at 718, 294 S.E.2d at 382-83. Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the elections on the
grounds that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Consti-
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cluded under the Voting Rights Act,62 plaintiffs argued that they should be
allowed to vote because, under North Carolina law, they had become county
citizens on the effective date.63
Moore resolved the apparent conflict between G.S. 160A-49(f) and the
Voting Rights Act by holding that section 5 of the Act preempts all other stat-
utory provisons regarding the voting rights of those annexed.64 Affirming the
superior court, the court of appeals held that plaintiffs, as residents of a newly
annexed area, were not enfranchised by the annexing municipality until the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act were satisfied. 65 The provisions of G.S.
160A-49(f) notwithstanding, the court rejected plaintiffs' claims because the
sixty-day preclearance period of section 5 had not expired. 66 On the effective
date of the annexation ordinance, therefore, plaintiffs became citizens of the
City of Washington for all purposes except voting.
Moore is significant to North Carolina practitioners because forty coun-
ties in this state are subject to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.67 Moore is also
significant because it is the first case to decide whether qualified voters resid-
ing in a newly annexed area are precluded from voting in a bond referendum
of the annexing municipality held prior to the expiration of the section 5
preclearance period.68 While the court's holding that section 5 preempts G.S.
160A-49(f) was not compelled by the relevant case law,69 the result in Moore
is in accord with the policies underlying the Voting Rights Act.70 These poli-
cies would be furthered and section 5 jurisprudence faithfully followed if the
tution barred municipalities from holding elections during the first sixty days after an annexation.
Id. at 718, 294 S.E.2d at 383-84. For the resolution of this claim, see infra note 64.
62. Id. at 718, 294 S.E.2d at 383. The controlling case on this point of law is City of Rome,
Ga. v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221 (D.D.C. 1979), affd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
63. 58 N.C. App. at 718, 294 S.E.2d at 383.
64. Id. The court of appeals found that Dotson v. City of Indianola, 514 F. Supp. 397 (N.D.
Miss. 1981), was "dispositive of the issue whether plaintiffs were entitled to vote in the. . . sewer
bond referendum, held after annexation but before the period for preclearance of the resultant
voting change by the Attorney General had expired." 58 N.C. App. at 719, 294 S.E.2d at 383.
The court of appeals also affirmed the superior court's denial of plaintifi's request for an
injunction against the municipal bond referendum. The court held that plaintiffs were neither
injured nor deprived of a fundamantal right as a result of their exclusion from the referendum.
• at 719, 294 S.E.2d at 384.
65. 58 N.C. App. 718, 294 S.E.2d at 383.
66. Id.
67. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended, 28 C.F.R. app., pt. 51 (1981). Those forty counties are Anson, Beaufort, Bertie, Bladen,
Camden, Caswell, Chowan, Cleveland, Craven, Cumberland, Edgecombe, Franklin, Gaston,
Gates, Granville, Greene, Guilford, Halifax, Harnett, Hertford, Hoke, Jackson, Lee, Lenoir, Mar-
tin, Nash, Northampton, Onslow, Perquimans, Pasquotank, Person, Pitt, Robeson, Rockingham,
Scotland, Union, Vance, Washington, Wayne, and Wilson.
68. Other cases construing section 5 have decided the question whether those annexed may
vote in elections (not bond referenda) held by the annexing municipality during the preclearance
period. These cases have held that the annexation is not effective for voting purposes during that
period. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
69. There is no North Carolina law on point, and decisions by the federal judiciary and the
courts of other states are not dispositive. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70. The Voting Rights Act was enacted to protect minority citizens' right to vote. See gener-
ally S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
177, 180-86.
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North Carolina judiciary were to construe Moore broadly, and apply it to mu-
nicipal elections- as well as to bond referenda during the annexation
preclearance period.
2. Records
Baugh v. Woodard7 presented the North Carolina Court of Appeals with
the issue whether a prisoner who has undergone psychiatric or psychological
treatment while in prison is entitled to direct access to the records of that trea-
ment. Suing on behalf of himself and all present and past prisoners, plaintiff
presented three legal theories to support his claim. First, plaintiff argued that
he had a statutory right to his psychiatric records pursuant to G.S. 122-55.2.72
Second, he claimed a common-law right to the records in question.73 His third
theory was based upon three constitutional arguments: (1) disallowing him
direct access to his mental health records denied him equal protection;74 (2)
denying him direct access to his records violated the fourteenth amendment by
depriving him a property interest without due process of law;75 and (3) deny-
ing him access to his records constituted cruel and unusual punishment in vio-
lation of the eighth amendment.76 The court dismissed the action in response
to a motion made under rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. 77
On appeal, the court of appeals first considered plaintiff's claim that he
had a right of access to his records pursuant to G.S. 122-55.2. This claim was
based upon his contention that he was a patient in a treatment facility.78 Since
a finding that a prison constitutes a treatment facility for prisoners who receive
mental health care would entitle prisoners to a variety of rights not afforded
ordinary prisoners,79 the court of appeals reasoned that "the legislature could
not have contemplated that prison-operated mental health facilities be in-
cluded within the meaning of 'treatment facility' as defined in G.S. 122-
36(g)."80 Therefore, the court ruled that plaintiffs argument was without
71. 56 N.C. App. 180, 287 S.E.2d 412 (1982).
72. Id. at 182-83, 287 S.E.2d at 414. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-55.2 (1981), which sets forth
rights for patients in treatment facilities, provides that "no restriction may be placed upon the
right of any patient to communicate with an attorney of the patient's choice, to have that attorney
visit with him and, with the consent of the patient, to have the attorney provided with copies of an
pertinent records and information relating to the patient."
73. 56 N.C. App. at 184, 287 S.E.2d at 414.
74. Id. at 184, 287 S.E.2d at 415.
75. Id. at 185, 287 S.E.2d at 415.
76. Id. at 186, 287 S.E.2d at 416.
77. Id. at 181, 287 S.E.2d at 413. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 12(b)(6) (1969).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-36(g) (1981) defines treatment facility as
any hospital or institution operated by the State of North Carolina and designated for
the admission of any person in need of care and treatment due to mental illness or
mental retardation, any center or facility operated by the State of North Carolina for the
care, treatment, or rehabilitation of inebriates, any community health clinic or center
79. For instance, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-55.2(b)(5) (1981) would allow a patient to keep and
use his own clothing and personal possessions.
80. 56 N.C. App. at 183, 287 S.E.2d at 414.
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merit. 81 Relying on Goble v. Bounds,82 the court of appeals then determined
the common-law rule to be that "prison records of inmates are confidential
and are not subject to inspection by the inmate concerned." 83 Thus, the court
concluded that plaintiffs claim of a common-law right to inspect his psychiat-
ric records was without merit.84
The court then examined plaintiff's constitutional arguments. Plaintiffs
equal protection claim was based upon the premise that prisoners receiving
mental health care in a Department of Human Resources facility are entitled
to direct access to their psychiatric records, while similarly treated prisoners
remaining in prison are not so entitled.8 5 In refuting this argument, the court
of appeals construed G.S. 122-36(g) to -55.2 as excluding prisoners who are
mental health patients.86 The court relied upon the rule of statutory construc-
tion that "[w]hen a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one
of which will raise a serious constitutional question and the other will avoid
such question, the court must adopt the construction which avoids the consti-
tutional question."87
Plaintiffs second constitutional argument was based upon the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court quoted the United States
Supreme Court, and stated that, "[t]o have a property interest in a benefit
[protectable under due process], a person clearly must have more than an ab-
stract need for or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement of it."88
Since the court of appeals had found that there was no statutory or common-
law rule that would make plaintiffs wish to gain access to his records more
than a unilateral desire,89 the court held that there was no property interest in
such records and, therefore, there was no merit to plaintiffs due process
argument.90
Finally, the court of appeals dismissed plaintiffs cruel and unusual pun-
ishment argument, since it found that withholding the records in question did
not "offend the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."9 1
3. Separation of Powers
In 1981 the North Carolina legislature increased the membership of the
81. Id. at 184, 287 S.E.2d at 414.
82. 281 N.C. 307, 188 S.E.2d 347 (1972).
83. 56 N.C. App. at 184, 287 S.E.2d at 414.
84. Id. at 184, 287 S.E.2d at 415.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 185, 287 S.E.2d at 415.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 185-86, 287 S.E.2d at 415, (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
89. 56 N.C. App. at 186, 287 S.E.2d at 415-16.
90. Id. at 186, 287 S.E.2d at 416.
91. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
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Environmental Management Commission92 by four persons, all of whom were
to be members of the North Carolina General Assembly. Subsequently, the
North Carolina Supreme Court in State ex rel Wallace v. Bone93 held that
G.S. 143-283(d) violated the separation of powers provision of the North Car-
olina Constitution by involving legislators in executive and administrative
functions of government.94 In response to the court's decision in Bone, the
General Assembly passed the Separation of Powers Act of 1982.95 This Act
provides that no member of the General Assembly may serve on any of the
listed boards or commissions, 96 one of which is the Environmental Manage-
ment Commission.97 Further legislation was pending in early 1983.98 Thus,
the issue of separation of powers in North Carolina is still part of an unsettled
and developing area of the law.99
C. Employment
1. Unemployment Compensation.
In Intercraft Industries Corporation v. Morrison100 the North Carolina
Supreme Court adopted a standard definition for the term "misconduct" as it
appears in G.S. 96-14(2). l1 Under this statute, misconduct disqualifies an
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-283 (1983) provides for the composition of the Environmental
Management Commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-282 (1983) empowers the Environmental
Management Commission "to promulgate rules and regulations to be followed in the protection,
preservation, and enhancement of the water and air resources of the State."
93. 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982).
94. Id at 608-09, 286 S.E.2d at 88-89. For a discussion of Bone, see Survey ofDevelopments
in North Carolina Law, 1981-Constitutional Law, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1273, 1283-85 (1982).
95. Act of June 17, 1982, ch. 1191, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 74 (Reg. Sess.).
96. Id. § 2 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-123 (Interim Supp. 1982)). The boards or
commissions on which a legislator may not serve include the Board of Agriculture, the Art Mu-
seum Building Commision, the Governor's Advocacy Council for Persons with Disabilities, the
Board of Public Telecommunications Commissioners, the Board of Transportation, the Board of
Trustees Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement System, the Coastal Resources Commission,
the Environmental Management Commission, the State Fire Commission, the Public Officers and
Employees Liability Insurance Commisssion, the North Carolina Land Conservancy Corporation,
the North Carolina Capital Building Authority, the North Carolina Criminal Justice Education
and Training Standards Commission, the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency Board of Di-
rectors, the North Carolina Seafood Industrial Park Authority, the Committee for Review of Ap-
plications for Incentive Pay for State Employees, the Board of Trustees of the North Carolina
School of Science and Mathematics, the North Carolina Board of Sciences and Technology, the
State Farm Operations Commission, the Board of Commissioners of the Law Enforcement Of-
ficers' Benefit and Retirement Fund, the Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina
Center for Public Television, the Commission for Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Sub-
stance Abuse Services, the Governor's Waste Management Board, the North Carolina Alcoholism
Research Authority, the North Carolina Ports Railway Commission, the North Carolina State
Ports Authority, the Property Tax Commission, the Social Services Commission, the North Caro-
lina State Commission of Indian Affairs, the Wildlife Resources Commission, the Council on the
Status of Women, and the Board of Trustees of the North Carolina Museum of Art.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. §120-123(8) (Interim Supp. 1982).
98. See LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, SEPARATION OF POWERS: REPORT TO THE
1983 GEN. ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA (1983).
99. See Orth, Forever Separate and Distinct: Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1983).
100. 305 N.C. 373, 289 S.E.2d 357 (1982).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (1981).
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employee from eligibility to receive unemployment benefits. The need for a
standard definition is apparent because courts frequently are required to make
this factual determination. 10 2 Adopting a definition first articulated by the
court of appeals in In re Colngsworth ,103 the court in Intercraft declared that
"misconduct sufficient to disqualify a discharged employee from receiving un-
employment compensation is conduct which shows a wanton or wilful disre-
gard for the employer's interest, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules,
or a wrongful intent." 1°4
The Intercraft court did not find sufficient misconduct to disqualify the
employee, Morrison, from receiving unemployment compensation. Morrison
had been absent from work because she "couldn't find child care."10 5 Writing
for the court, Chief Justice Branch stated, "[I]t is generally recognized that
chronic or persistent absenteeism, in the face of warnings, and without good
cause may constitutue wilful misconduct . . . . However, a violation of a
work rule is not wilful misconduct if the evidence shows that the employee's
actions were reasonable and taken with good cause." 10 6 The supreme court
specifically withheld judgment as to whether the inability to procure child care
necessarily constitutes "good cause;" good cause remains an issue for factual
determination dependent upon the circumstances of each case.' 0 7
Evidentiary burdens of proof under G.S. 96-14(2)108 were also addressed
in lntercraft. The court declared that the general policy of the Unemployment
Compensation Act'0 9 was to create a rebuttable presumption that a claimant is
entitled to benefits.' 10 The burden of proof is now clearly placed upon the
employer to show circumstances disqualifying the claimant. In the instant
case, Intercraft Industries failed to offer evidence to rebut Morrison's evidence
showing "good cause." '  This new presumption alters the former burden of
proof which required a claimant to show he was not disqualfoed for benefits
102. For 1982 cases dealing with "misconduct," see Collins v. B & G Pie Co., 59 N.C. App.
341, 296 S.E.2d 809 (1982); In re Peden Steel Co., 57 N.C. App. 363,291 S.E.2d 308 (1982); Walter
Kidde & Co. v. Bradshaw, 56 N.C. App. 718, 289 S.E.2d 571 (1982); In re Chavis, 55 N.C. App.
635, 286 S.E.2d 623 (1982).
103. 17 N.C. App. 340, 194 S.E.2d 210 (1973).
104. 305 N.C. at 375, 289 S.E.2d at 359.
105. Id. at 376, 289 S.E.2d at 359.
106. Id. at 375, 289 S.E.2d at 359.
107. Id. at 377, 289 S.E.2d at 360. This facet of Intercraft was apparently missed by the dis-
senters, who adopted the dissent filed by Judge Hedrick in the court of appeals. Id. at 377, 289
S.E.2d at 360 (Carlton, J., dissenting). Judge Hedrick objected to allowing the inability to procure
child care to constitute good cause for an employee to miss work, because it might discourage
employers from hiring women with young children. Intercraft, 54 N.C. App. 225, 228-29, 282
S.E.2d 555, 558 (Hedrick, J., dissenting). Since the inability to find child care was held to not to
constitute good cause in all circumstances, the point became moot. The dissent's argument is espe-
cially inapposite in that Intercraft lost primarily because it failed to meet its burden of proof and
not because Morrison had good cause for her absenteeism. See infra notes 108-114 and accompa-
nying text.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (1981).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-1 to -18 (1981).
110. 305 N.C. at 376, 289 S.E.2d at 359.
111. Id. at 377, 289 S.E.2d at 360.
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under the provisions of G.S. 96-14.'12 This shifting of the burden of proof
may be insignificant, however, because the express provisions of G.S. 96-14
disqualifying a claimant have always been strictly construed in favor of the,
claimant, 13 despite the statute's general policy that all an employer need
prove to prevail is that a claimant is out of work because of his own
misconduct.' 14
The most notable 1982 case disallowing unemployment benefits was Col-
lins v. B & GPie Co."Is Using the Intercraft definition of misconduct, the court
of appeals held that "absence from employment in violation of a work rule
due to incarceration for a willful or legally unexcused probation violation"
disqualified the claimant from receiving unemployment compensation." t6 It
appears that a parolee who has violated his probation will therefore be conclu-
sively precluded from receiving unemployment benefits, since reincarceration
will always be the result of the parolee's "own fault," i.e. breaking the condi-
tions of his parole." 17
In Employment Security Commission of North Carolina v. Lachman"8 the
state supreme court took judicial notice, pursuant to G.S. 150A-64,' t9 that
employees of the North Carolina Employment Security Commission are sub-
ject to competitive services rules. 120 This holding enables employees of the
Employment Security Commision to use Chapter 126 grievance procedures 12'
pursuant to G.S. 126-39.122
Legislative action included the amendment in 1981 of Chapter 96 of the
General Statutes123 to bring it into conformity with federal requirements.12 4
In particular, G.S. 96-17125 was amended to allow withholding of unemploy-
ment benefits for the payment of child support obligations. 126 This provision
will allow child support obligations imposed by Chapter 110127 to be dis-
charged in a more efficient and reliable manner when wages cannot be gar-
112. See Blue Jeans Corp. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867
(1969); In re Stutts, 245 N.C. 405, 95 S.E.2d 919 (1957); State ex rel. Employment Security
Comm'n, v. Jarrell, 231 N.C. 381, 57 S.E.2d 403 (1950); In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d
544 (1941). See also the general policy statement found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2 (1981).
113. Inre Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 161 S.E.2d 1 (1968); In re Scaringelli, 39 N.C. App. 648, 251
S.E.2d 728 (1979).
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2 (198J).
115. 59 N.C. App. 341, 296 S.E.2d 809 (1982).
116. Id. at 341, 296 S.E.2d at 810.
117. Id. at 343, 297 S.E.2d at 811.
118. 305 N.C. 492, 290 S.E.2d 616 (1982).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-64 (1978).
120. 1 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 8C.0602(b)(1) as adopted by the State Personnel Commission effec-
tive February 1, 1976.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-34 to -39 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-39 (1981).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-1 (1981).
124. Act of June 16, 1982, ch. 1178, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 55 (Reg Sess.)(codifled primarily at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-17 (Interim Supp. 1982)).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-17 (1981).
126. Defined at ch. 1178, § 2, 1982 Sess. Laws 55 (Reg. Sess. 1982) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 96-17(d)I.(B) (Interim Supp. 1982)).
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-141 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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nished.128 The same legislative act also amended the extended benefits for
Chapter 96129 uniform state and federal indicators will now activate the ex-
tended benefits provisions of G.S. 96-12.130 In addition, G.S. 96-14 was
amended 131 specifically to allow unemployment compensation for persons in
training programs approved under the Trade Act of 1974.132
2. Retirement and Health Benefits
Federal decisions interpreting disability standards under Title II of the
Social Security Act, 133 while "persuasive authority on relevant issues," 134 were
found not to be binding upon North Carolina courts in Lackey v. North Caro-
lina Department of Human Resources.135 The supreme court made this ruling
despite the mandate of G.S. 108A-56136 that "[a]ll of the provisions of the
federal Social Security Act 137 providing grants to the states for medical assist-
ance are accepted and adopted, and the provisions of this Part shall be liber-
ally construed in relation to such act so that the intent to comply with it shall
be made effectual."' 138 Following its declaration of judicial independence, the
court did cite federal authorities extensively in deciding to allow disability
compensation to the claimant. 139 The court held that the burden is on the
claimant:
to prove he is disabled within the meaning of the social security stat-
utes .... Once plaintiff has established that he is disabled and can
no longer perform his usual work, the burden of going forward shifts
to the defendant to show that there are other specific jobs which exist
in the national economy that plaintiff can perform. 140
The report of a nonexamining physician was found not to discharge defend-
ant's burden once plaintiff has made his prima facie case. 141
In Stanley v. Retirement and Health Division142 a widower of a public
school teacher was awarded death benefits. The deceased was held to be a
"career teacher" at the time of her death, even though she had applied for
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-136 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-12(3) (Interim Supp. 1982).
130. Act of June 16, 1982, ch. 1178, §3, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 57 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 96-12(e)A.(1) (Interim Supp. 1982)).
131. Id. § 15 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(11) (Interim Supp. 1982)).
132. 19 U.S.C. § 2296 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1976).
134. Lackey v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 236, 293 S.E.2d 171,
175 (1982).
135. 306 N.C. 231, 293 S.E.2d 171 (1982).
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-56 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-59 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
139. 306 N.C. at 235-40, 293 S.E.2d at 176-82.
140. Id. at 242-43, 293 S.E.2d at 179 (citations omitted). All plaintiff need show is "evidence
of what he has done, of his inability to do that kind of work any longer, and, of his lack of
particular experience for any other type of job." Id. at 242, 293 S.E.2d at 179 (quoting Rice v.
Celebreeze, 315 F.2d 7, 17 (6th Cir. 1963)).
141. 306 N.C. at 249, 293 S.E.2d at 176.
142. 55 N.C. App. 588, 286 S.E.2d 643 (1982).
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disability payments, because her application for disability had not yet been
approved. Thus, the court considered her still to be "in service." 143 A teacher
is "in service" if her "last actual day of service occurred not more than 366
days before the date of [her] death if [she] during said one-year period had
applied for and was entitled to receive a disability retirement allowance under
the System."'144 The court of appeals rejected respondent's contention that the
"90 day deemed" rule of G.S. 135-4(h) 145 precluded the widower's claim and
held that the provisions of the statute were intended "not to exclude, but to
include state employees under an umbrella of protections."' 146 The court
therefore opted to have the 366-day restriction take precedence over the more
restrictive 90-day rule of G.S. 135-5.147 The liberal holding in Stanley clearly
comports with previous case law that the purpose of Chapter 135 is to ensure
that state employees will have benefits in sickness and old age. 148
3. Dismissal and Demotion of Public Employees
In North Carolina Department of Correction v. Gibson 149 a black guard at
a minimum security prison was held by the court of appeals to be the victim of
racial discrimination because of his dismissal. The court overturned the trial
court order that had reversed the decision of the State Personnel Commission
(SPC) in favor of the dismissed employee.' 50 The similar wording of Title
VII 151 and the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act 152 regarding
the unlawfulness of racial discrimination in employment practices led the
court to hold the SPC's use of federal evidentiary standards "eminently rea-
143. Id. at 592, 286 S.E.2d at 645-46.
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 135-5(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
145. Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 1223, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1415 (Reg. Sess.)(codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 135-4(h) (1981)).
146. Stanley, 55 N.C. App. at 591, 286 S.E.2d at 645.
147. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. 135-5(1)(2) (1974)(amended 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1981) stated:
For the purposes of this subsection (1), a member shall be deemed to be in service at the
date of his death if his last day of actual service occurred not more than 90 days before
the date of his death.
(2) Last day of actual service shall be:
a. When employment has been terminated, the last day the member actually
worked.
b. When employment has not been terminated, the date on which an absent mem-
ber's sick and annual leave expire, unless he is on approved leave of absence and is in
service under the provisions of G.S. 135-4(h).
Stanley was decided under the 1974 version of this statute, the relevant wording of which was not
altered by the 1981 amendments. Act of June, 24, 1981, ch. 672, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 970 (1st
Sess.).
148. Bridges v. City of Charlotte, 221 N.C. 472, 20 S.E.2d 825 (1941); Powell v. Board of
Trustees of Teachers and State Employees Retirement Sys., 3 N.C. App. 39, 164 S.E.2d 80 (1968).
149. 58 N.C. App. 241, 293 S.E.2d 664 (1982).
150. Id. at 259, 293 S.E.2d at 675. The court of appeals held the trial court reversal an abuse
of discretion under the "whole record" test of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15OA-51 (1981). 58 N.C. App. at
255-59, 293 S.E.2d at 673-75.
151. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 154-422.1 to -422.3 (1978).
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sonable."' 53 The SPC used the standards enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglass Corporation v. Green. 154 Under this
standard, the court held: (1) that Gibson had carried his initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination (that he was black,
qualified for his job, and dismissed although three white guards were not dis-
missed for the same incident);155 (2) that the burden then shifted to the De-
partment of Correction (DOC) to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Gibson's dismissal (DOC offered evidence to
show that Gibson had been more negligent than his white peers); 156 and (3)
that Gibson then had the burden of proving that DOC's stated reasons for his
dismissal were merely a pretext for racial discrimination. 157 In this last deter-
mination the court of appeals felt compelled to defer to the SPC's decision
because the subjective nature of the standard applied.158 Gibson is significant
because it is the first North Carolina decision to articulate clearly the eviden-
tiary standards to be used in cases arising under the North Carolina Equal
Employment Practices Act.
In Canpe v. Abercrombie159 no abuse of discretion was found in the
Mecklenburg County Civil Service Board's requirement of written examina-
tions for promotion to police sergeant and captain, but not to assistant chief.
The argument was made that Chapter 398 of the 1973 Session Laws 160 re-
quired the police department to use the results of the police entrance exams in
determining priority for all promotions. The court rejected the argument,
holding that since the law refers only to "applicants for positions on the police
force . ..,161 the competitive examination mentioned therein is mandated
only for entry level positions. Therefore, the police department was not re-
quired to use the results from the entrance exam in determining later promo-
tion. Addressing the issue why an examination was required only for
promotion to police sergeant and captain, and not for assistant chief, the court
emphasized the discretion afforded the chief of police in choosing persons who
are to be in a close professional relationship with him. 162
D. Education
In Nova University v. Board of Governors of the University of North Caro-
lina' 63 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the question whether
G.S. 116-15164 authorizes the Board of Governors to regulate through a licens-
153. 58 N.C. App. at 247, 293 S.E.2d at 668.
154. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
155. 58 N.C. App. at 248-49, 293 S.E.2d at 669.
156. Id. at 249-50, 293 S.E.2d at 669-70.
157. Id. at 250-55, 293 S.E.2d at 670-73.
158. Id. at 254, 293 S.E.2d at 672. See supra note 150.
159. 58 N.C. App. 395, 293 S.E.2d 647 (1982).
160. Act of May 9, 1973, ch. 398, § 7, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 489 (1st Sess.).
161. Id. § 5.
162. 58 N.C. App. at 398, 293 S.E.2d at 650.
163. 305 N.C. 156, 287 S.E.2d 872 (1982).
164. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-15 (1978 & Cure. Supp. 1981).
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ing procedure teaching in North Carolina by a nonresident institution when
that teaching institution leads to the conferral of degrees in a state other than
North Carolina. Defendant, acting pursuant to G.S. 116-15,16s denied Nova,
a Florida corporation and educational institution, a license to teach curricula
designed to culminate in Nova's conferral of academic degrees in Florida.1 66
The court of appeals held that G.S. 116-15 did not give the Board of Gover-
nors power to regulate Nova's teaching program insofar as it did not confer
degrees in North Carolina. 167
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' interpretation of G.S.
116-15 for a variety of reasons. First, after surveying several cases concerning
attempted regulation of teaching, the court concluded that the Board's inter-
pretation of G.S. 116-15168 would raise constitutional questions under the first
amendment, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the
commerce clause.169 As a result, the court noted that the Board's position was
in conflict with the canon of statutory construction which provides that "where
one of two reasonable constructions will a raise serious constitutional ques-
tion, the construction which avoids this question should be adopted.' t70
Moreover, since "[ijnherent in the power to license degrees is the power to
establish minimum criteria which a North Carolina institution must meet in
order to be licensed to grant degrees," 17' the court believed that the power to
license teaching was not needed to accomplish the purpose of G.S. 116-15.172
The court also found that with the exception of G.S. 116-15, provision of
Chapter 116 purports to give the Board authority over private institutions. 173
Justice Carlton dissented from the decision on the grounds that the power to
license a degree program not only is inherent in the power to license an institu-
tion to confer degrees,174 but also is essential in allowing the Board of Gover-
nors to plan and develop a coordinated system of higher education in North
Carolina. 175
165. This statute provides in part:
(a) No nonpublic educational institution created or established in this State after Decem-
ber 31, 1960, by any person, firm, organization, or corporation shall have power or au-
thority to confer degrees upon any person except as provided in this section. For
purposes of this section, the term "created or established in this State" or "established in
this State" shall mean, in the case of an institution whose principal office is located
outside of North Carolina, the act of issuance by the Secretary of State of North Caro-
lina of a certificate of authority to do business in North Carolina ....
Id.
166. 305 N.C. at 157, 287 S.E.2d at 874.
167. Id. at 158, 287 S.E.2d at 874.
168. The Board argued that since G.S. 116-15 authorized the Board to license degree confer-
rals, the power to license the degree program is necessarily implied. 305 N.C. at 163, 287 S.E.2d at
877.
169. Id. at 166, 287 S.E.2d at 879.
170. Id. at 163,287 S.E.2d at 878 (quotingIn re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 642,231 S.E.2d 614,616
(1977)).
171. 305 N.C. at 168, 287 S.E.2d at 880.
172. Id. at 167, 287 S.E.2d at 880.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 172, 287 S.E.2d at 883 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
175. Id. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-11(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
[Vol. 61
ADMINISTATIVE LAW
Even though the Board of Governors has the power to plan and develop a
coordinated system of higher education in North Carolina, 176 it does not fol-
low, as the dissent proposed, that the Board would be able to regulate Nova's
teaching program. First, as discussed earlier, such a power would raise consti-
tutional problems. Second, the stated goal in G.S. 116-11(1) of a coordinated
system of higher education seems to refer to a coordinated system of North
Carolina's public and private institutions. Insofar as an institution such as
Nova is a nonresident institution that does not confer degrees in North Caro-
lina, it is difficult to comprehend how regulation of the degree program of such
an institution would promote the goal of a coordinated system of higher edu-
cation in North Carolina.
In Appeal of Willett t7 the court of appeals confronted the question
whether the University of North Carolina and its constituent institutions were
exempt from the hearing procedures of North Carolina's Setoff Debt Collec-
tion Act.178 In 1977 petitioner, a Kentucky resident, was accepted for admis-
sion at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNC-G) and was
billed at the in-state tuition rate, which he paid.179 On October 5, 1977, ap-
proximately one month past the deadline to drop courses and still receive a
tuition refund from UNC-G, petitioner withdrew from the university. He was
subsequently notified by UNC-G that his account had been charged an addi-
tional $573, representing the difference between in-state and out-of-state tui-
tion, since he had been erroneously classified as an in-state student.180 After
the Cashiers' Office of the University notified the petitioner that it intended to
claim his 1979 income tax refund pursuant to G.S. 105A-1 to -16181 to pay his
delinquent account, petitioner requested and was granted a hearing before the
Refund Committee.' 82
When petitioner sought judicial review from the adverse Committee deci-
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-11(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Contra Nova 305 N.C. at 167, 287
S.E.2d at 880.
177. 56 N.C. App. 584, 289 S.E.2d 576 (1982).
178. Id. at 588, 289 S.E.2d at 578. The hearing procedures for North Carolina's Setoff Debt
Collection Act are set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105A-8(a) (1979).
179. 56 N.C. App. at 584-85, 289 S.E.2d at 576.
180. Id.
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105A-1 to -16 (1979). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105A-5 (1979) provides that
the "Department of Revenue shall upon request render assistance in the collection of any delin-
quent account or debt owing to any claimant agency. This assistance shall be provided by setting
off any refunds due the debtor from the Department by the sum certified by claimant agency as
due and owing."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105A-7 (1979) provides:
(a) The claimant agency, upon receipt of notification from the Department that a debtor
is entitled to a refund, shall within 10 days send a written notification to the debtor and a
copy of the same to the Department of its assertion of rights to the refund or any part
thereof. Such notification shall inform the debtor of the claimant agency's intention to
direct the Department to apply the refund or any portion thereof against the debt certi-
fied as due and owing ....
(b) The contents of the written notification to the debtor of the setoff claim shall clearly
set forth ... the debtor's opportunity to give written notice of intent to contest the valid-
ity of the claim before the claimant agency within 30 days of the date of the mailing of
the notice ....
182. 56 N.C. App. at 585, 289 S.E.2d at 576. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105A-8 provides that a claim-
19831
NORTH CAROLINA LW WREVIEWV
sion,183 the trial court vacated the decision on the ground that an official rec-
ord of the proceedings had not been made as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act.18 4 Claiming that the Committee process was exempt from the
hearing procedures of G.S. 105A-8(a),' 8 5 respondent appealed from the trial
court's decision.' 8 6 Respondent's claim was based upon G.S. 150A-l(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act which provides:
Article 4 of this Chapter, governing judicial review of final agency
decision, shall apply to the University of North Carolina and its con-
stituent or affiliated boards, agencies, and institutions, but the Uni-
versity of North Carolina and its constituent or affiliated boards,
agencies, and institutions are specifically exempted from the remain-
ing provisions of this Chapter. 8 7
The court of appeals held that although UNC-G was exempt from the
hearing procedures required by G.S. 105A-8(a) under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, it was not exempt from these procedures under the Setoff Debt
Collection Act.' 88 The court's decision was grounded in its belief that the
legislature had simply adopted the hearing procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act as the appropriate hearing procedures under the the Setoff Debt
Collection Act and did not intend to provide an exemption from the Setoff
Debt Collection Act under G.S. 150A-(1)(a). 189 Therefore, the court affirmed
the trial court's decision.' 90
Although the court of appeals' interpretation is subject to debate, 19' the
decision is understandable in that it assures a reviewing court an official record
from which it can accurately determine whether the agency decision was sup-
ported by the evidence presented at the hearing.
ant agency shall grant a hearing to the debtor according to the procedures established under the
Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 150A. See infra note 184.
183. 56 N.C. App. at 586, 289 S.E.2d at 577.
184. Id. at 587-88, 289 S.E.2d at 577-78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-36 (1978) provides that "[a]
final decision or order of an agency in a contested case shall be made, after review of the official
record as defined in G.S. 150A-37(a). . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-37(a) (1978) provides:
An agency shall prepare an official record of a hearing which shall include:
(1) Notices, pleadings, motions, and intermediate rulings;
(2) Questions and offers of proof, objections, and rulings thereon;
(3) Evidence presented;
(4) Matters officially noticed, except matters so obvious that a statement of them
would serve no useful purpose;
(5) Proposed findings and exceptions; and
(6) Any decision, opinion, order, or report by the officer presiding at the hearing
and by the agency.
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105A-8(a) (1979). See supra note 182.
186. 56 N.C. App. at 588, 289 S.E.2d at 578.
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. 150A-l(a) (1979).
188. Id. at 589, 289 S.E.2d at 578.
189. Id. at 588-89, 289 S.E.2d at 578.
190. Id. at 590, 289 S.E.2d at 579.
191. It could be argued that N.C. GEN. STAT. 105A-8(a) (1979) was subject to the entire Ad-




One of the most demanding tasks a state legislature faces is the redrawing
of voter districts. The apportionment of legislators among voters goes to the
core of representative democracy and "touch[es] legislative sensibilities as do
few subjects."'192 During the 1981 session of the General Assembly, the job
had to be done twice and may not be finished yet.
The North Carolina Constitution requires state legislative redistricting
during the first regular session after the return of each decennial census.'
93
Each legislator is to represent, "as nearly as may be, an equal number of in-
habitants,"'194 and "no county shall be divided in the formation of a. .. dis-
trict."' 95 Two sets of legislative districts are required because the number of
representatives is not an even multiple of the number of senators. The inevita-
ble result of the requirements of an equal population per legislator and the
prohibition against dividing counties is the creation of large multiseat
districts.196
In addition to the above considerations, forty of North Carolina's coun-
ties' 97 are subject to the requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, according to which any redistricting plan must obtain federal ap-
proval. 198 Without such approval the state is prohibited from enforcing the
plan. 199 In addition, the plan may be open to attack by private action even
after the required federal approval is obtained.20°
192. J. SANDERS, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1981, 55 (A. Sawyer ed. 1981)(available in
North Carolina Institute of Government Library).
193. N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 5 (1970).
194. Id. §§ 3(1), 5(1). The redrawing of United States congressional districts is required by
the United States Constitution and by federal statutes. See U.S. CONsT. art. L § 2; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV § 2; 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1982). The Constitution requires that "as nearly as is practible
one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 527-28 (1969) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
195. N.C. CONsT. art. II, §§ 3(3), 5(3).
196. J. SANDERS, supra note 192, at 55.
197. For a listing of the forty counties subject to the Act, see supra note 67.
198. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.9 (1982). Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1976), prohibits states subject to its provisions:
from enforcing "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1,
1964," unless it has obtained a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the
Dictrict of Columbia that such change "does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or has sub-
mitted the proposed change to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not
objected to it.
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 132-33 (1976) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)).
The Act further provides that "[n]either an affirmative indication by the Attorney General
that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory
judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). See also supra note 196. For a discussion of the Voting Rights
Act, see Bickerstaff, Reapportionment By State Legislatures:A Guidefor the 1980", 34 Sw. L.J. 607




With all these factors in mind, the 1981 session of the General Assembly
passed reapportionment plans for United States congressional districts,201 and
state senate202 and representative20 3 districts. These plans were challenged
shortly thereafter in Gingles v. Edmisten,2°4 a class action brought on behalf of
all black residents of North Carolina. Plaintiffs alleged that the plans violated
their rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
under the fifteenth amendment, and under the Voting Rights Act by diluting
the vote of black citizens. They also alleged that the plans did not comply
with the one person-one vote requirement enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court.205 Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and injuctive relief to
prevent any election from being conducted pursuant to the apportionment
plans.
The Gingles case also raised an issue concerning the validity of the 1968
amendment to the North Carolina Constitution that prohibits the splitting of
counties among voting districts.20 6 The amendment, which only applies to
state senate and representative redistricting had never received federal ap-
proval as required by the Voting Rights Act.20 7 When plaintiffs sought to
prevent enforcement of the amendment, the State Board of Elections submit-
ted the amendment to the Attorney General for approval on October 1,
1981.208 The Attorney General objected to the amendment because he was
"unable to conclude that the 1968 Amendment. . . does not have a racially
discriminatory purpose or effect." 209 The Attorney General's analysis showed
that the prohibition against dividing counties "predictably" required the use of
large multimember districts that "necessarily submerges cognizable minority
population concentrations into larger white electorates." 210 The Attorney
General further observed that "[iun the context of the racial bloc voting that
seems to exist, such a phenomenon operates and would continue to operate 'to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial. . . elements of the voting
population"'. 211
201. Act ofJuly 9, 1981, ch. 894, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1330,amendedby Act of Feb. 11, 1982,
ch. 7, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 13 (1st Ex. Sess. 1982) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-201 (Interim
Supp. 1982)).
202. Act ofJuly 3, 1981, ch. 821, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1191, amendedby Act of Feb. 11, 1982,
ch. 5, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 10 (Ist Ex. Sess. 1982); Act of April 27, 1982, ch. 2, 1981 N.C. Sess.
Laws 15 (2d Ex. Sess. 1982)(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-1 (Interim Supp. 1982)).
203. Act of Oct. 30, 1981, ch. 1130, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1657, amendedby Act of Feb. 11,
1982, ch. 4, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 6 (1st Ex. Sess. 1982); Act of April 27, 1982, ch. 1, 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws 15 (2d Ex. Sess. 1982) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-2 (Interim Supp. 1982)). For
an analysis of the plans, see J. SANDERS, supra note 192, at 57-62.
204. Gingles v. Edmisten, No. 81-803 (E.D.N.C. filed September 17, 1981). A similar suit,
Pugh v. Hunt, No. 81-1066 (E.D.N.C. flMed Nov. 25, 1981), was fied in Iredell County State Court
and subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, where it was consolidated with Gingles.
205. See supra note 194.
206. N.C. CoNsT. art. II §§ 3(3), 5(3).
207. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). See supra note 6.
208. Objection letter to the State of North Carolina (Nov. 30, 1981).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
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When the State Board of Elections submitted the reapportionment plans
for the United States congressional districts and for the reapportionment of
the North Carolina senate on October 6, 1981, the Attorney General objected
to both plans.212 The Attorney General's analysis of the senate plan showed
that the use of multimember districts diluted the political strength of minori-
ties; he noted that this effect "well may have been the result of the State's
adherence to the 1968 Amendment" to which he objected earlier.213
In objecting to the congressional redistricting, the Attorney General was
chiefly concerned with the decision to exclude Durham County from District
No. 2. He was unable to conclude that the decision was wholly free from dis-
criminatory purpose and effect: "In this connection we find particularly troub-
lesome the 'strangely irregular' shape of Congressional District No. 2 ...,
which appears designed to exclude Durham County from that district contrary
to the House Congressional Redistricting Committee's recommendation. '214
The Attorney General noted that prior to 1971, District No. 2 had been ap-
proximately 43 percent black, that the 1971 redistricting plan decreased that
percentage to 40.2 percent and that the proposed plan further reduced the
black population in the district to 36.7 percent. The State Board of Elections'
submission of the proposed reapportionment plan for the state house of repre-
sentatives met with similar results.215 The effect of the Attorney General's
objections was to make the plans legally unenforceable. 216 Thus, the General
assembly was faced with the choice of either seeking declaratory judgment
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that the
plans were not discriminatory or drafting new reapportionment plans. The
General Assembly chose to rewrite the plans.
On February 2, 1982, the Governor of North Carolina proclaimed that
the General Assembly would meet in a second extra session on February 9 for
the purpose of enacting legislation concerning the redistricting. 217 New plans
were enacted,218 and the reapportionment plan for the United States congres-
sional districts was submitted to the Attorney General and approved on March
11, 1982.219 The redistricting plans for the state house and senate were sub-
mitted to the Attorney General on February 23, 1982. Although the Attorney
General noted that the new plans divided numerous counties and represented
212. Objection letter to the State of North Carolina (Dec. 7, 1981).
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)).
215. Objection letter to the State of North Carolina (Jan. 20, 1982). The Attorney General
found deficiencies in the house of representatives plans similar to those objected to earlier in the
senate plan.
216. See supra note 198.
217. Governor Hunt acted pursuant to N.C. CON ST. art. III, § 5(7)
218. Act of February 11, 1982, ch. 7, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 13 (1st Ex. Sess. 1982) (reappor-
tioned United States congressional districts); Act of Feb. 11, 1982, ch. 5, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 10
(1st Ex. Sess. 1982), amendedby Act of April 27, 1982, ch. 2, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 15 (2d Ex. Sess.
1982) (reapportioned the state senate districts); Act of Feb. 11, 1982, ch. 4, 1981 N.C. Sess. 6 (1st
Ex. Sess. 1982), amended by Act of April 27, 1982, ch. 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 15 (2d Ex. Sess.
1982) (reapportioned the state house of representative districts).
219. Letter to the State of North Carolina (March 20, 1982).
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a "substantial improvement" over the previously rejected plan he nevertheless
objected to the plans.220 The senate plan was deficient in that District No. 2,
although redrawn with a 51.7 percent black population, could easily have been
drawn with a 55 percent black population, which was "widely recognized" as
necessary before black voters could have a reasonable chance of electing a
candidate. As to the house plan, the Attorney General disapproved of the
districts.drawn in Cumberland County. Although a single-member district
with an overwhelmingly black composition had been created, nearly three-
fourths of Fayetteville's black community was submerged within a white-ma-
jority, four-member district.221
The General Assembly thereupon remedied these problems222 and the
final plans were submitted to the Attorney General and approved on April 30,
1982.223 This result does not mean, however, that the redistricting plans are
now free from attack since the Voting Rights Act provides that "an affirmative
indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made. . shall
[not] bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of [the change]. '224
In addition to the Gingles and Pugh cases225, an additional suit has been
filed challenging the reapportionment plans. Plaintiffs in Cavanaugh V.
Brock226 are Forsyth County citizens, including State Representative Frank
Rhodes and State Senator John Cavanagh. Plaintiffs seek a delaratory judg-
ment and an injunction restraining the State Board of Elections from imple-
menting any redistricting plan pertaining to Forsyth County that would
violate the prohibition of the North Carolina Consititution against the split-
ting of counties. 227 Cavanaugh has been consolidated with Gingles and slated
to be heard before a three judge panel in April, 1983.
Even if the reapportionment statutes withstand the current attack, the
General Asembly may not have completed its work with election law. In
North Carolina Socialist Workers Party v. North Carolina State Board of Elec-
tions, 228 the federal district court for the Eastern District issued a preliminary
injunction to restrain enforcement of that part of the statutory procedure for
the creation of new political parties which requires that voters signing petitions
in support of the new party "request and direct the county board of elections
to change [their] political party affliation to the [new party]". 229
Prior to 1981, the statute required the petitions to "declare that the signers
intend to organize a new political party on a statewide basis, that they intend
220. Objection letter to the State of North Carolina (April 19 1982).
221. Id.
222. Act of April 27, 1982, ch. 1-2, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 15 (2d Ex. Sess. 1982) (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-1 to -2 (1982)).
223. Letter to the State of North Carolina (April 30, 1982).
224. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 131-33 n.1 (1976) (quoting section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)).
225. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
226. No. 82-545 (E.D.N.C. filed May 4, 1982).
227. N.C. CotsT. art. II, §§ 3(3), 5(3).
228. 538 F. Supp 864 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-96(b) (1982).
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to participate as a political party in the next succeeding general election, and
that they intend to affiliate with the new party by voting for its nominees. '230
Under this version of the statute, plaintiffs qualified for a position on the 1980
ballot.23' After the General Assembly repealed the statute in 1981, apparently
as a result of an opinion from the Attorney General that the "intent to vote for
its nominees" section was unconstitutional,232 it ratified the present section
pertaining to party affiliation.
In petitioning the court to restrain enforcement of the disaffiliation re-
quirement, plaintiffs argued that the section substantially interfered with their
effort to obtain a position on the ballot, impinged their freedom to associate in
the formation of a political party, and impaired the right of qualified voters to
cast their votes effectively. In addition, plaintiffs asserted a fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection claim on the grounds that independent candidates were
not required to submit petitions containing the disaffiliation directive.233 In
support of their motion, plaintiffs submitted "numerous affidavits of registered
voters who would have signed a petition supporting placement of the Socialist
Workers Party on the ballot but declined to sign the petition when informed
that their signatures would direct the local board of elections to change their
party affiliation."234
The court found that plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing that the
disaffiliation requirement had a substantially restrictive effect on their access
to the ballot.235 As a result, the burden was placcd on the state to show that
the restriction was necessary to serve a substantial state interest and that it was
the least restrictive means available to achieve that state interest.236 Plaintiffs
did not dispute that the state has a compelling interest to ensure the integrity,
efficiency, and manageability of the elections process. Plaintiffs did argue,
however, and the court agreed, that there were less restrictive means to achieve
these goals, such as requiring the new party to submit the ordinary petitions
used for independent candidates. 237 Consequently, the court, balancing the
likelihood of irreparable harm to plaintiffs against the likelihood of harm to
the interests of the State Board of Elections concluded that the balance of
hardships favored plaintiff and that its claim for relief should be granted.238
As the court observed, plaintiffs would likely prevail in a trial on the mer-
its. In Illinois State Board of Electors v. Socialist Workers Party,239 the
230. Act of June 14, 1967, ch. 775, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 848, 886 (Reg. Sess.).
231. 538 F. Supp. at 865.
232. Id. at 865 n.l.
233. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-122(a)(1) (1982).
234. 538 F. Supp. at 865-66.
235. Id. at 866.
236. See Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184-86
(1979).
237. 538 F. Supp. at 867.
238. Id. at 867-68. The court observed that the harm to plaintiffs was not tecluically irrepara-
ble since the court could at some later date order that the party be put on the ballot. To do so,
however, might require such "drastic measures" as delaying or even overturning the elections,
actions that the court sought to avoid. Id.
239. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
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Supreme Court held that "[r]estrictions on access to the ballot burden two
distinct and fundamental rights, the 'right of individuals to associate for the
advancement of political-beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of
their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively."' 240 When such fun-
damental rights are affected, the state must choose the least drastic means to
achieve its ends.241 In light of the General Assembly's requirement of an ordi-
nary petition (without a disaffiliation requirement) in the case of independent
candidates who seek a place on the ballot,242 it seems unlikely that the state
can successfully maintain that the disaffiliation requirement for new political
parties represents the least restrictive means available.
The difference between the petition requirements for independent candi-
dates versus new political parties also provides the basis for a fourteenth
amendment equal protection attack on the statute. The state argued that the
purpose of the disaffiliation requirements was to ensure that new political par-
ties demonstrate an appreciable modicum of public support.243 There is, how-
ever, no substantial difference between new political parties and independent
candidates that should require the disaffiliation requirement in the case of the
former but not the latter.
The state submitted as an independent ground for the requirement sub-
stantial evidence that petition signers had been the victims of misrepresenta-
tion by solicitors. As the Court pointed out, however:
The problem of misrepresentation would be more directly attacked
with sanctions directed at any party actually found to be misrepre-
senting the import of a petition and with criminal sanctions directed
at persons misrepresenting the purpose of the petitions, neither of
which would have any restrictive impact on bona fide solicitation. 244
Thus, it appears that the General Assembly will once again be forced to re-
write G.S. 163-96 in a manner that avoids abridging the first and fourteenth
amendment rights of North Carolinians.
F Health and Medical Law
In Harrell v. Wilson County Schools245 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals construed the requirement of a "free appropriate public education"
under G.S. 115-363.246 The statute is North Carolina's version of the Educa-
240. Id. at 184 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
241. Id. at 185.
242. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-122(a)(1) (1982).
243. 538 F. Supp. at 867.
244. Id.
245. 58 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687 (1982).
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-363 (1978) provides:
Policy- The policy of the State is to provide a free appropriate publicly supported
education to every child with special needs. The purpose of this Article is to (i) provide
for a system of special educational opportunities for all children requiring special educa-
tion (hereinafter called "children with special needs"); (ii) provide a system for identify-
ing and evalutating the educational needs of all children with special needs;(iii) require
evaluation of the needs of such children and the adequacy of special education programs
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tion for All Handicapped Children Act,247 which was recently interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court in Rowley v. Board of Education.248 Stating
that the Rowley standard did not control,249 the court of appeals ruled that the
North Carolina General Assembly intended a higher standard: "eliminat[ing]
the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child will be given an
equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible." 250 Nevertheless, the
court denied the hearing-impaired child's request that the Wilson County
Schools subsidize her education in a school for the deaf in St. Louis, stating
that the schools had satisfied their obligations under G.S. 115-363. The case is
significant, however, for asserting the right of handicapped children in North
Carolina to receive a free appropriate public education that is judged by a
higher standard than that required under federal precedent.
G. Professional Standards and Licensing
In North Carolina National Bank v. Virginia Carolina Builders, Inc. 251 the
court of appeals ordered the reinstatement of a default judgment upon a find-
ing that defendant was inexcusably negligent in hiring a Virginia attorney to
represent it in a North Carolina court. The majority found the trial court
committed reversable error in taking judicial notice of the long-standing prac-
tice whereby Virgina attorneys practicing near the North Carolina border ap-
pear in North Carolina courts without complying with the state's requirements
for the limited practice of out-of-state attorneys.252
After plaintiff filed suit seeking recovery on a promissory note executed
before placing children in the programs; (iv) require periodic evaluation of the benefits
of the programs to the children and of the nature of the children's needs after placement;
(v) prevent denials of equal educational opportunity on the basis of physical, emotional,
or mental handicap; (vi) to assure that the rights of children with special needs and their
parents or guardians are protected; (vii) insure that there be no inadequacies, inequities,
and discrimination with respect to children with special needs; and (viii) bring State law,
regulations, and practice into conformity with relevant federal law.
247. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). The North Carolina statute was designed in part to bring North Carolina into conform-
ity with the federal statute.
248. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
249. In Rowley the Supreme Court rejected a deaf child's request for a full-time interpreter,
and stated that the child was receiving a free appropriate public education if she received "special-
ized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational bene-
fit to the handicapped child." Id. at 3048.
250. 58 N.C. App. at 264-65,293 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3055 (White, J.,
dissenting)). This standard is supported by the express statutory policy of ensuring "every child a
fair and full opportunity to reach his full potential." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115 C-106 (Cum. Supp.
1981). The standard was espoused by the district and appellate courts in Rowley, but rejected by
the Supreme Court. 102 S. Ct. at 3042. See generally Note, Board of Education v. Rowley: The
Supreme Court Takes a Conservative Approach to Handicapped Children, 61 N.C.L. REv. 881
(1982).
251. 57 N.C. App. 628, 292 S.E.2d 135 (1982).
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4.1 (1981). The statute provides for admission to practice in North
Carolina for attorneys who are licensed in other states but who have not been admitted to the
North Carolina bar. The privilege is limited in that attorneys admitted under this statute may
appear only in the legal proceeding specified in their application for admission. Information that
must be supplied by an attorney seeking admission under G.S. 84-4.1 includes an acknowledge-
ment that the state in which the applicant is admitted grants similar privileges to North Carolina
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by defendant, Virginia attorney Epperly filed an answer on defendant's behalf,
alleging a much smaller amount due on the note. Subsequently, plaintiff filed
a motion for entry of a default judgment on the ground that no proper answer
had been filed because Epperly had not satisfied the statutory requirements for
limited admission. 25 3 When the clerk of court filed an entry of default, Ep-
perly and North Carolina attorney Bryant then each filed a motion to set aside
the default judgment and Epperly moved pursuant to G.S. 84-4.1 to be admit-
ted in the case. The court granted both motions and ordered that defendant's
answer be declared a proper motion of the record. Taking judicial notice of
the custom among Virginia attorneys practicing near the state line to appear in
North Carolina without complying fully with G.S. 84-4. 1, the court concluded
that Epperly had been negligent in failing to comply with the statute, but that
such neglect should not be imputed to defendant. The court also found that
defendant had asserted a meritorious defense. 254
The decision by the court of appeals reversing this trial court order is
open to question. The North Carolina Rules of Court provide that a court
may relieve "a party or his legal representative" from a default judgment for
excusable neglect.255 The court was correct in finding Epperly guilty of inex-
cusable neglect in failing to comply with the statute for over seventeen months.
The existence of a particular custom in an area certainly does not justify ignor-
ing the law.256 Nevertheless, custom is certainly relevant to the issue of de-
fendant's negligence in hiring an out-of-state attorney. As Chief Judge Morris
observed in dissent, despite a finding of inexcusable neglect of Epperly's part,
defendant was still entitled to have the default judgment vacated providing he
himself exercised proper care.257 When, by virtue of a long-standing practice,
defendant's chosen attorney was apparently qualified to practice in the court
of jurisdiction, defendant's neglect in relying upon those apparent credentials
should be excused. 258 At the very least, evidence of such apparent qualifica-
attorneys, a statement that the applicant has associated a North Carolina attorney to appear with
him in the proceeding, and a statment by the client that he has retained the applicant.
In Holley v. Burroughs Welcome Co., 56 N.C. App. 337, 289 S.E.2d 393 (1982), the court
reiterated the rule that before the trial court may exercise its discretion in admitting an out-of-state
attorney for limited practice under G.S. 84-4.1 the statutory requirements must be met. See In re
Smith, 301 N.C. 621, 272 S.E.2d 834 (1980). Upon a finding that plaintiff's Georgia attorney's
motion for admission under G.S. 84-4.1 did not conform to the requirements of the statute, the
trial court in Holley denied the motion in the exercise of its discretionary power. The court of
appeals held this denial was error and that the trial court's ruling was properly one of law. Ac-
cording to the court of appeals, the discretionary ruling denied plaintiff the opportunity to request
leave to amend in order to correct any deficiences in his attorney's motion.
253. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4.1 (1981).
254. North Carolina case law holds that in order for a default judgment to be set aside, de-
fendant must have a meritorious defense and must not have committed inexcusable negligence.
See, e.g., Davis v. Mitchell, 46 N.C. App. 272, 265 S.E.2d 248 (1980).
255. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1, Rules 60(b), 55(d) (1981) (emphasis added).
256. As the court noted, "Such a custom in no way abrogates or excuses out-of-state counsel
from complying with the statute." 57 N.C. App. at 631, 292 S.E.2d at 137.
257. Id. at 634, 292 S.E.2d at 139 (Morris, C.J., dissenting). See Moore v. Deal, 239 N.C. 224,
79 S.E.2d 507 (1954).
258. 57 N.C. App. at 632, 292 S.E.2d at 138 (Morris, C.J., dissenting). In reaching a contrary
conclusion, the majority relied upon Harrell v. Welstead, 206 N.C. 817, 175 S.E. 283 (1934). In
Harrell, however, defendant was found to have committed inexcusable neglect in that "he en-
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tion should be relevant to the determination of defendant's negligence.
In essence, the court declared defendant's answer through his Virginia
attorney to be void ab inito. By contrast, in Pope v. Jacobs259 the court ruled
that in the absence of a showing or prejudice, it was not a reversable error for
the trial court to fail to require plaintiff's attorney to comply with G.S. 84-4.1.
The purpose of the statute is to afford the courts a means of controlling
out-of-state counsel and assuring compliance with the duties and responsibili-
ties of attorneys practicing in North Carolina.260 This legitimate aim must be
balanced, however, against the policy that disputes should be settled on their
merits and not on technicalities. Thus, the flexible Pope approach seems more
equitable than that of North Carolina National Bank.
G.S. 87-15.1 to -15.2, which provide for licensing of general contrac-
tors,261 were recently interpreted in two court of appeals cases. These statutes
are intended to protect the public from work being done by incompetent
builders.262 Under North Carolina law, a general contractor that is unlicensed
by the state is barred from recovering compensation for its work both under its
contract and in quantum meruit.263
In Barrett, Robert and Woods, Inc. v. ARM1264 the court of appeals held
that the protective purpose of the licensing statute had been satisfied and that
plaintiff contractor should not be barred from recovering under its contract,
even though it was not licensed for ninety percent of the construction period.
Plaintiff in Barrett brought suit alleging breach of contract and seeking
$35,163 plus interest which was the balance due on a contract with defendant
for the construction of a customized residential dwelling. After discovery,
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff
was not licensed during most of the construction period. The motion was de-
nied, and following judgment in plaintiff's favor for $36,055, defendant
appealed.
The evidence showed that plaintiff was duly licensed at the time the con-
tract was executed, but that the license expired after approximately ten percent
of the work was completed. Plaintiff, according to the court, "inadvertently
failed to file a renewal application until October 1978; "265 by then, plaintiff
had left thejob.266 In finding that the protective policy of the statute had been
satisfied, the court found the following determinative:
trusted his case to one who is neither a licensed nor a practicing attorney in this state, and em-
ployed no one who regularly practices in the courts of Currituck County." Id. at 820-21, 175 S.E.
at 286. Although it is unclear from the North Carolina Nat'!Bank opinion whether Epperly prac-
ticed regularly in North Carolina, the retention in this case of North Carolina attorney Bryant
suggests that the court's practice reliance upon Harrell is misplaced.
259. 51 N.C. App. 374, 276 S.E.2d 487 (1981).
260. North Carolina Nat' Bank, 57 N.C. App. at 631, 292 S.E.2d at 137.
261. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-1 to -15.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
262. Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, 217 N.C. 264, 162 S.E.2d 507 (1968).
263. Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970).
264. 59 N.C. App. 134, 296 S.E.2d 10 (1982).
265. Id. at 138, 296 S.E.2d at 13.
266. Id.
1983]
NORTH C4ROLINA L,4W REVIEW[
[P]laintiff was licensed at the significant moment of contracting;
plaintiff's license lapsed through inadvertence, not as a result of in-
competence or disciplinary action by the licensing board; plaintiff's
license was renewed immediately upon its filing of a renewal applica-
tion and fees; plaintiff's financial condition and composition, particu-
larly the involvement of Runyon C. Woods, plaintiff's chief designer,
carpenter, and construction supervisor who qualified plaintiff for its
general contractor's license by passing the required written examina-
tion, remained unchanged during the period plaintiff was not
licensed.267
In PhilI6ps v. Parton2 68 defendant general contractor did not fare so well.
In contrast to plaintiff in Barrett, defendant in Phillos was not licensed either
before or after the contract was executed. Defendant argued, however, that in
view of the extensive control exercised over the project by plaintiff, defendant
should be considered a subcontractor or employee rather than a general con-
tractor. The court rejected defendant's claim; nevertheless, this defense should
not be overlooked. Although in determining whether the builder is a general
contractor within the meaning of the statute the cost of the project is often a
determinative factor,269 the statute by its terms applies to "any person...
who... undertakes. . . to construct or who undertakes to superintend or
manage, on his own behalf or for any other person. . . that is not licensed as a
general contractor pursuant to this Article .... ,,27o Thus, if the "builder"
can show that he did not undertake to superintend or manage the construction
of the building, he should not be subject to the terms of the statute.
H Utilities Regulation
During 1982 the General Assembly made two significant changes in the
public utilities statutes. First, the legislature amended G.S. 62-133(b)(1) 271 to
make it discretionary rather than mandatory for the Utilities Commission to
include in its general ratemaking determinations the cost of public construc-
tion work in progress (CWIP). The General Assembly deleted the require-
ment that CWIP "shall be included" and substituted in its place the words
CWIP "may be included, to the extent the commission considers such inclu-
sion in the public interest and necessary to the financial stability of the utility
in question." 272 Prior to the amendment, the Utilities Commission seemed
267. Id. at 140,296 S.E.2d at 14. The court seemed particularily impressed by Woods' score of
96 out of 100 on the written licensing examination. Id. at 138, 296 S.E.2d at 13.
268. 59 N.C. App. 179, 296 S.E.2d 317 (1982).
269. Hickory Furniture Mart v. Burns, 31 N.C. App. 626, 631-32, 230 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1976).
Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981), a "general contractor" is one who undertakes
projects costing $30,000 or more.
270. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
271. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (1982). This section applies to public utilities "other than
motor carriers and certain water and sewer utilities." Id. § 62-133(a). The rate base for water and
sewer utilities is determined pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.1 (1982). N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 62-133.2 (1982), which governs fuel adjustment proceedings, applies only to electric utilities. See
infra notes 277-82 and accompanying text.
272. Act of June 17, 1982, ch. 1197, § 6, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 99, 100 (Reg. Sess.).
[Vol. 61
ADMINISTA4TIVE LAW
inclined to grant public utilities their full requests for increases in the rate base
to cover the cost of CWIP.273 Under the new law, however, the Commission
appears more willing to closely examine such requests to determine whether
they are "reasonable and prudent" and "in the public interest and necessary to
the financial stability of the utility."274 A recent rate case suggests that the
Commission will no longer grant entire CWIP requests as a matter of course.
Applying the new G.S. 62-133(b)(1) tests in that case, the Commission fac-
tored only 38.3% of the required CWIP into the public utility's rate base.2 75
The second major statutory development during 1982 involved the provi-
sion governing fuel adjustment clause proceedings for electric utilities. By re-
placing G.S. 62-134 with G.S. 62-133.2,276 the General Assembly detailed
guidelines for the simple standards previously used by the Utilities Commis-
sion in considering a utility's request for a temporary rate change pending the
next general rate case. Under the repealed G.S. 62-134, the Commission's
scope of review was limited to whether an increase should be granted "based
solely upon the increased cost of fuel used in the generation or production of
electricity. '2 77 Under the newly enacted G.S. 62-133.2, the Commission
"shall" consider changes both in "the cost of fuel" and in the cost of "the fuel
component of purchased power used in providing the North Carolina custom-
ers with electricity. '278 Hearings on fuel charge adjustments are to be held
"within 12 months of the last general rate case order" and "on an annual ba-
sis" thereafter."279 Based on an analysis of nine categories of information pro-
vided by the utility,280 the Commission is to determine "whether an increment
or decrement rider is required to reflect actual changes."'281
By complicating the procedure for fuel adjustment proceedings, G.S. 62-
133.2 may have diminished their usefulness. Gathering the information neces-
sary to satisfy the requirements of G.S. 62-133.2 will require a major invest-
273. See, e.g., Re Carolina Power and Light Co., 40 Pub. Util. Rep. 366, 512 (PUR) (N.C.
Util. Comm'n, Feb. 12, 1982) (The Commission found "that the expenditutes on construction
projects... were reasonably incurred and... will be needed to provide adequate service to
CP&L's customers in the future.").
274. Re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 48 Pub. Util. Rep. 327, 341 (PUR) (N.C. Util. Comm'n,
August 26, 1982).
275. Id.
276. Law of June 17, 1982, supra note 271, §§ 1-2.
277. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-134(e) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (repealed 1982). The definition of the
"cost of fuel" under the repealed fuel adjustment statute was a controversial issue during 1982. In
separate cases, two panels of the North Carolina Court of Appeals reached opposite results when
called upon to decide whether the "cost of fuel" included the cost of purchased or interchange
power. Cf. State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Public Staff-N.C. Util. Comm'n, 58 N.C. App. 480, 293
S.E.2d 880 (1982) ("[tjhe increase experienced by the selling utility is incurred by the power-
purchasing utility when it pays for the purchased power, and this increase may properly be the
basis of an adjustment, based solely on the cost of fuel, in the power-purchasing company's rates
pursuant to G.S. 62-134(e).") Id. at 491, 293 S.E.2d at 886.
278. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.2 (1982).
279. Id. § 62-133.2(b). While additional hearings are to be held annually after the initial post-
general rate case fuel charge adjustment, "only one hearing for each such electric utility may be
held within 12 months of the last general rate case." Id.
280. These information requirements are outlined in id. § 62-133.2(c).
281. Id. § 62-133.2(b).
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment in time and money by the utility seeking review. Without much
additional effort, an electric utility could present a general rate case to the
Utilities Commission, allowing it to obtain a more comprehensive considera-







282. The scope of a general rate case is broader than that of a fuel clause proceeding. While
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.2 (1982) limits the Utilities Commission's inquiry to nine categories of
information, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (1982), which governs general rate-making, states that
"[the Commission shall consider all. . . material facts of record that will enable it to determine
what are reasonable and just rates." Id. § 62-133(d). By virtue of this catch-all provision, a public
utility can introduce in the general rate hearing any information that supports its rate request.
Those facts would become part of the administrative record and, if material, an element in the
Commission's rate base determination.
283. Because the review of utility rate requirements under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-13 (1982) is
broader than under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.2 (1982) and presumably does not take substan-
tially more time, the Utilities Commission would be acting inefficiently if it were to begin a fuel
cost adjustment proceeding after an electric utilty had filed a general rate case. Whether an ongo-
ing fuel adjustment hearing would be incorporated into a subsequently filed rate case is open to
question. To insure that the Commission does not contravene a rate adjustment proceeding
before a general rate case is filed, an electric utility should inform the Commission that it will
request an annual review of its entire rate structure.
It seems likely that given a choice between a fuel adjustment proceeding and a general rate
case, an electric utility would opt for the latter. While the utility could obtain judicial review
pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-94 (1982) of a rate adjustment by the Commission, that appeal,
barring an error of law or abuse of discretion, is unlikely to be successful. The courts may not
substitute their judgment for that of the Utilities Commission in factual disputes or policy dis-




.4. Service of Process
Roshelli v. Sperryl is a recent reaffirmation of North Carolina's strict ad-
herence to the prescriptions for summons issuance contained in North Caro-
lina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a).2 Rule 4(a) provides that following the filing
of the complaint "summons shall be issued forthwith, and in any event within
five days. "3 In Roshelli the complaint was filed and the initial summons was
issued4 on the same day, but the initial summons incorrectly named the party
defendant. A second summons naming the proper party defendant and con-
taining an endorsement by the clerk was not issued until eleven days after the
complaint was filed.5
Rejecting plaintiff's arguments to the contrary,6 the court of appeals
stated that the policy behind the five day period was to set an outer limit for
issuance of the summons after the filing of the complaint.7 Pursuant to rule
4(b),8 the court found the initial issuance and service invalid, and plaintiff's
1. 57 N.C. App. 305, 291 S.E.2d 355 (1982).
2. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(a).
3. Id. (emphasis added). Compare North Carolina's strict rule and interpretation with rule
4(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which simply requires that the summons be issued
"forthwith." 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1084, at 337
(1969).
4. A civil action may be commenced in North Carolina by filing a complaint with the court
or by issuance of a summons coupled with an appropriate application to the court and a court
order. N.C.R. Civ. P. 3. Under Federal Rule 3 only the former avenue is open. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
5. N.C.R. CIv. P. 4(d) provides two alternative methods for a party to continue an action
when service is not made within the period prescribed by rule 4(c): the party may secure an
endorsement upon the original summons or he may sue out an alias or pluries summons. N.C.R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(1), (2).
6. Plaintiff first argued that the misnaming of defendant in the first summons merely repre-
sented a "misnomer." He then argued that by securing the clerk's endorsement on the second
summons, rule 4(d) extended the time for service on defendant and that when effected, the service
of the second summons related back, under rule 4(0, to the date of issuance of the original sum-
mons. The court rejected plaintiffs misnomer argument because the original summons did not
comply with the strict requirement of rule 4(b) that process be directed to the defendant and
issued and served as required by the rule. The court rejected plaintiff's 4(d) argument by noting
that the extension provisions of rule 4(d) can be used only when a properly named party is not
served. The extension provisions are not applicable when, as here, a proper summons is not issued
within the prescribed period because the party defendant has never been named. The court sim-
ply rejected the relation back prong of plaintiff's argument. The court also noted that plaintiff
should have attempted to amend the original summons under rule 4(i) which allows "any process
... to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substan-
tial rights of the party against whom the process issued." Since both the original and second
summons were served by leaving a copy with the wife of defendant, rule 4(i) may well have
provided plaintiff with a simple remedy to his problem.
7. 57 N.C. App. at 306, 291 S.E.2d at 356.
8. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(b) requires that the summons "shall be directed to the defendant." The
court in Roshelli noted that "process must be issued and served in the manner prescribed by
statute, and failure to do so makes the service invalid even though a defendant had actual notice
of the lawsuit." 57 N.C. at 307, 291 S.E.2d at 356. The court's statement in Roshelli contradicts its
statement several months later in Jones v. Whitaker, 59 N.C. App. 223, 296 S.E.2d 27 (1982). In
Jones, the original summons, the alias and pluries summons, and plaintifi's original complaint all
incorrectly named defendant's daughter as defendant. When defendant mentioned this fact to the
process server, the process server corrected the alias and pluries summons and served process on
defendant. The Jones court did not even discuss whether the alias and pluries summons could be
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action based upon his initial summons abated. The second summons, proper
in form, was ostensibly untimely because it was not issued within the
prescribed five days. Nevertheless, the court held that because defendant
failed to move to dismiss the action prior to the issuance of the second sum-
mons, the issuance and service of that summons effected a revival and com-
mencement of a new action on the date the second summons was issued. The
case should alert practitioners that prompt and proper issuance of a summons
is necessary to meet the strict notice requirements of rule 4,9 and that prompt
objection by the defense attorney may be advisable to preserve plaintiff's error.
Such an objection must be counterbalanced against the dangers of putting the
plaintiff on notice of a possible violation of the rule 4 issuance prescription or
the statute of limitations.' 0
B. Rules 7(a) & 8(d)-Compulsory Forms of Pleadings
Under the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the forms of plead-
ings are strictly prescribed. 1 In Connor v. Royal Globe Insurance Co. 12 the
court of appeals carved out a limited exception to the general rule that failure
to file a reply to a counterclaim requires that the allegations in the counter-
claim be admitted. 13 The court held that failure to reply to a counterclaim
would not be deemed an admission when allegations in the counterclaim were
issued when the original summons had been issued for service on a person not a party to the
action. Nor did the court discuss whether plaintiff could have used rule 4(i) to amend process.
Rather, the court in Jones held that the process server's change of name was of no legal signifi-
cance since the proper party was actually served. Id at 226, 296 S.E.2d at 29. Jones may be a
harbinger of a significant shift in the law. It suggests that the strict prescriptions of rule 4 that
have been a touchstone of proper and sufficient service in North Carolina may be giving way to an
"actual notice" requirement characteristic of federal decisions in this area of the law.
9. See Kleinfeldt v. Shoney's, Inc., 257 N.C. 791, 794, 127 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1962); Swenson
v. All Am. Assurance Co., 33 N.C. App. 458, 465, 235 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1977). But see McCoy v.
McCoy, 29 N.C. App. 109, 223 S.E.2d 513 (1976) (holding that issuance of summons is not essen-
tial to validity of service of process by publication made pursuant to N.C.Rt Civ. P. 4(j)(9)(c)); see
also Jones, 59 N.C. App. at 226, 296 S.E.2d at 29 (process server's changing name from that of
defendant's daughter to that of defendant and serving process on defendant is of no legal signifi-
cance when proper party is actually served and consequently suffers no prejudice).
10. See generally W. SHUFORD, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3-7,
at 9 (2d ed. 1981).
11. N.C.R. Cwv. P. 7(a) provides in pertinent part:
There shall be a complaint and an answer a reply to a counterclaim denominated as
such; an answer to a crosselaim, if the answer contains a crossclaim; a third party com-
plaint if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of
Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party complaint is served.... (emphasis
added).
12. 56 N.C. App. 1, 286 S.E.2d 810, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 382, 294 S.E.2d 206 (1982).
13. There is no substantive difference between the North Carolina and the federal rule. The
former makes one additional provision for a permissive reply of last clear chance when the answer
alleges contributory negligence. The provisions of rule 8(d) contain the enforcement mechanism
for rule 7(a):
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a
pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or
avoided.
N.C.R. Ci. P. 8(d) (emphasis added).
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neither relevant nor material to a party's recovery. 14 In Connor plaintiff-mort-
gagors sued to recover on a fire policy. The defendant-insurer's answer as-
serted that plaintiffs had violated several of the policy's conditions of recovery
and included an allegation that plaintiffs were guilty of arson.15 Nevertheless,
defendant's counterclaim sought a set-off only for the outstanding balance it
had paid the plaintiffs' mortgagee.16 During trial, both parties stipulated that
defendant was entitled to the outstanding balance it sought in its counter-
claim.1 7 After a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant revived its earlier 8(d) ar-
gument that plaintiffs' failure to respond to defendant's counterclaim
constituted an admission by plaintiffs of the allegation of arson in the counter-
claim. Such an admission would, of course, completely bar plaintiffs'
recovery.
After considering the "general policy of proceeding to the merits of an
action," 18 the opinion of commentators,1 9 and earlier case law,20 the court
refused to adhere strictly to the language of rules 7(a) and 8(d).21 Relying
upon the identical language of federal rule 8(d) as interpreted by federal
courts, the court in Connor found an implied exception to the provision of the
rule that failure to deny averments in a preceding pleading constitutes an ad-
mission of the facts alleged in those pleadings. Instead, the court followed
federal precedent and held that "when a defendant makes a counterclaim de-
nominated as such and the plaintiff fails to make a reply, [only] the material or
relevant averments of the counterclaim are deemed admitted." 22 Because
plaintiffs stipulated at trial that they owed the amount prayed for in defend-
ant's counterclaim, 23 plaintiffs' failure to reply was neither material nor rele-
14. 56 N.C. App. at 6, 10, 286 S.E.2d at 813, 815. Despite its flexible approach in the Connor
case, the court issued a sharp warning that "[l]itigants should comply strictly with our rules." Id.
at 5, 286 S.E.2d at 813.
15. Defendant's answer asserted that plaintiffs had violated their policy by setting fire to their
own building, increasing the fire risk, and misrepresenting other material facts. Id. at 2-3, 286
S.E.2d at 811.
16. The counterclaim restated the essentials of defendant's answer and claimed that defend-
ant's subrogation rights entitled it to recover the outstanding balance it had paid to the mortgagee.
Id. at 3, 286 S.E.2d at 811-12.
17. Id. at 8, 286 S.E.2d at 814.
18. Id. at 8, 286 S.E.2d at 813 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 40, 43, 187 S.E.2d
420, 422 (1972). Defendant's failure to object before proceeding to the merits was a major factor in
the court's decision. Id. at 7-8, 286 S.E.2d at 814.
19. 56 N.C. App. at 6, 286 S.E.2d at 813 (citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3,
§ 1279, at 354-55).
20. Eubanks v. First Protection Life Ins., Co., 44 N.C. App. 224, 261 S.E.2d 28 (1979), disc.
rev. den., 299 N.C. 735, 267 S.E.2d 661 (1980); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 40, 187 S.E.2d
420 (1972). See also Dyotherm Corp. v. Turbo Machine Co. 233 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
21. See sufpra notes I1 & 13.
22. Conner, 56 N.C. App. at 6, 286 S.E.2d at 813. The court also noted that defendant's
counterclaims were neither material nor necessary to the defendant's recovery. The court did not
clarify the distinction between its stated test of materiality or relevancy on the one hand, and
materiality or necessity on the other.
23. Had defendant in Connor prayed for an amount greater than the amount of the stipulated
set-off, it is arguable that plaintiffs' failure to reply would be deemed an admission under the
court's "material or relevant" test. In short, defendant's counterclaim was not material or relevant
because it was limited to the amount of damage set-off to which it had stipulated. Id. at 5, 286
S.E.2d at 813. The opinion is unclear why defendant so limited its counterclaim.
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vant to defendant's recovery.
Thus, the rule of admission in 8(d) does not apply to averments of (1)
amount of damages,24 (2) pleadings to which responsive pleadings are not spe-
cifically required,2 5 or (3) facts which are neither "material" nor "relevant. '26
Because the terms "material" and "relevant" are necessarily defined case by
case, a cautious pleader will respond to all allegations in a preceding pleading
that require a response.
C Compulsory Counterclaims
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided two cases interpreting the
requirements for compulsory counterclaims under rule 13.27 In the first of
these cases, Curlings v. Macemore,28 the trial court dismissed plaintiff's negli-
gence suit against defendant-landlord on the grounds that the claim should
have been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in defendant's prior sum-
mary ejectment action. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision
and held that a tenant's subsequent claim based upon a landlord's negligence
was not a compulsory counterclaim to an ejectment action. Citing Twin City
Apartments, Inc. v. Landrum,29 related federal precedent,30 and the opinions
of commentators,31 the court enunciated a three-part balancing test for deter-
mining whether a claim is a compulsory counterclaim: "(1) whether the issues
of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim are largely the same; (2)
whether substantially the same evidence bears on both claims; and (3) whether
any logical relationship exists between the two claims."'32
24. This exemption is specifically enumerated in N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(d).
25. Id.
26. Conner, 56 N.C. App. at 6, 286 S.E.2d at 813.
27. N.C.R. CIv. P. 13(a). The rule states in pertinent part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
The North Carolina rule is identical to its federal counterpart. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-19 (Cum. Supp. 1981) which essentially removes alimony, divorce, custody,
and support actions from the compulsory counterclaim rule.
28. 57 N.C. App. 200, 290 S.E.2d 725 (1982).
29. 45 N.C. App. 490, 263 S.E.2d 323 (1980)(holding plaintiffs subsequent claim for sum-
mary ejectment not a compulsory counterclaim to defendant's prior action for breaches of lease
agreement, of covenants of fitness and habitability, and of duty to repair, because of the divergent
nature of actions and remedies sought).
30. Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1291 (7th Cir. 1980) ("whether a partic-
ular counterclaim should be considered compulsory depends not so much on the immediacy of its
connection with the plaintiffs claim as upon its logical relationship to that claim"); Whigham v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 599 F.2d 1322 (4th Cir. 1979) (in applying rule 13(a) to particular cases courts
have considered three factors: (1) whether the counterclaim raises significantly different issues of
fact or law; (2) whether the evidence to support the claim and the counterclaim differs; (3) whether
the claim and the counterclaim are logically related). Both Valencia and Whigham arose in a
Truth-in-Lending context.
31. 6 C. Wmiurr & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1410, at 40 (1977).
32. Curlings, 57 N.C. App. at 202, 290 S.E.2d at 726. Landrum required a logical relationship
between the factual and legal backgrounds of the claims and a logical relationship between the
nature of the actions. Curlings added a "similar evidence" requirement to the Landrum test. This
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In applying the test to the facts in Curlings, the court noted that the two
claims failed to provide an affirmative answer to any of the questions raised.
The court noted that the two claims contained many dissimilar issues of fact
and law, and that a compulsory counterclaim "should not be used to combine
actions that, despite their origin in a common factual background, have no
logical relationship to each other."33 The court's decision in Curlings suggests
a willingness to define narrowly the scope of rule 13(a) to avoid the harsh
consequences of a determination that a party's counterclaim is compulsory
rather than permissive. While this result is ostensibly accomplished through
application of a balancing test, the requirement of evidentiary congruence spe-
cifically serves to narrow the scope of compulsory counterclaims.
The second court of appeals decision involved an application of the rule
13 condition that the pleader know the facts giving rise to the compulsory
counterclaim at the time of the pleading. In Stines v. Satterwhite34 the court,
consistent with both the plain meaning of the rule and prior case law, upheld
the refusal of the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs cause for failure to assert it as
a compulsory counterclaim. In Stines the court found that, since the aggrieved
party neither knew nor could reasonably have ascertained alleged construction
defects until after the prior institution of related cases, no claim existed at the
time of the pleading. Thus, plaintiff's counterclaim could not be defined as
compulsory under rule 13(a). The holding in Stines corresponds with federal
standards for compulsory counterclaims. 35
additional requirement underscores the court's implicit emphasis upon the requirement that the
legal (as opposed to factual) backgrounds of the claims be congruent. Neither Whigham nor Curl-
ings made clear the exact nature of the test. Wright and Miller enumerate four tests: (1) Are the
issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res
udicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3)
ill substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant's
counterclaim? (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? Under
any one of these tests an affirmative answer to the question means that the counterclaim is com-
pulsory. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 42. The Curlings court adopted the three-
part test suggested in Whighana See supra note 5.
Wright and Miller's analysis suggests the three tests enuciated in Whigham and Curlings are
generally perceived as alternatives, rather than factors to be balanced. Because both Curlings and
Whigham failed to provide an affirmative answer to any of the questions posed, it is impossible to
state with certainty what the North Carolina rule 13 test is for determining whether a counter-
claim is compulsory. But the analysis and language in both cases suggests that the court has
adopted a balancing test in which an affirmative answer to any one of the questions posed will not
necessarily render the counterclaim compulsory as a matter of law. See also Note, Creditor's
Counterclaim for Underlying Debt in Default is a Compulsory Counterclaim in Truth in Lending
Action, 31 MERCER L. REV. 1071 (1980).
33. Curlings, 57 N.C. App. at 201, 290 S.E.2d at 726.
34. 58 N.C. App. 608, 294 S.E.2d 324 (1982).
35. Both cases confirm that a party asserting this defense must meet a heavy burden of proof
in order to warrant a dismissal of the nonmovant's claim. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 3, § 141, at 54.
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D. Summary Judgment36
In Lowe v. Bradford37 the North Carolina Supreme Court lent added
vigor to the requirement of rule 56(e)38 that if the moving party satisfies its
burden of proof, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations
of his pleadings"39 but must "set forth speej'cfacts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial."4 Thus, while the party opposing summary judgment
is only required to convince the court that an issue of material fact exists, 41
and not that he will win at trial, he cannot successfully counter a summary
judgment motion under rule 56(e) by relying upon conclusory allegations un-
supported by facts.42
E Rule 60(b)(1): Relief From Judgment
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) provides that "on mo-
tion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect. ' 43 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina has consistently interpreted rule 60(b)(1) as
requiring the movant to show both excusable neglect and a meritorious de-
fense before a trial judge may grant the motion.44 In Emdur Metal Products,
Inc. v. Super Dollar Stores, Inc. 45 the North Carolina Court of Appeals af-
firmed a trial judge's modification of a default judgment pursuant to a rule
60(b)(1) motion. This is the first case since the adoption of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure to modify judgment pursuant to a 60(b)(1) motion,
rather than to grant complete and total relief from a judgment.
In Emdur, upon defendant's failure to answer, the trial judge granted
36. In American Travel Corp v. Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 57 N.C. App. 437, 291
S.E.2d 892 (1982), the court of appeals held that a motion for summary judgment denied by one
superior court judge may not be allowed by another superior court judge on identical legal issues.
An order denying summary judgment is determinative as to issues presented.
Summary judgment for the party with the burden of proof was held to be properly granted in
Stanley v. Walker, 55 N.C. App. 377, 285 S.E.2d 297 (1982) (plaintiffs established prima facie case
alleging possession of validly executed note, nonpayment, and exercise of right to accelerate;
defendants failed to support allegation of payment in unverified answer and affadavit).
37. 305 N.C. 366, 289 S.E.2d 363 (1982).
38. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(e) and FED R. Cirv. P. 56(e) are identical.
39. 305 N.C. at 370, 289 S.E.2d at 366.
40. Id. at 369-70, 289 S.E.2d at 366 (emphasis in original). Twice the court underscored the
necessity for the nonmovant to meet the movant's motion with specific facts in order to satisfy the
response requirement of rule 56(e).
41. In Rathburn v. Hawkins, 56 N.C. App. 82, 84,286 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1982), the court noted
that an issue is material if the facts as alleged "would constitute a legal defense, or would affect the
result of the action, or if its resolution would prevent the party against whom it is resolved from
prevailing in the action." Id (quoting with approval Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C.
513, 518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972)).
42. 305 N.C. at 370, 289 S.E.2d at 366.
43. N.C.R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(1).
44. Stephens v. Childers, 236 N.C. 348, 72 S.E.2d 849 (1952); Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147,
63 S.E.2d 133 (1951); Dishman v. Dishman, 37 N.C. App. 543, 246 S.E.2d 819 (1978); Whaley v.
Rhodes, 10 N.C. App. 109, 111, 177 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1970).
45. 55 N.C.App. 668, 286 S.E.2d 642 (1982).
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plaintiff a default judgment for the recovery of $12,960 in a breach of contract
action. After receiving notice of the default judgment, defendant moved pur-
suant to rule 60(b)(1) to set aside the verdict. Defendant first demonstrated
excusable neglect,46 and further claimed to have a meritorious defense that
some of the goods delivered by plaintiff were defective. The trial judge ruled
that a meritorious defense existed only as to $5,507.30 of the judgment, and
modified the default judgment by reducing the award to $7,452.7M. 47 Defend-
ant appealed, claiming that the meritorious defense and the showing
ofexcusable neglect entitled him to a vacation of the entire default judgment
and a new trial.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's ruling.48 Citing Geer v.
Reams,49 the court observed, "[O]ur Supreme Court, long ago stated that
'[t]he court [is] vested with a full legal discretion over the matter. . . and [has]
the right to annul or modify the judgment.'- 50 Thus, in interpreting the cur-
rent Rules of Civil Procedure the court of appeals reaffirmed the previous rule
under G.S. 1-22051 that there is "no abuse of discretion in setting aside only
that portion of the judgment for which there was both excusable neglect and a
meritorious defense."52
If a court does not find excusable neglect on the part of a party making a
rule 60(b)(1) motion, the motion shall be denied whether or not a meritorious
defense is shown.53 Thus, establishing excusable neglect is an indispensable
requisite to a successful 60(b)(1) motion. In the recent case of Lee v. Jenkins54
the court of appeals held it was error for a trial judge to deny a party the
opportunity to show excusable neglect after making a 60(b)(1) motion. In Lee
plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in an automobile accident; de-
fendant counterclaimed for damages and asserted the last clear chance de-
fense. At trial, neither plaintiff nor his counsel were present. When the judge
was informed that plaintiffs counsel was in superior court eighty-five miles
away, the judge promply called the superior court and was advised that coun-
sel was leaving to attend the Lee case. Although plaintits counsel had not yet
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-1 was adopted in 1967, repealing, among other statutes, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 1-108, 1-220. Nevertheless, the cases interpreting former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-220
are still applicable. See, e.g., Kirby v. Asheville Contracting Co., 11 N.C. App. 128, 180 S.E.2d
407, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 602 (1971).
47. 55 N.C. App. 668, 286 S.E.2d 642. An employee of defendant corporation received the
complaint but failed to deliver it to defendant's counsel.
48. Id. at 669, 286 S.E.2d at 642-43.
49. 88 N.C. 197 (1883). In Geer the supreme court affirmed the trial judge's decision to mod-
ify a default judgment against defendant by reducing the amount of the judgment from full value
to one-fourth that originally awarded.
50. 55 N.C. App. at 670, 286 S.E.2d at 643 (quoting Geer, 88 N.C. at 199).
51. Although not cited in Emdur, further authority supports the court's conclusion. In Al-
ligood v. Shelton, 224 N.C. 754, 32 S.E.2d 350 (1944), the court stated that "it was in the power of
the trial judge in the exercise of his sound discretion to set aside the verdict of the jury, in whole or
in part." Id. at 756, 32 S.E.2d at 351.
52. 55 N.C. App. at 670, 286 S.E.2d at 643.
53. City of Durham v. Keen, 40 N.C. App. 652, 253 S.E.2d 585, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 608,
257 S.E.2d 217 (1979); Holcombe v. Bowman, 8 N.C. App. 673, 174 S.E.2d 362 (1970); Ellison v.
White, 3 N.C. App. 235, 164 S.E.2d 511 (1968).
54. 57 N.C. App. 522, 291 S.E.2d 797 (1982).
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arrived when the trial began, the judge dismissed plaintiff's claim and allowed
defendant to proceed with his counterclaim. The jury found for defendant
and awarded him $3,000. Subsequently, the son of plaintiff's counsel moved to
set aside the verdict, and the motion was denied.55
The court of appeals held that the motion made by the son of plaintiff's
counsel should have been treated as a rule 60(b)(1) motion, even though it was
not made in that form. The court also stated that the trial judge was obligated
to allow plaintiff to show excusable neglect and a meritorious defense.,56
Though no express holding was made on the matter, the court seemed to indi-
cate that the docket conflict for plaintiffs counsel was ground for excusable
neglect. The court relied upon rule 3 of the General Rules of Practice for the
Superior and District Courts, which states, "When an attorney has conflicting
engagements in different courts, priority shall be as follows: Appellate Courts,
Superior Court, District Court, Magistrate's Court."' 57
Judge Hedrick dissented, arguing that no rule 60(b)(1) motion was ever
properly made. He noted that the motion by the son of plaintiffs counsel was
one to set aside the verdict, not the judgment; furthermore, there was no show-
ing that the son had standing to make such a motion. Judge Hedrick also
noted that even though plaintiff's counsel had ample time to file a rule 60(b)(1)
motion, he instead chose to appeal immediately to the court of appeals.58 In
so doing, the appellant was required to show prejudicial error 59-a burden
Judge Hedrick felt appellant had failed to discharge.
Although the dissent correctly noted that the son of plaintiff's attorney
made the motion, and that plaintiff himself never actually fied a rule 60(b)(1)
motion, the majority was obviously and reasonably disturbed with the trial
judge's decision to proceed with the trial when he knew that plaintiffs counsel
had a conflict that took precedence. To correct this result, the majority found
the motion to be a rule 60(b)(1) motion, which required a hearing on excusa-
ble neglect.60
55. Id. at 523, 291 S.E.2d at 797-98.
56. Id. at 525,291 S.E.2d at 798. See also U.S.I.F. Wynnewood Corp. v. Soderquist, 27 N.C.
App. 611,219 S.E.2d 787 (1975); Johnson v. Sidbury, 225 N.C. 208, 34 S.E.2d 67 (1945); Carolina
Electric Serv. Inc. v. Granger, 16 N.C. App. 427, 192 S.E.2d 19 (1972).
57. 57 N.C. App. at 524, 291 S.E.2d at 799. Rule 3 of the General Rules of Practice for the
Superior and District Courts was adopted pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-34 (1981). The Lee
case was first brought in the district court.
58. 57 N.C. App. at 526-27, 291 S.E.2d at 799-800 (Hedrick, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 526, 291 S.E.2d at 799. See also London v. London, 271 N.C: 568, 570, 157 S.E.2d
90, 92 (1967).
60. North Carolina courts have recognized that a rule 60(b)(1) motion need not be specified
as such. In Taylor v. Triangle Porsche-Audi, Inc., 27 N.C. App. 711, 220 S.E.2d 806 (1975), cerl.
denied, 289 N.C. 619, 223 S.E.2d 396 (1976), the court of appeals stated, "[A]Ithough Rule 60 says
the court is to act 'on motion' it does not deprive the court of the power to act in the interest ofjustice in an unusual case where its attention has been directed to the neccessity for relief by
means other than a motion." Id. at 717,220 S.E.2d at 811. The trial judge was made aware of the
conflict of plaintiff's attorney in Lee, and therefore had the discretionary power to vacate thejudgment. Because the trial judge did not do so, the court of appeals characterized the motion
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F Rule 59: New Trials; Amendment of Judgments
In 1982 the North Carolina Supreme Court decided two cases dealing
with motions for a new trial made pursuant to rule 59 of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure.6 1 In Housing, Inc. v. Weaver 62 the court articulated
a new rule establishing the proper time for a trial judge to grant a rule 59
motion. In Worthington v. Bynum 63 the court refused to adopt the federal stan-
dard for determining whether a trial judge abused his discretion in granting or
denying a rule 59 motion.
The plaintiff in Housing brought suit seeking to have a note declared void
because of economic duress; defendant counterclaimed for the value of the
note and other damages. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge submitted
five issues to the jury. The fifth issue concerned the amount of damages to
which defendant would be entitled if the jury found in his favor. On that issue
the trial judge instructed the jury that the evidence tended to show that de-
fendant was entitled to damages in the amount of $149,167, but that the jury
could use any other figure they deemed appropriate based upon their assess-
ment of the evidence. The jury found for the defendant but awarded no dam-
ages, and the trial court entered judgment on December 13, 1979 in
accordance with the jury's findings.64
Seven days after judgment was entered, defendant filed alternative mo-
tions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,65 amendment of the judgment,
or a new trial.66 Plaintiff fied similar motions on the same day, December 20,
1979. Under current statutory provisions, such motions must be made not
made by the son of plaintiffs counsel as a rule 60(b)(1) motion, thus requiring the trial judge to
hold a hearing on the issues of excusable neglect and meritorious defense.
Although the dissent questioned whether the son's motion was proper, the trial judge treated
the son's statements as a motion, as shown by the following transcript from the trial:
MR. JONES [son of plaintiffs counsel]: Your Honor, may I be heard?
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Jones.
MR. JONES: I give notice of appeal, your Honor, rd also like to make a motion at this
time.
THE COURT: All right, sir. Irll be delighted to hear from you.
MR. JONES: I'd like to make a motion to set aside the verdict based on excuse (unintel-
ligible) from the fact that my father was tied up in criminal Superior Court this morning
and that he tried to get over here and that he got hung up over there.
THE COURT: Motion is denied. Anything else, Sir?
57 N.C. App. at 523, 291 S.E.2d at 798. Since the trial judge treated Mr. Jones' statements as a
motion, the majority seems to be well justified in characterizing the statements as a rule 60(b)(1)
motion: motions need not be made in writing if made orally during the session in which the trial
is calandered. Sims v. Oakwood Trailer Sales Corp., 18 N.C. App. 726, 198 S.E.2d 73, cert. de-
nied, 283 N.C. 754, 198 S.E.2d 723 (1973); N.C.R. Civ. P. Rule 7. Arguably, the recognized oral
motion could be construed as a rule 60(b)(1) motion, although it was not specified as such. See
Taylor v. Triangle Porsche-Audi Inc., 289 N.C. 619, 223 S.E.2d 396 (1976).
61. N.C.R. Civ. P. Rule 59.
62. 305 N.C. 428, 290 S.E.2d 642 (1982).
63. 305 N.C. 428, 290 S.E.2d 599 (1982).
64. 305 N.C. at 429-38, 290 S.E.2d at 643-48.
65. Id. at 438, 290 S.E.2d at 648. The motion was made pursuant to N.C.R. CIv. P. Rule 50.
66. 305 N.C. at 438, 290 S.E.2d at 648. The motion was made pursuant to N.C.R. CIv. P.
59(b), (e).
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later than ten days after entry of judgment.67 Thus, all motions in this action
were timely. On June 19, 1980 the trial judge entered final judgment, denying
plaintiffs motions, vacating the award made by the jury and amending the
judgment for defendant in the amount of $215,866.68 Although the record did
not state when the trial judge adjourned the session in which the case was
heard, the supreme court determined that the trial judge adjourned the term
before December 17, 1979.69 Thus, the supreme court faced the issue of the
propriety of a trial judge's modification ofjudgment subsequent to the expira-
tion of the term.
A unanimous court held that it was proper for the trial judge to grant the
rule 59 motion and amend the judgment subsequent to adjourning the term in
which the judgment was initially entered.70 Prior to the adoption of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 the accepted rule was that "once a trial
judge has adjourned court and left the bench for the term, he cannot modify a
judgment entered during that term." 72 With the adoption of rules 50(b) and
59(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the legislature specified
a ten day limit upon motions made pursuant to those rules. The court in
Housing, noted that "[n]o time is specified for judicial action upon such a
motion."73 The court reasoned that if the old rule prohibiting the amendment
of judgments after adjournment of the term were followed, the time limits set
in rules 50(b) and 59(e) would be senseless for the following reason: a timely
motion could be made after adjournment of the term, but the judge would not
be able to act upon that motion. The court refused to adopt a rule that would
render the trial judge powerless to act upon such a motion.74 Instead, the court
held that a timely rule 50(b) or 59(e) motion allows the trial judge to act upon
that motion even if the term has been adjourned.75
Once a timely motion for a new trial is made, the trial court may grant or
67. See N.C.R. Civ. P. Rules 50(b)(1), 59(b) & (e).
68. 305 N.C. at 438, 290 S.E.2d at 648.
69. Id.
70. Id at 441, 290 S.E.2d at 650.
71. The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I, were adopted in
1967.
72. 305 N.C. at 439, 290 S.E.2d at 649. See, e.g., Shaver v. Shaver, 248 N.C. 113, 102 S.E.2d
791 (1958).
73. 305 N.C. at 440, 290 S.E.2d at 649.
74. The court cited W. SHUFORD, supra note 10 § 59-18 (2d ed. 1981) as support for this
proposition.
75. Although not specifically stated, it appears that this rule applies in either of these fact
situations: (1) the timely motion was made prior to the court adjourning for the term; or (2) the
timely motion was made after the court adjourned for the term. The Housing fact situation fits
only catagory (2) above. Nevertheless, given the court's reasoning that a 10 day limitation upon
judicial action is not applicable, motions made in a category (1) situation would also allow a trial
judge to act after adjournment of the term.
In Hennessee v. Cogburn, 39 N.C. App. 627, 251 S.E.2d 623, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 300, 254
S.E.2d 919 (1979), a case not cited by the court in Housing, a timely rule 59(a)(7) motion for a new
trial was made and granted by the trial judge in a subsequent term. The court of appeals held that
the trial judge "did not lose his power [to set aside the verdict] when the term of court ended." Id.
at 629, 251 S.E.2d at 624. The Hennessee case does not indicate whether the timely motion was
made during the initial term of the court (category (1) above), or after the initial term had ad-
journed (category (2) above). The relation between the timing of the motion and the adjournment
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deny the motion within its sound discretion.76 Upon appeal of the discretion-
ary ruling, the court is strictly limited to a determination from the record
whether the judge abused his discretion.77 The question of what constitutes an
abuse of discretion by a trial judge in granting a rule 59 motion for a new trial
was faced by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Worthington v. Bynum. 78
Defendant admitted negligence in an auto accident in which plaintiffs were
injured. The sole issue for the jury in a consolidated trial was damages. Plain-
tiffs sought damages in the amount of $250,000 and $200,000, respectively, but
the jury returned verdicts of $175,000 and $150,000. Defendant made a timely
rule 59 motion for a new trial; the trial judge held a hearing and granted de-
fendant's motion. The order for a new trial made it clear that the trial judge
had granted the motion in his discretion. 79
Applying the federal rule for determining whether an abuse of discretion
had occurred, the court of appeals reversed.80 That federal test permits a find-
ing of abuse of discretion when the trial judge grants a motion for a new trial
but the jury verdict for damages is within the maximum limits of a reasonable
range.8l
In reversing the court of appeals, the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
jected the "maximum limits of a reasonable range" test:
[Tihe overwhelming precedent of this Court discloses no compelling
reason for the implementation of such a rule in North Carolina.
of the term apparently was immaterial so long as the motion was made within the prescribed
limitations of rule 59.
76. See Coletrane v. Lamb, 42 N.C. App. 654, 257 S.E.2d 445 (1979); Currence v. Hardin, 36
N.C. App. 130, 243 S.E.2d 172, aj7'd, 296 N.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 387 (1978); City of Winston-Salem
v. Rice, 16 N.C. App. 294, 192 S.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 425, 192 S.E.2d 835 (1972); Man-
gum v. Surles, 12 N.C. App. 547, 183 S.E.2d 839 (1971), rev'don other grounds, 281 N.C. 91, 187
S.E.2d 697 (1972); Glen Forest Corp. v. Bensch, 9 N.C. App. 587, 176 S.E.2d 851 (1970).
77. Goldston v. Chambers, 272 N.C. 53, 59, 157 S.E.2d 676, 680 (1967).
78. 305 N.C. 478, 290 S.E.2d 599 (1982).
79. Id. at 480-81, 290 S.E.2d at 601.
80. Worthington v. Bynum, 53 N.C. App. 409, 281 S.E.2d 166 (1981), rev'd, 305 N.C. 478,
290 S.E.2d 599 (1982).
81. Id. at 414, 281 S.E.2d at 171. The court of appeals relied upon Howard v. Mercer, 36
N.C. App. 67, 243 S.E.2d 168, cert. granted, 295 N.C. 466, 246 S.E.2d 9 (1978) (petition later
withdrawn on defendant's motion). In Howard the court adopted the same "maximum limits of a
reasonable range" test in overturning a trial judge's grant of a motion to set aside the verdict. The
court of appeals in Howard, as in Worthington, adopted this rule as one recognized by the federal
courts in dealing with similar appellate review of rule 59 motions, as announced in Taylor v.
Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969). The use of
federal precedent as a guide for North Carolina courts in determining the scope of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure has been accepted, since the North Carolina Rules are based on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 182 S.E.2d 345 (1971);
Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 40, 187 S.E.2d 420 (1972).
After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the court of appeals in Worthington stated:
[Tihe amount of medical expenses, the severity and diversity of the injuries, the perma-
nent disabilities, and the extensive evidence of pain and suffering of each plaintiff impel
us to conclude that the verdicts were clearly within the maximum limit of a reasonable
range. The fact that the jury considered its verdict for approximately thirty minutes
simply shows the degree of unanimity as to the verdicts and adds emphasis to the fact
that the jury unanimously believed that both Worthington and Cogdell [plaintiffs] had
sustained substantial damages.
Worthington, 53 N.C. App. at 418, 281 S.E.2d at 173.
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Moreover, we are not persuaded that the appellate use of a vague test
to measure the "reasonable range" of a given verdict's amount would
provide a more effective, consistent or precise method of determining
whether a trial judge has exceeded the bounds of discretion in the
grant or denial of a new trial.82
In rejecting the federal test the court explicitly overruled Howard v. Mercer83
on the same point.84
The court then reaffirmed its adherence to the abuse of discretion stan-
dard of review of a trial court's rulings on rule 59 motions. Proceeding with
that analysis, the court noted that "a trial judge's discretionary order pursuant
to G.S. lA-I, rule 59 for or against a new trial upon any ground may be re-
versed on appeal only in those exceptional cases where an abuse of discretion
is clearly shown."85 The court found that the trial judge did not overstep his
bounds in determining that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury's award and in finding that the jury disregarded many of the judge's in-
structions.86 The court held that there was not a clear showing of abuse of
discretion, and therefore reinstated the order for a new trial. Finally, the court
reminded appellate courts not to "disturb a discretionary Rule 59 order unless
it is reasonably convinced by the cold record that the trial judge's ruling prob-
ably amounted to a substantial miscarriage of justice."87
G. Rule 68: Offer of Judgment
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 68 provides for a procedural de-
vice by which defendants may compel plaintiffs to give serious consideration
to defendants' settlement offers.88 If the offeree does not accept the offer
within ten days, he must bear his costs accrued from the time the offer was
made if the judgment ultimately obtained is less than the offer.89
In Purdy v. Brown90 defendant tendered to plaintiff in a personal injury
action an offer of judgment of $5,001, "together with the costs, except any at-
torneys'fees, accrued at the time the offer [was] filed." 91 Plaintiff did not re-
spond to the offer, the action proceeded to trial, and a judgment was returned
for plaintiff in the amount of $3,500. Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees pursu-
82. 305 N.C. at 485, 290 S.E.2d at 604 (citations omitted).
83. 36 N.C. App. 67, 243 S.E.2d 168 (1978).
84. 305 N.C. at 485, 290 S.E.2d at 604.
85. Id. at 484, 290 S.E.2d at 603. See Scott v. Trogden, 268 N.C. 574, 151 S.E.2d 18 (1966);
Sherrill v. Boyce, 265 N.C. 560, 144 S.E.2d 596 (1965); Walston v. Greene, 246 N.C. 617, 99 S.E.2d
805 (1957); Frye & Sons, Inc. v. Francis, 242 N.C. 107, 86 S.E.2d 790 (1955).
86. 305 N.C. at 485-87, 290 S.E.2d at 604-05.
87. Id. at 487, 290 S.E.2d at 605.
88. N.C.R. Crv. P. 68(a) provides in part, "At any time more than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allowjudgment to be taken against him for the money or property or the effect specified in his offer, with
costs then accrued."
89. Id.
90. 56 N.C. App. 793, 290 S.E.2d 397 (1982).
91. Id. at 793, 290 S.E.2d at 397-98.
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ant to G.S. 6-21.192 and was awarded $1,200. In appealing the award, defend-
ant contended that once a rule 68 offer ofjudgment is made and subsequently
rejected, the offeree must bear the costs accrued-including attorney's fees-
from the time the offer of judgment was made.
The court of appeals held that an offer of judgment is defective and inva-
lid under rule 68 if the offer excludes attorney's fees from the tender of costs
then accrued.93 Thus, when a judgment obtained is less than $5,000 the court
in its discretion, pursuant to G.S. 6-21.1, may award attorney's fees. If defend-
ant's offer of judgment had been valid, plaintiff would not have been entitled
to any costs incurred after the offer was made, despite G.S. 6-21.1. 94 Noting
that there was no authority in North Carolina dispositive of the issue whether
attorney's fees could be excluded from an offer of judgment,95 the court
looked to federal precedent.96 The court cited Scherff v. Beck 97 as holding
that a rule 68 offer of judgment is fatally defective when it excludes attorney's
fees then accrued.98 Thus, it is clear from the court of appeals' holding in
Purdy that a plaintiff need not fear bearing costs accrued after refusing an
offer of judgment if the offer excludes attorney's fees as part of the costs
accrued.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.1 (1981) provides:
In any personal injury or property damage suit, or suit against an insurance com-
pany under a policy issued by the defendant insurance company and in which the in-
sured or beneficiary is the plaintif, upon a finding by the court that there was an
unwarranted refusal by the defendant insurance company to pay the claim which consti-
tutes the basis of such suit, instituted in a court of record, when the judgment for recov-
ery is five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less, the presiding judge may, in his discretion,
allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the litigant
obtaining a judgment for damages in said suit, said attorney's fee to be taxed as a part of
the court costs.
93. 56 N.C. App. at 795, 290 S.E.2d at 398.
94. Id. at 796, 290 S.E.2d at 398.
95. The court did not discuss Yates Motor Co. v. Simmons, 51 N.C. App. 339, 276 S.E.2d 496
(1981), which seems to support the finding in Purdy. In Yates, another personal injury action,
plaintiff accepted defendant's rule 68 offer of judgment and asked the court "for the allowance of
a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as part of the cost of the action." Defendant opposed
plaintiff's motion; the court, however, awarded plaintiff the sum of $624 for attorneys' fees. De-
fendant appealed, claiming that rule 68(a) does not authorize the inclusion of attorneys' fees as
part of the "costs then accrued." The court of appeals disagreed, holding that a "trial court
clearly has the authority to award plaintiffs attorney's fees accrued at the time the offer of judg-
ment was made as part of the costs accrued."
96. See supra note 81.
97. 452 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo. 1978).
98. The court in Scherffstated, "Rule 68 does not permit an offeror to choose which accrued
costs he is willing to pay." 452 F. Supp. at 1260. The court of appeals in Purdy cited only Scheri"
as precedent. In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981), Justice Powell noted:
A Rule 68 offer ofjudgment is a proposal of settlement that, by definition, stipulates that
the plaintiff shall be treated as the prevailing party. It follows, therefore, that the "costs"
component of a Rule 68 offer of judgment. . . must include reasonable attorney's fees
accrued to the date of the offer.
Id. at 363 (Powell, J., concurring in result). See also Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852 1976) (rule 68(a) requires attorney to file a bill of cost to determine
portion of attorneys' fees accrued at time of offer to be allowed as costs). But see Cruz v. Pacific
Am. Ins. Corp., 337 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1964) (attorneys' fees discretionary with trial court, there-
fore, could not be considered accrued at the time offer of judgment is made).
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H Interlocutory Appeals
In Love v. Moore99 the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified when a
party has the right of an immediate appeal from adverse rulings concerning
personal jurisdiction.100 The facts of Love are complex, arising from an auto
accident that occurred in 1970.101 In 1975, plaintiff obtained a judgment
against defendant (who did not attend the trial after being served process
through publication) and attempted to enforce the judgment against defend-
ant's insurance company, Nationwide Mutual. The court of appeals later held
the judgment unenforceable against Nationwide because the judgment was, in
effect, a default judgment. 10 2
In 1980 plaintiff successfully moved to vacate the 1975 judgment and gave
notice to Nationwide to enable the insurance company to file a defense on
behalf of its insured. 10 3 Nationwide fied and was granted a motion to inter-
vene. Nationwide then filed motions "to strike the order vacating the default
judgment and to dismiss the action for lack ofjurisdiction because of improper
service on its insured."1 4 After the trial judge denied these motions, and the
court of appeals affirmed,10 5 Nationwide appealed to the North Carolina
Supreme Court.
Finding that neither of Nationwide's motions were appealable prior to
final judgment, the supreme court vacated the court of appeals decision and
remanded the case. The court reaffirmed its previous holdings that interlocu-
tory rulings are "immediately appealable only when they affect a substantial
right of the appellant and will work an injury to him if not corrected before an
appeal from a final judgment." 1" 6 The court reasoned that because an order
vacating a default judgment is interlocutory and not immediately appeala-
ble, 10 7 an appeal from an order denying the motion to strike the order setting
aside a default judgment is equally premature.108
Nationwide's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because
of improper service was also held to be not immediately appealable. The
court recognized that rulings on motions to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction would appear to be immediately appealable under G.S. 1-277(b).' 0 9
99. 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982).
100. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
101. For a full discription of the facts in Love, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1981--Civil Procedure, 60 N.C.L. REV. 1214, 1230-32 (1982).
102. Love v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 45 N.C. App. 444, 263 S.E.2d 337, cerl. denied, 300
N.C. 198, 269 S.E.2d 617 (1980).
103. 305 N.C. at 577, 291 S.E.2d at 144.
104. Id.
105. Love v. Moore, 54 N.C. App. 406, 283 S.E.2d 801 (1981).
106. 305 N.C. at 578, 291 S.E.2d at 144. See Veazy v. Durham, 231 N.C. 354, 57 S.E.2d 375
(1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
107. See Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 270 S.E.2d 431 (1980) (order vacating default judg-
ment does not work substantial injury to applicant and therefore is not appealable).
108. 305 N.C. at 578, 291 S.E.2d at 145.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981) provides, in part, "Any interested
party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person or property of the defendant .... "
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The court noted, however, that the real nature of Nationwide's motion was for
dismissal based upon the insufficiency of service of process (rule 12(b)(5)),110
and insufficiency of process (rule 12(b)(4)),"' rather than dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction as contemplated by rule 12(b)(2) of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure.112
In determining when a party may resort to G.S. 1-277(b) for an immedi-
ate appeal of an interlocutory order, the court distinguished between motions
for dismissal based upon a rule 12(b)(2) motion and the same motion based
upon rules 12(b)(4) and (5). 113 The court declared that under G.S. 1-277(b),
immediate appeals from interlocutory decisions are limited to those concern-
ing rule 12(b)(2). Other orders by the trial court based upon other rule 12(b)
motions are issues concerning technical defects that can be fully considered on
appeal from a final judgment, and such orders are therefore not immediately
appealable. This rule, the court reasoned, provides judicial economy "while
ensuring that parties who have less than 'minimum contacts' with this state
will never be forced to trial against their wishes."' 14
110. N.C.R. Cry. P. 12(b) states, in part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive plead-
ing thereto, if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion:
(1) Lack ofjurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) Lack of jurisdiction over the person,
(3) Improper venue or division,
(4) Insufficiency of process,
(5) Insufficiency of service of process,
(6) Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
(7) Failure to join a necessary party.
111. Id. When plaintiff attempted to personally serve Moore and was unable to do so, plain-
tiff resorted to service through notice by publication. Plaintiff used the name Frank William
Moore in the publication, since that was the name on the accident report; defendant's name, how-
ever, was actually Frank Willard Moore. Nationwide contended that this service on defendant
was improper and justified dismissal. 305 N.C. at 576-79, 291 S.E.2d at 143-45.
112. See supra note 110.
113. The court stated.
G.S. 1-277(b) applies to the state's authority to bring a defendant before its courts, not to
technical questions concerned only with whether that authority was properly invoked
from a procedural standpoint. This is not a mere technical distinction; it has far-reach-
ing substantive effect. If the court has no personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it has
no right to require the defendant to come into court. A trial court determination con-
cerning such an important fundamental question is made immediately appealable by
G.S 1-277(b). However, if the court has the jurisdictional power to require that the party
defend and the challange is merely to the process or service used to bring the party
before the court, G.S. 1-277(b) does not apply.
305 N.C. at 580, 291 S.E.2d at 145.
114. 305 N.C. at 581, 291 S.E.2d at 146. The court in its holding in Love reversed any prior
decisions construing G.S. 1-277(b) as applying to adverse rulings on service and process. The
court specifically cited the following cases as overruled on this point: Kahan v. Longiotti, 45 N.C.
App. 367, 263 S.E.2d 345, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 675 (1980); Smith v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 38 N.C. App. 457, 248 S.E.2d 462, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 586,
254 S.E.2d 33 (1978); Van Buren v. Glasco, 27 N.C. App. 1, 217 S.E.2d 579 (1975).
The court specifically stated that adverse rulings on rule 12(b)(2) motions are immediately
appealable under G.S. § 1-277(b), while adverse rulings on rule 12(b)(4) and (5) motions are not.
The court did not make specific declarations about the other rule 12(b) motions. See supra note
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When an order determines less than all the claims for relief in an action, a
party has two avenues of appeal. First, he may appeal if, pursuant to rule
54(b),115 the trial judge certifies the appeal by entering a final judgment on
fewer than all the claims. Second, he may appeal if the interlocutory order1 16
"affects a substantial right" claimed in any action or proceeding.117 In Green
v. Duke Power Co. 118 the supreme court reviewed the lower courts' application
of the substantial rights test in a liability-contribution context. The trial court
had granted third-party defendants' motion for summary judgment on the is-
sue of liability, while reserving the issue of contribution for a second trial.
Defendant 19 appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. 120 The supreme
court aflfirmed orders of both lower courts and held that since the order did not
impinge upon a "substantial right,"' 2 ' the trial court's reservation of the con-
tribution issue until a second trial was not, by itself, immediately appealable
under the interlocutory appeal provisions of G.S. 1-277(a) 122 and G.S. 7A-
27(d).123
110. Nevertheless, the court's distinction that technicalities are not to be immediately appealable
seems to imply that adverse rulings on rule 12(b)(3) through (7) motions would not be immedi-
ately appealable.
115. N.C.R. Crv. P. 54(b) states that the trial judge; "[M]ay enter a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only if there is no just reason for delay and it is so
determined in the judgment. Such judgment shall then be subject to review by appeal or as other-
wise provided by these rules or other statutes."
116. "An order is interlocutory if it does not determine the issues but directs some further
proceeding preliminary to final decree.' Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 207,
240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978). The precise line between an interlocutory and final order is not clear.
See, e.g., Poore v. Swan Quarter Farms, Inc. 57 N.C. App. 97, 100-01, 290 S.E.2d 799, 801-02
(1982) judgment that specifically retained cause for "such further orders as may be necessary to
the proper determination of the rights of the parties" is final judgment and not merely interlocu-
tory); see generally Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981-Civil Procedure, 60
N.C.L. REv. 1214, 1222 (1982) (discussing substantial rights doctrine in North Carolina).
117. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981), 7A-27(d) (1981). The term "sub-
stantial right" has never been precisely defined. See infra note 121. For a general discussion of
the substantial right doctrine in North Carolina, see Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in North
Carolina: The Substantial Right Doctrine, 18 WAKE FORFST L. REV. 857 (1982).
118. 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982).
119. Duke Power is here referred to as defendant, but may more properly be thought of as
defendant and third party plaintiff appellant.
120. Green v. Duke Power Co., 50 N.C. App. 646, 274 S.E.2d 889 (1981).
121. 305 N.C. at 606, 290 S.E.2d at 595. The court in Green, after noting that the term "sub-
stantial right" must be evaluated on a case by case basis, adopted a general principle suggested by
one writer. See id (quoting with approval Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1978--
CivilProcedure, 57 N.C.L. REv. 891, 907-08 (1979)).
122. N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-277(a)(Cum. Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent part, "An appeal
may be taken from every judicial order or determination of a judge of a superior court or district
court, upon or involving a matter of law or legal inference, whether made in or out of session,
which affects a substantial right claimed in any action or proceeding ....
123. N.C. Gat. STAT. § 7A-27(d) provides that an appeal may be taken:
From any interlocutory order or judgment or a superior court or district court in a
civil action or proceeding which
(1) Affects a substantial right, or
(2) In effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal
might be taken, or
(3) Discontinues the action, or
(4) Grants or refuses a new trial, appeal lies of right directly to the Court of
Appeals.
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In Green plaintiff brought suit against defendant to recover for injuries
received when she came in contact with an electrical transformer owned and
operated by defendant. 124 Duke Power impleaded the landowner and lessee as
third-party defendants, and sought contribution from each as joint
tortfeasors. 125 Both third party defendants moved for, and were granted, sum-
mary judgment. 126 Duke Power then appealed, contending that the granting
of the motions for summary judgment affected its substantial right to have its
claim for contribution from both third-party defendants determined in the
same proceeding in which Duke Power's liability to plaintiff was to be
determined.1 27
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals decision 28 upholding
the trial court, and dismissed the appeal. The court held that no substantial
right would be lost by Duke Power's inability to take an immediate appeal
from summary judgment against it. 129 The court explained that Duke Power
would have no right to appeal if it later won, 130 and its exception to the entry
of summary judgment would fully and adequately preserve its right to seek
contribution thereafter if it lost.' 3 1 While eschewing a statement of a general
rule, the court quoted with approval a principle suggested by one writer that
"the right to avoid one trial on the disputed issues is not normally a substantial
right that would allow an interlocutory appeal while the right to avoid the
possibility of two trials on the same issues can be such a substantial right."132
The court found that the contribution issue of thepotential second trial did not
involve the same questions as did the issues of liability at the first trial.133
Thus, there was no possibility that a party would be prejudiced in successive
trials by different juries' rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same factual
issue. 134
124. The court held that when the character of an easement is such that failure to keep it in
repair will result in injury either to the servient estate or to third persons, the owner of the ease-
ment will be liable in damages for the injury so caused. Thus, it is the control and not the owner-
ship that determines the liability. 305 N.C. at 611-12, 290 S.E.2d at 598 (quoting with approval
Levy v. Kimball, 50 Hawaii 497, 499, 443 P.2d 142, 144 (1968)).
125. 305 N.C. at 604-05, 290 S.E.2d at 594. Duke Power based its third-party complaint upon
the alleged failure of either defendant to secure or lock the transformer before the accident. Id. at
605, 290 S.E.2d at 594.
126. Id. at 605, 290 S.E.2d at 594.
127. Id. at 606, 290 S.E.2d at 595; see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law-Civil
Procedure, 60 N.C. L. REV. 1214, 1224-25 (1982) (comparing Oestreicher v. Am. Nat'l Stores, Inc.,
290 N.C. 118,225 S.E.2d 797 (1976) and Green v. Duke Power Co., 50 N.C. App. 646, 274 S.E.2d
889 (1981) when that case was before the court of appeals).
128. 50 N.C. App. 646, 274 S.E.2d 889. For a critique of this decision, see Survey of Develop-
ments in North Carolina Law-Civil Procedure, 60 N.C. L. REv. 1214, 1224-25 (1982).
129. 305 N.C. at 607, 290 S.E.2d at 596.
130. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-271 (1969) (only an aggrieved party may appeal); see also
Carawan v. Tate, 304 N.C. 696, 286 S.E.2d 99 (1982).
131. 305 N.C. at 607, 290 S.E.2d at 596.
132. Id (quoting with approval Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1978---Civil
Procedure, 57 N.C.L. REv. 891, 907-08).
133. 305 N.C. at 608, 290 S.E.2d at 596. The trial on the contribution issue would never take
place if Duke Power were not found liable in the initial trial.
134. Id. The court noted that its holding would be different if the third party defendants had
never been brought into the action or if, upon being impleaded, they had asserted as a defense to
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The significance of Green seems to lie in the court's apparent willingness
to allow the severance of different legal claims arising out of the same factual
background. The flurry of cases in this area in the past two years suggests a
movement by the court to subordinate judicial efficiency and the right to avoid
multiple litigation to a practical consideration of keeping parties and issues
simple for the jury, unless the factual and legal considerations are inseparably
intertwined.135
I Res Judicata
In Underwriters National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident
& Health Insurance Guaranty Association 136 the United States Supreme Court
held that North Carolina courts violated the full faith and credit clause by
refusing to accept as binding an Indiana court's adjudication of rights to a
deposit posted by Underwriters in North Carolina. Because of its uncertain
financial condition, the petitioner Underwriters, an Indiana corporation, had
been required by the North Carolina Department of Insurance to deposit
$100,000 for the benefit of potential North Carolina claimants. After further
financial difficulties, the Indiana Department of Insurance began rehabilita-
tion proceedings. 137 Because a judgment in the rehabilitation proceedings
would extinguish all prerehabilitation claims not included in the rehabilitation
plan, the respondent, the North Carolina association, was required to inter-
vene in the proceedings to preserve its interest. Upon Underwriters' attempt to
continue to do business in North Carolina, the association sought a declara-
tory judgment in the Wake County Superior Court that the previously re-
quired deposit could be used to satisfy prerehabilitation claims. Underwriters
contended that the Indiana judgment incorporating the rehabilitation plan
was res judicata as to any such claims.
The North Carolina trial court ruled that only a state court of North Car-
olina had "the 'requisite subject matter jurisdiction to determine the rights of
North Carolina policyholders in the special deposits made by [Underwriters]
for their protection.' "138 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, 139
Duke Power's third-party complaint that Duke Power was not liable in negligence to plaintiff
Green. Under either of these circumstances, third-party defendants might be free at a subsequent
trial to deny Duke Power's liability to plaintif, leaving the jury free in the contribution trial to
find that the company was not liable to plaintiff despite a contrary finding by a different jury in
the principle case. Since neither party asserted that Duke Power was not liable to plaintiff for
negligence, such a result could not occur in the instant case.
135. For a contrary view, see Comment, supra note 117.
136. 455 U.S. 691 (1982).
137. An Indiana rehabilitation proceeding is an insolvency action brought in the Indiana Re-
habilitation Court, which is a court of general jurisdiction. The purpose of the proceeding is to
marshal the assets of a company that is insolvent or in imminent danger of becoming insolvent
and develop a plan of rehabilitation to restore the company's financial health. In Underwriters the
plan of rehabilitation was characterized as a compromise and settlement of all claims against
Underwriters. Upon final approval of the plan by the Rehabilitation Court, all claims against
Underwriters were compromised, settled, and dismissed. See id at 695 n.l, 699, 702; IND. CODE
27-1, -2 (1975) (rehabilitation of domestic insurance companies) (repealed 1979).
138. Underwriters, 455 U.S. at 703.
139. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guaranty Ass'n v. Underwriters NatiAssur-
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and the North Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionary review.' 40
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the North Carolina courts
were bound by the Indiana judgment extinguishing all prerehabilitation
claims. The Court rejected the association's argument that the Indiana court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the North Carolina courts had ex-
clusive subject matter jurisdiction. The Court stated that although the North
Carolina trial court may have been correct in ruling that it had exclusive juris-
diction as a matter of North Carolina law, the issue of jurisdiction may be res
judicata when it is fully and fairly litigated in a prior action in another
state. 14 1 In such a case, the full faith and credit clause requires North Caro-
lina to abide by the foreign judgment.142
The Court further stated that the Indiana court's lack of in personam ju-
risdiction over North Carolina officials and policyholders was irrelevant be-
cause the issue of personal jurisdiction had not been presented for direct
review on an appeal of the Indiana judgment. 14 3
Although the Court's opinion gave short shrift to the niceties of insurance
law,144 its reasoning is sound.' 45 If the Indiana court made errors of law, the
association as a party, and any prerehabilitation claimant by a class represen-
tative, had opportunities to appeal the decision. As the Court stated, to colat-
eraly attack the judgment in another forum put the North Carolina court in
the position of rendering a contrary decision, which was "precisely the situa-
tion the Full Faith and Credit Clause was designed to prevent."'
146
ance Co., 48 N.C. App. 508, 269 S.E.2d 688 (1980). The North Carolina Court of Appeals ex-
plained that because the deposit was located in North Carolina and held in trust by the
Commissioner of Insurance and the Treasurer, over whom the Indiana court lacked personal ju-
risdiction, the only court that could hear the action was a North Carolina court.
140. 301 N.C. 527, 273 S.E.2d 453 (1980).
141. 455 U.S. at 705 & n.11, 706 (citing Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963)). The Court
held that the jurisdiction issue had been fully and fairly litigated in the Indiana proceedings. Id
at 707.
142. "This Court has consistently recognized that, in order to fulfill this constitutional man-
date, the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect in every other
court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced." 455 U.S. at 704
(citations omitted).
143. The Indiana court had concluded that it had jurisdiction over the North Carolina deposit
as an asset of the company. The Court noted: "This conclusion may very well have been errone-
ous as a matter of North Carolina law. Erroneous or not, however, this jurisdictional issue was
fully and fairly litigated and finally determined by the Rehabilitation Court." 455 U.S. at 714
(citations omitted).
144. The Court conceded that the determination by the Indiana court that the funds were an
asset of the company includable in the rehabilitation plan may have been erroneous as a matter of
North Carolina insurance law. See 455 U.S. at 714 (citing North Carolina ex rel Ingram v. Re-
serve Ins. Co., 303 N.C. 623, 629, 281 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1981)). Nevertheless, the Court declined to
review the determination, stating "[Tihe Rehabilitation Court's conclusion that it had jurisdiction
to compromise the claims of the parties before it to the North Carolina deposit is not presented to
this Court on direct review, and we express no opinion on the propriety of this conclusion." 455
U.S. at 714.
145. The Court repeatedly alluded to the fact that the Indiana court had made a jurisdictional
inquiry and thus concluded that "the only forums in which [the association] may challenge the
Rehabilitation Court's assertion ofjurisdiction... are in Indiana." 455 U.S. at 715. That deci-
sion may be based in part on the Court's belief that the association still has an avenue of review
open in the Indiana forum. Id at 715 n.24.
146. 455 U.S. at 715.
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J Personal Jurisdiction
In Kaplan School Supply v. Henry Wurst Inc. 147 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals again considered the minimum contacts requirement of "long arm"
jurisdiction. Plaintiff, a North Carolina corporation, contracted with Henry
Wurst, Inc., a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business in Mis-
souri, and with Henry Wurst, Inc.-Raleigh, a North Carolina corporation
with its principal place of business in North Carolina, to print, bind, and mail
catalogs of plaintiffs wares. Plaintiff filed an action in North Carolina against
the Wurst corporations, seeking damages in tort and for breach of contract
arising out of the defective manufacture of the catalogs. Defendants in turn
filed a third party complaint against Precision Services & Supply, Inc., an
Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in Iowa, which had sub-
contracted with the Missouri arm of Henry Wurst, Inc. to do the actual print-
ing, binding, and mailing. Precision Services moved to dismiss the third party
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion,
finding that there were sufficient minimum contacts to warrant the exercise of
jurisdiction over Precision Services.' 48
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found the trial court's refusal to
dismiss the third party defendant erroneous.'4 9 The court reiterated that the
standard for exercising jurisdiction under G.S. 1-75.4, the North Carolina
"long arm" statute, is one of due process. "Due process requires that a nonres-
ident defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that
the maintenance of the suit [in the forum state] does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and subs' antial justice.' "150
The court noted that the Iowa corporation had no contact with North
Carolina other than shipping catalogs into the state. Also, it had not done
business in the state nor did it have an agent in the state. Its sole knowledge of
the plaintiff corporation, whose catalogs it printed, came through the Missouri
corporation with which it had dealt. Thus it had done no act by which it
"purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws."''1 Clearly
147. 56 N.C. App. 567, 289 S.E.2d 607, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 384, 294 S.E,2d 209 (1982).
148. By contracting to print and bind the catalogs of a North Carolina business, to send
samples of the catalog to the North Carolina business in Winston-Salem, North Caro-
lina, to mail thousands of copies of the catalog to North Carolina addresses and to ship
to the Plaintiff in North Carolina a substantial quantity of the catalogs, the Third Party
Defendants have the necessary "minimum contacts" with North Carolina to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over them by this Court in an action based upon a claim
arising from those contacts.
Id at 569, 289 S.E.2d at 609 (quoting from the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law).
149. Id at 572, 289 S.E.2d at 610.
150. Id at 571, 289 S.E.2d at 609-10 (quoting Phoenix America Corp. v. Brissey, 46 N.C. App.
527, 530, 265 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1980)). In Brssey, the court found the contact insufficient because
defendants did business solely in South Carolina, plaintiff solicited the order in South Carolina,
shipped the goods into South Carolina, and received payment there.
151. 56 N.C. App. at 571, 289 S.E.2d at 609. See United Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 296
N.C. 510, 515, 251 S.E.2d 610, 614 (1979) (exercise of in personum jurisdiction is proper only if
both the following requirements are met: (1) the state "long arm" statute confers jurisdiction over
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then, when a foreign party solicits another foreign party to manufacture goods
outside the state, mere delivery into the forum state will not suffice to legiti-
mate the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the delivering party. 152
A related issue arose in Whitener v. Whitener.153 The parties, divorced in
1973, had sold a parcel of real property located in North Carolina in 1968
while married and living in Florida. At the time of the sale they received a
purchase money note secured by a deed of trust. Plaintiff husband, while
domiciled in North Carolina, brought an action in North Carolina for an ac-
counting of proceeds received on the note by defendant, who remained domi-
ciled in Florida. The trial court refused to exercise jurisdiction despite
plaintiff's assertion that it was proper under G.S. 1-75.4(6)(b),1 54 which autho-
rizes jurisdiction over actions for recovery of any benefits accruing to the de-
fendant by virtue of the use or control of property in North Carolina.
The court of appeals held that this action for an accounting was not one
in rem, as it did not affect the debt owed by the purchaser of the property 55
nor was it a quasi in rem action because the debt was not garnished in an
ancillary proceeding. 156 Therefore, the minimum contacts test of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington 157 had to be met for the exercise of in personam juris-
diction. Viewed in light of the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 58 such contacts
were not present. 159 Although defendant previously owned property in North
the nonresident defendant and (2) "defendant purposely avails [himself] of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws").
See also Mabry v. Fuller-Shuwayer Co., 50 N.C. App. 245, 249, 273 S.E.2d 509, 511 (because the
North Carolina "long arm" statute was intended to assert personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent
allowed by due process, the only meaningful inquiry is whether defendant has the requisite mini-
mum contacts with the forum state), disc. rep. denied, 302 N.C. 398, 279 S.E.2d 352 (1981).
152. Arguably, this case is contra to Brissey because the defendant shipped the goods into the
state, thereby initiating contact. Defendant manufactured the goods outside the state, however,
and never dealt directly with the North Carolina firm. Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958) (nonresident trustee's "regular communications" with resident settlor did not satisfy mini-
mum contacts requirement); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (single life
insurance policy shipped into the forum state satisfied minimun contacts).
153. 56 N.C. App. 599, 289 S.E.2d 887, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 393,294 S.E.2d 221 (1982).
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (Cum Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent part:
A court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a
person served in an action pursuant to Rule 4(j) of the Rules of Civil Procedure under
any of the following circumstances:
6) Local Property-In any action which arises out of:
(b) A claim to recover for any benefit derived by the defendant through the use, owner-
ship, control or possession by the defendant of tangible property situated within this
State either at the time of the first use, ownership, control, or possession or at the time the
action is commenced; ....
155. 56 N.C. App. at 600, 289 S.E.2d at 888.
156. Id Based on Holt v. Holt, 41 N.C. App. 344, 255 S.E.2d 407 (1979), the garnishment of
the debt would be insufficient to warrant jurisdiction in the action for an accounting as that would
allow jurisdiction only over the obligor of the note. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977),
which requires that the property garnished be the subject of the action. Here the very point of the
action was to determine if a debt was owed by the defendant.
157. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
158. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See supra note 156.
159. The court distinguished Holt v. Holt, 41 N.C. App. 344, 255 S.E.2d 407 (1977), in which
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Carolina, not every action concerning the note received upon the sale of that
property comes within the purview of G.S. 1-75.4(6)(b). While it is true that
defendant had an interest in the property by virtue of the note and deed of
trust, the thrust of plaintiff's action was that defendant breached a duty to him
concerning money she had received. Rights in the real property were not the
subject of the suit; thus it provided no basis for jurisdiction over a Florida
resident. 160
Two cases involved the North Carolina courts' power to inquire into the
exercise of jurisdiction by sister states. In Ft. Recovery Industries Inc. v.
Perry 61 the court of appeals held that under some circumstances the North
Carolina courts could review the sufficiency of jurisdiction exercised by a sister
state in an action to enforce the judgment rendered by the sister state. Because
the issue of jurisdiction was litigated in the prior foreign action, however, the
court held the foreign court's judgment bound the North Carolina court.162 In
Old Dominion Distributors, Inc. v. Bissete,163 a summary judgment against
defendant on the issue of jurisdiction was reversed upon a finding that defend-
ant had not appeared in the Virginia action. Thus, the issue of jurisdiction
had not been litigated in that forum. The North Carolina court could then
properly inquire into the sufficiency of jurisdiction before granting full faith
and credit to the foreign judgment. judgment. 164
K Limitation of Actions
The constitutionality of G.S. 1-50(5),165 a so-called "statute of repose," 166
jurisdiction was exercised. There the plaintiff sought satisfaction of a Missouri judgment arising
out of her divorce. The real property was the actual res in controversy; the husband owned North
Carolina property subject to the property settlement. Thus, the action was primarily a determina-
tion of rights in the property. See also Balcon, Inc. v. Sadler, 36 N.C. App. 322, 244 S.E.2d 164
(1978) (North Carolina lacked jurisdiction over defendant, a Maryland resident who owned prop-
erty in North Carolina that plaintiff, a Maryland corporation, tried to reach in collateral action).
160. See supra notes 154-156.
161. 57 N.C. App. 354, 291 S.E.2d 329 (1982).
162. The decision in Ft. Recovery accords with the full faith and credit mandate of Durfee v.
Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). The judgment, reflecting the decided issue ofjurisdiction, is entitled to
the full faith and credit of the North Carolina court. 57 N.C. App. at 357, 291 S.E.2d at 331.
163. 56 N.C. App. 200, 287 S.E.2d 409 (1982).
164. Id at 202, 287 S.E.2d at 410.
165. In 1977, when the cause of action in Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 55 N.C. App.
686, 286 S.E.2d 876 (1982) arose, the statute provided:
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for an
injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribu-
tion or indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of con-
struction or construction of such improvement to real property, more than six years (6)
after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction. This limitation
shall not apply to any person in actual possession and control as owner, tenant, or other-
wise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improve-
ment constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring an
action.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1969). This section was amended in 1981 to enumerate specific acts.
166. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of
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was upheld by the court of appeals in Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp.1 67
That statute bars actions for wrongful death against persons designing or con-
structing defective or unsafe improvements to real property that are not com-
menced within six years after the completion of such improvements; persons
making the improvements who also retain actual control or possession of the
property at the time of the injury are not protected by the statute.
In Lamb plaintiffs decedent was pushed or fell to his death from a sixth
floor window of defendant's hotel in 1977. The trial court dismissed the claim
against the architect who designed the building, which was completed in 1965.
Plaintiff contended that the statute violated the equal protection clause em-
bodied in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and
section 18 of article I of the North Carolina Constitution. 168
The court's decision appears to be based on decisions in other jurisdic-
tions evaluating the constitutionality of similar statutes. 169 Without present-
ing any detailed analysis, the court concluded that "the differences between
architects and manufacturers, materialmen, and suppliers so far as [their]
functions in the construction industry" provided a rational basis for granting
architects earlier repose. 170
The opinion is interesting because of its treatment of the statute in light of
article I, section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution, which provides in part
that "right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or de-
lay."' 7 1 Recently, in Bolick v. American Barmag Corp. ,172 the court of appeals
invoked that clause to invalidate a similar statute of repose, G.S. 1-50 (6),173 as
a denial of access to the courts. The majority in Lamb 174 disagreed with the
Bolick decision, holding that a guarantee of impartial access to the courts does
not bar the General Assembly from "defining or abolishing claims which arise
Repose, 30 AM. U. L. Rlv. 579, 584 (1981) (statute of repose differs from a statute of limitation
because it begins to run at a time unrelated to the traditional accrual of the cause of action).
167. 55 N.C. App. 686, 286 S.E.2d 876 (1982).
168. The fourteeth amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"No state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1. Section 18 of article I of the North Carolina Constitution states: "All courts shall be
open; every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have a
remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or
delay." N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 18.
169. See, eg., Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 563 (1971) (statute held unconstitu-
tional); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 l. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967) (statute held unconstitutional);
Kallas Mill Work Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975) (statute held
unconstitutional); Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81
Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1973) (statute upheld against constitutional attack).
170. 55 N.C. App. at 694, 286 S.E.2d at 882.
171. See supra note 168.
172. 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), mod#fed, 306 N.C.364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
173. "No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property
based upon or arising out of any alleged defect... in relation to a product shall be brought more
than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
50(6)(Cum. Supp. 1981).
174. Judge Wells dissented, agreeing with the Bolick reasoning. 55 N.C.App. at 696, 286
S.E.2d at 883 (Wells, J., dissenting).
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under the common law."175
The supreme court subsequently overruled Bolick, but did not reach the
constitutionality issue. The supreme court opinion seems to buttress the Lamb
decision, as the court held that the legislature may create a time limitation in
which the action must be brought as a condition precedent to the action.176
Thus, rather than abolishing the common law claim against the architect, G.S.
1-50(5) redefines the claim by placing the time limitation within its substantive
framework.
In F & D Co. v. 4etna Insurance Co. 177 the supreme court clarified its
stance on contract provisions that limit the time in which a claimant may bring
an action. Plaintiff contended that the policy provision limiting the time in
which to bring its action to no more than one year after it suffered the physical
injury or damage conflicted with G.S. 58-31.178 That statute prohibits insurers
from limiting actions to any period less than one year from the date the cause
of action accrues. Since Hei(g v. Aetna Lfe Insurance Co. ,179 the North Caro-
lina courts have construed such policy provisions liberally to mean that actions
must be commenced within one year of accrual of the cause of action, rather
than the time of the injury, thus eliminating conflict with the statute. InF& D
Co., however, the supreme court read the policy literally and held that plain-
tif's claim was barred by the provision unless it was commenced within one
year of the injury.180 Because the cause of action did not accrue until the
claimant had filed proofs of loss and the company had denied payment, the
policy limit conflicted with the protections of the statute.181 The court, there-
fore, held that the policy provision was void and plaintiff should be allowed to
pursue his claim because he filed suit within one year of the expiration of the
period reserved by the company for determining its liability.'82
175. Id at 695, 286 S.E.2d at 883.
176. That the legislature has the authority to establish a condition precedent to what ori -
inally was a common law cause of action is beyond question. mhe General Assembly is
the policy-making agency of our government and when it elects to legislate in respect to
the subject matter of any common law rule, the statute supplants the common law rule
and becomes the public policy of the State in respect to that particularmatter.
McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 483, 91 S.E.2d 231, 234 (1956), quotedin Bolick, 306 N.C. at
370, 293 S.E.2d at 420.
177. 305 N.C. 256, 287 S.E.2d 867 (1982).
178. No company or order, domestic or foreign, authorized to do business in this State
under this Chapter, may make any condition or stipulation in its insurance contracts
concerning the court or jurisdiction wherein any suit or action thereon may be brought,
nor may it limit the time within which such suit or action may be commenced to less
than one year after the cause of action accrues. ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-31 (1982).
179. 152 N.C. 358, 67 S.E. 927 (1910).
180. 305 N.C. at 263-64, 287 S.E.2d at 871.
181. "If, at the end of the 30-day period after the proofs are filed, the company has not paid
the insured's loss, its cause of action accrues." Id at 264, 287 S.E.2d at 871.
182. Id at 264-65, 287 S.E.2d at 871-72. The supreme court was unable to determine, from
the record on appeal, when plaintiff's cause of action accrued. Consequently, the case was re-
manded to the trial court for a determination of the accrual date and a ruling on whether plaintiff




It has long been held that a defendant in a civil action may invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination when the plaintiff is seeking punitive dam-
ages.183 A recent ruling by the court of appeals, however, permitted sanctions
against a defendant who, claiming the privilege, refused to allow discovery in
defiance of an order to respond to interrogatories. In Stone v. Martin 184 plain-
tiff shareholder brought an action for damages, punitive damages, and arrest
for the unlawful acts and omissions of the defendant corporate officer. Upon
defendant's refusal to answer interrogatories, the trial court issued an order
compelling him to respond; three questions were exempted by the court be-
cause they called for potentially incriminating replies. After defendant again
asserted his claim of privilege and declined to respond, the court struck his
answer to the complaint and entered default judgment for plaintiff.
The court of appeals upheld the sanctions on two grounds. First, the
court stated that defendant could not himself determine the scope of the privi-
lege. 185 Instead, defendant's proper remedy was to appeal the order compel-
ling discovery.186 Second, the interrogatories and requests for admission
sought information to which the plaintiff was entitled as a shareholder. 187 Cit-
ing United States v. White,188 the court held that one may not withhold infor-
mation entrusted to him in a representative capacity, even though such
information may tend to incriminate him. 189 Thus, the privilege did not apply
and defendant had no grounds upon which to refuse to comply with the
order.190
183. See Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31, 134 S.E.2d 186 (1964).
184. 56 N.C. App. 473, 289 S.E.2d 898, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 392, 294 S.E.2d 220 (1982).
185. "Determination of whether the privilege applies must be by the court, not the individual
claiming the privilege.... That plaintiffs seek punitive damages does not, ipsofacto, entitle
defendant to refuse, with impunity, to submit to the requested discovery." Id at 477, 289 S.E.2d
at 901.
186. In Midgett v. Crystal Dawn Corp., 58 N.C. App. 734, 294 S.E.2d 386 (1982), defendant
refused to make discovery, claiming a work product privilege. The trial court ordered the produc-
tion of certain documents, and when they were not surrendered, ordered that sanctions were ap-
propriate. The court of appeals held that defendant could not unilaterally determine which
documents were privileged. "Absent a stay by virtue of appeal, defendant could not justifiably
disobey the order." 58 N.C. App. at 736-37, 294 S.E.2d at 387.
187. "Plaintiffs thus had a statutory right, enforceable by an action in the nature of manda-
mus, to inspect the records of the corporation. G.S. 55-38." Stone, 56 N.C. App. at 478, 289
S.E.2d at 902.
188. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
189. 56 N.C. App. at 478, 289 S.E.2d at 902.
190. Furthermore, sanctions may be imposed in the absence of an order compelling discovery.
In First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Powell, 58 N.C. App.229, 292 S.E.2d 731, disc. rev. denied,
306 N.C. 740, 295 S.E.2d 477 (1982), the trial court struck defendant's answer and entered a de-
fault judgment for failure to answer interrogatories. The appellate court stated that while imposi-
tion of severe sanctions prior to an order to compel discovery was unusual, such sanctions were
clearly authorized by rule 37(d) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the court
of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when there was no evidence in the
record that injustice would result from the imposition of sanctions. See also Carpenter v. Cooke,
58 N.C. App. 381, 293 S.E.2d 630 (trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' actions for failure to
comply with discovery order), cert. denied, 306 N.C. 740, 295 S.E.2d 758 (1982).
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In Shepherd v. Oliver19 1 sanctions were held inappropriate when plaintiff
had no opportunity to supplement answers to interrogatories before trial. The
defendant sought to exclude testimony by an expert witness, called by plaintiff,
on the ground that he had not been listed as one whom plaintiff planned to
call at trial.192 The court of appeals held that the trial court's exclusion of the
testimony was erroneous. The court noted that plaintiff called the witness as a
last resort when her own expert witness failed to testify as expected. Thus,
plaintiff had no duty to supplement her responses to interrogatories when such
information was not available to her before trial.
M. Dismissal
In Dealers Specialties, Inc. v. Neighborhood Housing Services193 the
supreme court took the opportunity to clarify in dictum the role of the trial
judge in a nonjury trial when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule
41(b).194 The court of appeals had stated that in making such a ruling the
evidence should be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.19 5 In
Bryant v. Kelly1 96 the court of appeals had earlier ruled, consistently with the
federal practice, that the judge "is to evaluate the evidence without any limita-
tions as to the inferences which the court must indulge in favor of the plain-
tiff's evidence on a similar motion for a directed verdict in a jury case."'197
The confusion over this standard was created by Rogers v. City ofAsheville, 198
in which the court of appeals quoted Bryant but stated the limitation in favor
191. 57 N.C. App. 188, 290 S.E.2d 761, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 387, 294 S.E.2d 212 (1982).
192. The excluded testimony was given by a doctor listed by defendant as his expert witness.
The jury had been examined concerning him, and defendant was notified two days before his
appearance that he would be called by plaintiff. Id at 188-89, 290 S.E.2d at 762. Defendant's
claim of surprise rings hollow under the circumstances.
193. 305 N.C. 633, 291 S.E.2d 137 (1982).
194. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim therein against
him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without ajury, has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted. may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the
facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline
to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment
on the merits against the plaintifi the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
section and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a necessary party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits. If the court specifies that the dismissal of an action com-
menced within the time prescribed therefor, or any claim therein, is without prejudice, it
may also specifly in its order that a new action based on the same claim may be com-
mence within one year or less after the dismissal
195. 54 N.C. App. 46, 53, 283 S.E.2d 155, 160 (1981). The federal rule is to the contrary. Thetrial judge may consider all the evidence and weigh its probative value and credibility. See 5 J.
MOa, J. LUCAs & J. Wic r , MoOre'S FEDERAL PRACr e J41.13[3] & n.1l1 (2d ed. 1982).
196. 10 N.C. App. 208, 178 S.E.2d 113 (1970), r'don other grounds, 279 N.C. 123, 181 S.E.2d
438 (1971).
197. Id at 213, 178 S.E.2d at 116.
198. 14 N.C. App. 514, 188 S.E.2d 656 (1972).
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of the plaintiff. A subsequent decision in Sanders v. Walker 199 then read Rog-
ers as ascribing this limitation to the Bryant court as well. Although the issue
was not essential to the disposition of the case, the supreme court in its reversal
held in Dealers that Bryant was correct in removing the limitation on the trial




199. 39 N.C. App. 355, 250 S.E.2d 84 (1979).
200. 305 N.C. at 639, 291 S.E.2d at 140. See also 1 A. McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAC-




In Butcher v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co. I the North Carolina Court of
Appeals confronted the issue of when a death is "accidental" under an Acci-
dental Death Benefit rider to a life insurance policy.2 Plaintiff in Butcher, the
insured's wife, woke the insured as he was sleeping on a couch. The insured
immediately began hitting and cursing plaintiff; he produced a knife, and in
the ensuing struggle he was wounded in the heart and died. Plaintiff subse-
quently testified that she and her husband had fought several times before. On
cross-examination, she admitted that she had been convicted of fighting in
public and of trespass.3 The issue went to the jury phrased exactly according
to the terms of the Accidental Death Benefit rider to the insurance policy:
"Did the death of [the insured] result directly and independently of all other
causes from bodily injury caused solely by external, violent and accidental
means?"'4 The jury answered in the affirmative, and the trial court denied
defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The court of appeals reversed. Citing several North Carolina cases,5 the
court quoted from another North Carolina case containing similar facts:
Where the policy insures against loss of life through accidental
means, the principle seems generally upheld that, if the death of the
insured, although in a sense unforeseen and unexpected, results di-
rectly from the insured's voluntary act and aggressive misconduct, or
where the insured culpably provokes the act which causes the injury
and death, it is not death by accidental means, even though the result
may be such as to constitute an accidental injury.6
Plaintiff relied upon a recent court of appeals case, Logan v. Lfe Insur-
ance Co. of North America.7 In Logan plaintiff was the wife of the insured,
from whom she was separated. When plaintiff refused to sleep with the in-
1. 56 N.C. App. 776, 290 S.E.2d 373 (1982).
2. It is common for life insurance policies to provide for payment of double the face amount
of the policy if death results from an accident. These provisions generally exclude suicide, self-
inflicted injury, military service during wartime, participation in riot or insurrection, and disease
or bodily infirmity. J. MACLEON, LIFE INSURANCE 328-29 (3d ed. 1932).
3. 56 N.C. App. at 778, 290 S.E.2d at 374.
4. Id.
5. Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966) (insured died from
voluntary jump backwards, apparently as a result of hypertension, delirium tremens, or some
other mental or physical infirmity; death held not accidental); Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244
N.C. 502, 94 S.E. 558 (1956) (insured started fight resulting in his own death; held not death by
"accidental means"); Clay v. State Ins. Co., 174 N.C. 642, 94 S.E. 289 (1917) (insured struck and
threatened acquaintance, eventually leading to a gunfight in which insured was killed; held that
aggression by insured will not by itself render the death nonaccidental; jury question remained
whether aggression occurred under circumstances rendering a homicide likely, but if facts were
found as they appeared on record, a directed verdict for defendant would be appropriate).
6. 56 N.C. App. at 780,290 S.E.2d at 375 (quoting Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 224 N.C.
502, 505, 94 S.E.2d 558, 561 (1956)).
7. 46 N.C. App. 629, 265 S.E.2d 447, drc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 93 (1980).
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sured, he began to hit her and produced a gun. After a struggle in which
plaintiff took control of the gun, the insured was shot and killed.
The trial court in Logan granted summary judgment for defendant. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the question whether the
insured's death was accidental was for the jury. Citing a case relied upon in
Butcher,8 the court stated that "the true test of liability in cases of this sort is
not whether the insured was the aggressor in the affray that took his life, but
whether he was 'the aggressor, under circumstances that would render a homi-
cide likely as the result of his own misconduct." 9 The court noted that the
insured had assaulted plaintiff several other times but that she had withdrawn
rather than resisted. Therefore, it was a question of fact whether the insured
could have anticipated on the last occasion that plaintiff would struggle with
him.10 Earlier North Carolina cases holding an aggressor's death nonacciden-
tal as a matter of law"1 were distinguished on the ground that there had been
no previous course of conduct between the parties to the fight that might have
influenced the expectations of the insured. The Logan court did not cite any
North Carolina case that dealt with previous course of conduct in a marital
context; rather, the court's holding was based upon decisions from other juris-
dictions involving similar facts.' 2
The court in Butcher distinguished Logan summarily, stating that it did
not control because different language appeared in the Logan insurance pol-
icy. 13 The Logan policy insured against death "by accident,"' 14 while the term
in Butcher was "[by] accidental means."' 5 The court did not attempt to ana-
lyze the significance of the difference. The opinion mentions that North Caro-
lina is one of the jurisdictions that differentiates between the two terms, giving
a more limited interpretation to "accidental means." 6 These comments, how-
8. Clay v. State Ins. Co., 174 N.C. 642, 94 S.E. 289 (1917).
9. 46 N.C. App. at 630, 265 S.E.2d at 448 (quoting Clay v. State Ins. Co., 174 N.C. 642, 645-
46, 94 S.E. 289, 290 (1917)).
10. 46 N.C. App. at 630, 265 S.E.2d at 448.
11. Gray v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 286, 118 S.E.2d 909 (1961); Scarborough v.
World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 94 S.E.2d 558 (1956); Clay v. State Ins. Co., 174 N.C. 642, 94 S.E.
289 (1917).
12. Yeager v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 P.2d 117 (Colo. App.), rek denied, cert. denied (1973)
(long history of aggressive conduct by husband with no resistance from wife until fatal shooting in
self-defense); Martin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 56, 463 S.W.2d 681 (1971)
(wife shot husband as he held razor to her throat; previous conduct would not necessarily lead
insured to foresee resistance leading to his death). See also Mackln v. Commonwealth Life and
Accident Co., 121 I11. App. 2d 119, 257 N.E.2d 256 (1970); Life and Casualty Co. v. Hulsy, 109
Ga. App. 15, 134 S.E.2d 880 (1964); General State Mut. Life Ass'n v. Gray, 290 P.2d 217 (1955).
But see Wooden v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 205 Va. 750, 139 S.E.2d 801 (1965); Annot.,
26 A.L.R.2d 399 (Supp. 1981).
13. 56 N.C. App. at 781, 290 S.E.2d at 376.
14. 46 N.C. App. at 629, 265 S.E.2d at 447.
15. 56 N.C. App. at 780, 290 S.E.2d at 373.
16. The term "accidental means" refers to the occurrence or event which produces death and
not to the death itself. Chesson v. Insurance Co., 268 N.C. 98, 150 S.E.2d 40 (1966). The word
"accidental" describes the means of death. Id. "The motivating, operative and causal factor must
be accidental in the sense that it is unusual, unforeseen and unexpected .... mhe emphasis is
upon the accidental character of the causation-not upon the accidental nature of the ultimate
sequence of the chain of causation. Fletcher v. Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 150, 16 S.E.2d 687, 688
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ever, were made without reference to Logan. The court did not attempt to
expand the analysis or state clearly why Logan should not control when an
"accidental means" policy is involved.
The Logan opinion does not indicate that it would have been decided
differently under an "accidental means" policy. Indeed, a careful reading of
Logan indicates that the holding was meant to apply under either a "by acci-
dent" or an "accidental means" policy. The principal North Carolina author-
ity relied upon in Logan, Clay v. State Insurance Co.,17 was a case involving
an "accidental means" policy. 18 Moreover, distinctions in wording were not
an issue in either of the out-of-state cases cited in Logan. 19
In cases involving the death of an insured as a result of his own aggres-
sion, Clay had established that foreseeability is an element that must be shown
for death to be by non-"accidental means."'20 Logan applied this rule to cases
in which there had been a previous course of conduct between the quarreling
parties. If the insured had been the aggressor and had never before met with
resistance, Logan directed that foreseeability should be a question of fact. It is
clear that counsel for plaintiff in Butcher attempted to bring this case within
the scope of the Logan holding. Although the opinion notes that plaintiff testi-
fied as to previous fights, 2 ' the court did not elaborate upon the substance of
that testimony or attempt any analysis of plaintiff's claim under the Logan
criteria. Instead, the court dispensed with Logan merely on semantic grounds.
North Carolina continues to cling to the distinction between the terms
"accidental" and "accidental means," despite a trend away from such an inter-
pretation in other jurisdictions. 22 Regardless of the merits of the distinction, it
is difficult to discern a reason in policy, logic, or North Carolina authority for
its application in distinguishing Butcher from Logan. Because the court of-
fered no analytical justification for its decision, it appears that until the North
Carolina Supreme Court clarifies the matter, the Butcher holding will leave
the significance of Logan in doubt. Insurers, consumers, and counsel should
carefully scrutinize the wording in Accidental Death Benefit riders to life in-
surance policies.
(1941). See Butcher, 56 N.C. App. at 779,290 S.E.2d at 375. See also Skillman v. Acacia Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 1, 127 S.E.2d 789 (1962); Scarborough v. World Ins. Co., 244 N.C. 502, 94
S.E.2d 558 (1956); 26 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 562 (1982); Annot., 166 A.L.R. 469 (1947).
17. 174 N.C. 642, 94 S.E. 289 (1917).
18. Id.
19. In Yeager v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 P.2d 117 (Colo. App. 1973) there was no discussion
of the terms of the policy. In Martin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 56, 463
S.W.2d 681 (1971), the policy insured against death by "accidental bodily injury," however, the
court's analysis did not refer to the specific wording of the terms.
20. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
21. 56 N.C. App. at 778, 290 S.E.2d at 375.
22. The leading case rejecting the distinction is Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident
Ass'n, 295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d 248 (1966). For a listing of jurisdictions that have dropped the
distinction see 26 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 562 (1982). This trend has been influenced by a criti-
cism Justice Cardozo voiced in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934),
(Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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In Shew v. Southern Fire & Cas. Co. 23 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals reversed summary judgment for the defendant on an issue that had ap-
parently never been litigated in North Carolina or any other jurisdiction.
Plaintiff, the insured, was convicted on criminal traffic violations and sen-
tenced to eighteen months imprisonment.24 The sentence was suspended, and
among the conditions for suspension was a requirement that plantiff reimburse
the county for damage done to a police car. The judgment stated that the
reimbursement was "an addition to what insurance coverage fails to pay as a
result of liability damages or if insurance refuses to pay such damage." 25 The
insurance company refused to pay. Plaintiff took out a loan and paid the dam-
ages himself, then sued the insurance company for restitution.
26
At trial, the insurance company contended that the sum paid by plaintiff
to the county was not money he was "legally required to pay" 27 within the
meaning of the policy. Defendant argued that plaintiff paid the money volun-
tarily to comply with the conditions of probation and to avoid imprisonment.
The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for defendant.
The court of appeals reversed. The court held that plaintiff, in suing for
reimbursement of money paid to the county, stood in the shoes of the county
against defendant. The court stated that if the county had sued plaintiff, de-
fendant would "without question" have had to defend the suit and pay any
judgment rendered against plaintiff.28 This result, the court said, fulfilled the
purpose of liability insurance-to protect those damaged by negligent opera-
tion of an automibile.29
Judge Becton dissented because he believed plaintiff could not recover
since public liability insurance is designed to protect against civil liability only,
and a contract insuring one against criminal liability would be void as against
public policy.30 Judge Becton did not believe that plaintiff was "legally obli-
gated" to pay the county. "He was not ordered to pay restitution," Judge Bec-
ton contended, rather, "he was allowed to pay restitution."'3 ' The dissent also
suggested that the accident was not an occurrence under the terms of the pol-
icy, because the damages stemmed from plaintifs admittedly intentional
act. 3
2
23. 58 N.C. App. 637, 294 S.E.2d 233 (1982).
24. Plaintiff was a 17-year old insured under his stepfather-coplaintifl's liability insurance
policy. He had led several sheriffs deputies on a chase that reached speeds of 130 miles per hour.
The chase culminated with plaintiff crashing into a roadblock formed by deputies' cars.
25. 58 N.C. App. at 638, 294 S.E.2d at 234.
26. Id. See Standard Accidential Ins. Co. v. Harrison-Wright Co., 207 N.C. 661, 178 S.E.
235 (1935).
27. The policy provided, "The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of property damage to which
this insurance applies." 58 N.C. App. at 639, 294 S.E.2d at 235.
28. Id. at 640, 294 S.E.2d at 236.
29. The court cited Harrelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 275 N.C. 603, 158 S.E.2d 812
(1968). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-309 to -319 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
30. See generally COUCH, INSURANCE 2D § 45:2 (rev. ed. 1981).
31. 58 N.C. App. at 643, 294 S.E.2d at 237.
32. It is, however, settled in North Carolina that under a claim by an injured party against an
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The dissent also highlighted practical problems raised by the majority
opinion. First, because the insurance company could not be a party to the
criminal trial, and because damages are usually not argued in criminal cases,
the insurance company would have no opportunity to be heard. In addition,
Judge Becton was troubled by the implications of requiring insurers to pay
restitution in criminal cases because such restitution is completely within the
discretion of the trial court. Finally, Judge Becton argued that defendant may
have had a defense in a civil trial based on the contributory negligence of the
county's agents.33 He argued that these civil issues should be resolved prior to
a judgment of restitution in a criminal action.
There is very little authority regarding an insurer's obligation to pay resti-
tution ordered by a court in a criminal case when the damages for which resti-
tution is made were within the coverage of the policy. Therefore, the majority
relied heavily on policy arguments, emphasizing the need to construe liablity
insurance policy provisions liberally in order to assure that innocent victims
will be compensated.34 In so doing, however, the court failed to analyze the
crucial issue in the case: whether a reimbursement by the insured to the in-
jured party in lieu of imprisonment, pursuant to a criminal judgment, consti-
tutes a legal obligation to pay on the part of the insured. In holding for the
plaintiff without directly addressing this issue, the majority in Shaw was un-
able to provide adequate answers to the questions raised by the dissent.
The court of appeals demonstrated further willingness to construe liber-
ally liability insurance policy terms in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ander-
son,35 a case that focused upon the Financial Responsibility Act.36 Defendant
in Ohio Casualty purchased a car for his exclusive possession and use. Simul-
taneously with this transaction, however, legal title was transferred to his son.
Defendant's son was unaware that the car was registered in his name. Plaintiff
issued defendant an owner's policy of liability insurance.37 While driving the
insurer under a policy of compulsory motor vehicle insurance, an "accident" occurs if the occur-
rence was accidental from the point of view of the injured party. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 634 (1964). See also Note, 43 N.C.L. REv. 436 (1965).
33. "The Keystone comedy routine, which would be funny in a movie. . . had all the poten-
tial in the world for tragedy in the highways of Iredell County. . . [Biased on plaintiffs testimony
the conduct of Iredell County Sheriff's Department was equally as willful and wanton." 58 N.C.
App. at 650, 294 S.E.2d at 238.
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (Supp. 1981). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fire-
men's Fund Ins. Co., 279 N.C. 240, 182 S.E.2d 571 (1971); Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
270 N.C. 454, 155 S.E.2d 118 (1967); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134
S.E.2d 654 (1964).
35. 59 N.C. App. 621, 298 S.E.2d 56 (1982).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981). The Act provides for
compulsory liability insurance for all motorists. Courts have held that the provisions of the Act
are written into every automobile liability policy as a matter of law, and when terms of a policy
conflict with the statute, the statute will prevail. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 293
N.C. 431, 238 S.E.2d 597 (1977); Harrelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 272 N.C. 603, 158
S.E.2d 812 (1968); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 34, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967);
Engle v. State Farm Ins. Co., 37 N.C. App. 126, 245 S.E.2d 532, disc. rev. denied, 293 N.C. 645,248
S.E.2d 250 (1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Webb, 10 N.C. App. 672, 179 S.E.2d 803 (1971); Lichten-
berger v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 7 N.C. App. 269, 172 S.E.2d 284 (1970).
37. The Financial Responsibility Act provides for two kinds of liability insurance policies--
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car, defendant collided with another vehicle. Plaintiff, claiming that defend-
ant did not own the car, obtained a declaratory judgment in the trial court that
its owner's policy did not cover the collision. The court of appeals reversed.
Two North Carolina cases 38 had previously given a strict interpretation
to the definition of "owner" appearing in G.S. 20-4.01(26).3 9 These cases held
that an owner's liability insurance extends coverage only to the holder of legal
title. In Ohio Casualty, however, the court distinguished these cases on the
ground that they concerned attempts by vendees to claim coverage under own-
er's liability policies before the vendees had received legal title. In Ohio Casu-
aly neither vendor nor vendee had title after the sale, because title was
transferred to vendee's son.4 The court held that under these circumstances,
when defendant paid the entire purchase price, had exclusive possession and
use of the vehicle, and had obtained insurance and paid the premiums, he
likewise retained a clear equitable interest in the vehicle. This equitable inter-
est was sufficient "to make him the 'owner' of the vehicle within the coverage
intent of the policy, interpreted in light of the purpose and intent of the Finan-
cial Responsibility Act. ' 41
The Ohio Casualty opinion makes it clear that under G.S. 20-4.01, the
owner is the legal title holder "unless the context otherwise requires."'42 The
court appears to have balanced the underlying policy of the Financial Respon-
sibility Act43 against strong precedent holding to a strict construction of the
"owner's" (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.211 (1978)) and "operator's" (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(c) (1978)).
38. Younts v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 281 N.C. 582, 189 S.E.2d 137 (1972); Nation-
wide Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970). See also Norris v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 26 N.C. App. 91, 215 S.E.2d 379 (aircraft liability insurance), cert. denied, 288
N.C. 242, 217 S.E.2d 666 (1975).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(26) (Cum. Supp. 1981) defines "owner" as:
A person holding the legal title to a vehicle, or in the event a vehicle is the subject of a
chattel mortgage or an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof or other like
agreement, with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the
agreement, and with the immediate right of possession vested in the mortgagor, condi-
tional vendee or lessee, said mortgagor, conditional vendee or lessee shall be deemed the
owner for the purpose of this Chapter ....
40. 59 N.C. App. at 624-25, 298 S.E.2d at 59.
41. Id. at 624-25, 298 S.E.2d at 59. Two earlier cases, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 279 N.C. 240, 182 S.E.2d 571 (1971) and Indiana Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Parton, 147 F. Supp. 887 (M.D.N.C. 1957), rejected the proposition that a holder of an equitable
interest is an "owner" for liability purposes. The Ohio Casualty court distinguished these cases. In
both Nationwide and Indiana Lumbermans the legal title holder was the insured; therefore, the
court in both cases upheld coverage.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
43. The court quoted a previous case defining the policy of the Financial Responsibility Act:
'The primary purpose of... compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance is to compen-
sate innocent victims who have been injured by financially irresponsible motorists. The
victim's rights against the insurer are not derived through the insured. . . . Such rights
are statutory and become absolute upon the occurence of injury or damage inflicted by
the named insured, by one driving with his permission, or by one driving while in lawful
possession of the named insured's car regardless of whether or not the nature and cir-
cumstances of the injury are covered by the contractual terms of the policy.'
59 N.C App. at 625, 298 S.E.2d at 59 (quoting Engle v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 37 N.C.
App. 126, 245 S.E.2d 532 (1978)). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431,
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term "owner" in liability cases.44 Policy considerations prevailed as the court
decided that under "the discrete facts and circumstances" 45 of Ohio Casualty,
"owner" should be liberally construed. The weight of authority, however, still
favors a strict construction of ownership.46 Ohio Casualty will probably be
useful precedent only in cases in which the nontitle holder has a very strong
equitable interest and strict construction of G.S. 20-4.01(26) would frustrate
the purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act.
B. Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practices47
In Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hospital, Inc. 48 plaintiffs, two
podiatrists, alleged that defendants, a hospital and two orthopedic surgeons,
conspired to prevent them from obtaining privileges to practice in the hospital.
Both surgeons said they would no longer perform surgery in the hospital were
plaintiffs given hospital privileges. Soon thereafter, the hoslital staff voted not
to amend institutional bylaws to grant plaintiffs hospital privileges. Plaintiffs
charged that these actions constituted an illegal conspiracy under G.S. 75-149
and unfair methods of competition under G.S. 75-1.1.5 0 Affirming a directed
verdict for defendants, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found insufficient
evidence of a boycott or conspiracy to support a claim under G.S. 75-1. In
addition, the court held that members of learned professions who were en-
gaged in the performance of professional services could not be sued under the
238 S.E.2d 597 (1977); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Firemans Fund, 279 N.C. 240, 182 S.E.2d 571
(1971); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964).
44. See supra note 38.
45. 59 N.C. App. at 626, 298 S.E.2d at 59.
46. See supra notes 36 & 38.
47. In United States v. Southern Motor Rate Carriers Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469 (5th
Cir. 1982), the United States Court of Appeals held that the North Carolina Motor Carrier
Association (NCMCA) should be enjoined from meeting to discuss and agree upon intrastate
transportation rates to be proposed to the appropriate state regulatory commission. The NCMCA
had been conducting such activities under the auspices of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-152.1(b) (1982),
which allows any party to a multicarrier agreement regarding uniform rates to apply to a state
commission for approval of the agreement. Subsection (h) of the same statute relieves parties to an
approved agreement from the operation of the antitrust laws. The NCMCA argued that this
provision placed them under the state action exception to federal antitrust laws.
In cases in which governmental action supplants competition, courts have often recognized
an exception to the Sherman Act, 15 USC § 1 (1976). See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943). The court of appeals noted, however, that the exception applies only when anticompetitive
activity is compelled by state action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-152.1(b) (1982) allows but does not
compel the rate agreements that the government claimed were price fixing. Therefore, the
NCMCA was enjoined from any further collective rate-making activities.
48. 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901 (1982).
49. N.C. GEN STAT. § 75-1 (1981) states, "Every contract, combination.., or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce in the State of North Carolina is hereby declared to be illegal."
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1981) provided in part, "Unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful." This section was amended in 1977 to provide: "(a) Unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
declared unlawful .... (b)'commerce'. .. does not include professional services rendered by a
member of a learned profession."
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superceded version of G.S. 75-1.1.51
In reaching its conclusion, the court observed that G.S. 75-1 was based
upon section 1 of the Sherman Act.52 The court noted that federal law, though
not binding, was instructive in interpreting the North Carolina statute.53 The
court then cited federal cases that have found unilateral acts to be insufficient
to constitute a conspiracy.54 Those cases, the court noted, required a showing
of "some consciousness of commitment to a common scheme" in order to
make out a claim of conspiracy under the Sherman Act.55
Turning to North Carolina law, the court stated that G.S. 75-1 resembles
the law regarding civil conspiracy: even though the conspiracy may be estab-
lished by circumstantial evidence, "the evidence of the agreement must be suf-
ficient to create more than a suspicion or conjecture [of conspiracy]."'56 The
court had earlier noted that the only indications of an agreement in this case
were defendant surgeons' statements and the hospital's subsequent refusal to
grant privileges to plaintiffs. This evidence, said the court, showed merely "in-
dividual expression of like personal opinion." T57 Because plaintiffs had failed
to show sufficient evidence of concerted acts by defendants, the court rejected
their claim of conspiracy under G.S. 75-1. 58
Turning to the allegation that defendants had committed unfair trade
practices under G.S. 75-1.1, the court held that plaintiff could not bring such a
claim under the statute.59 The court interpreted the terms "trade or com-
merce" to "include practically every business occupation. . . into which the
elements of bargain and sale (or) barter. . . enter."' 60 Defendants in Cam-
eron, however, were doctors, not sellers.61 As a result, the court held that they
did not fall under the rubric of G.S. 75-1.162
51. The court was considering the 1981 version of the statute under which plaintiff brought
suit.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1981).
53. 58 N.C. App. at 293, 293 S.E.2d at 918. See Ross v. Video Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643,
655, 194 S.E.2d 521, 530 (1973).
54. See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
55. 58 N.C. App. at 442, 293 S.E.2d at 918 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil, Inc., 316
F.2d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 1963)).
56. 58 N.C. App. at 438, 293 S.E.2d at 916 (quoting Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 456,
276 S.E.2d 325, 337 (1981)).
57. 58 N.C. App. at 439, 293 S.E.2d at 916.
58. Id. at 439, 293 S.E.2d at 918.
59. Id. at 446, 293 S.E.2d at 921.
60. Id at 444, 293 S.E.2d at 920 (quoting North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penny Co.,
292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977)).
61. The court relied on Batiste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1,231 S.E.2d
269 (holding that doctors do not engage in the sale of goods under the UCC), disc. rev. denied, 292
N.C. 466, 233 S.E.2d 921 (1977).
62. The court further stated that plaintiff could not have proceeded under the amended stat-
ute, see supra note 50, either, because it exempts those engaged in learned professions. See also N.
ALLEN, NORTH CAROLINA ANTITRUST AND TRADE REoULATION § 2-10, at 21 (1982): "Mhe
term 'learned profession' was determined to apply to physicians, attorneys, clergy, and related
professions .... However, the Attorney General carefully noted that members of learned profes-
sions are not themselves exempt. Rather, professional services are not to be regarded as coin-
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The Cameron decision is a proper application of the law to the facts of the
case. Under federal antitrust law, "[u]nrelated action, no matter what its moti-
vation cannot violate § 1 [of the Sherman Act]."'63 Similarly, case law is unan-
imous in requiring that evidence of a conspiracy do more than create mere
suspicion of conspiracy.64 In Cameron, the only signs of conspiracy were the
doctors' complaint and the subsequent denial of hospital privileges to plain-
tiffs. No evidence was introduced to show agreement, explicit or implicit, be-
tween the doctors and the hospital. Therefore, the court correctly followed the
example of federal cases which have held that evidence equally indicitive of
either independent or concerted activity is insufficient to prove a conspiracy.65In American Motors S ales Corp. v. Peters 66 the court of appeals had to
determine whether G.S. 20-30567 is unconstitutional under the antimonopoly
provisions of the North Carolina Constitution. 68 The case arose when the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles issued an injunction under G.S. 20-305 that
prohibited plaintiff from granting an additional Jeep franchise in an area
where it already had an established dealer. Plaintiff obtained a stay of the
order, but the superior court subsequently denied the dealer's motion that the
stay be continued pending outcome of a hearing on the injunction order.
Plaintiff appealed on the grounds that G.S. 20-305 was unconstitutional on its
face because it allows monopolies and that it was unconstitutional in this case
because it granted a monopoly to the existing dealer.
The court of appeals held G.S. 20-305 to be constitutional and found the
Commissioner to be within his power in granting the order.69 The court ob-
served that plaintiff could by contract with the existing dealer legally grant an
exclusive dealership to sell Jeeps in the trade area.70 The state did not grant a
monopoly when it required plaintiff to do what plaintiff could voluntarily do
merce under the statute. (citing Opinion of Attorney General to Representative Robert L.
Farmer, 47 N.C.A.G. 118 (1977)).
63. Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d, 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1980).
64. See, e.g., Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980);
Coughlin v. Capital Constr. Co., 571 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Standard Oil Inc.,
316 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1963).
65. See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980).
66. 58 N.C. App. 684, 294 S.E.2d 764 (1982).
67. N.C GEN. STAT. § 20-305 (1978) states:
It shall be unlawful for any manufacturer
(5) to grant an additional franchise for a particular line-make of motor vehicle in a trade
area already served by a dealer. . . in that line-make unless the franchisor first advised
in writing such other dealers... provided that no such additional franchise may be
established in the trade area if the Commissioner has determined. . . that there is rea-
sonable evidence that after the grant of the new franchise, the market will not support all
of the dealerships in that line-make in the trade area.
68. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34 provides, "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the ge-
nius of a free state and shall not be allowed."
69. 58 N.C. App. at 688, 294 S.E.2d at 769. The court cited N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-301(b)
(1978), which reads, "The Commissioner shall have power to prevent unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts or practices." The court stated that the granting of a franchise in
violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305 (1978) would be an unfair trade practice that the Commis-
sioner was empowered to prevent.
70. See, eg., Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors Corp., 254 N.C. 117, 118 S.E.2d 559
(1969) (a contract giving two dealerships exclusive trading areas was not a restraint of trade).
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by contract. Furthermore, the court noted that the Commissioner's order did
not effect a horizontal agreement not to compete between competitors. Finally
the court stated that the case was distinguishable on its facts from In Re Certfl-
cate of Needfor Aston Park Hospital.71
The dissent focused upon In Re Hospital as precedent for its contention
that G.S. 20-305 is unconstitutional to the extent it encourages monopolies.
The dissent failed to grasp the distinction between In Re Hospital and the
Peters cage: American Motors could have granted an exclusive franchise to its
dealer by contract; the other hospitals in In Re Hospital had no right to ex-
clude an additional hospital.
Abernathy v. Ralph Squires Realty Corp. 72 addressed the issue whether a
real estate company had engaged in unfair and deceptive acts under G.S. 75-
1. 1.73 Plaintiff engaged defendant real estate company to aid him in selling his
house and in locating a new one. Defendant located a house suitable for
plaintiff before a buyer for plaintiffs house could be found. Plaintiff con-
tracted to buy the house. The contract provided for the seller to finish insulat-
ing the house before closing and granted plaintiff the right to inspect the entire
house. To ensure that plaintiff would have sufficient funds to purchase the
house, defendant contracted to purchase plaintiffs former residence. Plaintiff
was to receive fifty percent of the net proceeds from the resale of the house by
defendant. Before plaintiff closed the deal for the new house, he asked de-
fendant's agent if the house had been put in proper condition. When the agent
replied in the affirmative, plaintiff took title and moved into the new residence.
Subsequently, plaintiff discovered that the roof leaked and that the seller
had not provided complete insulation. He then learned that defendant had
sold the old residence for a net loss after expenses. Plaintiff brought suit,
charging defendant with unfair and deceptive trade practices under G.S. 75-
1.1. Plaintiff contended that defendant had willfully misrepresented the con-
dition of the house and had added unnecessary expenses to the sale of the
house to reduce the net profit.74 The court granted summary judgment for
defendant and plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals first stated that an unfair practice is one that is "im-
moral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to con-
sumers." 75 A deceptive practice was defined as one with a "capacity or
tendency to deceive."'76 The court then held that defendant's subtraction of
expenses from the gross proceeds of the sale of plaintiffs house was neither
unfair nor deceptive. These deductions, said the court, were contemplated by
71. 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a statute that gave a state
commission the right to deny a private corporation a certificate of need required to build a
hospital).
72. 55 N.C. App. 354, 285 S.E.2d 325 (1982).
73. See supra note 50.
74. 55 N.C. at 356, 285 S.E.2d at 326. Plaintiff listed the unnecessary expenses as loan fees,
title examination, insurance fees, and survey fees.
75. Id. at 357, 285 S.E.2d at 327 (quoting Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C.
247, 262-63, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 (1980)).
76. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 265, 266 S.E.2d 610, 622 (1980).
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the term "net proceeds" in the contract. 77 The court also held that plaintiff's
evidence of willful misrepresentation was insufficient to go to the jury. The
affirmative response by defendant's agent "to. . .a broad question" did not




In Zickgraf Hardwood Co. v. Seay,80 the court of appeals held that, on
the facts before the court, a businessman's wife was not a partner in his busi-
ness. Ralph Seay was the owner of the Twin Oaks Company, and plaintiff was
a corporation engaged in the business of selling building materials. Seay had
a credit account in the name of "Ralph Seay, Builder." All invoices and state-
ments of the account were addressed to Ralph Seay, and all payments on the
account were paid by cashier's checks with Ralph Seay as payor, or by Twin
Oaks Company checks. Although Twin Oaks checks were generally signed by
Ralph Seay, one was signed by Mrs. Seay at her husband's direction. 8'
Plaintiff brought suit against Mr. and Mrs. Seay as principal owners of the
business alleging a balance due on the Seay account of $8,186.49. Mrs. Seay
denied she had ever purchased any materials from plaintiff in any capacity
and moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion, and the
jury, finding Mrs. Seay to be a principal owner of the business, returned a
verdict against both defendants. Mrs. Seay then appealed the denial of her
motion for a directed verdict.
Plaintiff argued that Mrs. Seay worked as a part-time employee in the
office of the Twin Oaks Company without pay and in return received her sup-
port and maintenance from the profits of the business. This benefit, plaintiff
argued, made her a principal in the business, chargeable with the account of
her husband. Plaintiff also argued that a partnership existed by virtue of Mrs.
Seay's participation in the management and control of the business as co-
owner.
82
The court of appeals rejected both of plaintiff's arguments and held that
the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a verdict against
77. 55 N.C. App. at 354, 285 S.E.2d at 327.
78. Id. at 359, 285 S.E.2d at 328.
79. In Davis v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 25, 293 S.E.2d 268 (1982), the court of appeals found
there was sufficient evidence that a partnership existed despite the absence of a written agreement,
The actions of the partners were sufficent indicia of the existence of a partnership. The court,
citing Eggleston v. Eggleston, 288 N.C. 668, 674, 47 S.E.2d 243, 247 (1948), stated that a
partnership agreement could be express or implied. Evidence that plaintiff and defendant had
shared profits constituted prima facie evidence of a partnersip under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-37
(1982). The existence of the partnership was further supported by evidence that defendant had
filed a partnership tax return.
80. 60 N.C. App. 128, 298 S.E.2d 208 (1982).
81. Id. at 130, 298 S.E.2d at 209.
82. Plaintiffs claim was based on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-36(a) (1982), which defines a part-
nership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit.
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Mrs. Seay.83 The court stated that the only evidence to support plaintiffs
claim that Mrs. Seay received the benefits of the business was that the money
generated by the business provided Mrs. Seay with support and income. This
evidence only showed that Mrs. Seay received support she was entitled to re-
ceive from her husband under the law, and was not sufficient to establish a
business agreement between Mrs. Seay and her husband. 84
Furthermore, the court could find no evidence that Mrs. Seay had exer-
cised any managerial or independent control over the affairs of the business.
The evidence showed only that Mrs. Seay performed duties as a secretarial
employee; the fact that Mrs. Seay received no paycheck did not imply that she
received a share of the profits as co-owner rather than as an employee.85
Thus, there was no evidence of Mrs. Seay's co-ownership of the Twin Oaks
Company, and plaintiff was not entitled to collect from her.8 6
Another partnership case involved an action by a limited partner against
the general partners to recover the amount of his investment. In Roper v.
Thomas87 the court held that the limited partner was entitled to recover his
investment in a partnership formed to construct an apartment complex, when
the mortgage on the complex was foreclosed because of the general partner's
failure to obtain permanent financing pursuant to their obligation under the
partnership agereement. This negligent breach of the partnership agreement
was the direct cause of plaintiffs loss and entitled him to recover his
investment.
The court also stated that plaintiff had standing to sue even though the
partnership had not wound up its partnership affairs.88 North Carolina law
allows a partner to sue his co-partner when the partnership was formed for a
single venture that has been completed.89 The partnership at issue was formed
for the single purpose of erecting an apartment complex, and that venture
came to an end when all of its assets were extinguished by foreclosure. Thus,
the court reasoned that plaintiffs suit was not premature.
In Dixon, Odom & Co. v. Sledge9" the North Carolina Court of Appeals
upheld the enforcement of a contract between two partners upon the dissolu-
tion of their partnership. Under the terms of the contract, defendant bound
himself for ten years to pay plaintiff fifty percent of fees received from former
clients of plaintiff. As consideration, plaintiff released defendant from all debt
83. 60 N.C. App. at 134, 298 S.E.2d at 211.
84. Id. at 133, 298 S.E.2d at 211. The court cited Supply Co. v. Reynolds, 249 N.C. 612, 107
S.E.2d 80 (1959).
85. The court relied upon N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-37(4)(b) (1982), which provides: "(4) [T]he
receipt ... of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that. . . [the receiver] is
a partner... but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received:.. . (b) as wages
of an employee."
86. 60 N.C. App. at 134, 298 S.E.2d at 211.
87. 60 N.C. App. 64, 298 S.E.2d 424 (1982).
88. The court cited Bennett v. Trust Co., 265 N.C. 148, 143 S.E.2d 312 (1965) for the general
rule that one partner cannot sue another partner until there has been a complete settlement of
partnership affairs.
89. See Pugh v. Newbern, 193 N.C. 258, 261, 136 S.E. 707, 708-09 (1927).
90. 59 N.C. App. 280, 296 S.E.2d 512 (1982).
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obligations to plaintiff, and agreed to pay a yearly sum to defendant for ten
years. Defendant later refused to pay the fees on the grounds that they were
unreasonable and that the agreement constituted an unenforceable covenant
not to compete.
Upon appeal the court affirmed summary judgment for plaintiff. The
court ruled that the agreement was not a covenant not to compete because it
neither restricted the area in which defendant could compete, nor forbade him
from serving plaintiff's former clients. The court ruled the contract was a
proper means of settling the affairs of the partnership upon dissolution and
thus was enforceable.91
2. Corporations
In geiselman v. Meiselman92 the court of appeals examined the circum-
stances under which a minority shareholder in a corporation is entitled to have
the corporation or its other shareholders buy out his interest under G.S. 55-
125.1(a)(4). 93 In addition, the court confronted the issue of whether a minor-
ity shareholder is entitled to recover in a derivative action the profits diverted
to another corporation owned solely by the majority shareholder.
Plaintiff and defendant were brothers who had inherited their interest in
Eastern Federal Corporation from their father, the founder of the corporation.
Eastern Federal was a holding company that owned the stock of several small
theater management corporations. 94 At the time of suit, defendant controlled
sixty to seventy percent of the defendant corporations, while plaintiff con-
trolled thirty to forty percent.95
Plaintiff alleged that defendant had denied him any voice in the manage-
ment of the defendant corporations or in the distribution of dividends. Plain-
tiff also claimed that defendant, as managing officer of the defendant
corporations, had entered into a contract whereby Republic Management.Cor-
poration, a company owned solely by defendant, was to manage the defendant
corporations' properties. As a result of this contract, plaintiff alleged, profits
91. Id. at 284-85, 296 S.E.2d at 515.
92. 58 N.C. App. 758, 295 S.E.2d 249 (1982).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1(a)(4) (1982) provides:
(a) In any action filed by a shareholder to dissolve the corporation under G.S. 55-125(a),
the court may make such order or grant such relief. . . as in its discretion it deems
appropriate, including... an order- . . .
(4) Providing for the purchase... of shares of any shareholder, either by the corpo-
ration or by other shareholders.
The court's discretion under G.S. 55-125.1 has been called the "most sweepfing authority granted
by any state statute, other than the South Carolina statute from which it was taken." R. ROBIN-
SON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTiCE § 29-14, at 596 (2d ed. 1974).
94. The small corporations all held stock in each other. They were joined as defendants in
the lawsuit along with the brother and Eastern Federal Corporation. 58 N.C. App. at 760, 295
S.E.2d at 252. Hereinafter the term "defendant corporations" shall be used in the text to denotejointly Eastern Federal Corp. and the smaller management companies.
95. The trial court found that defendant held 39.07% of the stock, plaintiff held 29.82%, and




were transferred from the defendant corporations to Republic. In his first
claim, plaintiff sought either dissolution of the defendant corporations under
G.S. 55-125 (A)(4),96 or a forced purchase, by defendant or by the defendant
corporations, of plaintiff's shares in the corporations. In his second claim, a
derivative action, plaintiff sought the return of the funds of the defendant cor-
porations that had been paid under the contract with Republic. The trial court
dismissed both claims. 97
The court of appeals reversed, and held that plaintiff was entitled to an
order requiring defendants to purchase plaintiff's stock under G.S. 55-125.1.
Furthermore, the court ruled that defendant would have to refund the profits
"diverted into his solely owned corporation."9 8 After discussing the legislative
history of G.S. 55-125 and G.S. 55-125.1, the court stated that the two statutes
give the trial court "plenary power to frame whatever order it sees fit to protect
the rights of a complaining shareholder." 99 Because G.S. 55-125 (a)(4) re-
quires the complaining shareholders to show only that basic fairness compels
dissolution, the court reasoned that a shareholder need only show real harm to
be entitled to relief under G.S. 55-125.1.100
In ruling that plaintiff had suffered real harm, the court relied upon evi-
dence that plaintiff had been denied any voice in either management or divi-
dend policies of the corporations. The court also found that plaintiff had been
discharged from employment by the corporation and had occasionally been, at
the order of his brother, denied access to corporate offices, account books, and
records. Noting that defendant's actions had deprived plaintiff of all control
over his inheritance, the court ruled that the harm to plaintiff was sufficient to
entitle him to relief under G.S. 55-125.1, even though the value of his interest
in the corporation had increased 300% under defendant's management.
10 1
The court also held that it was unlawful for defendant as majority share-
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982) authorizes involuntary dissolution of a corpora-
tion when "reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining
shareholder."
97. The trial court found a lack of evidence of any "oppression, overreaching on the part of
management, the taking of any unfair advantage... or any other wrongful conduct on the part
of the majority stockholder. . ." that would entitle plaintiff to relief under his first claim. 58 N.C.
App. at 768, 295 S.E.2d at 255-56. Furthermore, the court concluded that "[there has been no
actionable breach of fiduciary duty by any of the defendants" that could justify relief for the
plaintiff under his second claim. Id. at 774, 295 S.E.2d at 259.
98. Id. at 775, 295 S.E.2d at 260.
99. Id. at 765, 295 S.E.2d at 254. "It [G.S. 55-125.1] appears to permit the superior court...
to fashion virtually any type of relief it feels is equitable." R. ROBINSON, supra note 93, § 29-14, at
596. The court pointed out that G.S. 55-125.1 was copied from an identical provision in the South
Carolina Business Corporation Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23 (Law. Co-op. 1962), subsequently
recodified as S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-230 (Law. Co-op. 1976). 58 N.C. App. at 764,295 S.E.2d at
254. The court also stated that the two statutes were enacted as part of a trend to liberalize stan-
dards for dissolution by court order and to recognize the need for equitable alternatives to dissolu-
tion. Id.
100. 58 N.C. App. at 766, 295 S.E.2d at 254-55.
101. Id. at 769-70, 295 S.E.2d at 256-57. The court noted that although its liberal interpreta-
tion of G.S. 55-125 and G.S. 55-125.1 created the potential for abuse of the statute by disgruntled
minority shareholders, the courts would have to decide on a "case by case" basis whether relief
was appropriate. Id. at 772, 295 S.E.2d at 258.
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holder and managing officer of the defendant corporations, to enter into a
contract that generated profit for his solely owned corporation when plaintiff
objected to that contract. The court observed that case law'0 2 and statute10 3
impose on corporate officers and directors a fiduciary duty of good faith ex-
tending to both the corporation and the shareholder. Officers and directors are
guilty of breaching their duty whenever they use their position to acquire "an
advantage to themselves not common to all." 10 4 Thus, the court found that
defendant was in breach of his fiduciary duty to the defendant corporations
and should not be allowed to retain the profits derived from that breach.10 5
In dissent, Judge Hill rejected the conclusions reached by the majority
concerning both of plaintiffs claims.' 0 6 The dissent rejected the court's inter-
pretation of G.S. 55-125 and G.S. 55-125.1 as overly broad and conducive to
abuse by minority stockholders. In addition, because plaintiff received sub-
stantial dividend income from his holdings and had realized a large increase
in the value of his interest because of defendant's management of the corpora-
tions, Judge Hill contended that plaintiff had not been harmed. Finally, the
dissent argued that the contract between Republic and the defendant corpora-
tions was "just and reasonable"'1 7 and did not constitute a breach of duty by
defendant.
Meiselman represents the first occasion a North Carolina court has
granted relief under G.S. 55-125.1 as a matter of law. The liberal interpreta-
tion of the dissolution statutes 0" contained in the case does nothing to weaken
North Carolina's reputation as the state most receptive to corporate dissolu-
tion as a means of protecting the interests of minority shareholders. 0 9 Never-
theless, Judge Hill's fear that the decision will lead to abuse of the remedies
provided in G.S. 55-125 and G.S. 55-125.1 seems unfounded.1 10 In affirming
the principle that suits by minority shareholders seeking involuntary dissolu-
tion be assessed on a case by case basis, the court of appeals lessened the po-
tential impact of Meiselman and preserved an important barrier against
undeserving plaintiffs. Finally, the court's decision in Meiselman to ignore the
increase in value of plaintiffs stock in the defendant corporations was appro-
priate. Because of the dominant position occupied by the majority stockholder
in the closely held defendant corporations, it is unlikely that plaintiff could
have found an outside purchaser for his shares. Only by compelling the
purchase of his shares under G.S. 55-125.1 could plaintiff realize the full value
of his interest.
102. Loy v. Lorm Corp., 52 N.C. App. 428, 278 S.E.2d 897 (1981).
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982).
104. 58 N.C. App. at 774, 295 S.E.2d at 259 (quoting Pender v. Speight, 159 N.C. 612, 615, 75
S.E. 851, 852 (1912)).
105. Id. at 775, 295 S.E.2d at 259.
106. Id. at 776-78, 295 S.E.2d at 260-61 (Hill, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 777, 295 S.E.2d at 261.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-125 to -125.1 (1982).
109. See supra notes 93 & 101.
110. The dissent could offer no authority for a different interpretation of the statute.
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In Onslow Wholesale Plumbing v. FisherII' the court of appeals addressed
the question whether defendant, who served as general manager, agent, officer,
and director of a corporation, breached a fiduciary obligation to the corpora-
tion by purchasing a shareholder's stock for himself while under orders from
the corporation to purchase the stock for the corporation. Defendant in On-
slow was a vice president and director of the plaintiff corporation. 112 The
plaintiff corporation held a right of refusal or first option to purchase any
shareholder's stock. At the meeting with the corporation's president and
chairman of the board, defendant was instructed to purchase for the corpora-
tion all outstanding shares of stock other than those owned by the president,
defendant, and one other stockholder. Defendant testified that he at no time
objected to this order. Defendant later purchased shares of stock in his own
name from three other shareholders." 3
The corporation brought suit on the grounds that defendant, as a director
and officer of the corporation, had breached both a fiduciary and a statutory
duty owed to the plaintiff corporation. The trial court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs motion for partial sum-
mary judgment. Plaintiff corporation appealed on the grounds that the uncon-
tradicted facts showed defendant had breached his fiduciary duty as a general
manager, agent, officer, and director." 4
The court of appeals held that defendant breached his fiduciary duty as a
matter of law when he purchased the stock of two of the three shareholders for
himself, and that plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to summary judgment based
upon these two transactions. Defendant's testimony that the president of the
corporation had told him not to purchase the third shareholder's stock at the
price quoted raised an issue of material fact that should have been decided by
a jury-'s
The court observed that defendant had a statutory fiduciary duty to the
corporation under G.S. 55-35.116 Furthermore, defendant had a contractual
duty to follow the orders of the corporation's board of directors. According to
the court, defendant breached both obligations when he disobeyed the order to
purchase the stock for the corporation. The court also found that defendant
breached his fiduciary duty as an agent of the corporation. The court noted
that an agent breaches his fiduciary duty when he deals in an agency matter
for his own benefit without the consent of his principal." 7
111. 60 N.C App. 55, 298 S.E.2d 718 (1982).
112. Defendant was employed under a contract in which he agreed to be "subject to the gen-
eral supervision and pursuant to the orders, advice and direction of the corporation's Board of
Directors." Id. at 57, 298 S.E.2d at 720 (quoting the contract).
113. Id. at 57-58, 298 S.E.2d at 720.
114. Id. at 56, 298 S.E.2d at 719.
115. Id. at 58, 298 S.E.2d at 720. The court reasoned that if the jury found this testimony to be
true, plaintiff would have exercised its right of first refusal on the stock. Id.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982) which provides that "[olificers and directors shall be
deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation. . . and shall discharge the duties of
their respective positions in good faith .... "
117. 60 N.C. App. at 60, 298 S.E.2d at 721-22. The court relied on 3 Amf. JUR. 2D Agency
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The court found defendant's contention that he had no duty to purchase
the stock absent an instruction from the full board of directors to be without
merit. The court observed that a board of directors can take action without
meeting if the directors normally take action informally and if no director
objects to the action taken.118 The court stated that there was clear evidence
that plaintiff corporation's board regularly took such informal action, and that
two of the four directors had given their express consent to the purchase of the
stock. As a director, defendant had given consent to the action by failing to
object to the order to purchase the stock. The fourth director was one of the
shareholders from whom the defendant purchased his stock. The court stated
that defendant's actions prevented that fourth director from giving consent;
the court refused to allow defendant to benefit from his wrongdoing in this
manner. Thus, like Me/selman, the Onslow decision sent a stem message to
officers of North Carolina corporations that the courts will not tolerate self-
serving actions that work to the detriment of their corporations.
In Foreman v. Bell' 19 0: shareholder brought suit under G.S. 55-71120 on
the grounds that the board of directors had been improperly elected and that
all its actions should be declared void. Plaintiff contended that the trustees
who elected the board were improperly selected under the terms of the decla-
ration of trust, which empowered them to vote 73% of the corporation's
stock. 121
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs action and the court of appeals af-
firmed on jurisdictional grounds. The court held that the shareholder had no
standing to sue under the statute because the statute only applied to corporate
elections. Plaintifts complaint concerned the selection of the trustees who
voted the stock for others, a matter that was neither a corporate concern nor
directed to the validity of the election of the directors. 122
D. Contracts
1. Employment Contracts
The court of appeals also decided two cases concerning employment con-
tracts. In Roberts v. Wake Forest University 123 plaintiff sought to recover for
breach of an oral employment contract. The term was not fixed, but plaintiff
alleged that the parties intended for the contract to extend for at least six
§ 220 (1962), which states in part that an agent "cannot be permitted to deal in the agency matter
on his own account .... "
118. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 55-29(a)(3) (1982).
119. 56 N.C. App. 625, 289 S.E.2d 567, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 383, 294 S.E.2d 207 (1982).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-71(a) (1982) provides that "[a]ny shareholder ... may commence
a summary proceeding in the superior court to determine any controversy with respect to any
election or appointment of any director or officer of such corporation ....
121. 56 N.C. App. at 626-27, 289 S.E.2d at 567-68.
122. Id. at 628, 289 S.E.2d at 569.
123. 55 N.C. App. 430, 286 S.E.2d 120 (1982).
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years. 124 The evidence showed that plaintiff's dismissal resulted from his un-
satisfactory performance as golf coach at defendant university. The court held
that the contract was governed by the general rule that contracts for an indefi-
nite term are terminable at will by either party.125
Plaintiff relied upon dicta contained in an earlier North Carolina case,
Still v. Lance,126 in which the court stated that a contract for an indefinite
term may be enforced for a fixed term if business usage or other circumstances
indicate the parties intended to contract for a fixed term.127 Plaintiff in Rob-
erts offered evidence showing that golf coaches customarily serve long periods
and that he was classified as a permanent employee under classifications con-
tained in defendant's personnel and policy manual. The court of appeals,
however, found this evidence insufficient to establish a business usage.128 The
court held further that action by the Employment Security Commission grant-
ing unemployment benefits is not res judicata on the issue whether plaintiff
was dismissed due to his own misconduct. 129 The court noted that the doc-
trine of res judicata is inapplicable to adjudication by unemployment compen-
sation agencies. 130
In Humphrey v. Hill131 plaintiff also contended that he had made a con-
tract for "permanent employment." The court reiterated the rule that a con-
tract for permanent employment for an indefinite term is terminable at will. 132
The court acknowledged, however, that a "permanent" employment contract
may be enforced if the employee gives some consideration in addition to serv-
124. Id. at 431, 286 S.E.2d at 121. The contract was for employment as the University's golf
coach and associate athletic director. Id.
125. Id. at 434, 286 S.E.2d at 123. See Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971);
Tuttle v. Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 139 S.E.2d 249 (1964).
126. 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971) (dismissal of school teacher without cause held to be
appropriate at end of school year;, indefinite contract not terminable at will until end of school
year).
127. Id. at 259, 182 S.E.2d at 406-07. The court observed:
Where, however, there is a business usage, or other circumstance, appearing on the rec-
ord, or of which the court may take judicial notice, which shows that, at the time the
parties contracted, they intended the employment to continue through a fixed term, the
contract cannot be terminated at an earlier period except for cause or by mutual consent.
Id. See Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 435 (1943); 53 Ass. JUR. 2D Master
and Servant § 27 (1970); Annot., 161 A.L.R. 706 (1946).
128. 55 N.C. App. at 435, 286 S.E.2d at 123-24. The court said that under North Carolina law
the term "permanent" employment simply refers to a position of some permanence as contrasted
with temporary employment and that "ordinarily, where there is no additional expression as to
duration, a contract for permanent employment implies an indefinite general hiring terminable at
will." Id. at 436, 286 S.E.2d at 124. See Howell v. Credit Corp., 238 N.C. 442, 78 S.E.2d 146
(1953); Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 436 (1943).
129. 55 N.C. App. at 436, 286 S.E.2d at 124. Plaintiff based his contention upon the rule that
an employee is disqualified for benefits if he leaves work voluntarily without good cause attributa-
ble to the employer, or if he is discharged for misconduct connected with his work. SEE N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 96-14(1) & (2) (Cum. Supp. 1981). Roberts is apparently the first time a North
Carolina court has addressed this question. See Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Employ-
ment Comm., 28 Cal. 2d 33, 168 P.2d 686 (1946); Waterbury Say. Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 78,
20 A.2d 455 (1941).
130. See 76 Am. JUR. 2D Unemployment Compensation § 93 (1975).
131. 55 N.C. App. 359, 285 S.E.2d 293 (1982).
132. See supra note 128.
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ices rendered.13 3 Plaintiff in Humphrey claimed that by giving up another job
he had furnished additional consideration 134 because even though "the giving
up of present or future jobs may be a detriment to the employee, it is also an
incident necessary to place him in a position to accept and perform the con-
tract." 135 In dictum, the court suggested that if plaintiff agreed not to go into
business with a competitor, and defendant's position were thereby enhanced, a
contract for permanent employment might be enforced.136
2. Building and Construction Contracts
The court of appeals considered several issues concerning building and
construction contracts in Triangle Air Conditioning v. Caswell County Board of
Education.137 The parties in that case had contracted for the construction of
part of an addition to a school. The contract required that any additional
work, change in work, change in contract sum or contract time be authorized
by written change order from the owner or architect. l38 A separate clause
provided that, should the contractor wish to make a claim for an increase in
the contract sum, "he shall give the Architect written notice thereof within
twenty days after the occurrence of the event giving rise to such claim." 139
133. 55 N.C. App. at 360-61, 285 S.E.2d at 295. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Hall, 68 F.2d
533 (4th Cir. 1934); Tuttle v. Kemersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 139 S.E.2d 249 (1964);
Stevens v. Southern RR., 187 N.C. 528, 122 S.E. 295 (1924); Fisher v. John L. Roper Lumber Co.,
183 N.C. 485, 111 S.E. 857 (1922).
134. The court listed some additional factors that would constitute sufficient consideration to
render such a contract enforceable: "Where the employee gives some special consideration in
addition to his services, such as relinquishing a claim for personal injuries against the employer,
removing his residence from one place to another in order to accept employment, or assisting in
breaking a strike, such a contract may be enforced." 55 N.C. App. at 362, 285 S.E.2d at 296
(quoting Burkhimer v. Gealy, 39 N.C. App. 450, 454, 250 S.E.2d 678, 682, cert. denied, 297 N.C.
298, 254 S.E.2d 918 (1979)).
135. 55 N.C. App. at 362, 285 S.E.2d at 296. See Winand v. Case, 154 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md.
1957); Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 436 (1943); Minter v. Tootle, Camp-
bell Drygoods Co., 187 Mo. App. 16, 173 S.W. 4 (1915).
136. 55 N.C. App. at 363, 285 S.E.2d at 296. See Fletcher v. Agar Mfg. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 650
(W.D. Mo. 1942); 60 A.L.R.3D 266 (1974).
137. 57 N.C. App. 482, 291 S.E.2d 808 (1982).
138. The relevant provision of the contract stated:
12.1 CHANGE ORDERS
12.1.1. The Owner, without invalidating the Contract, may order Changes in the Work
within the general scope of the Contract consisting of additions, deletions or other revi-
sions, the Contract Sum and the Contract Time being adjusted accordingly. All such
Changes in the Work shall be authorized by Change Order, and shall be executed under
the applicable conditions of the Contract Documents.
12.1.2 A Change Order is a written order to the Contractor signed by the Owner and
the Architect, issued after the execution of the Contract, authorizing a Change in the
Work or an adjustment in the Contract Sum or the Contract Time. Alternatively, the
Change Order may be signed by the Architect alone, provided he has written authority
from the Owner for such procedure and that a copy of such written authority is furnished
to the Contractor upon request. A Change Order may also be signed by the Contractor
if he agrees to the adjustment in the Contract Sum or the Contract Time. The Contract
Sum and the Contract Time may be changed only by Change Order.
Id. at 484-85, 291 S.E.2d at 810.
139. Id at 485, 291 S.E.2d at 810. The provision in full provided:
12.2 CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL COST
12.2.1 If the Contractor wishes to make a claim for an increase in the Contract Sum, he
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The same section also provided that "[a]ny change in the Contract Sum result-
ing from such claim shall be authorized by Change Order." 140
The court of appeals found that plaintiff incurred increased costs due to
delay caused by other contractors on the project. This delay, the court noted,
did not occur on a specific date. Therefore, written notice of plaintiff's claim
forty-nine days after the completion date of the contract was sufficient despite
the twenty-day provision in the contract. 141 In addition, the court held that
defendant, through its conduct, had waived the requirement of a written
change order. Evidence showed that although plaintiff made two written re-
quests for additional compensation, defendant did not reply 1 42 Plaintiff con-
tinued work thereafter only because its bonding company required it to do so.
The court cited no authority in ruling on the twenty-day notice provision;
the point apparently has not been frequently litigated. There is certainly a
good argument that the provision was breached. Though the date on which
delay in a construction project occurs cannot always be specified, it seems ob-
vious that a delay has occured when the completion date of the contract passes
and the project remains unfinished. At the very least a contractor giving no-
tice of a claim arising from a delay under a provision such as the one in Trian-
gle Air Conditioning should be expected to give notice within twenty days of
the completion date of the contract.
The court's decision was probably influenced by the inequitable result
such a rule would have imposed in the case. Plaintiff had clearly suffered
losses through no fault of its own. Moreover, defendant had been apprised of
plaintiffs extra expense by plaintiff's requests for additional compensation.
The court in Triangle Air Conditioning was on more solid ground in hold-
ing that defendant had waived the requirement for a written change order. It is
settled that parties may waive a contract provision through a course of con-
duct.143 Although courts generally are reluctant to find a waiver of provisions
requiring a written change order in cases involving public works, 44 the facts
in this case were strong enough to warrant a finding of waiver. Defendant's
shall give the Architect written notice thereof within twenty days after the occurrence of
the event giving rise to such claim. This notice shall be given by the Contractor before
proceeding to execute the Work .... No such claim shall be valid unless so made. If
the Owner and the Contractor cannot agree on the amount of the adjustment in the
Contract Sum, it shall be determined by the Architect. Any change in the Contract Sum
resulting from such claim shall be authorized by Change Order.
Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 488, 291 S.E.2d at 411-12. See Shalman v. Board of Educ., 31 A.D.2d 338, 297
N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1969) (similar facts, but notice provision was incorporated in statute; claim for loss
because of delay does not accrue until extent of damages can be ascertained). See also Annot., 88
A.L.R. 1223 (1934).
142. "The event which gave rise to the plaintiff's demand was the delay in the construction. It
did not occur on a specific date. We hold that under the forecast of evidence in this case that the
plaintiff complied with the notice requirement. ... 57 N.C. App. at 488, 291 S.E.2d at 811-12.
143. General Specialties Co. v. Teer Co., 41 N.C. App. 273, 254 S.E.2d 658 (1979); Garrison
Grading Co. v. Piracci Constr. Co., 27 N.C. App. 725, 221 S.E.2d 512 (1975); Graham and Son,
Inc. v. Board of Educ., 25 N.C. App. 163, 212 S.E.2d 542 (1975).
144. See 65 AM. JUR. 2D Public Works and Contracts § 195 (1972).
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inaction in response to plaintiffs request for a change order, coupled with its
knowledge that plaintiff was continuing work on the project, seem sufficient to
justify a holding that defendant waived the contractual requirement.145
E. Unmform Commercial Code
1. Sales
In Bernick v. Jurden 146 the North Carolina Supreme Court held for the
first time that the absence of privity between plaintiff and defendant does not
bar plaintiffs action on an implied warranty. PlaintiffinBernick was a college
hockey player struck in the face with a hockey stick during a game. Although
plaintiff was wearing a mouthguard at the time, it shattered; as a result, plain-
tiff suffered a fractured jaw and four broken teeth.147 Plaintiff subsequently
brought an action for breach of express and implied warranties against the
manufacturer and seller of the mouthguard. The trial court granted defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment. 148 Following dismissal of plaintiffs ap-
peal by the court of appeals, the supreme court granted discretionary review.
The court first addressed plaintiffs express warranty claim. Although
plaintiffs mother had purchased the mouthguard, the court ruled that under
G.S. 25-2-318, "[p]laintiff as a third-party beneficiary of any express warranty
made to his mother gets the benefit of the same warranty which she received as
purchaser."149 The absence of plaintiffs personal reliance upon the represen-
tations contained on the product was thus found to be "of no importance." 150
In ruling that plaintiff could maintain an implied warranty action against
defendant manufacturer despite the absence of privity, the court relied upon
Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. Co. 151 In Kinlaw the court held that the absence of priv-
ity was not fatal to a claim by plaintiff for breach of express warranty. The
court noted that "[t]he privity bound procedure whereby the purchaser claims
against the retailer, the retailer against the distributor, and the distributor, in
turn, against the manufacturer ... is unnecessarily expensive and waste-
145. Annot., 2 A.L.R. 3D 620 (1965); Annot., 1 A.L.RL 173 (1919).
146. 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).
147. Id at 437, 293 S.E.2d at 407.
148. Among the grounds defendants offered in support of the trial court's action were that
plaintiff had not himself relied upon any express warranty and that plaintiffs implied warranty
claim was barred by lack of privity. 306 N.C. at 447-48, 293 S.E.2d at 413-14.
149. Id at 448, 293 S.E.2d at 413. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1965) provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in
the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of
this section.
Official Comment 2 to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1965) states in part that "the purpose of this
section is to give the buyer's family, household and guests the benefit of the same warranty which
the buyer received in the contract of sale, thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from any techni-
cal rules as to 'privity'."
150. 306 N.C. at 448, 293 S.E.2d at 413.
151. 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979).
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ful.,1"52 The court in Bernick expressly adopted this rationale and concluded
that plaintiffs claim for breach of implied warranty was not barred by lack of
privity.153 The court bolstered its conclusion that privity was not required by
reference to G.S. 99B-2(b), North Carolina's product liability statute, which
provides that as of October 1, 1979, lack of privity of contract shall not bar
product liability actions against a manufacturer for breach of implied
warranty. 154
Prior to the Bernick decison, at least one commentator urged that the ra-
tionale of Kinlaw did not extend to suits based upon breach of implied war-
ranty. 155 The writer argued that "[b]ecause implied warranties are imposed by
law and often have no real consensual basis, the Kinlaw court's objective of
holding a manufacturer directly responsible for his assurances to the consumer
does not extend to implied warranty."'156 Bernick obviously rejects this rea-
soning. Two court of appeals cases decided after Kinlaw, both of which held
that Kinlaw did not abolish privity as a prerequisite to implied warranty
claims, 157 must now either be deemed overruled or distinguished as concern-
ing actions filed before October 1, 1979.158
Only seven days after Bernick was decided, the court of appeals con-
cluded in McCollum v. Grove Mfg. Co. 159 that plaintiff could not recover on a
breach of warranty theory because he lacked "the contractual privity necessary
for an action based upon an implied warranty."'160 Plaintiff in A.AcCollum sued
to recover damages for injuries sustained when he was struck by a crane
designed and manufactured by defendant. 161 Plaintiff sought to recover, in
part, on a breach of warranty theory. The court of appeals, citing cases de-
cided prior to Bernick,162 simply held that no action for breach of implied
warranty would lie absent privity of contract.163 The court of appeals was
evidently unaware of the supreme court's holding in Bernick; nevertheless,
McCollum may also be distinguishable because the claim in that case had
been fied in September 1979.164
In Simmons v. C. W. Myers Trading Post, Inc.165 plaintiff leased a mobile
152. Id. at 500-01, 259 S.E.2d at 557.
153. 306 N.C. at 449, 203 S.E.2d at 414.
154. Id at 449, 293 S.E.2d at 414. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(b) (1979). Plaintiff in
Bernick filed his complaint on December 14, 1979. 306 N.C. at 436, 293 S.E.2d at 407.
155. See Note, Products Liability-No Pivity Requirement f Express Warranty Addressed to
the Ultimate Consumer, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 857, 873 (1980).
156. Id.
157. Davis v. Sioo, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 237, 246, 267 S.E.2d 354, 360 (1980); Richard W.
Cooper Agency, Inc. v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 46 N.C. App. 248, 251, 264 S.E.2d 768, 770
(1980).
158. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
159. 58 N.C. App. 283, 293 S.E.2d 632 (1982).
160. Id at 291, 293 S.E.2d at 638.
161. Id at 284, 293 S.E.2d at 634.
162. Davis v. Siloo, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354 (1980); Fowler v. General Elec.
Co., 40 N.C. App. 301, 252 S.E.2d 862 (1979).
163. 58 N.C. App. at 291, 293 S.E.2d at 638.
164. Id. at 284, 293 S.E.2d at 634; see supra note 154 and accompanying text.
165. 56 N.C. App. 549, 290 S.E.2d 710, modified, 307 N.C. 122, 296 S.E.2d 294 (1982).
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home from defendant under a contract that gave plaintiff ownership of the
trailer upon completion of payments. After a fire destroyed the mobile home,
plaintiff sued defendant to recover a portion of the payments made defendant.
Plaintiff alleged that, before purchase of the trailer, defendant had agreed to
make certain repairs, and that his fialure to do so lowered the value of the
trailer and entitled plaintiff to damages. The trial court directed a verdict for
defendant. Although the written contract provided that the trailer was "leased
as is," the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. 166
The court held that the Retail Installment Sales Act' 67 prevented waiver
of the express warranty. The court noted that the sales agreement came within
the definition of a consumer credit sale under G.S. 25A-2(b). 168 G.S. 25A-20
prevents exclusion from the written agreement of any express warranty made
as part of the bargain. 169 The court held that if plaintiff prevailed at trial, she
could recover the difference between the value of the mobile home as war-
ranted and the value as actually received. 170 The court also held that she
would be entitled to treble damages under G.S. 25A-44.171 On appeal, the
North Carolina Supreme Court modified the holding, stating that the treble
damages issue should not have been decided before a jury verdict for plain-
tiff.172 The supreme court apparently based its ruling on the statutory require-
ment that the violation be "wilful;" under chapter 25A there appears to be no
other barrier to an award of treble damages should plaintiff prevail at trial. 173
North Carolina courts have consistently been among those holding that
the contributory negligence of a purchaser of defective goods bars recovery
against the seller in a warranty action. In the leading North Carolina case on
the issue, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Don Allen Chevrolet Co., 17 4 the
supreme court held that a plaintiff who operated an automobile with knowl-
edge that the engine leaked gasoline was barred from recovering damages
caused by the explosion of the auto. In Arrington v. Brad Ragan, Inc. 175 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals distinguished Nationwide and reversed sum-
mary judgment for the seller of an oil heater that exploded and caused the
buyer's home to be destroyed by fire.
In Arrington plaintiff presented evidence that the heater made unusual
166. id at 555, 290 S.E.2d at 714.
167. N.C. GEN STAT. § 25A-20 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-2(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981). The apparent purpose of this section is
to give a purchaser under a contract that is formally a lease or bailment the same rights that a
buyer under an actual installment sales contract would have.
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-20 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
170. The court relied upon N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-714(2) (1965), which is a codification of
the common law as it existed in North Carolina.
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-44(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981) states that "the knowing and willing
violation" of any provision of Chapter 25A is an unfair trade practice under G.S. 75-1.1. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981) provides that a violation of any unfair trade practice rule under Chap-
ter 75 entitles the injured party to treble damages.
172. 307 N.C. at 124, 296 S.E.2d at 295.
173. See supra note 171.
174. 253 N.C. 243, 116 S.E.2d 780 (1960).
175. 56 N.C. App. 416, 289 S.E.2d 122, cert. denied, 305 N.C. 759, 292 S.E.2d 573 (1982).
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noises, gave off an odor of fuel oil, and overheated after twenty minutes if set
on low or medium settings. Plaintiff testified, however, that the heater had
never malfunctioned while set on pilot. While away overnight, plaintiff left
the heater set on pilot. Evidence showed that the heater exploded and de-
stroyed the house by fire. The court of appeals distinguished the case from
Nationwide on the ground that plaintiff in Arrington did not know that the
heater would malfunction if set on pilot. 176 The court stated that the question
whether plaintiff knew or by reasonable diligence should have known that the
heater would malfunction if set on pilot was an issue for the jury.177 The facts
in Arrington did not differ markedly from those in Nationwide. In both cases
plaintiff knew that the product was at least partially defective. A strong argu-
ment can be made that plaintiff in Arrington should have realized the possible
danger created by the defective heater, even though he noticed the odor only
when the heater was set on low or medium. The court's decision to allow the
case to go to the jury suggests that the court might now be willing to impose a
less stringent burden upon the purchaser of a defective product than that im-
posed in previous cases.178 Nevertheless, it should be noted that Nationwide
concerned an express warranty; plaintiff in Arrington sued for breach of im-
plied warranty. The Arrington result may, therefore, reflect a greater judicial
reluctance to allow defendants to avoid warranty liability arising by operation
of law.
The issue of plaintifi's negligence in Arrington may turn upon the "rea-
sonable diligence" requirement articulated by the court. 179 What standard of
care reasonable diligence requires of the purchaser, however, is unclear. While
states differ on whether contributory negligence is a bar to recovery on war-
ranty theory,180 apparently all states recognize some form of purchaser's con-
duct as a bar to recovery.' 8 ' Both Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of
176. Id at 418, 289 S.E.2d at 124.
177. Id.
178. Other North Carolina cases barring recovery on warranty because of the contributory
negligence of plaintiff include Douglas v. Mailing and Son, 265 N.C. 362, 144 S.E.2d 138 (1965);
Veach v. Bacon Am. Corp., 266 N.C. 542, 146 S.E.2d 793 (1966). Note, however, that both cases
arose in a commercial setting.
179. 56 N.C. App. at 417, 289 S.E.2d at 123-124.
180. Cases holding that contributory negligence is not a defense include Texsun Feed Yards,
Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971); Dillon v. General Motors Corp., 315 A.2d
732 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aft'd, 367 A.2d 1020 (Del. 1976); Gregory v. White Truck & Equip.
Co., 163 Ind. App. 240, 323 N.E.2d 280 (1975); Imperial Die Casting Co. v. Cavil Insulation Co.,
264 S.C. 604,216 S.E.2d 532(1975). For another jurisdiction holding that contributory negligence
is a defense to a warranty action see Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298
N.E.2d 622 (1973). Some courts deal with the issue of plaintfifs negligent conduct in terms of
proximate cause. See, eg., Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962); FordMotor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486, 224 S.E.2d 168, aft'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
237 Ga. 554, 229 S.E.2d 379 (1976).
181. Assumption of risk is a defense in states in which contributory negligence is not. See J.
WHIE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-8 (2d ed. 1980). Distinguishing the
doctrines is difficult, however, because as White and Summers note, "one court's assumption of
risk may be another's contributory negligence and vice versa." Id at 412. See infra note 183. See
generally Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of
Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1972); Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufac-
turer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REv. 627 (1968).
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Torts refer to an "assumption of risk" defense under which a purchaser who
knowingly encounters a dangerous product is barred from recovery.18 2 This
defense, however, places no burden upon the purchaser to inspect the product
for defects. The formal difference between contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk as defenses to warranty actions thus appears to be that only
under the former doctrine is the purchaser required to inspect for defects.' 8 3
Arrington, in which plaintiff recovered despite failure to inspect, could be ex-
plained on the basis of this distinction had the court not stated that plaintiff
did, indeed, have a duty to inquire reasonably into defects.184 Plaintiff in Ar-
rington had reason to inquire into defects in the heater, since it emitted oil
fumes. On the other had, the difference between Nationwide and Arrington
may be explained because in Nationwide, plaintiff did nothing to repair the
automobile, while plaintiff inArrington sought to have the heater repaired. 85
The Arrington court may have viewed this action as lightening plaintiffs bur-
den to inquire into defects later. If so, the result ofArrington could represent a
partial reconciliation of the contributory negligence rule in North Carolina
with the assumption of risk rule in other states. In the final analysis, the result
in Arrington should turn on whether plaintiffs conduct was so unreasonable
that he should not be permitted to rely upon the seller's implied warranty.186
When any question exists on the issue, the best approach is to allow the jury to
decide whether plaintiff should be barred from recovery.
In Cudahy Foods Co. v. Holloway 187 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of when a purchaser of goods is a "merchant" for purposes
of applying the exception in G.S. 25-2-201(2) to the writing requirement of the
statute of frauds.' 8 8 Defendant in Cudahy was an experienced real estate bro-
182. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 670-71 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORT § 402A, comment n (1976). The Restatement rule deals with strict liability.
Because North Carolina has refused to adopt strict liability generally, the Restatement rule is
perhaps not directly applicable, though warranty liability is analogous to strict liability.
183. Compare Dillon v. General Motors Corp., 315 A.2d 732 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), a'd, 367
A.2d 1020 (Del. 1976) (plaintiffs contributory negligence no bar to warranty action absent knowl-
edge of danger); Texsun Feed Yards v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971)(contribu-
tory negligence in failure to discover defect not a bar to warranty suit); Gregory v. White Truck &
Equip. Co., 163 Ind. App. 240, 323 N.E.2d 280 (1975); with Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973) (negligence in failing to discover defect bars recovery on
warranty theory). But see Bereman v. Burdolski, 204 Kan. 162, 460 P.2d 567 (1969) (suggesting
that the result in either assumption of risk or contributory negligence jurisdictions is likely to be
the same because it is possible in most contributory negligence cases to find voluntary exposure to
a known risk).
184. 56 N.C. App. at 417, 289 S.E.2d at 124. Given North Carolina's unwillingness to adopt
strict liability, it is unlikely that a North Carolina court would allow recovery when plaintiff had
unreasonably failed to discover a defect. In fact, U.C.C. § 2-715 Comment 5 (1978) suggests there
is a duty to conduct a reasonable inspection of the goods.
185. 253 N.C. at 250, 289 S.E.2d at 123.
186. See Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio and Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744
(1970), for a good discussion of the issues involved.
187. 55 N.C. App. 626, 286 S.E.2d 606 (1982).
188. N.C. GEN STAT. § 25-2-201(2) (1965) provides that:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract
and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know
its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (I) against such a party unless
written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is received.
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ker who had invested in a restaurant. Allegedly on the oral promise of de-
fendant to guarantee payment, plaintiff sold cheese worth $11,000 to the res-
taurant. 189 Plaintiff sent defendant an invoice,190 and sued to collect the
purchase price when the restaurant filed bankrupcy proceedings. The trial
court granted summary judgment for plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed
holding that the statute of frauds barred proof of the oral contract because
defendant was not a "merchant" within the meaning of G.S. 25-2-201(2).
Plaintiff in Cudahy argued that defendant, as a businesswoman with
twenty-four years of experience in a real estate development business, met the
definition of "merchant" in G.S. 25-2-104.191 Plaintiff noted that Comment 2
to that section states that "every person in business" will be considered a
"merchant" for "non-specialized business practices such as answering
mail." 192 Plaintiff argued that the cases dealing with this issue generally focus
upon the "professionalism" of the party to be charged.193 On this basis, plain-
tiff argued that general business knowledge acquired by defendant as a real
estate broker was sufficient to make her a "merchant" for the purposes of G.S.
25-2-201(2).
In rejecting plaintiffs argument the court of appeals stressed that defend-
ant did not deal in cheese, that she was not in the restaurant business, and that
a real estate broker is not a dealer in "goods" under the definition contained in
G.S. 25-2-105.194 The court noted that familiarity with trade practices might
sometimes be sufficient to confer "merchant" status: "However, the familiarity
with trade customs test is not so broad as to extend to the isolated purchase of
a type of goods unrelated and unnecessary to the business or occupation of the
buyer." 195
The court's reasoning in this respect is somewhat confusing. Although
the court referred to comment 2 of G.S. 25-2-104, which states that every per-
son in business is a "merchant" for the purposes of G.S. 25-2-201(2) if he is
acting in his "mercantile capacity,"' 196 the court held that defendant was not a
"merchant." The fact that the cheese in Cudahy was unrelated and unneces-
sary to defendant's real estate business should make no difference under the
189. Plaintiff knew that the restaurant was having fnancial difficulties, and claimed that it
would ship the cheese only upon defendant's promise to guarantee payment. 55 N.C. App. at 627,
286 S.E.2d at 606.
190. Defendant admitted receipt of the invoice, but claimed that she immediately contacted
plaintiffs offices and disclaimed the obligation to pay. 55 N.C. App. at 626, 286 S.E.2d at 606.
191. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-104 (1965) provides:
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed
by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who has by his knowl-
edge or occupation held himself out as having such skill.
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-104 comment 2 (1978).
193. Brief for Plaintiff at 7-8, 55 N.C. App. 626, 286 S.E.2d 606. See Dacatur Coop. Ass'n v.
Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 176, 547 P.2d 323, 328 (1976).
194. 55 N.C. App. at 627, 286 S.E.2d at 607.
195. Id.
196. See supra note 191.
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Code. In addition, the general purpose of G.S. 25-2-201(2), to prevent abuse
by the recipient of confirmatory memos, provides further support for interpret-
ing the definition in comment 2 of "merchant" as "any person in business."' 197
The more difficult issue concerning the application of the Code to Cudahy
arises out of the court's statement that G.S. 25-2-201(2) applies only to a per-
son in his "mercantile capacity." 198 The court of appeals apparently meant to
suggest that defendant was not acting in her "mercantile capacity," but purely
as a private investor, when she allegedly promised payment for the cheese. 199
It is not clear whether the court's interpretation of "mercantile capacity" is the
one intended by the Code. Comment 2 to G.S. 25-2-104 gives the example of
a lawyer or bank president who purchases fishing tackle for his own use as a
transaction not within the purchaser's "mercantile capacity." 200 The example
could be interpreted as meaning that whenever a businessman engages in
transactions unrelated to his business, he is not a "merchant". This interpreta-
tion would support the court's result. The example, however, could also be
interpreted as meaning that a businessman is not a "merchant" when he acts
only as a consumer, but is otherwise held to merchant standards.
The latter view appears preferable. The premise underlying G.S. 25-2-
201(2) support this reasoning.20' In these cases, most of which have involved
farmers sued for breach of an oral contract to sell their crops, courts have
generally focused upon the issue of "professionalism." Those courts holding
that the farmer is not a "merchant" generally view the farmer as an inexperi-
enced or casual seller.202 Courts that find farmers to be "merchants" focus on
the farmer's knowledge of the market and familiarity with nonspecialized
business skills such as opening mail.203 Although defendant in Cudahy did
not have experience in the cheese market, the facts suggest she possessed as
much "business knowledge" as would an experienced farmer. Her alleged
guarantee of payment was the action not of a casual purchasor but of an active
participant in a business. Her experience in the real estate businees for over
197. The purpose of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(2) (1965), as articulated by the drafters of the
Code and other writers, was to prevent the unjust situation created by the practice of sending
confirmations of oral contracts, thereby binding the sender but not the receiver. Because this
practice was common among businesses, it was believed that any person in business should be
bound by a confirmation if he did not respond within a reasonable period. See Malcolm, The
Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAW. 113, 182-83 (1951) (discussion before the Editorial Board
of the U.C.C., Jan. 28, 1951). The discussion contained therein suggests that those provisions
assuming ordinary business competence and experience, such as the duty to reply to a memoran-
dum, have nothing to do with whether the receiver is an expert with respect to the particular
goods. All purchasers except consumers should be bound by these duties.
198. U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2 (1978).
199. The court noted that this was an "isolated purchase" of goods unrelated to defendant's
occupation. 55 N.C. App. at 629, 286 S.E.2d at 607.
200. See supra note 191.
201. See supra note 196.
202. See Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975): Cook Grains, Inc. v.
Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965).
203. See Campbell v. Yokel, 10 Ill. App. 3d 702,313 N.E.2d 628 (1974); Rush Johnson Farms,
Inc. v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 555 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Nelson v. Union Equity Co-
op. Exch., 548 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1977).
1044 [Vol. 61
COMMERCIAL LAW
twenty years suggests she should have realized that an invoice received in the
mail merits a prompt response.
Because North Carolina has held a farmer with minimal experience in the
farming business to be a "merchant" for the purpose of enforcing an oral
agreement to sell grain,2°4 the result is unexpected. The court may have been
concerned that a real estate developer might be unaware of practices in a retail
market. Such concern, however, is unjustified by the facts: defendant's real
estate firm often installed heating systems and appliances in the homes it con-
structed.205 Furthermore, a businesswoman with defendant's experience
should realize that the confirmation had the potential to render her liable. A
holding that defendant was a "merchant" for G.S. 25-2-201(2) would not
make defendant a "merchant" under other provisions of the Code, such as
those imposing warranties of merchantability.2°6 To allow an experienced
businesswoman to bind a plaintiff seller to that seller's confirmation, but not
bind herself, preserves the very inequities that G.S. 25-2-201(2) was intended
to remedy.
In Wright v. O'Neal Motors, Inc. 207 the court of appeals examined the
circumstances under which a buyer may revoke acceptance under G.S. 25-2-
608.208 Plaintiff, the purchaser of an automobile, brought an action against
the seller and the manufacturer to revoke his acceptance on the ground that
the automobile had such defects that its value to plaintiff was substantially
impaired.209 The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment.210
The court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part.211 The court
204. Currick Grain Co. v. Powell, 38 N.C. App. 71, 246 S.E.2d 853 (1978).
205. 55 N.C. App. at 626, 286 S.E.2d at 606.
206. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(2) comment 2 (1965), includes as a merchant "any person in
business." The second group of sections includes the warranty of merchantability, and applies
only to sellers of the particular goods involved in the transaction. The third group, dealing with
"good faith" and other problems, restricts the definition of "merchant" to persons familiar either
with the goods or the practices in the particular business.
207. 57 N.C. App. 49, 291 S.E.2d 165 (1982).
208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-608 (1965) provides:
(1)The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconform-
ity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it:
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has
not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably in-
duced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
209. 57 N.C. App. at 49-50, 291 S.E.2d at 165. Plaintiff alleged that on the day after he
purchased the automobile he experienced "a roaring noise while driving as well as excessive vibra-
tion, fluid leaks, poor gas milage, a dead battery, the car would pull to the right and other serious
defects." Id.
210. Id.
211. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for defendant manufacturer in light
of the majority rule that revocation of acceptance is a remedy available to the buyer only against
the seller, and that the manufacturer, in the absence of a contractual relationship with the ultimate
consumer, is not a seller. See Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir.
1974); Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. 472, 188 S.E.2d 653 (1972)(by implication); but see Durfee v.
Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977), notedin Comment, Uniform Commercial
Code: Buyers of Nonconforming Goods Who Revoke Acceptance Under Section 2-608 May Recover
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first addressed the question of substantial impairment under G.S. 25-2-608.
Adopting a two-part test, the court of appeals ruled that substantiality of im-
pairment must be assessed under both (1) a subjective standard, measured by
the buyer's needs, circumstances, and reaction to the nonconformity, and (2)
an objective standard, measured by the product's market value, reliability,
safety, and usefulness for purposes for which similar goods are generally
used.212 Plaintiff had the burden of proof on these two standards at the start
of trial; however, because defendant moved for summary judgment, the bur-
den shifted.213 The court held that because defendant attacked plaintiffs
cause on only the objective standard, summary judgment was improper.2 14
The court next examined defendant's contention that plaintiffs failure to
inspect the car before purchase was a complete defense on the issue of defects
that might have been discovered by inspection at the time of delivery.215 The
court held that the provisions of G.S. 25-2-608(l)(b) make it clear that "ac-
ceptance of goods without discovery of nonconformities must be judged in the
light of whether such acceptance 'was reasonably induced either by the diffi-
culty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances."' 216 Because
there were different versions of what took place at the time of sale and deliv-
ery, it remained for the trier of fact to resolve those issues regarding plaintiffs
opportunity to inspect.2 17
2. Secured Transactions
In Church v. Mickler218 the court of appeals held that a creditor's failure
to notify a debtor of the sale of collateral does not absolutely bar the creditor's
right to a deficiency judgment, provided that the creditor can prove the collat-
eral was sold for its market value.219 Following default by defendant, plaintiff
inMickler brought an action for deficiency judgment on a lease-purchase con-
tract of farm machinery. Plaintiff had repossessed and sold the equipment at a
private sale without notifying defendant. After the sale, plaintiff had repur-
chased some of the equipment from the foreclosure purchaser. Defendant
contested plaintiffs right to a deficiency judgment and counterclaimed for re-
covery of the amount provided in G.S. 25-9-507(1) for plaintiffs failure to give
notice of the sale. 20 Defendant also charged that plaintiffs repurchase of col-
the Purchase Price From a Remote Supplier Despite Lack of Privity ofContract, 63 MINN. L. REV.
665 (1979).
212. 57 N.C. App. at 51-52, 291 S.E.2d at 167. See generally Annot., 98 A.L.R.3n 1183 (1980);
J. WHrrE & R. SumMERs, supra note 181, § 8-3, at 308-09 (2d ed. 1980).
213. 57 N.C. App. at 54, 291 S.E.2d at 168.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 55, 291 S.E.2d at 168.
216. Id. See supra note 208.
217. 57 N.C. App. at 55, 291 S.E.2d at 168.
218. 55 N.C. App. 724, 287 S.E.2d 131 (1982).
219. Id. at 728, 287 S.E.2d at 134.
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-507(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the provi-
sions of this part, disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and
conditions. If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notifica-
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lateral constituted self-dealing.221 The trial court awarded judgment for
plaintiff and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court noted that, although G.S. 25-9-504(3)222 mandates notification
of sale, failure to notify the debtor simply causes the debt to be credited with
the amount that could have been obtained through commercially reasonable
sale of the collateral.22 3 In addition, lack of notice gives rise to a presumption
that the collateral was worth at least the amount of the debt. This presump-
tion, however, may be overcome if the creditor proves that the collateral was
sold at market value and that market value was less than the amount of the
debt.224 Courts in other jurisdictions have employed the same presump-
tion.2 2 5 The argument in favor of allowing a creditor a deficiency judgment
despite his misbehavior is that, because G.S. 25-9-507 constitutes a compre-
hensive codification of a debtor's remedies, and because that section makes no
reference to denial of a deficiency judgment, such a denial is not a permissible
remedy.2 6 This argument is bolstered by the statement in G.S. 25-9-201 that
the creditor has all the rights that his agreement with the debtor gives him
(except when the Code specifically provides otherwise).227
Unpersuaded by this reasoning, other courts have suggested that compli-
ance with the provisions of part five, article nine is a condition precedent to
recovery of a deficiency.228 Their stance is supported by G.S. 25-1-103,229 the
Code's incorporation of the general rules of common law and equity. Under
this provision, a court's denial of a deficiency merely represents the exercise of
traditional equitable powers.230 The debtor can also argue that silence of part
five in the face of this prior case law indicates that the Code leaves courts free
don or whose security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the
disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by failure to
comply with the provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor
has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit service plus 10
percent (10%) of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus 10
percent (10%) of the cash price.
Because the farm machinery purchased in Mickler could not be classified as "consumer goods",
the court denied defendant the sanction sought under G.S. § 25-9-507(1). 55 N.C. App. at 729,
287 S.E.2d at 134.
221. 55 N.C. App. at 726, 287 S.E.2d at 134. The court disagreed and noted that defendant
provided no authority for the proposition that the repurchase of collateral is commercially unrea-
sonable. Id. at 732, 287 S.E.2d at 136.
222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-504(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides for the methods to be fol-
lowed by a secured party in disposing of collateral.
223. 55 N.C. App. at 728, 287 S.E.2d at 134. See Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 223
S.E.2d 848 (1976).
224. 55 N.C. App. at 728, 287 S.E.2d at 134.
225. See, eg., United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied
sub nom. Baker v. United States, 421 U.S. 912 (1975); In re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973);
Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. App. 1977).
226. J. WHiTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 181, § 26-15, at 1127.
227. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-201 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
228. See, e.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963),
mod#Fedon othergrounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); Braswell v. American Nat'1 Bank, 117 Ga.
App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968).
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-103 (1965).
230. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 181, § 26-15, at 1127.
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to reach this result.23 1
Arguably, the rule adopted by the court inMickler is the better rule. Abo-
lition of the deficiency judgment because of the creditor's misbehavior may
tend to restrict the availability of credit.23 2 Furthermore, because failure to
notify places a greater burden of proof on the creditor when he brings suit for
deficiency judgment, it is unlikely that the Mickler rule will tempt a creditor to
forego giving notice. As indicated, the presumption is that the value of the
collateral is equal to the outstanding debt. The secured party can recover the
deficiency only if it can convince the court that the reasonable value of the
collateral was less than the outstanding debt.23 3 There have been cases in
which the secured party failed to meet this burden of proof and judgment was
ordered for the debtor.23 4 Admittedly, failure to notify frustrates the purpose
of notification;235 nevertheless the presumption rule restricts an opportunity
for abuse of the right of the debtor while preserving for the creditor what is
rightfully his.
In Barclays/American Credit Co. v. Riddle3 6 the court of appeals held
that "a general lender operating under G.S. 53-173 is entitled to secure any
loan by taking a security interest in a motor vehicle." 23 7 The case is significant
because it represents the first time a North Carolina court has construed G.S.
53-173 and -176.1 as each provision relates to the other and to the overall
policies of the Consumer Finance Act.23 8
Plaintiff in Riddle was engaged in the business of making small loans pur-
suant to G.S. 53-173.239 In 1979 plaintiff made a loan to defendant in return
for a security interest in defendant's car and a signed promissory note. In 1981
plaintiff brought an action on the account and alleged that defendant was in
arrears on the loan. The magistrate entered judgment for plaintiff. Defendant
appealed to district court, denied liability, and alleged that the loan was void
because it violated the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act. The trial
judge granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds. that
plaintiff, though purporting to operate under G.S. 53-173, was in fact a motor
vehicle lender under G.S. 53-176.1240 and thus was prohibited from charging
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1135.
233. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
234. T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc, 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969).
235. In Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 223 S.E.2d 848 (1976), the court noted that
personal notice to the debtor is required under G.S. 25-9-504(3) to adequately inform the debtor
to "protect his interest in the collateral by paying the debt, finding a buyer, or being present at the
sale to the bid . I..." .d. at 197, 223 S.E.2d at 850.
236. 57 N.C. App. 662, 292 S.E.2d 177 (1982).
237. Id. at 665, 292 S.E.2d at 179.
238. Id. at 663, 292 S.E.2d at 178. The North Carolina Consumer Finance Act is codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-164 to -191 (1982).
239. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-173 (1982) states the maximum rates that can be charged by lend-
ers licensed to make small loans under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-168 (1982). Currently, the maxi-
mum rate for loans not exceeding $3000 is 36% on that portion of the unpaid principal balance not
exceeding $600 and 15% on the remainder.
240. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-176.1 (1982) provides:
No office holding a license under the provisions of this section and making loans secured
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more than sixteen percent interest per annum. The trial judge, concluding that
plaintiff violated G.S. 53-176.1 by charging defendant an interest rate of
23.27% per annum, held the loan contract void.241
The court of appeals reversed. The court noted that plaintiff was licensed
as a general lender under G.S. 53-168242 and operated pursuant to G.S. 53-
173. In addition, the court stated that the only section of the Consumer Fi-
nance Act that limits the type of collateral available to a general lender under
G.S. 53-173 is G.S. 53-180(f), which states that "[nlo loan made pursuant to
the provisions of G.S. 53-173 shall be secured in any way by an interest in real
property."243 A lender under G.S. 53-173 is not subject to any other restric-
tions regarding the type of collateral that may be used to secure its loan. The
court, however, went beyond consideration of the plain meaning of the Con-
sumer Finance Act in an effort to determine whether G.S. 53-176.1 should be
construed as an implied limitation on G.S. 53-173.244 After a brief examina-
tion of the legislative history and the purpose and policy behind these provi-
sions, the court held that G.S. 53-173 does not limit the type of security that
may be taken by a lender. Had the legislature intended to prohibit the use of
motor vehicles as security for loans made under G.S. 53-173, it would have so
stated.245
3. Commercial Paper
Ind-Com Electric Co. v. First Union National Bank246 concerned a bank's
duty to examine its customer's checks for forgeries before making payment of
the checks. Plaintiffs employee forged thirty-seven checks drawn over a four-
teen month period against plaintiffs account at defendant bank. Plaintiff sued
the bank to recover the amount paid out of its account on the forged checks.
Although plaintiff stipulated that it had been negligent in failing to examine its
bank statements, 247 it alleged that the bank's negligence in failing to discover
the forgeries entitled it to recover under G.S. 25-4-406(3).248 In arguing that
by motor vehicles may make loans under the provisions of G.S. 53-166, G.S. 53-173,
G.S. 53-180, or G.S. 52-141, nor shall such office allow or admit loans under the other
provisions of this Article to be made on its premises or any connecting premises. All
other provisions of this Article not inconsistant with this section shall apply to a "motor
vehicle lender."
The maximum amount that can be loaned under G.S. 53-176.1 is $5000 at a rate not to exceed
16%.
241. 57 N.C. App. at 663, 292 S.E.2d at 178.
242. See supra note 239.
243. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-180(f) (1982).
244. 57 N.C. App. at 663-64, 292 S.E.2d at 178.
245. Id. at 665, 292 S.E.2d at 179. The court rejected defendant's contention that a general
lender should be precluded from "having the advantage of a higher interest rate [coupled with] the
low risk security of a motor vehicle." Id.
246. 58 N.C. App 215, 293 S.E.2d 215 (1982).
247. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-406(2)(b) (Cure. Supp. 1981), if a customer fails to notify
a bank of any forgeries shown on his bank statement within fourteen days of receipt, the customer
will be precluded from asserting claims on later forgeries by the same person.
248. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-406(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981), if both the bank and the cus-
tomer are negligent, the customer will prevail.
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the bank had used inadequate protective measures, plaintiff noted that the
bank employed only five clerks to compare endorsements against customer
signature cards, that each clerk handled between 4,000 and 10,000 checks each
day, and that the clerks' training was inadequate.249 The trial court granted
summary judgment for defendant, apparently on the basis of plaintiff's stipu-
lation that the bank had complied with generally accepted commercial stan-
dards, thereby satisfying its duty under G.S. 25-3-406.250
On appeal plaintiff argued that section 4-406(3) imposed a duty of ordi-
nary care on the bank in payment of checks, that section 3-406 was inconsis-
tent with this duty, and that section 4-406 should govern the transaction. On
this basis plaintiff argued that its stipulation as to the bank's compliance with
generally accepted commercial standards should not bar its claim. The court
did not reach this issue,251 because it found that plaintiff had not met its bur-
den of proving that the bank had not acted with ordinary care.25 2 The court's
holding that plaintiff had not proved negligence on the part of the bank is
supported both by the Code and by other courts. G.S. 25-4-103(3) provides
that compliance with general banking usage is prima facie evidence of ordi-
nary care, and clearly places the burden upon plaintiff to show lack of care.
Most courts have held that measures such as those employed by defendant are
adequate, and in the absence of suspicious circumstances on the face of the
check, those courts have held in favor of the bank in cases like Ind-Com
Electric.253
The result in Ind-Com Electric seems proper. As one court has noted, a
bank cannot reasonably be expected to scrutinize each signature with the ex-
pertise of a handwriting expert.254 Because the cost of such a practice would
be prohibitive, the only rationale for imposing liability upon the bank in such
circumstances would have to be based upon "enterprise" notions.255 When a
customer has been negligent in examining statements, thereby allowing forger-
249. Brief for Plaintiff at 5, 58 N.C. App 215, 293 S.E.2d 215. A former handwriting expert for
the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation later testified for defendant that the forgeries
were so good that even an expert could not easily have detected the forgery. Brief for Defendant
at 9-10, 58 N.C. App. 215, 293 S.E.2d 215.
250. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-406 (1965) provides that "any person who by his negligence
substantially contributes to... an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting (his claim)
... against the drawee... who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's... business."
251. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 254406 (Cum. Supp. 1981) should prevail over N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-3-406 (1965) for two reasons: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-102(1) (1978) provides that Article 4
governs over the provisions of Article 3; in addition, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-406 (Cum. Supp.
1981) is more closely tailored to the specific issues in this case.
252. 58 N.C. App. at 217, 293 S.E.2d at 216.
253. See Industrial Sys. of Huntsville, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank, 376 So.2d 742 (Ala. App.
1979); Nu-Way Servs., Inc. v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 530 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. App. 1975);
Zenith Sys. Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 23 U.C.C. REP. SER. (Callaghan) 1267 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1978). But see First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Cutright, 189 Neb. 805, 205 N.W.2d 542
(1973)(refusing to overturn a verdict for the consumer on facts very similar to Ind-Com Electric).
254. Zenith Sys., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1267, 1269
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978).
255. In other words, the bank, despite its relative lack of fault, should suffer liability as a cost
of doing business.
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ies to continue, no reason exists for giving the customer this benefit. Absent a
showing of special circumstances, a finding of lack of care by the bank in cases
such as Ind-Com Electric would effectively defeat the rule of G.S. 25-4-406(2)
that a customer who fails to examine his bank statement, thereby contributing






A. Freedom of Speech
In Fehihaber v. North Carolina 1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that North Carolina's obscenity nui-
sance statute, G.S. 19,2 constitutes an illegal prior restraint 3 on first amend-
ment freedom of speech.4 The obscenity nuisance statute, relatively simple in
design, grants the state courts power to issue an injunction against the sale or
exhibition of obscene pictorial materials when such activity is deemed to con-
stitute a nuisance.5 A nuisance is defined as any place or business where ob-
scene films are shown as a "predominant and regular course of business" or
where obscene publications are "a principal or substantial part of the stock in
trade."' 6 As a preliminary matter, the court may order a temporary restraining
order for the purpose of preserving the evidence.7 Upon determining that a
nuisance exists, the court will issue an abatement injunction prohibiting the
defendant from maintaining or resuming the activity in question.8 Violation
of the injunction triggers criminal contempt sanctions.9 In any contempt pro-
ceeding, however, the state must establish not merely an occasional sale or
exhibition of obscene material, but rather the resumption of activity rising
fully to the level of nuisance.10 Any lesser offense falls short of a violation of
the order. Nevertheless, the contempt mechanism provides Chapter 19 the
substantive power of a criminal statute.I
Plaintiffs in Fehlhaber argued that G.S. 19 is unconstitutional to the ex-
tent that it empowers the courts to enjoin the sale or exhibition of materials
1. 675 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Fehlhaber and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-
I to -21 (1978), see Comment, The Constitutionality of North Carolina's Nuisance Abatement Stat-
ute: .4 Prior Restraint on Nonobscene Speech, 61 N.C.L. REV. 685 (1983).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-1 to -21 (1978).
3. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTioNAL LAW §§ 12-31 to -36 (1978); Emer-
son, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. .
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.1 (1978).
6. Id. § 19-1.2. The definition of obscenity incorporates the "contemporary community
standards" test of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1(2)
(1978).
7. During the period in which the temporary restraining order is in effect, the defendant
may continue to distribute the challenged materials, but must provide a full accounting of al such
transactions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.3.
8. Id. § 19-2.1. Specifically, the defendant is prohibited from maintaining the nuisance at
the place in question and from resuming the activity at any other place in North Carolina; in
addition, all persons are prohibited from maintaining the nuisance at the place which is the sub-ject of the complaint. Id. Enforcement of the injunction against defendant's successors in interest,
provided they have notice, probably raises no substantial due process issues. See generally D.
DoBBs, REMEDIES § 2.9, at 101-03 (1973).
9. The defendant may be subject to a fine not to exceed $1000 or imprisonment not to
exceed six months, or both. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-4 (1978).
10. See State ex rel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979).
11. Under a criminal statute, however, the defendant would be entitled to a jury trial. U.S.
CONsT. amend. VII. The defendant is entitled to a jury trial during the injunctive proceeding,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.4 (1978), but not during any subsequent contempt proceeding, since the
penalty imposed may not exceed six months' imprisonment. See State ex rel. Andrews v. Chateau
X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979).
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not yet judicially declared obscene.12 The district court agreed, declaring the
statute facially unconstitutional. 13 The court of appeals, however, reversed.
While acknowledging that the abatement injunction operates as a prior re-
straint, 14 the court nevertheless found the statute to be constitutionally sound,
primarily because of two redeeming features. First, unlike the statute struck
down by the United States Supreme Court in Vance v. UniversalAmusement
Co. ,1 G.S. 19 authorizes no preliminary restraints of an indefinite nature. 16
Under the statute, the court may advance the trial on the merits to the time of
the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction. 17 Even if that provi-
sion is not used, the trial on the merits must be held at the next term of court
following the filing of the complaint and is given priority over most other civil
cases. 18 Second, in any contempt proceeding under G.S. 19, the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has resumed activity con-
stituting a nuisance.' 9 Noting that "[i]f any prior restraint is ever justified, the
area of pictorial obscenity is the place," 20 the court concluded that the statute,
as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court, contains sufficient proce-
dural safeguards to survive first amendment scrutiny.21
Judge Phillips, dissenting, focused on the distinction between criminal
statutes directed at specific material already adjudicated obscene and civil in-
junctions proclaiming, in effect, a general prohibition against pornography.22
The latter, he argued, present "an inherently vague command" not counte-
12. 675 F.2d at 1366.
13. 445 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
14. 675 F.2d at 1370-71.
15. 445 U.S. 308 (1980). For a full discussion of the issues raised by Vance, see Comment,
Prior Restraint of Obscenity as a Public Nuisance-Vance v. UniversalAmusement Co., 26 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1122 (1981).
16. 675 F.2d at 1370.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.4 (1978).
18. Id. § 19-3.
19. 675 F.2d at 1370. The North Carolina Supreme Court so construed the statute in State ex
rel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E. 2d 603 (1979). For a brief discussion of
Chateau X, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981-Constitutional Law, 60
N.C.L. REv., 1272, 1273-75 (1982).
20. 675 F.2d at 1371. The court observed that "[e]xplicit photographic portrayals of natural
and deviant sexual activity stand upon a plain far below [the spoken or written word]." Id. That
approach, however, is suspect, as the following passage from Professor Tribe's well-known treatise
makes clear.
Nor does it help to distinguish situations in which the "speech" involved does not merit
first amendment protection from those in which it does merit such protection, the latter
alone deserving the benefit of the full-blown presumption against prior restraints. A
particular communication cannot authoritatively be called protected or unprotected at a
point when, by definition, no court has yet determined the constitutional question.
L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-33, at 729. Nevertheless, when pictorial pornography is involved, the
distinction drawn by the court in Fehlhaber may be defensible, even though a similar distinction
involving written or verbal language would not be.
21. 675 F.2d at 1371. Strangely, the court did not cite or discuss Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1964), in which the Supreme Court held that prior restraints on motion pictures are
constitutionally permissible as long as procedural safeguards are used to avoid the dangers of
censorship. The safeguards established in Freedman are similar to those deemed critical in Fehl-
haber. See id. at 58-59.
22. 675 F.2d at 1372 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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nanced by the federal constitution.23 Moreover, Judge Phillips criticized the
majority's distinction between verbal political speech and pictorial nonpoliti-
cal speech.24 Finally, he argued that the "chilling effect" of an obscenity nui-
sance statute falls squarely within the doctrine of Near v. Minnesota,2 the
seminal Supreme Court prior restraint case.26
B. Right to Jury Trial
In 1975 the North Carolina General Assembly eliminated the statutory
right to a jury trial in attorney disciplinary proceedings. 27 In North Carolina
State Bar v. DuMont28 an attorney challenged that amendment on the
grounds that the adoption of the 1970 state constitution extended the right to a
jury trial to all situations in which the right existed at common law, or by
statute, at that time.29 The 1868 constitution had been so construed by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Groves v. Ware.30 In DuMont, however, the
supreme court refused to apply a similar construction to the 1970 revision. In
making its determination, the court focused on the intent of the drafters, the
purpose of the new constitution, and the evils which that document sought to
remedy.31 The court concluded that the revision was largely editorial32 and
was intended to preserve, not extend, the rights existing under the 1868
constitution:
[T]he new document enacted in 1970, of which Article I, § 25 is
a part, was not a fundamentally new constitution. It was an exten-
23. Id. One answer to that argument is that the term "nuisance," which is used in the injunc-
tion, is specifically defined by the statute. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Thus, the
injunction does indeed make clear what conduct is prohibited.
24. 675 F.2d at 1372 (Phillips, J., dissenting). There is merit to Judge Phillips' criticism of the
majority's distinction between protected and unprotected communications. See supra note 20.
25. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down an injunction prohibiting the distribution of written
materials not yet judicially declared outside first amendment protection).
26. 675 F.2d at 1372. The Court in Near recognized in dictum that prior restraints may be
constitutionally permissible in the enforcement of obscenity laws, one of several "exceptional
cases" noted by Chief Justice Hughes. 283 U.S. at 716. Judge Phillips accorded the issue superfi-
cial treatment.
27. Act of June 13, 1975, ch. 582, § 5, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 657 (1st Sess.) (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 84-28 (1981)). The right to jury trial in attorney disciplinary proceedings had ex-
isted more than forty years in North Carolina. See Act of April 3, 1933, ch. 210, § 11, 1933 N.C.
Sess. Laws 313 (1st Sess.) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28(3)(d)(1) (1975)).
28. 304 N.C. 627, 286 S.E.2d 89 (1982).
29. Id. at 632, 286 S.E.2d at 92-93. N.C. COtsT. art. I, § 25 provides the following mandate:
"In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best
securities of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable."
30. 182 N.C. 553, 109 S.E. 568 (1921). The court in Groves offered the following interpreta-
tion of article I, section 25:
The right to a trial by jury, which is provided in this section, applies only to cases in
which the prerogrative existed at common law, or was procured by statute at the time the
Constitution was adopted, and not to those where the right and the remedy with it are
thereafter created by statute.
Id. at 558, 109 S.E. at 571.
31. 304 N.C. at 633-34, 286 S.E.2d at 93-94.
32. The document adopted in 1970 did not include important substantive changes; rather, the
General Assembly submitted such changes to the voters in the form of separate amendments. Id.
at 636, 286 S.E.2d at 95.
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sive editorial revision of the 1868 document. The evils sought to be
remedied were obsolete language, outdated style and illogical ar-
rangement. The intent, object and purpose of the framers and adopt-
ers was to correct those evils. 33
Consequently, the "critical point of reference" 34 for determining the right to a
jury trial recognized at common law or by statute, and thus preserved in the
constitution, is 1868, not 1970.35 Under that test, the right to a jury trial in
attorney disciplinary proceedings is not within the scope of the constitution,
since no such right existed in 1868.36 Rather, the prerogative was both created
and eventually withdrawn by legislative action.
C. Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process37
In Harrell v. Wilson County Schools38 the parents of a hearing-impaired
child were dissatisfied with a public school committee's decision not to subsi-
dize the child's education at an out-of-state school for the deaf.39 The com-
mittee denied the subsidy after determining that the needs of the student could
be met by the public school system through an individualized education pro-
gram.40 During the decision-making process, however, one member of the
committee expressed a strong professional preference for mainstreaming
rather than residential placement.4 1 The parents argued that the member's
33. Id. at 636-37, 286 S.E.2d at 95.
34. Id. at 641, 286 S.E.2d at 94.
35. Id. at 641, 286 S.E.2d at 97.
36. Id. at 633, 286 S.E.2d at 93.
37. Nearly half a decade ago, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 29-19 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1981), which restricts the right of illegimate children to inherit
through or from their putative fathers, violates neither the equal protection nor due process clause
of the federal constitution. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979). In a recent
case, Herndon v. Robinson, 57 N.C. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 305 (1982), the state court of appeals
declined an invitation to reexamine the constitutionality of the statute. In addition, the court
rejected an appealing argument based on a constructive compliance theory. ,
38. 58 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 740, 295 S.E.2d 759 (1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1251-52 (1983).
39. Id. at 261, 293 S.E.2d at 689.
40. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-363 (1978), amended by Act of May 20, 1981, ch. 423, § 1,
1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 510, 552 (Ist Sess. 1981) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106 (Cum.
Supp. 1981)), provided at the time the action was brought that "[t]he policy of the State is to
provide a free appropriate publicly supported education to every child with special needs." Thus,
the issue before the committee was whether the public school could develop an individualized
education program that would provide an "appropriate" education in a mainstream environment.
See infra note 42. If that determination were negative, the school system would subsidize the
child's education in a special institution elsewhere.
The statute, as rewritten, now provides that "the policy of the state is to ensure every child a
fair and full oportunity to reach his full potential .... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106 (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
41. That member was employed by the public schools as a consultant for developing pro-
grams for the hearing impaired. 58 N.C. App. at 265, 293 S.E.2d at 691. Mainstreaming arose as
an alternative to the once prevalent "practice of removing indentified handicapped children from
regular education and placing them in special classes or schools for special instruction." Miller &
Miller, The Handicapped Child's Civil Right As It Relates to the '"east Restrictive Environment"
andAppropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. LJ. 1, 2 (1978). In contrast to the exclusionary approach,
mainstreaming involves placing "a handicapped child in the 'least restrictive environment' and
providing an appropriate program in the mainstream of regular education." Id. at 6.
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predisposition regarding mainstreaming precluded a fair and impartial deci-
sion by the school committee. 42 The court of appeals rejected that argument.
Citing various state and federal authorities for the proposition that members
of administrative tribunals may perform adjudicatory roles despite having al-
ready formed and expressed professional opinions at a policy level, the court
concluded that the "predisposition or professional theory which [the member]
had, and brought to the Committee, was not enough to constitute bias and a
violation of due process."'43
While the holding in Harrell is logical, the analysis supporting it is not
clear. Under the court's analysis, the existence of a constitutional violation
depends upon a finding of bias. The court did not articulate, however, the
factors that it considered important in determining whether the committee
member's predisposition reached the level of bias for purposes of due process
analysis. For that reason, Harrell sheds little light on the underlying issues.
D. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
Two recent North Carolina cases soundly rejected equal protection chal-
lenges to special statutes of limitations. In State v. Beasley44 the court of ap-
peals upheld G.S. 49-4(1), 45 which provides a three-year statute of limitations
for prosecution of persons who willfully fail to provide support for their illegit-
imate children.46 The state argued that G.S. 49-4(1), in effect, discriminates
against illegitimate children, since there is no limitations period applicable to
willful nonsupport of legitimate children.47 Essential to the state's argument
was the notion that the limitations period deprived illegitimate children of the
right to parental support.48 The court, however, rejected that theory, and
noted that the right to parental support is enforced in civil actions,49 not crimi-
nal proceedings, and that the statutory bar to criminal prosecution, therefore,
has no effect on the rights of the children.50
In Roberts v. Durham County Hospital l plaintiff argued that G.S. 1-
15(c),5 2 a statute of limitations designed to decrease the number of medical
42. 58 N.C. App. at 265, 293 S.E.2d at 691.
43. Id. at 267, 293 S.E.2d at 692.
44. 57 N.C. App. 208, 290 S.E.2d 730 (1982).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-4(1) (1976).
46. Willful nonsupport of illegimate children is a misdemeanor under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-
2 (Cure. Supp. 1981).
47. 57 N.C. App. at 209, 290 S.E.2d at 731. Willful nonsupport of legitimate children is a
misdemeanor under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322(d) (1981).
48. 57 N.C. App. at 209, 290 S.E.2d at 731.
49. Id. at 210, 290 S.E.2d at 731 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-14 to -15 (1976)). In an
earlier case, County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson, 46 N.C. App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980),
the court had held that a discriminatory statute of limitations on an illegitimate child's civil action
for parental support violated the equal protection clause. In Beasley the State sought to extend the
holding of Johnson to criminal prosecutions.
50. 57 N.C. App. at 210, 290 S.E.2d at 731. Furthermore, the court suggested that even if
G.S. 14-4(1) were discriminatory, the state would have no standing to bring suit. Id.
51. 56 N.C. App. 533, 289 S.E.2d 875 (1982).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981). The statute establishes, with one excep-
tion, an outside limit of four years from the occurrence of the last act of the defendant giving rise
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malpractice suits, 53 discriminates against persons engaged in nonmedical pro-
fessions.5 4 Applying a rational basis test,55 the court held that the statute, en-
acted in response to a malpractice crisis, was "rationally related to maintaining
sufficient medical treatment" in North Carolina.56 The court noted that medi-
cal malpractice insurance premiums had increased so dramatically, and the
continued availability of such insurance was so precarious, that legislative ac-
tion was required to ensure the survival of the health services industry.
5 7
E. Freedom of Religion
In Vaughn v. Garrison58 plaintiff alleged that prison regulations restricting
inmate requests for Islamic prayer rugs violated the first amendment right to
freedom of religion.59 Two regulations were at issue. First, prisoners were not
permitted to order prayer rugs unless they first requested a pork-free diet.
60
Second, the rugs had to be purchased from distributors approved by prison
authorities.61 The federal district court held that neither restriction constituted
an unlawful deprivation of plaintiff's first amendment rights.62 Applying a
rational basis test,63 the court determined that the pork-free diet requirement
was a reasonable means of obtaining a legitimate prison objective, the elimi-
nation of frivilous requests for prayer rugs.64 Similarly, the court deemed the
"approved distributor" requirement a reasonable means of promoting prison
discipline and order, since rugs from unapproved vendors would present a
threat of smuggled contraband and would impose an undue inspection burden
to the cause of action. The exception involves instances in which foreign objects are left inside the
body following surgery, for which the limit is extended to ten years after the last act of the defend-
ant. Subject to those limitations, all medical malpractice actions must be brought within one year
after the injury is, or reasonably should have been discovered. In no event, however, shall the
limitation period be less than three years. Id. For a discussion of such "statutes of repose" in a
products liability context, see Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980"s: 'Repose Is Not the
Destiny" of Manufacturers, 61 N.C.L. Rav. 33 (1982).
53. 56 N.C. App. at 541, 289 S.E.2d at 880.
54. Presumably, this class would include attorneys, accountants, engineers, architects, and
other nonmedical professionals. Whatever the parameters of the class, however, plaintiffs were
clearly outside it. For that reason, the court ruled that plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the
statute. Id at 538-39, 289 S.E.2d at 878. Nevertheless, the court went on to consider the equal
protection claim.
55. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
56. 56 N.C. App. at 541, 289 S.E.2d at 880.
57. Id at 540-41, 289 S.E.2d at 879-80.
58. 534 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
59. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
60. 534 F. Supp. at 92.
61. Id
62. Id at 92-93.
63. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
64. 534 F. Supp. at 92. The constitutional legitimacy of that objective, however, is questiona-
ble, particularly since the danger posed by "insincere" Moslems was neither alleged nor demon-
strated. Upon what basis do prison authorities restrict prayer rugs to "genuine members of the
Islamic Faith"? Id Similar requests for bibles or rosary beads, for example, probably could not
be scrutinized to determine whether the prisoner making the request was a sincere or genuine
Christian. Unfortunately, the court does not discuss the possible valid reasons for eliminating
frivolous requests for prayer rugs.
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upon prison staff.65
F. Power to Tax
In In re Housing Bonds6 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
G.S. 122A-5.4,67 which extends the reach of the North Carolina Housing Fi-
nance Agency 68 to moderate income families, serves a public purpose and is a
valid exercise of the power to tax.69 The court stated:
[W]e find that the public purpose of the Act has not changed, only
the economy has. The legislature has appropriately responded to the
changing conditions in the residential housing market, and the
benefits flowing from the 1979 amendment to the Act are, in our
opinion, benefits for the common good of all the people of the State.
The increase in available housing which would result from the pro-
posed bonds would further the aim of promoting the health, safety
and general welfare of our people.70
Prior to the amendment, the agency could issue housing finance bonds only
for lower income families.
G. Separation of Powers
In Advisory Opinion In re Separation of Powers7 the North Carolina
Supreme Court examined G.S. 143-23(b), 72 involving state budget transfers,
and G.S. 120-84,73 involving federal block grants, and determined that both
statutes violate the separation of powers provision of the North Carolina Con-
stitution.74 G.S. 143-23(b) grants a joint legislative committee on governmen-
tal operations75 the power to control budget transfers proposed by the
governor. Under the state constitution, however, the governor, not the Gen-
eral Assembly, is the administrator of the budget.76 Since the duties envi-
sioned by G.S. 143-23(b) are essentially administrative, the court concluded
that the statute both exceeds the power vested in the General Assembly77 and
encroaches upon the constitutionally mandated role of the governor.78
The court's analysis of G.S. 120-84 focused upon the question whether the
65. Id. at 93.
66. 307 N.C. 52, 296 S.E.2d 281 (1982).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122A-5.4 (1981).
68. Id. §§ 122A-1 to -23.
69. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(l).
70. 307 N.C. at 61, 296 S.E.2d at 286-87.
71. 305 N.C. 767, 295 S.E.2d 589 "(1982).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-23(b) (1983).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-84 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
74. "The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be
forever separate and distinct from each other." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6.
75. The commission was established by Act of June 6, 1975, ch. 490, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws
498 (1st Sess.) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-16.1 (1983)).
76. N.C. CONsT. art. II, § 5(3).
77. The General Assembly has the constitutional authority to enact the budget. N.C. CONST.
art. II, § 1.
78. 305 N.C. at 776-77, 295 S.E.2d at 594.
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General Assembly had delegated its own legislative powers too extensively,
not whether it had delegated powers properly belonging to the governor.
Through its power to enact the budget, the General Assembly has the power to
accept and use federal block grants.79 G.S. 120-84 purports to delegate that
power to a joint legislative committee whenever the full assembly is not in
session. The court determined that the statute effects an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative powers and violates the separation of powers doctrine.80
PAUL ABBOTT PARKER
79. See supra note 77.




The North Carolina statutory definition of armed robbery states that any
person "who, having in possession or with the use or threatened use of any
firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement, or means, whereby the life of
a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts to take
personal property from another" is guilty of a felony.' Two 1982 decisions,
State v. Alston2 and State v. Thompson,3 suggest that courts will distinguish
between a "firearm" and a "dangerous weapon" in determining whether use of
an instrument falls under the statute. The supreme court stated in41ston that
the use of a "dangerous weapon" must actually endanger or threaten life.4
The Thompson decision, on the other hand, implies that when a "firearm" is
used, the victim's awareness of the firearm will be crucial, even if there is
evidence that the firearm did not actually endanger or threaten life.5
In State v. Alston the state's evidence showed that defendant's accomplice
pointed a rifle at a store attendant during a robbery. The jury found each
defendant guilty of armed robbery. The supreme court reversed, finding error
in the trial court's failure to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of
common law robbery. The court based its conclusion upon the accomplice's
testimony that the weapon was in fact a BB rifle. This evidence, the court said,
affirmatively identified the instrument as something other than that which it
appeared to be to the victims. The witnesses testified that the weapon was a
firearm.6
Given evidence that the gun was a BB rifle, the court next faced the ques-
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (1981). The court of appeals recently declined to answer
whether the danger or threat may be posed to a third person rather than the victim of the robbery
in State v. Irwin, 55 N.C. App. 305, 285 S.E.2d 345 (1982).
2. 305 N.C. 647, 290 S.E.2d 614 (1982).
3. 57 N.C. App. 142, 291 S.E.2d 266, aft'd per curiam on other grounds, 307 N.C. 125, 296
S.E.2d 297 (1982).
4. 305 N.C. at 651-52, 290 S.E.2d at 616.
5. 57 N.C. App. at 147, 291 S.E.2d at 272.
6. 305 N.C. at 650, 290 S.E.2d at 615. The court considered the accomplice's testimony as
falling within the rule stated in State v. Thompson, 297 N.C. 285, 254 S.E.2d 526 (1979). In
Thompson, the witness was uncertain whether a gun used during a robbery was fake or real. The
court held that the witness' testimony was not sufficient basis for submission to the jury of the
lesser included offense of common law robbery. The court concluded that when a person uses a
weapon that appears to be a firearm or dangerous weapon, in the absence ofevidence to the con-
trary, the law will presume the instrument to be that which the defendant's conduct represents it
to be. Id. at 289, 254 S.E.2d at 528. This conclusion overruled a contrary holding in State v.
Baily, 278 N.C. 80, 178 S.E.2d 801 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). See Survey of Develop.
ments in North Carolina Law, 1981-Criminal Law, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1294 (1982).
InAlston witnesses to a robbery testified that the weapon used was a firearm. Moreover, the
accomplice testified on direct examination that the gun was a Remington pellet rifle. He stated on
cross examination, however, that it was a BB rifle. The court noted that this testimony, unlike the
witness' statement in Thompson, was not a mere failure to testify positively that the instrument
was a firearm or dangerous weapon. On the contrary, the accomplice's statement affirmatively
identified the instrument. Thus, the presumption articulated in Thompson may be rebutted by
testimony from a participant in the robbery that the weapon is not what the witnesses perceived it
to be.
tion whether it was a firearm or dangerous weapon within the armed robbery
statute. Because the court did not consider a BB rifle to be a firearm, the issue
was whether a BB rifle is a dangerous weapon. If it is not a dangerous
weapon, the lesser included offense of common law robbery as well as armed
robbery should have been submitted to the jury. In making its determination,
the court rejected dicta in civil cases suggesting that a BB gun is a dangerous
instrument. Neither did the court compare a BB rifle to other instruments that
have been held dangerous weapons under the armed robbery statute.7 The
court instead asked whether the evidence was sufficient to support a jury find-
ing that a life was in fact endangered or threatened. 8 While testimony that the
rifle was a firearm was sufficient to support such a finding, testimony that it
was a BB gun was not sufficient. Thus, for an instrument to be a dangerous
weapon under the statute, it is not sufficient that the victim perceives it to be a
threat to his life. The court reaffirmed the rule that a person's life must be in
fact endangered or threatened by the weapon.9
The Aiston holding appears to be contrary to the result in State v. Thomp-
son. In Thompson the court of appeals concluded that defendant was guilty of
armed robbery (if he was guilty at all) despite an accomplice's testimony that
the gun used in the robbery was not loaded.10 Defendant argued that even
though the weapon was a firearm, this testimony presented evidence from
which a jury could conclude that the instruement was not a dangerous
weapon. Defendant thus argued that the lesser included offense of common
law robbery should be submitted to the jury. The court was unpersuaded by
the defense argument, and stated that there was evidence showing the use or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon. The court noted as evidentiary sup-
port for its finding the facts that weapons were pointed at the witnesses, the
witnesses were bound, and defendant relied on an alibi."
The court's reliance upon the alibi defense and the binding of the victims
is confusing because these facts are irrelevant to the nature of the weapon used
in the crime. Evidence that guns were pointed at the victims, however, is sig-
nificant in light of two prior supreme court decisions. In State v. Gibbons the
victims did not see defendant's shotgun and was not threatened with it.12 The
court concluded that mere possession of the shotgun was not sufficient to sup-
port a conviction. In State v. Evans13 defendant unloaded the shotgun at the
7. Instruments held to be dangerous weapons within the statute include: a knife, State v.
Norris, 264 N.C. 470, 141 S.E.2d 869 (1965); a crowbar, State v. Lilly, 32 N.C. App. 467, 232
S.E.2d 495, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 643, 235 S.E.2d 64 (1977); a board, State v. Home, 21 N.C. App.
197, 203 S.E.2d 636 (1974); non-chukas, State v. Mullen, 47 N.C. App. 667, 267 S.E.2d 564, disc.
rev. denied, 301 N.C. 103, 273 S.E.2d 308 (1980), appeal after remand, 53 N.C. App. 106, 280
S.E.2d 11 (1981). In State v. Gibbons, 303 N.C. 484, 279 S.E.2d 574 (1981), the court found it was
unnecessary to determine whether fists could be dangerous weapons.
8. 305 N.C. at 351-52, 290 S.E.2d at 616. See State v. Moore, 279 N.C. 455, 183 S.E.2d 546
(1971).
9. 305 N.C. at 651-52, 290 S.E.2d at 616.
10. 57 N.C. App. at 145-46, 291 S.E.2d at 268.
11. Id. at 145, 291 S.E.2d at 268.
12. 303 N.C. 484, 490-91, 279 S.E.2d 574, 578 (1981).
13. 279 N.C. 447, 183 S.E.2d 540 (1971).
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victim's request. Submission of armed robbery to the jury was error, said the
court, since there was no evidence that a life was endangered or threatened.14
Like the defendants in Gibbons and Evans, defendant in Thompson may be
viewed as merely possessing a firearm without threatening or endangering life.
Nonetheless, the distinguishing feature is that the Thompson defendant
pointed the weapon at a victim. Thus, the court's conclusion in Thompson
emphasizes the victim's perception of danger instead of the firearm's actual
ability to threaten or endanger life.
Arguably, Thompson impliedly modifies the rule that threat or danger to
life is an essential element of the armed robbery offense.' 5 Thompson suggests
that mere possession of a firearm may be enough to support a charge of armed
robbery, if if the victim perceives a threat to his life. Thompson indicates that
this result will be possible even if there is evidence that the weapon did not
actually endanger life. The status of this decision as the last word on the mat-
ter is, however, open to question. Although the supreme court affirmed the
decision, the court declined to address the issue. 16 In sum, there is a discerni-
ble distinction in the court of appeals' treatment of "firearm" and the supreme
court's treatment of "dangerous weapon." If the instrumentality is not a fire-
arm, actual threat or danger to life determines whether it is a weapon under
the armed robbery statute. The victim's knowledge of the character of the
weapon is irrelevant. If the instrumentality is a firearm, however, the court of
appeals suggest that the victim's awareness of the firearm may be crucial, de-
spite evidence that the firearm is incapable of endangering life.
B. Arson
Arson is a nonstatutory common-law offense, 17 defined in North Carolina
as "the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another per-
son."' 8 The gravamen of the offense is the danger to persons who might be in
the dwelling,' 9 and G.S. 14-58 makes both first and second degree ars6n a
felony.20 In State v. Shaw2 1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
common-law requirement that the dwelling burned be that "of another" is
satisfied by a showing that some other person or persons and defendant jointly
occupied the dwelling.
In Shaw defendant was convicted of setting fire to a house in which he
14. Id. at 451, 183 S.E.2d at 542.
15. See State v. Gibbons, 303 N.C. 484, 279 S.E.2d 574 (1981); State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55,
243 S.E.2d 367 (1978); State v. Moore, 279 N.C. 455, 183 S.E.2d 546 (1971).
16. 307 N.C. at 121, 296 S.E.2d at 297.
17. State v. Long, 243 N.C. 393, 90 S.E.2d 739 (1956).
18. Id.; State v. Porter, 90 N.C. 719 (1884); State v. Arnold, 21 N.C. App. 92, 203 S.E.2d 395,
af'd, 285 N.C. 751, 208 S.E.2d 646 (1974).
19. State v. White, 288 N.C. 44, 215 S.E.2d 557 (1975).
20. The offense is first degree arson if the bulding is occupied at the time of the burning and
second degree if it is not. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1979) was amended 1977, effective July 1,
1981. Prior to amendment, the statute did not distinguish between an occupied and unoccupied
dwelling.
21. 305 N.C. 327, 289 S.E.2d 325 (1982).
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lived with his wife, three nieces, and father-in-law. Although the court con-
cluded that defendant's mere occupancy of the house did not prevent a convic-
tion of arson,22 it also noted that the dwelling was rented by defendant's
father-in-law, that defendant was a transient, and that he had been forced by
his father-in-law at gunpoint to leave the house. The majority's consideration
of these facts intimates that it felt defendant had little interest in the dwelling
itself. Nevertheless, the court found the need for protection against willful and
malicious burning of a dwelling so compelling that it extended its holding to
any situation in which a defendant and any other person or persons are joint
occupants of a dwelling unit.23 Relying upon State v. Jones,24 the court noted
that the main purpose of the law governing arson is protection of those who
might be in the burned dwelling. In Jones the court did not comment upon
defendant's argument that, because he was an occupant of the apartment
burned, he did not set fire to the dwelling of another.25 Instead, the court
based its decision upon the presence of three other occupied apartments in the
building.26 Responding to the same argument in the instant case, the court in
Shaw noted that the need for protection is as compelling when a dwelling is
jointly occupied as when there are adjoining apartments.27
State v. Shaw suggests that the court may be expected to interpret the
common-law definition of arson in a flexible policy-oriented manner, rather
than in a rigid, technical fashion. Given this orientation, it is interesting to
speculate upon the result should a defendant burn down a building owned by
himself but occupied by another. If the underlying policy of the rule-pro-
tection of persons in the building-is to be effected, the court would have to
find that even actual ownership of a building by a defendant does not prevent
it from being treated as a "dwelling of another." The decision in Shaw makes
this result considerably more likely.
C. Assault With Intent to Kill
In State v. Irwin28 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that proof of
a defendant's conditional intent to kill was inadequate to support submission
to the jury of the question whether defendant had a specific intent to kill. The
evidence in Irwin showed that defendant held a hostage at knifepoint and ver-
bally threatened to kill the hostage if his demands were not met. Persons
present complied with his demands, and he subsequently released the hos-
22. Id. at 337, 289 S.E.2d at 331.
23. Id. at 338, 289 S.E.2d at 331.
24. 296 N.C. 75, 248 S.E.2d 858 (1978).
25. This issue was not even presented in State v. Reavis, 19 N.C. App. 497, 199 S.E.2d 139
(1973). In Reavis defendant, who was in the process of separation from his wife, burned the
mobile home owned and occupied by his wife. Evidence showed that he kept his clothes in the
dwelling.
26. 296 N.C. at 77, 248 S.E.2d at 859. See also State v. Wyatt, 48 N.C. App. 709, 269 S.E.2d
717 (1980) (apartment building is a single dwelling and occupancy of one apartment satisfies re-
quirement of occupancy for purposes of statute).
27. 305 N.C. at 337-38, 289 S.E.2d at 331.
28. 55 N.C. App. 305, 285 S.E.2d 345 (1982).
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tage.29 The court of appeals reversed defendant's conviction for assault with
intent to kill on the grounds that the State had proved only conditional intent
to kill. In other words, the court found that defendant never actually intended
to kill the hostage by means of the assault. His intent to kill was conditioned
entirely upon the nonperformance of the acts he required of those present.
Proof of this conditional intent was insufficient to submit the "intent to kill"
issue to the jury, and thus all the elements of the crime charged had not been
adequately proved by the State.30
Traditionally, in North Carolina proof of assault with intent to kill has
required proof of specific intent to kill.3 ' Moreover, under North Carolina
law specific intent to kill may be inferred from the nature of the assault, the
manner in which the assault is made, the conduct of the parties, and other
relevant circumstances. 32 For example, in State v. Cauley3 3 there was evi-
dence that defendant severely beat his stepdaughter with a heavy belt. The
beating lasted through the night, and almost caused the child to die. This
evidence was held to be sufficient support for an inference of intent to kill; the
charge of assault with intent to kill was thus allowed to go to the jury. Simi-
larly, in State v. 7hacker34 proof that defendant intentionally stabbed a wo-
man, who subsequently required six days of hospitalization, was sufficient
evidence of intent to take the issue of assault with intent to kill to the jury.
And finally, in State v. Revels 35 proof that defendants indiscriminately in-
flicted knife wounds on three victims was sufficient evidence of intent to sup-
port the submission of the jury charge of assault with intent to kill. As these
and other cases demonstrate, intent to kill can be proved circumstantially, and
ordinarily the issue of intent has been a jury question.36
By adopting the conditional intent theory in Irwin, the court has taken the
intent issue from the jury. In addition to Irwin, the conditional intent theory
has been applied in other limited and fairly well-defined circumstances, in-
cluding two Mississippi cases relied upon in Irwin to support the conditional
intent theory. In Stroud v. Sate37 defendant threatened to kill the victim if he
refused to sign certain papers. The victim signed the papers and was not
killed. The court overturned defendant's conviction for assault with intent to
29. Id. at 306, 285 S.E.2d at 347.
30. Id. at 309-10, 285 S.E.2d at 349-50. In overturning the assault with intent to kill convic-
tion, the court stated that the evidence was sufficient to allow submission of the offense of assault
with a deadly weapon to thejury. The court also said that since the jury found defendant guilty of
assault with intent ot kill, it necessarily found him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. The
lower court was thus ordered to enter a verdict of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon.
31. State v. Cooper, 8 N.C. App. 79, 173 S.E.2d 604 (1970) (instruction that proof of intent to
kill may be found from evidence of intent to kill or inflict great bodily larm held improper,
because assault with intent to kill requires specific intent to kill as essential element).
32. See State v. Thacker, 281 N.C. 447, 189 S.E.2d 145 (1972).
33. 244 N.C. 701, 94 S.E.2d 915 (1956).
34. 281 N.C. 447, 189 S.E.2d 145 (1972).
35. 227 N.C. 34, 40 S.E.2d 474 (1946).
36. State v. Allen, 186 N.C. 302, 119 S.E. 504 (1923) (issue of intent to rape, or lack thereof,
was jury question).
37. 131 Miss. 875, 95 So. 738 (1923).
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kill, because the only proof of intent to kill was proof of conditional intent.38
Similarly, in Craddock v. State39 a Mississippi court held that a defendant who
threatened to shoot a deputy if the deputy moved had only a conditional intent
to kill. Since the deputy did not move, and defendant did not shoot, the intent
to kill never became actual.4 Irwin is factually similar to, and closely follows
the principles enunciated in, Stroud and Craddock.41
Irwin represents the first time the Mississippi conditional intent theory
had been adopted as North Carolina law. This new theory will occasionally
take the intent issue from the jury. Nonetheless, Irwin does not radically
change prior North Carolina law. The Irwin rule would have no effect on the
aforementioned cases of Cauley, Thacker, and Revels,42 since none of those
cases involved anything approximating a conditional intent to kill. Also, in a
case containing evidence of a conditional intent to kill, the courts will proba-
bly hold the evidence sufficient to submit the intent to kill issue to the jury.43
Finally, although it can be argued that Irwin gives the court too much power
by placing the conditional intent determination in its hands, it seems clear that
the conditional intent situation is sufficiently circumscribed to prevent any
substantial abuse of this power.
D. Defenses
1. Duress Defense for Prison Escapees
Since 1974 courts in many jurisdicitions have struggled to define the con-
ditions that would legally excuse an inmate's escape from prison.44 The most
widely recognized decision in the area is People v. Lovercamp,45 and since that
1974 decision many courts have adopted the Lovercamp elements of the duress
defense in prison escape cases. In State v. Watts46 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals was confronted with the issue for the first time and adopted the
Lovercamp elements for this defense.47
38. Id. at 879, 95 So. at 738.
39. 204 Miss. 606, 37 So. 2d 778 (1948).
40. Id. at 609, 37 So. 2d at 778.
41. In light of the two Mississippi cases and Irwin, it seems unlikely that the conditional
intent theory would be applied unless a conditional threat was specifically made and its terms met.
It also seems unlikely that the theory would be applied when the defendant threatens conditional
harm and in fact harms the victim inspite of the nonoccurance of the condition.
42. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
43. Judge Martin, who dissented in Irwin, refused to accept the conditional intent theory and
believed there was sufficient evidence of assault with intent to kill to support the submission of the
charge to the jury. 55 N.C. App. at 312-13, 285 S.E.2d at 351 (Martin, J., dissenting).
44. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d
823, 188 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974); People v. Unger, 33 I. App. 3d 770, 338 N.E.2d 442 (1975), aft'd,
66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977); People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212
(1974), aj'd, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975); People v. Field, 28 Mich. App. 476, 184
N.W.2d 551 (1971); Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498, 576 P.2d 1129 (1978).
45. 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974). For a discussion of Lovercamp, see Note,
Availability of the Duress Defense in Prison Escapes People v. Lovercamp, 12 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 1102 (1976).
46. 60 N.C. App. 191, 298 S.E.2d 436 (1982).
47. This was a case of first impression in the North Carolina Court of Appeals. In State v.
19831 1065
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW
The five Lovercamp elements are as follows:48
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible
sexual attack, or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future;
(2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities, or there ex-
ists a history of futile complaints that make any result from such
complaints illusory;
(3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts;
(4) There is no evidence of force or violence used toward prison
personnel or other "innocent" persons in the escape; and
(5) the prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when
he had attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.
The jury will be instructed on the duress defense in prison escape cases only if
the defendant presents evidence on all five elements of the defense.
In Watts defendant claimed that he had been threatened with serious
bodily injury by a Department of Correction officer, and that he had reported
this threat to the prison superintendent, who ignored the complaint. There
was no evidence that he had used force in escaping. The court of appeals
found, however, that defendant failed to meet the fifth requirement of the de-
fense-to report immediately to the authorities once he escaped from the im-
mediate threat. Watts was captured thirteen days after escape. Although he
testified that he planned to surrender that day, the court held that a delay of
thirteen days was unjustifiable under the circumstances of the case.49
The significance of Watts is not yet clear. Jurisdictions accepting the
Lovercamp elements have applied them with different degrees of flexibility,50
and clarification of how strictly North Carolina will interpret these elements
awaits further case development. Also unclear is whether the defendant or the
State has the burden of proving or disproving the elements of the defense.
Although affirmative defenses usually require the defendant to carry the bur-
den of proof,51 this rule has not been followed in North Carolina cases involv-
ing the duress defense.5 2 States that have adopted the Lovercamp elements are
Carver, No. 81CRS49172, (Superior Court, Wake County June 30, 1982), however, defendant was
acquitted of escape by means of a more conventional formulation of the duress defense. In Carver
the judge simply gave normal jury instructions for the duress defense as found in North Carolina
Pattern Jury Instructions-Crim. 310.10. According to that formulation of the defense, the de-
fendant is not guilty of a crime if his action was prompted by a reasonable fear of immediate or
imminent bodily harm or sexual assault. In North Carolina, once a defendant submits evidence of
duress, the burden of proof is upon the state to prove that those conditions did not exist. See N.C.
Pattern Jury Instructions-Crim. §310.10; State v. Sherian, 234 N.C. 30, 65 S.E.2d 331 (1951).
48. As set out in State v. Watts, 60 N.C. App. at 193, 298 S.E.2d at 437.
49. Id. at 194, 298 S.E.2d at 437.
50. See supra note 44.
51. State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 209, 213, 108 S.E.2d 223, 236 (1959); State v. Johnson, 229 N.C.
701, 706, 51 S.E.2d 186, 190 (1949).
52. In North Carolina, once the defendant presents evidence of duress, the state has burden
of proving that duress should not apply. See North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions-Crim.
310.10; State v. Sherian, 234 N.C. 30, 65 S.E.2d 231 (1951). The court in Sherian implied that the
duress defense negates the element of intent. The State, therefore, must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the crime was committed with "felonious intent" and "not under compulsion or
through fear of death or great bodily harm." Id. at 33, 65 S.E.2d at 232. Another possible ration-
ale for giving the State the burden of disproving duress is that duress is a "hybrid"-it has some
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split on this issue.53
The merits of the Lovercamp defense have been hotly debated. On the
one hand, there is concern that the availablity of the defense will prompt
"hordes of prisoners [to leap] over the walls screaming 'rape'. '54 There seems
to be little evidence to support this fear, however, since the defense is limited,
and the defendant must demonstate that he was in actual danger of serious
bodily harm.5 5 Furthermore, the availabliity of the defense may encourage
prison administrators to improve prison conditions, thereby reducing the need
for prisoners to escape to avoid serious bodily harm.56 One State court
concluded:
[O]ur decision may well produce a result entirely opposite to that
feared .... If the conditions of our penal institutions have reached
the point where the only recourse to free one's self from unwanted
personal attacks is to flee, then any improvements made in our pris-
ons with respect to assuring the personal safety of the inmates could
only serve to eliminate from the ranks of escapees those who do so
solely in an effort to protect themselves. The result, therefore, might
well be fewer prison escapes rather than more.5 7
In this light, the Lovercamp defense is not a magic formula that should be
applied with rigidity, but rather is an attempt to balance the need for prison
discipline with fundamental fairness. When prisoners escape solely to avoid
the unpleasant conditions of incarceration, they should be duly punished for
escape. But fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be afforded the
chance to demonstrate that his escape was prompted by fear of imminent bod-
characteristics of an element of the offense charged, and some of an affirmative defense. This
approach was exemplified in a case that dealt not with duress, but with another legal excuse. The
court in State v. Trimble, 44 N.C. App. 659, 262 S.E.2d 249 (1980), held that the placing of poison
in public places to exterminate rats constitutes an exception to the crime of putting poisonous
foodstuffs in public places. The court noted:
mhe State has no initial burden to show that defendant's actions do not fall within the
exception; however, once the defendant in a non-frivolous manner, puts forth evidence
to show that his conduct is within this exception, the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the exception does not apply falls upon the State.
Id. at 666, 262 S.E.2d at 303-304. For a further discussion of the burden of proof, see Dutile, The
Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Comment on the Mullaney-Patterson Doctrine, 55 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 380 (1980); Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980--Criminal Law, 59
N.C.L. REv. 1123-39 (1981).
53. See supra note 44. Courts in Michigan and New Mexico hold that the state has the
burden of proving that the elements of the duress defense have not been met. Courts in California
and Illinois, as well as the federal courts, hold that the defendant has the burden to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that all the elements are present.
54. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 832, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
55. Id.
56. People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 487, 220 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1974).
57. Id. The court continued:
Human nature being what it is, defendants who have escaped from prison for reasons
unconnected with those presented here will undoubtly argue that they did so becasuse of
homosexual attacks. These claims, however, will be judged within the framework of the
fact-finding process where the traditional safeguards for determining the truth of a tale
will be applied. To us this is extremely more desirable than relegating the actual victims
of such attacks to years more of the same treatment where no workable safeguards are
employed to protect their safety. Id.
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ily harm rather than by mere desire to escape confinement. Since this is a
question of intent, the jury should be given every reasonable opportunity to
make this determination.5s
2. Entrapment
A successful defense of entrapment requires proof that there have been
acts of persuasion, trickery or fraud by law enforcement officers or their agents
that seek to induce a defendant to commit a crime. Second, the criminal de-
sign must originate in the minds of the government officials rather than in the
mind of the defendant.5 9 In North Carolina, the jury will be instructed on the
entrapment defense only when evidence of both elements is present: govern-
ment agents induced commission of the crime and the intention to commit the
crime originated not with the defendant, but with the law enforcement of-
ficers.60 In State v. Luster61 the supreme court addressed the meaning of
"agents of law enforcement" as applied to the entrapment defense. The court
held that defendant was not entitled to an instruction on entrapment by an
agent when an unknowing third party was given the opportunity by an under-
cover officer to commit an offense and then, without the officer's specific direc-
tion, induced defendant's participation in the crime.
In Luster62 State's evidence showed that public safety officials and State
Bureau of Investigation agents operated an undercover fencing operation.
The officers encouraged those who had delivered stolen goods to get other
people to bring merchandise to them.63 As further encouragement for new
"business," the officers offered "the regulars" less money on succeeding
purchases. As a result, a "regular" asked defendant to transact a deal for him.
58. Id.
59. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 215 S.E.2d
589 (1975); State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 87 S.E.2d 191 (1955). In State v. Hageman, 307 N.C.
1, 296 S.E.2d 433 (1982), the court reaffirmed prior holdings that the defendant has the burden of
proving entrapment. When the defendant presents evidence of entrapment, the burden does not
shift to the prosecution to prove predispostion beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned
that entrapment is not a defense negating an essential element of the crime but is rather a defense
in the nature of confession and avoidance. In another 1982 entrapment case, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that failing to mention the defense in the final mandate to the jury was not
error when the judge explained the defense in the body of instructions immediately prior to the
mandate. State v. Tate, 57 N.C. App. 350, 294 S.E.2d 16, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 750, 295 S.E.2d
763 (1982). But cf. State v. Dooley, 285 N.C. 158, 203 S.E.2d 815 (1974) (failure to mention self-
defense in the final mandate error); State v. Patterson, 50 N.C. App. 280, 272 S.E.2d 924 (1981)
(failure to mention defense of others in the final mandate error).
60. See State v. Fletcher, 279 N.C. 85, 181 S.E.2d 405 (1971); State v. Coleman, 270 N.C. 357,
154 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
61. 306 N.C. 566, 295 S.E.2d 421 (1982).
62. Luster involved two separate trials consolidated for appellate review. At the trial level,
defendant was found guilty of felonious larceny of a vehicle (Case No. 79CRS22551) and of felo-
nious possession of a second vehicle (Case No. 79CRS28603). The court of appeals found no
error. The supreme court, with Justice Exum dissenting and Justice Carlton joining, affirmed.
The issue before the court in Case No. 79CRS28603 was whether the trial judge erred in not
instructing on entrapment by an agent, and in Case No. 79CRS22551, whether the trial judge
erred in refusing to give an instruction on the general defense of entrapment.
63. The S.B.I. agents did not actually say they would buy "stolen property," but said they
would buy only quality merchandise. 306 N.C. at 569, 295 S.E.2d at 423.
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Defendant denied knowing that the car he subsequently delivered to the fenc-
ing operation was stolen. On appeal, defendant argued that the police,
through financial manipulation, induced an unwitting third party to become
their agent. The principal issue was whether the trial judge, though he gave an
instruction on entrapment, erred in not instructing on entrapment by an
agent.64 The court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to indicate
that the "regular" was an agent of the police.65
While the court's conclusion was limited to the facts of the instant case,
analysis of its rationale suggests that a middleman's unawareness that the per-
sons for whom he acts are police officers will preclude the edstence of an
agency relationship. Basic to the court's reasoning is that entrapment is a de-
fense in North Carolina only when the entrapper is an officer or agent of the
government.66 The court noted that an agency relationship must be created by
mutual agreement.67 Therefore, if the government denies that the entrapper is
its agent, the defendant must produce substantial credible evidence of an
agency relationship.68 This, said the court, the defendant failed to do.
The dissenting opinion noted that the courts are divided on whether an
unsuspecting middleman can be an agent of officers for purposes of the en-
trapment defense.69 Crucial to the dissent's reasoning is the policy underlying
the entrapment defense--to deter officers from creating a crime solely to pros-
ecute and punish it.70 In light of this policy, it may be of little significance that
the third party who induces another to commit a crime is unaware that he is
being used by the government.
The majority in Luster did not directly state whether an unsuspecting
third party can be an agent of the police. Instead, it simply stated that there
was no evidence of an agency relationship between the "regular" and the of-
64. Id. at 571, 295 S.E.2d at 423-24. Defendant also contended that he was not otherwise
predisposed to commit the crime, but was induced by the "regular" to become involved. The
court stated that there was ample evidence to show defendant's predispostion. Id. at 572, 295
S.E.2d at 426.
65. Id. at 573-74, 295 S.E.2d at 425.
66. See State v. Jackson, 243 N.C. 216, 90 S.E.2d 507 (1955); State v. Whisnant, 36 N.C. App.
252, 243 S.E.2d 395 (1978); Note, Criminal Law-4 Survey and Appraisal of the Law of Entrap-
ment in North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. Rav. 982 (1976).
67, 306 N.C. at 574, 295 S.E.2d at 421.
68. Id. at 581, 295 S.E.2d at 433. See also State v. Yost, 9 N.C. App. 671, 177 S.E.2d 320
(1970).
69. 306 N.C. at 588, 295 S.E.2d at 433. See Note, Entrapment Through Unsuspecting Middle-
men, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1122 (1982); Note, Entrapment:A n Analysis of this Agreement, 45 B.U.L.
REV. 542, 563-65 (1965). The dissent argued that the "regular" was an agent of the police and that
defendant's predisposition to commit the crime should be a question for the jury.
70. Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (2d Cir. 1921). The dissent cited State v. Whisnant, 36
N.C. App. 252, 243 S.E.2d 395 (1978). In Whisnant defendant's conviction was reversed and a
new trial ordered because the trial judge failed to instruct on the entrapment defense. Nothing in
the opinion indicated that the friend who arranged a drug purchase between defendant and a
State Bureau of Investigation agent knew the true identity of the agent. Yet, the court of appeals
said, "[i]f Ms. Reynolds was acting as agent for SBI Agent Prillman and she as such agent induced
the defendant to commit the crime charged, the SBI agent would be responsible for her actions
and the defense of entrapment would be available to the defendant." Id. at 254, 243 S.E.2d at
396-97.
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ficers. 71 Yet, examination of the facts of the case clearly suggests an ongoing
relationship: the officers encouraged regular customers to solicit others to deal
with the operation, both indirectly, by offering less money on succeeding
purchases, and directly, by suggesting that they attract others to the operation.
Indeed, defendant entered the transaction at the request of a regular customer
who, encouraged by the officers, had brought in five or six people. Nonethe-
less, to constitute sufficient evidence of a mutual agreement, the court seemed
to require an acknowledged agency relationship between the police and a
knowing middleman.
3. Self-defense
A person may justifiably kill another in self-defense if he meets two con-
ditions: he must not have initiated the incident, and it must be necessary, or
appear to him to be necessary, to kill his adversary to save himself from death
or great bodily harm.72 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v.
Hunter,73 made several significant statements in dicta that broaden the con-
cept of self defense. The court adopted a court of appeals holding which said
that for the purpose of self-defense, a male who fears homosexual assault is
put in fear of great bodily harm.74
Furthermore, the court approved a model jury instruction dealing specifi-
cally with defense from sexual assault that differs from the instruction on self-
defense.75 The approved instruction states that the defendant must believe it
is necessary to kill the deceased in order to save herself [himself] from death,
great bodily harm, or sexual assault. 76 This instruction differs from the usual
self-defense instruction in two ways. Aside from the obvious addition of the
words "or sexual assault," the jury is permitted to consider the defendant's
knowledge of the deceased's reputation for sexual attacks.77 The court in
Hunter, however, may have limited the effect of its dicta when it found no
prejudicial error in the judge's instructions on ordinary self defense.78
In Hunter defendant signed a confession stating that the deceased at-
tempted to sodomize him. When defendant resisted, the initial aggressor got a
knife and continued the attempted sexual assault. When the deceased then
71. The majority stated that the evidence shows the "regular" acted solely to further his own
economic interests. 306 N.C. at 574, 295 S.E.2d at 426.
72. State v. Deck, 285 N.C. 209, 203 S.E.2d 830 (1974); State v. Gladden, 279 N.C. 566, 184
S.E.2d 249 (1971); State v. Kirby, 273 N.C. 306, 160 S.E.2d 24 (1968).
73. 305 N.C. 106, 286 S.E.2d 535 (1982).
74. State v. Molko, 50 N.C. App. 551, 274 S.E.2d 271 (1981). The supreme court has said in
dictum that a female may use deadly force to protect herself from rape. State v. Neville, 51 N.C.
(6 Jones) 413, 421 (1859).
75. 305 N.C. at 114-15, 286 S.E.2d at 540.
76. N.C. Pattern Jury Instructions-Crim. § 308.70.
77. 305 N.C. at 114, 286 S.E.2d at 540.
78. Id. at 115, 286 S.E.2d at 541. Other courts have held that an ordinary self-defense in-
struction is inadequate when evidence raises the issue of defense from sexual assault. Com-
menwealth v. Mitchell, 460 Pa. 665, 334 A.2d 385 (1975); see State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.2d 667
(Mo. 1959). But see State v. Milbradt, 68 Wash. 2d 684, 415 P.2d 2 (prosecution allowed to pres-
ent evidence of defendant's alleged homosexual tendencies), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966).
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struck defendant with the knife, defendant grabbed the weapon and stabbed
him.79 Defendant, appealing his conviction of second degree murder, as-
signed as error the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on his right to defend
himself from sexual assault.
On appeal, the court reasoned that the cause of defendant's fear of death
or great bodily harm was the threat posed by the knife, and not the attempted
sexual assault. The assault, said the court, was not a separate substantial fea-
ture of the case and thus did not require a jury charge. Instead, it was merely
one aspect of assault with a deadly weapon.80 Thus, the court implied that the
sexual assault itself must produce fear of death or great bodily harm for the
court to instruct on defense from sexual assault. Even so, the approved jury
instructions say "fear of bodily harm or sexual assault," not 'from sexual as-
sault." Since the words indicate that the latter is not dependent upon the for-
mer, the implication is quite different from an instruction on ordinary self
defense. In addition, the court indicated that had no deadly weapon been
involved, defendant would have been entitled to the charge requested.81 The
attacker's use of a weapon, therefore, may be cause to refuse to instruct on
defense from sexual assault. The model jury instruction that the court ap-
proved, however, lists the attacker's use of a weapon as an element for the jury
to consider. The instruction, then, certainly does not contemplate the rule im-
plied by the court: that use of a weapon in the course of sexual assault renders
the more specific instruction inappropriate.
The court's reasoning indicates that it may not consider the right to de-
fend oneself from sexual assault to be separate and distinct from the right to
defend oneself from death or great bodily harm. The court seemed to require
that the sexual assault produce fear of death or bodily harm. A sexual assault,
however, may take place without serious bodily injury to or death of a victim.
Thus, it is arguable that the court's analysis of defense from sexual assault in
Hunter and the jury instructions it approved are inconsistent.
E. Drug-Related Offenses
The rules governing criminal indictments in North Carolina are well-es-
tablished. A felony indictment must contain a pleading of the criminal
charges against the defendant,8 2 and the pleading must list separately each
offense charged and must contain a supporting factual statement for each
count.8 3 Charges in two indictments can be treated as separate counts of the
79. 305 N.C. at 107-08, 286 S.E.2d at 536-37.
80. Id. at 115, 286 S.E.2d at 241.
81. Id.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-644(a)(3) (1978): "An indictment must contain criminal charges
pleaded as provided in Art. 49 of this Chapter, Pleadings and Joinder".
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-644 (a)(2), (5) (1978) states:
A criminal pleading must contain a separate count addressed to each offense charged,
but allegations in one count may be incorporated by reference in another count. A plain
and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary
nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant's
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same indictment8 4 The defendant can be convicted of the offense charged in
the indictment or of a lesser offense, provided that all the elements of the lesser
offense are included in the crime charged in the indictment.85
In State v. Gooche86 defendant argued that he had been convicted of an
offense in violation of these well-established rules: the offense of which he was
convicted, he said, was not listed in the indictment. Defendant was indicted
for felonious possession "with intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance
59.9 grams of marijuana which is included in Schedule VI of the North Caro-
lina Controlled Substances Act. ' 87 In addition to submitting to the jury the
possible verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or
deliver, the trial court also submitted a separate offense - possession of more
than one ounce of marijuana.88 The defendant was convicted of the latter
offense; he subsequently contended on appeal that the court erred in submit-
ting this possible verdict because he had not been charged with this offense;
moreover, the offense is not a lesser included offense of possession of mari-
juana with the intent to sell or deliver.
Although the court of appeals supported defendant's latter contention, 9
it rejected his claim that he had not been charged with possession of more than
one ounce, since both elements of that offense were set out in the indictment.90
The court relied upon State v. McGi191 in upholding the trial judge's submis-
sion of both crimes to the jury. In McGill defendant was charged in separate
indictments with possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and
possession of more than one ounce of marijuana.92 The judge submitted both
offenses to the jury. Stating that the separate indictments could be considered
as separate counts of the same indictment, the North Carolina Supreme Court
commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant or defend-
ants of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation ....
84. State v. Stephens, 170 N.C. 745, 87 S.E. 131 (1915).
85. State v. Aiken, 286 N.C. 202, 209 S.E.2d 763 (1974).
86. 58 N.C. App. 582, 294 S.E.2d 13, rev'd, 307 N.C. 253, 297 S.E.2d 599 (1982).
87. Id. at 582, 294 S.E.2d at 13. The Controlled Substance Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)
(1981) states in pertinant part: "Except as authorized by this Article, it is unlawful for any person:
(1) To manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, a con-
trolled substance."
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(d) (1981) states in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsections (h) and (i) of this section, any person who violates G.S.
90-05(a)(3) with respect to: .... (4) A controlled substance classified in Schedule VI
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars
($100); but if the quantity of the controlled substance exceeds one ounce (avoirdupois) of
marijuana or one tenth of an ounce (avoirdupois) of the extracted resin of marijuana
. the violation shall be punishable as a Class I felony.
The amount of marijuana defendant in Gooche allegedly possessed (59.9 grams) was greater than
one ounce.
89. To prove the possession charge, the state must show that defendant possessed the drug
and that the amount possessed exceeded one ounce. To prove possession with intent to sell or
deliver, the state must show possession of any amount, and that defendant intended to sell or
deliver the marijuana. Each crime contains one element absent the other, and thus one cannot be
a lesser offense of the other. 58 N.C. at 584, 294 S.E.2d at 15.
90. Id.
91. 296 N.C. 564, 251 S.E.2d 616 (1979).
92. Id.
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in McGill upheld the trial court's action. The court of appeals in Gooche
noted that the defendant in McGill was properly charged with both offenses in
separate indictments, but despite this distinction the court held that the de-
fendant in Gooche was properly charged because the elements of both offenses
were set forth in the indictment. Thus, the trial judge acted properly in sub-
mitting alternative verdicts to the jury.
This decision appears to be in direct conflict with G.S. 15A-924, which
requires that an indictment contain "[a] separate count addressed to each of-
fense charged."93 The reason for this requirement is suggested by statutory
subsection (a)(5), which requires that the facts of each count be stated "with
sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant. . of the conduct which
is the subject of the accusation. . .. -94 The purpose of the separate count,
then, is to notify and allow the defendant to meet the charges against him. In
McGill the defendant had proper notice of both charges; in Gooche the de-
fendant was notified only of the offense of possession with intent to sell or
deliver, and thus was prepared to controvert only the elements of that offense.
On appeal the supreme court said that it was unnecessary for the court of
appeals to have heard the indictment issue; that portion of the lower court
opinion was vacated without discussion.95 The court did not reach the issue
because it found reversable error elsewhere: defendant's conviction for pos-
session of more than one ounce of marijuana was vacated because the trial
judge did not submit to the jury an essential element of the crime-the amount
of marijuana possessed.96 The supreme court was unpersuaded by the court of
appeals' argument that the trial judge was entitled to decide the amount ques-
tion as a matter of law since all the evidence showed that defendant possessed
either none of the drug or more than one ounce.97
After vacating defendant's conviction for possession of more than one
ounce of marijuana, the court turned to the question of remedy. The court
found it unnecessary to grant defendant a new trial, and held instead that
defendant had been convicted of simple possession of marijuana.98 It is on
this point that the court's reasoning is most open to criticism. The court cor-
rectly stated that possession is a lesser included offense of possession with in-
tent to sell or deliver.99 The weakness in the court's analysis, however, is that
defendant was not convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver. The
jury's refusal to convict defendant of possession with intent to sell or deliver,
suggests it must have believed either that he did not possess the marijuana, or
that he did not intend to sell or deliver it. Because the jury did not indicate
why it failed to return a guilty verdict on this charge, the supreme court could
93. N.C. GEMi. STAT. § 15A-924(a)(2) (1978).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-924(a)(5) (1978).
95. 307 N.C. at 255, 297 S.E.2d at 601 (1982).
96. Id. at 256, 297 S.E.2d at 599.
97. Id.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a)(3) (1981) states in pertinant part: "Except as authorized by
this Article, it is unlawful for any person: . . . (3) To possess a controlled substance."
99. See, eg., State v. Aiken, 286 N.C. 202, 209 S.E.2d 763 (1974).
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not rely upon this offense to find defendant guilty of simple possession. Thus,
the court was compelled to turn again to the offense for which defendant was
convicted-possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. 1°°
The court's reasoning in finding that a conviction for simple possession
may be based upon the original conviction of possession of more than one
ounce certainly appeals to logic. Since the jury convicted defendant for pos-
session of more than one ounce of marijuana, so the argument goes, it neces-
sarily must have determined that defendant possessed marijuana. Further, the
fatal flaw in that conviction-failure to submit the amount question to the
jury-has no relation to a charge of simple possession and thus had no preju-
dicial effect. But the court ignored the issue it had earlier found unnecessary
to reach-possession of more than one ounce of marijuana was not charged in
the indictment. Defendant was thus deprived of notice that he was being
charged with this offense, a serious deprivation in any criminal case.
In addition to the possessory offenses noted above, the North Carolina
statutes also declare unlawful the manufacture of a controlled substance. 101
Manufacture means the "production, preparation, propagation, compounding,
conversion, or processing"' 02 of a controlled substance, and marijuana is a
Schedule VI controlled substance.' 03 There are limited exceptions to this pro-
hibition: one exclusion covers the preparation or compounding of a controlled
substance for an individual's own use;1°4 a second exclusion covers the "prep-
aration, compounding, packaging, or labeling of a controlled substance by a
practitioner as an incident to his professional practice."105 The burden of
proof for an exemption rests upon the defendant. 10 6
In State v. Piland10 7 defendant doctor, was convicted of possession and
manufacture of marijuana. Defendant claimed that the marijuana growing in
100. 307 N.C. at 278, 297 S.E.2d at 602.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(a) (1981): "Except as authorized by this Article, it is unlawful
for any person: (1) To manufacture, sell or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, sell or
deliver, a controlled substance."
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(15) (Cum. Supp. 1981) states:
"Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conver-
sion, or processing of a controlled substance by any means, whether directly or indi-
rectly, artificially or naturally, or by extraction from substances of a natural orgin, or
independently by means of chemical synthesis; and "manufacture" further includes any
packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-94 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
104. See supra note 102.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(15) (Cum. Supp. 1981) states:
"[m]anufacturing... does not include the preparation or compounding of a controlled
substance by an individual for his own use or the preparation, compounding, packaging,
or labeling of a controlled substance: a. By a practitioner as an incident to his adminis-
tering or dispensing of a controlled substance in the course of his professional practice."
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-113.1(a) (1981) states:
It shall not be necessary for the State to negate any exemption or exemption set forth in
this Article in any complaint, information, indictment, or other pleading or in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding under this Article, and the burden of proof of any such
exemption or exception shall be upon the person claiming its benefit.
107. 58 N.C. App. 95, 293 S.E.2d 278 (1982).
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his backyard was to administered to his patients.108 He asserted that the only
way to be certain the marijuana had not been treated with harmful chemicals
was to grow it himself.1° 9 Although defendant testified at trial that he was
going to use the marijuana to treat a patient who was experiencing nausea
from chemotherepy, that patient denied being under defendant's care.' 10 De-
fendant also claimed that he did not try to obtain a special license for mari-
juana because he felt the attempt would be futile."'
On appeal defendant claimed he was exempted from the manufacture of-
fense by virtue of the practitioner's exception, G.S. 90-87(15).1I2 The court of
appeals found no exemption applicable because defendant "was doing more
than preparing or compounding marijuana; he was growing it.''113 Growing
marijuana as an incident to dispensing marijuana in the course of his practice,
said the court, was forbidden by law.
Close examination of the statute supports the court's decision. G.S. 90-
87(15)(a) exempts the preparation, compounding, packaging, or labeling of a
controlled substance. While growing marijuana comes under the heading of
manufacture,' 1 4 it is not included within the definitions of preparation, com-
pounding, packaging, or labeling. Growing, according to the statute, means
production,1 5 and production is not exempted by G.S. 90-87(15)(a). Thus, a
doctor in North Carolina cannot grow marijuana even if he has a proper
license.
Defendant also argued that G.S. 90-101(g) & (h)" 6 is unconstitutionally
vague." 7 He stated that since the term "tetrahydrocannabinols" reasonably
includes marijuana, he was led to believe he could grow and possess mari-
juana for patient use."l8 The court replied that even if the statute allows a
physician to possess tetrahydrocannabinols, or marijuana, in pharmaceutical
form, a physician could not reasonably believe the statute permits him to grow
marijuana and possess it in unprocessed form. Although the court of appeals
108. Id. at 97, 293 S.E.2d at 279.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Expert medical testimony was given to the effect that marijuana is useful for alleviat-
ing side effects of chemotherepy and that a license to dispense marijuana is very difficult to obtain
in North Carolina.
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(15) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
113. 58 N.C. App. at 100, 293 S.E.2d at 280.
114. See, e.g., State v. Whitfield, 51 N.C. App. 241, 275 S.E.2d 540 (1981).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-87(24) (Cum. Supp. 1981). "Production includes the manufacture,
planting, cultivation, growing or harvesting of a controlled substance."
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-101 (g), (h) (Cum. Supp. 1981) states:
(g) Practitioners licensed in North Carolina by their respective licensing boards may
possess, dispense or administer controlled substances to the extent authorized by law and
by their boards.
(h) A physician licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners pursuant to Article I of
the Chapter may possess, dispense or administer tetrahydrocannibinols in duly consti-
tuted pharmeceutical form for human administration for treatment purposes pursuant to
regulations adopted by the Commission.
117. 58 N.C. App. at 101, 289 S.E.2d at 281.
118. Id. Defendant noted that the North Carolina Drug Commission had adopted no inter-
pretive regulations for the statute.
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delivered a close and arguably correct reading of current statutory provisions,
the decision inPiland reemphasizes the complex tensions that exist for medical
practitioners between serving the best interests of the patient and observing the
letter of North Carolina law.
F Felony Murder
In State v. Davis1 19 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that North
Carolina does not recognize the offense of felony murder in the second de-
gree. 120 In Davis the evidence showed that after breaking into the victim's
home, defendant hit and stabbed her repeatedly. On appeal from his convic-
tion of first degree murder, defendant assigned as error the failure of the trial
court to instruct the jury that they could return a verdict of felony murder in
the second degree.121
In finding no error and holding that North Carolina does not recognize
the offense of felony murder in the second degree, the court construed G.S. 14-
17, the North Carolina murder statute that categorizes murder in two de-
grees.122 Under G.S. 14-17, first degree murder is specifically defined and in-
cludes murders committed during or while attempting to commit a felony in
which a deadly weapon is used, as well as murder committed in the course of
certain specified felonies, whether or not a weapon is used.' 23 Second degree
murder is defined as "[a]ll other kinds of murder. . . ." This statutory divi-
sion has existed in a similar form in North Carolina since 1893. Since that
time the courts have held that the statute merely restates common law defini-
tions of murder, rather than creating any new statutory offenses.' 24
In construing G.S. 14-17, the Davis court did not fully explain why felony
murders that do not fulfill the first degree murder standard of G.S. 14-17 can-
not be second degree murder under the same statute.125 The court apparently
assumed that felony murder, or felony murder other than that described as
first degree murder under G.S. 14-17, did not exist at common law and thus
119. 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982).
120. Id. at 422, 290 S.E.2d at 588. As a logical corollary of this holding, the court also stated
that the North Carolina pattern jury instruction on "Second Degree Murder in Perpetration of
Felony" should no longer be used by trial courts. Id. at 425, 290 S.E.2d at 589.
121. Id. at 422, 290 S.E.2d at 588.
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981) states in pertinant part:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or
which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson,
rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or at-
tempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree
.... All other kinds of murder ... shall be deemed murder in the second degree
123. 305 N.C. at 424, 290 S.E.2d at 589.
124. Id. at 422, 290 S.E.2d at 588 (citing State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 56 S.E.2d 649 (1949)).
125. A possible explanation for the holding is that the court believed proof of felony murder
would not constitute proof of an intentional and unlawful killing with malice aforethought, as
required for second degree murder. This explanation fails under the common-law theory that
malice is implied in a felony murder situation. See People v. Bauman, 39 Cal. App. 2d 587, 103
P.2d 1020 (1940).
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cannot be part of the "other kinds of murder" mentioned in G.S. 14-17. Such
an assumption is ill-founded since felony murder itself, including murder
other than that which would comprise first degree murder under G.S. 14-17,
was recognized at common law. 126 This fact has been noted by the North
Carolina court on at least one previous occasion. 127 In any event, it is clear
that a common-law felony murder will not support a conviction of second
degree murder under G.S. 14-17, unless the evidence shows the usual elements
of the offense: intentional, unlawful killing with malice but without premedi-
tation and deliberation.
G. Receipt of Stolen Goods
In State v. Hageman 128 the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled upon
three significant issues concerning receipt and attempted receipt of stolen
property. First, the court held that the crime of attempted receipt of stolen
property is punishable as a misdemeanour, not as a felony.129 Second, the
court held that when stolen property is recovered by the police it loses its sta-
tus as stolen property. 130 Thus, recovery of stolen property by the police
makes it legally impossible for a defendant who subsequently gains possession
of that property (through an undercover sale) to have committed the crime of
receiving stolen property. The court narrowed the effect of this ruling, how-
ever, in its third holding that despite the technical status of the property, a
defendant may be convicted of attempted receipt of stolen property. The court
stated that:
when a defendant has the specific intent to commit a crime and
under the circumstances as he reasonably saw them did the acts nec-
essary to consummate the substantive offense, but, because of facts
unknown to him essential elements of the substantive offense were
lacking, he may be convicted of an attempt to commit the crime.13 1
By refusing to limit its holding to the facts of the instant case or the particular
crime involved, the supreme court has indicated that neither legal not factual
impossibility will prevent conviction when one charged with a crime has
clearly demonstrated criminal intent and has taken all steps to complete the
crime.
Defendant in Hageman was the operator of a company that purchased
scrap gold and silver. On December 5, 1980, one Johnson stole silverware,
rings, and other jewelry from a residence. Johnson testified that before his
arrest on December 6, he sold several items to defendant. Prior to Johnson's
126. See State v. Jones, 95 Axiz. 4, 385 P.2d 1019 (1963). Generally, felony murder at com-
mon law involved a killing committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony dangerous to human life. The Davis court recognizes that this type of felony murder is no
longer first degree murder, but it advances no clear reason for its decision that it is not second
degree murder under the statute.
127. State v. Shrader, 290 N.C. 253, 261, 225 S.E.2d 522, 528 (1976).
128. 56 N.C. App. 274, 289 S.E.2d 89, aft'd, 307 N.C. 1, 296 S.E.2d 433 (1982).
129. 307 N.C. at 9-10, 296 S.E.2d at 439.
130. Id. at 11, 296 S.E.2d at 439.
131. Id. at 13, 296 S.E.2d at 441.
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preliminary hearing, the police took possession of the silver, but decided not to
seize the rings. In exchange for a lighter sentence, Johnson agreed to wear a
microphone and transmitter into defendant's shop and to offer to sell the silver
and a ring; he subsequently sold the goods to defendant. After purchasing the
silver, defendant telephoned a police "hot line "to obtain a standard informa-
tional report on stolen items. The police officer did not identify the ring or
silver, and defendant did not inquire about them.132
Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of receiving stolen
property (a jade ring), and the case was consolidated for trial with an indict-
ment charging defendant with the felony of receiving stolen property (the sil-
ver).133 The jury found defendant guilty of attempted nonfelonious receipt of
stolen property (the ring) and guilty of attempted felonious receipt of stolen
property (the silver).134 The court of appeals found no error in the first verdict
but concluded that defendant was guilty of a misdemeanor in the latter
case.135 The supreme court affirmed.
In resolving the first issue, the supreme court applied a two-step analysis
to conclude that attempted receipt of stolen property is not a felony. First, the
court noted that absent contrary statutory provision, an attempt to commit a
felony is a misdemeanor.1 36 Second, the court considered whether attempted
receipt of stolen property fell within the class of misdemeanors punishable as a
felony under G.S. 14-3(b). 137 The court noted the statutory requirements and
concluded that an attempt to receive stolen property did not fulfill them. The
misdemeanor, said the court, is not infamous, not done in secrecy or with mal-
ice, and not done with deceit and intent to defraud. In reaching its decision,
the court compared the Hageman facts to attempted crimes that do constitute
a felony.138 Because the latter are crimes against persons or involve a direct
132. Id. at 4-5, 296 S.E.2d at 436-37.
133. Id. at 4, 296 S.E.2d at 436.
134. In North Carolina, one can be convicted of attempting to receive stolen goods on an
indictment for receiving stolen goods. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-170 (1978). State v. Parker, 224 N.C.
524, 31 S.E.2d 531 (1944).
135. 307 N.C. at 6, 296 S.E.2d at 437.
136. Id. at 8,296 S.E.2d at 438. See State v. Hare, 243 N.C. 262, 90 S.E.2d 550 (1955); State v.Spivey, 213 N.C. 45, 195 S.E. 1 (1938); State v. Stephens, 170 N.C. 745, 87 S.E. 131 (1915); State v.
Jordan, 75 N.C. 27 (1876).
The court overruled a portion of State v. Parker, 224 N.C. 524, 31 S.E.2d 531 (1944), which
had found no error in defendant's conviction of an attempt to feloniously receive stolen property.
307 N.C. at 8, 296 S.E.2d at 438.
137. "If a misdemeanor offense as to which no specific punishment is prescribed be infamous,
done in secrecy and malice, or with deceit and intent to defraud, the offender shall, except where
the offense is a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor, be guilty of a Class H felony." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-3(b) (1981).
138. Crimes within the purview of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3(b) (1981) include: attempted
armed robbery, State v. Parker, 262 N.C. 679, 138 S.E.2d 496 (1964); attempted common-law
robbery, State v. McNeely, 244 N.C. 737, 94 S.E.2d 853 (1956); attempted burglary, State v.Surles, 230 N.C. 272, 52 S.E.2d 880 (1949); attempt to commit a crime against nature, State v.
Spivey, 213 N.C. 45, 195 S.E.1 (1938); attempt to obtain property by false pretenses, State v. Page,32 N.C. App. 478, 232 S.E.2d 460, disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 643, 235 S.E.2d 64 (1977). In State v.
Grant, 291 N.C. 652, 135 S.E.2d 666 (1964), the court held that an attempt to break and enter is a
misdemeanor punishable under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3(b) (1981).
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confrontation with the victim, attempt to receive stolen property is easily
distinguishable.
The courts turned to other jurisdictions to decide the second issue
whether stolen property loses its stolen character when it is recovered by the
police prior to its delivery to the defendant. The weight of authority, said the
court, is that "once stolen property is recovered, it loses its status as stolen
property."139 Thus, when the police recovered the silver, it was no longer sto-
len property. The court, however, rejected defendant's argument that the ring
had been constructively recovered by police. 14° Since the supreme court
agreed without discussing this issue, the court of appeals' reasoning is signifi-
cant. The court of appeals based its holding upon Copertino v. United
States,141 which held that property did not lose its stolen character when the
authorities did not take physical possession of it, but merely observed the
place in which it was hidden. Arguably, the facts in Hageman point to a dif-
ferent conclusion. The agents in Copertino did not exercise any dominion and
control over the property as did the police inHageman through Johnson, who
acted as their agent. Moreover, in Copertino the detectives were passive; they
did not cause the property to be delivered to the defendant as did the police in
Hageman. The Hageman court, however, may have been considering the
practical implications of its decision. The court's holding allows law enforce-
ment officers to preserve the property's stolen character by letting an inform-
ant retain the goods. This course of action, then, can preserve the possibility
of obtaining a conviction for receipt of stolen goods.
The court of appeals pointed out that Hageman therefore could have been
convicted of receipt of the stolen ring, but not of receipt of the stolen silver,142
which had come into police possession. The court did not address the obvious
question why a conviction for receipt of stolen property should depend upon
whether the police decided to take possession of the goods for a brief moment.
The distinction appears arbitrary, but should be of some interest to both de-
fense counsel and law enforcement officials.
The third and most significant aspect of Hageman concerns whether there
can be a conviction for attempting to commit an offense when the offense in
fact could not have been committed. The court held that a defendant may be
charged with attempt to commit a crime when he has the specific intent to
commit the crime and commits the acts necessary to consummate the substan-
tive offense under the circumstances as he saw them. This is so even if essen-
tial elements of the substantive offense are lacking.143 In Hageman the court
concluded that even if the silver had lost its character as stolen property,
thereby preventing a conviction for receipt of stolen property, defendant could
still be convicted of attempted receipt of stolen property. 44 The holding,
139. 307 N.C. at 11, 296 S.E.2d at 439.
140. Id.
141. 256 F. 519 (3d Cir. 1919).
142. 56 N.C. App. at 287, 289 S.E.2d at 97.
143. 307 N.C. at 13, 296 S.E.2d at 441.
144. Id.
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however, reaches beyond a conclusion affecting only the instant case and en-
compasses all crimes in which "attempt" is a lesser included offense.
The court examined two lines of cases in other jurisdictions to reach its
conclusion that defendant's conviction for attempted receipt of stolen property
was not erroneous. In People v. Jaffe145 the New York Court of Appeals over-
turned a conviction based on attempted receipt of stolen property. The court
in Jaffe reasoned that if an individual attempts actions that do not constitute a
crime, the mere attempt cannot itself constitute a crime. The Jaffe court dis-
tinguished a line of "pickpocket" cases in which convictions for attempted lar-
ceny were sustained, even though the targeted pockets were empty.146 The
distinction is between legal and factual impossibility. In deciding Hageman,
the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized, but rejected as unconvincing,
the New York Court's distinction.147 The court's holding in Hageman does
not distinguish between legal and factual elements that are lacking; dicta indi-
cated that the holding applies to both.148 There is an essential difference,
however, that the supreme court failed to discuss. If, in the attempted larceny
cases, the defendant had been able to complete that which he attempted to do,
the act would have constituted a crime. In Hageman, if the defendant had
accomplished that which he attempted to do, the act would not have been
criminal because the goods were not technically stolen goods.
Perhaps a more compelling reason for the court's rejection of Jaffe is a
concern that one charged with an attempt to commit a crime should not escape
prosecution. 149 This policy was expressed in People v. Rojas,150 upon which
the North Carolina Supreme Court relied. In Rojas the California Supreme
Court considered the controlling factor to be the specific intent of the actor,
not the external realities to which the intention refers. The statement by the
Hageman court that neither legal nor factual impossibility should be used as a
shield was a product of two policy arguments made in Rojas: the police
should not be discouraged from alert and efficient action to recover stolen
property; moreover, the defendant should not receive a windfall because
timely police action eradicated the projected criminality. 151 Thus, the major-
ity's adoption of these policy arguments illustrates a strong emphasis upon
preventing acquittals because of technicalities. Even though stolen property
may lose its "stolen character" thereby preventing conviction for receipt of
145. 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
146. Id. at 499, 78 N.E. 169.
147. 307 N.C. at 12-13, 296 S.E.2d at 440-41.
148. Id. at 13, 296 S.E.2d at 441.
149. Id.
150. 55 Cal. 2d 252, 358 P.2d 921, 10 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1961).
151. Id. at 257-58, 358 P.2d at 924, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 468 (quoted in State v. Hageman, 103 N.C.
at 12-13, 296 S.E.2d at 440). The importance of these considerations is suggested by the court's
failure to even discuss the arguments in Judge Becton's dissenting court of appeals opinion. 56
N.C. App. at 288-91, 289 S.E.2d at 98-100 (Becton, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Judge Becton argued that not only were the facts in Hageman different from those in Rojas, but
that absent a statute defining the crime, the court must be guided by the legal requirements of
mensrea and actus reus. The dissenting opinion acknowledged the policy arguments advanced by
the majority, but noted other options available to apprehend "fences."
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stolen property, the North Carolina Supreme Court has decided that a defend-
ant who intends to commit a crime and takes all steps to commit it will not
entirely escape the consequences of his actions.
H. Serious Injury
In State v. Pettfford152 the North Carolina Court of Appeals approved a
peremptory instruction that "a bullet wound to the head with the bullet lodg-
ing in the head is serious injury." Defendant in Pettfford had been charged
with a crime requiring proof of serious injury as an element.
Many courts have addressed the issue whether evidence in a particular
case is sufficient to justify peremptory instructions. The question may arise
when such an instruction is given,153 when the defendant moves for nonsuit
and contends that the state's evidence is insufficient to show serious injury,15 4
or when the defendant properly requests instructions on a lesser included of-
fense that does not involve the element of serious injury. 5 :5
In the earlier decision of State v. Jones'5 6 the supreme court had found
that the lower court had improperly defined serious injury. The supreme court
also said that the issue whether serious injury had occurred should be deter-
mined according to the particular facts of each case.157 In a later case, State v.
Ferguson,158 the court held that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury
that the offense charged could be proved by evidence of intent to kill or inflict
serious injury. The issue of serious injury, said the court, was one for the jury.
The Ferguson court cited Jones, and stated that serious injury should be deter-
mined according to particular facts, on a case by case basis.
Recently, however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has approved
peremptory instructions that particular injuries shown in particular cases are
serious injuries as a matter of law.'5 9 A similar result may be expected in
future case involving gunshot wounds that result in permanent damage and
require hospitalization, and when substantial hospital treatment and expense
are shown. When the defendant presents conflicting evidence about the seri-
152. 60 N.C. App. 92, 298 S.E.2d 389 (1982).
153. State v. Daniels, 59 N.C. App. 63, 295 S.E.2d 508 (1982); State v. Springs, 33 N.C. App.
61, 234 S.E.2d 193, disc. rev. denied, 293 N.C. 163, 236 S.E.2d 707 (1977). Cf. State v. Whitted, 14
N.C. App. 62, 187 S.E.2d 391 (1972) (victim shot in abdomen and suffered apparent permanent
nerve damage; evidence sufficient to go to jury on element of serious injury).
154. State v. Rotenberry, 54 N.C. App. 504,284 S.E.2d 197 (1981), cert. deniedsub nom. State
v. Dunn, 305 N.C. 306, 290 S.E.2d 705 (1982); State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 243 S.E.2d 367 (1978).
155. State v. Pugh, 48 N.C. App. 175, 268 S.E.2d 242 (1980); State v. Davis, 33 N.C. App. 262,
234 S.E.2d 762 (1977).
156. 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E.2d 1 (1962).
157. Id. at 91, 128 S.E.2d at 3.
158. 261 N.C. 558, 135 S.E.2d 626 (1964).
159. State v. Pettiford, 60 N.C. App. 92, 298 S.E.2d 389 (1982) (gunshot wound to head with
bullet lodged in head); State v. Daniels, 59 N.C. App. 63, 295 S.E.2d 508 (1982) (victim shot by
two .32 caliber bullets, one of which was removed by surgery, and one of which remained near
spine; victim in hospital twenty-one days); State v. Springs, 33 N.C. App. 61, 234 S.E.2d 193
(1977) (victim suffered from shotgun blast in chest, lost two ribs and lung); State v. Davis, 33 N.C.
App. 262, 234 S.E.2d 762 (1977) (victim struck in back of head, surgery required, nine days in
hospital, sixteen thousand dollar hospital bill).
19831
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
ousness of the injury, however, the case should go to the jury.160
Instructions about lesser included offenses not involving serious injury
should not be submitted when the evidence points conclusively to an injury of
a serious nature. 161 Although the jury might ignore the nature of the injury
and find the defendant guilty of the lesser charge, this potential result does not
justify submission of the lesser offense.162
In any event, Peftford suggests that the rule set out in Jones and Ferguson
may have been eliminated, at least when an obviously serious injury is in-
volved. Since trial judges now have more power to decide the issue of serious
injury, the jury will be able to focus its attention upon other questions of fact.
L Sex Crimes 63
In State v. Weaver' 64 the North Carolina Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether the offenses of taking indecent liberties with a child under
sixteen, 165 assault of a child under twelve, 166 and assault on a female by a
male over eighteen, 167 were lesser included offenses of first degree rape of a
160. See supra note 158, and accompanying text.
161. State v. Turner, 21 N.C. App. 608, 205 S.E.2d 628, appeal dismissed, 285 N.C. 668, 207
S.E.2d 751 (1974).
162. Id.
163. In State v. Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 297 S.E.2d 585 (1982), the supreme court held for the
first time that proof of infliction of "serious personal injury," which is required for a conviction of
first degree rape under G.S. 14-27.2 and first degree sexual offense under G.S. 14-27.4, could be
met by a showing of mental injury. Although the court did not define the degree of mental injury
that will satisfy the serious personal injury requirement, it did state that the injury must be greater
than that generally present in cases of forcible rape and sexual offense. Following the precedent
set by State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E.2d 1 (1962), which required the issue of "serious bodily
injury" to be determined on a case by case basis, the Boone court said the issue of "serious
personal injury" should similarly be determined on a case by case basis. 307 N.C. at 205, 297
S.E.2d at 589-90. See also King v. Higgins, 272 N.C. 267, 158 S.E.2d 67 (1967) (supports theory
that mental injury is equivalent to personal injury).
In State v. McGaha, 306 N.C. 699, 295 S.E.2d 449 (1982), the court held that proof that "a
child [is] of the age of twelve years or less," required for conviction of a first degree sexual offense
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4(a)(1) (1981), requires proof that the child has not yet passed his
twelfth birthday. The McGaha decision expressly overruled a 1981 North Carolina Court of
Appeals ruling involving identical statutory language. State v. Ashley, 54 N.C. App. 386, 283
S.E.2d 381 (1981) (case holding that a child between her twelfth and thirteenth birthday, i.e. in her
thirteenth actual year of life, was twelve or less), cert. denied, 305 N.C. 153, 289 S.E.2d 381 (1982).
In State v. Booher, 305 N.C. 554,290 S.E.2d 561 (1982), the victim induced defendant to force
him into a homosexual act, because the victim wanted to document the fact that he (the victim)
was not a homosexual. While the victim was in the process of so inducing defendant, he secretly
recorded their conversations, which recordings were later used at trial. The court found that a
defendant can not be convicted of first degree sexual offense under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4
(1981), unless the crime was committed without the victim's consent. State v. Locklear, 304 N.C.
534, 539, 284 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1981). The Booher court further held that a criminal offense that
requires lack of consent cannot be committed against a victim who arranges for the crime to be
committed. This rule also accords with the court's prior decision in State v. Nelson, 232 N.C. 602,
61 S.E.2d 622 (1950). In applying these rules to the Booher fact situation, the court overturned
defendant's conviction for first degree sexual offense on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence of lack of consent on the victim's part.
164. 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375 (1982).
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.1 (1981).
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(b)(3) (1981).
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(b)(2) (1981).
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child aged twelve or less.168 After defendant in Weaver had been indicted and
convicted of first degree rape of a child of twelve or less, he contended on
appeal that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the purported lesser
included offenses. 169 The court relied upon the "definitional test" and held
that the indecent liberties offense and the two assault offenses were not lesser
included offenses of first degree statutory rape.170
The definitional test discussed in Weaver requires a comparison of the
essential elements in the definitions of crimes. Unless the essential elements of
the lesser crime are subsumed definitionally within the essential elements of
the greater crime charged in the indictment, the lesser crime is not a lesser
included offense. The essence of the definitional test is that the factual circum-
stances of a case are not controlling on the lesser included offense issue. In
other words, if every element of the lesser offense cannot be found in the gen-
eral statutory and common-law definition of the greater offense, then the lesser
offense is not a lesser included offense. This result holds true even when the
particular facts supporting the charge of the greater offense also support a
charge of the lesser. 171
When the court applied the definitional test to the crimes involved in
Weaver, it found that none of the three "lesser" offenses were lesser included
offenses of the "greater" offense. Essential elements of the crime of indecent
liberties include age requirements and a sexual purpose or a lewd or lascivious
act; these elements are not included in the definition of first degree rape of a
child aged twelve years or less. 172 Similarly, assault on a child under twelve
and assault on a female both require assault as an essential element. Assault is
not an essential element of statutory rape. Also, assault on a female has the
essential element that the defendant be a male over eighteen. This element is
not required for conviction of statutory rape. 173
The Weaver court noted that its decision accorded with the holdings in
State v. Williams174 and State v. Ludlum, 175 in which the court held that the
crime of indecent liberties was not a lesser included offense of first degree
sexual offense. The Williams court reasoned that the former crime had an
essential element of sexual purpose, and that the latter did not. 176 The same
result was reached in Ludlum .177
The Weaver court also noted that its holding conflicted with State v.
Shaw,178 a case in which a defendant was convicted of statutory rape and
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (1981).
169. 306 N.C. at 633, 295 S.E.2d at 377.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 633-35, 295 S.E.2d at 377-79.
172. Id.
173. Id at 637-38, 295 S.E.2d at 380.
174. 303 N.C. 507, 279 S.E.2d 592 (1981).
175. 303 N.C. 666, 281 S.E.2d 159 (1981).
176. 303 N.C. at 514, 279 S.E.2d at 596.
177. 303 N.C. at 674, 281 S.E.2d at 164.
178. 293 N.C. 616, 239 S.E.2d 439 (1977).
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taking liberties. The Shaw court stated that statutory rape can only be com-
mitted by taking liberties with a female under sixteen, and that taking indecent
liberties was therefore a lesser included offense of statutory rape. The Shaw
court further reasoned that even though defendant had been convicted of both
crimes, the imposition of consecutive sentences constituted unlawful double
punishment for the same crime, since one was a lesser included offense of the
other.179 Weaver did not expressly overrule Shaw. To the extent Shaw held
taking indecent liberties to be a lesser included offense of statutory rape, how-
ever, it is no longer controlling.
In a series of 1982 cases the North Carolina Court of Appeals was asked
to determine a "lesser included offense" question similar to that dealt with by
the supreme court in Weaver. The issue in the court of appeals cases was
whether the statutory offense of crime against nature o80 is a lesser included
offense of North Carolina's statutory crimes of first and second degree sexual
offense.181 In two cases, State v. Warren18 2 and State v. Hill,18 3 the court held
that under certain circumstances a crime against nature is a lesser included
offense of a sexual offense. In a third case, State v. Barrett,184 the majority
failed to reach the issue. The dissent in Barrett, however, did reach the issue
and argued that a crime against nature is not a lesser included offense of the
crime of first degree sexual offense.185
The North Carolina Supreme Court had not specifically discussed the
lesser included offense issue raised in Warren, Hill, and Barrett; the court filed
an unpublished amended order in Barrett, however, in which it summarily
stated that crime against nature is not a lesser included offense of a first degree
sex offense.' 86 Even though this order is unpublished and, therefore, has not
179. Id. at 632, 239 S.E.2d at 449.
180. Crime against nature is a punishable offense under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1981).
Under North Carolina law, crime against nature requires proof of sexual intercourse contrary to
the order of nature. State v. Chance, 3 N.C. App. 459, 165 S.E.2d 31 (1969). To show the unnat-
ural sexual intercourse required by the crime, penetration of or by a sexual organ must be proved.
State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961).
181. The crime of first degree sexual offense, defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4 (1981),
generally involves a sexual act with a victim twelve years old or less, or with a nonconsenting
victim. If the sexual act is committed with a nonconsenting victim over the age of twelve, a con-
viction must be predicated upon the use of a dangerous or deadly weapon, or the victim must have
been seriously injured, or the defendant must have been aided or abetted by another. Absent
proof of these additional features, a sexual act with a noncosenting vicitm older than twelve
years is a second degree sexual offense under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.5 (1981). The sexual act
required in both first and second degree sexual offenses is defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(4)
(1981) and includes both fellatio and cunnilingus.
182. 59 N.C. App. 264, 296 S.E.2d 671 (1982).
183. 59 N.C. App. 264, 296 S.E.2d 17, disc. rev. allowed, 307 N.C. 128, 297 S.E.2d 404 (1982).
184. 58 N.C. App. 515, 293 S.E.2d 896 (1982). The court of appeals judgment was arrested by
amended order of the North Carolina Supreme Court. See infra note 186.
185. 58 N.C. App. at 519, 293 S.E.2d at 900. The majority stated no reason for its failure to
reach the issue. The dissent thought the issue was properly before the court by virtue of defend-
ant's motion for appropriate relief.
186. Amended Order, No. 525A82, Twenty-First District, From Forsyth, Nos. 81CRS8068
and 81CRS8069. If crime against nature is not a lesser included offense of first degree sexual
offense, it cannot be a lesser included offense of second degree sexual offense, since the second
degree offense has fewer essential elements definitionally than the first degree offense. See supra
note 181.
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been brought to the attention of practicing attorneys through normal channels,
it is presumably the law in North Carolina. In the order, the court held de-
fendant's appeal from the lower court's denial of his motion for appropriate
relief to be improperly before it. Even so, the court stated that defendant's
conviction for crime against nature was improper. Because the court did not
discuss the merits of the lesser included offense issue in the amended order, the
rationale for its holding is unclear. This failure to discuss the merits of the
issue also brings into question the intended scope of the order. It seems prob-
able from a "plain meaning" point of view that the court's brief statement that
"crime against nature. . . is not a lesser included offense of a sexual offense in
the first degree" is meant to be categorical in nature. If so, the trilogy of court
of appeals cases, Warren, Hill, and Barrett may be of little import. On the
other hand, it is possible, though certainly less likely, that the statement in the
amended order was meant to apply only to the Barrett fact situation. If so, the
court of appeals cases discussed below may still be important sources of North
Carolina law on crime against nature as a lesser included offense.
In Warren defendant was indicted for second degree sexual offense under
G.S. 14-27.4187 and specifically charged with unlawfully forcing the victim to
perform fellatio.188 At trial defendant was convicted of a crime against na-
ture. On appeal he urged that the charge of crime against nature should not
have been submitted to the jury because a crime against nature is not a lesser
included offense of the crime of second degree sexual offense. 189 Under the
general rule, as explained in Weaver, a crime is a lesser included offense of
another crime only if the greater crime definitionally includes all essential ele-
ments of the lesser.190 Defendant reasoned that in light of the holding in State
v. Ludlum, 191 penetration is neither a necessary element of the crime of first
degree sexual offense, nor a necessary element of second degree sexual offense.
Since a sexual offense can be committed without penetration, and a crime
against nature cannot, said defendant, crime against nature cannot be a lesser
included offense of the sexual offense. 192 Defendant's reasoning was in appar-
ent accord with Weaver, because both the defendant in Warren and the court
in Weaver reasoned that a lesser included offense determination should not be
based upon the particular facts of the case, but rather upon whether the
greater offense will always definitionally encompass the lesser. This analysis
may well be the unstated basis for the Barrett order and would support a cate-
gorical application of the order.
The court of appeals in Warren, however, rejected defendant's arguments,
distinguished Ludlum, and upheld defendant's conviction. The court observed
187. See supra note 181.
188. 59 N.C. App. at 270, 296 S.E.2d at 674.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text. See also State v. Davis, 302 N.C. 370,
373, 275 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1981); State v. Rorie, 252 N.C. 579, 114 S.E.2d 233 (1960).
191. 303 N.C. 666, 281 S.E.2d 159. The issue inLudlum was whether the sexual act of cunni-
lingus, defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(4) (1981), required penetration in all instances. The
court relied upon the dictionary and upon common sense in holding that it did not.
192. 59 N.C. App. at 270, 296 S.E.2d at 674-75.
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that Ludlum held only that the sexual act of cunnilingus can be performed
without penetration, whereas the specific act of fellatio was charged in the
Warren indictment. The Warren court used the same reasoning process as in
Ludlum, discerning legislative intent about a statutory word from its diction-
ary meaning and then applying the meaning in a nontechnical way. The court
concluded that fellatio usually, but not always, involves penetration by a sex-
ual organ. Since the court found that fellatio usually involves penetration, it
found that crime against nature is a lesser included offense of the specific
crime charged in the indictment. The crime against nature charge, then, was
properly submitted to the Warren jury. 9 3
The court inHill held, as it had in Warren, that crime against nature was
a lesser included offense of the crime of sexual offense.194 In Hill defendant,
with the help of two other persons, forcibly undressed the victim and then
performed cumilingus. He was indicted for a first degree sexual offense and
convicted of a crime against nature. Defendant argued on appeal that crime
against nature is not a lesser included offense of the crime of sexual offense,
and that submission of the charge of crime against nature was therefore preju-
dicial. 195 The indictment in Hill, like the indictment in Barrett and unlike the
indictment in Warren, did not charge a specific sexual act. Nevertheless, the
Hill court held that whenproof of the crime of which a defendant is indicted
will prove all the elements of a lesser offense, a conviction of the lesser offense
is proper.' 96 It followed that since proof of the first degree sexual offense in-
volved here would include proof of penetration, crime against nature was a
properly submitted lesser included offense. 197
Warren, Hill, and Barrett make it clear that under North Carolina law
conviction of a sexual offense does not necessarily require penetration as part
of the charge or proof. It is also clear that penetration is always an essential
element of crime against nature. A rule such as that proposed by the court of
appeals cases--that a crime against nature is a lesser included offense of a
sexual offense that involves penetration, but is not a lesser included offense of
a sexual offense that does not involve penetration-conflicts with Weaver. 198
Under such a rule, the lesser included offense status of crime against nature
193. Id. at 271, 296 S.E.2d at 675. This result is not in accord with Weaver, because the
Weaver test is not one of probabilities. Under Weaver the greater crime must always, rather than
usually, definitionally encompass the lesser crime. See supra notes 164-172 and accompanying
text.
194. 59 N.C. App. at 218, 296 S.E.2d at 19.
195. Id. at 217, 296 S.E.2d at 18.
196. This result obviously counters the definitional test of Weaver. See supra notes m2-m8
and accompanying text.
197. 59 N.C. App. at 217-18, 296 S.E.2d at 18-19. Defendant also asserted that all the evi-
dence tended to show that defendant was either guilty of first degree sexual offense or not guilty at
all. Defendant argued that submission of the crime against nature charge was prejudicial. The
court rejected this argument and stated that submission of a lesser included offense is generally
harmless error. Since there was no evidence here to show that the submission of the crime against
nature charge inhibited the jury from considering defendant's evidence, the charge was favorable
to defendant, even if it was given in error.
198. 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375. See supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text.
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turns upon the facts, rather than upon the definition, of the offense. 199 In
addition to the failure of the proposed rule to comply with the definitional test,
the reasoning of these cases is troublesome for another reason: crime against
nature and sexual offense do not share the same focus; the former is primarily
concerned with the "unnaturalness" of the sexual act, while the latter is pri-
marily concerned with the nonconsensual nature of the sexual act. In the final
analysis, a combination of Weaver, common sense, and the most logical read-
ing of the Barrett amended order should definitively preclude crime against
nature as a lesser included offense of sexual offense.
J Liabilityfor Failure to Act
In State v. Walden20° the North Carolina Supreme Court decided
whether criminal liability may be imposed on a person not for actions affirma-
tively taken but rather forfailure to act at all. The evidence in Walden showed
that the defendant mother stood in a room with a third party and her small
child while the third party beat the child with a belt for an extended period of
time; the mother did and said nothing to stop the third party.201 The state
prosecuted the parent for the child's injury on an aiding and abetting theory.
She was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.202
On appeal to the supreme court, defendant argued that criminal liability may
not be imposed forfailure to prevent wrongdoing by another.
The cotirt in Walden was aware of the general rule in North Carolina that
a person's mere presence at a crime, without some action or oral communica-
tion showing his consent or contribution to the crime, does not make him
criminally liable on an aiding and abetting theory.20 3 The court found the
general rule inapplicable to this case, however, and relied instead upon a com-
bination of two theories.
The court first adopted the theory recognized both at common law and by
statute that parents have an inherent duty to protect their children.2" 4 The
court added that when such a common law duty exists, an exception to the
general rule of criminal nonliability for an act of omission may also exist.
205
199. Application of Weaver to the "crime against nature as lesser included offense of sexual
offense" question is difficult, because the sexual act required for proof of a sexual offense may be
any one of many acts. See supra note 181. Depending upon which sexual act is charged, then, a
sexual offense may or may not definitionally, as well as factually, encompass crime against nature.
200. 306 N.C. 466, 293 S.E.2d 780 (1982).
201. Id. at 469, 293 S.E.2d at 783.
202. Id. at 473,293 S.E.2d at 786-87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(b) (1981) provides in pertinent
part, "Any person who assaults another person with a deadly weapon and inflicts serious injury
shall be punished as a class H felon."
203. 306 N.C. at 471, 293 S.E.2d at 784. A frequently cited case for this proposition is State v.
Aycoth, 272 N.C. 48, 157 S.E.2d 655 (1967). In that case the defendant merely sat in the passenger
seat of his car as his friend robbed a storekeeper. The court held defendant not guilty of aiding
and abetting an armed robbery.
204. 306 N.C. at 475, 293 S.E.2d at 786.
205. Id. at 475, 293 S.E.2d at 786. Although the court expressly reserved the question, it is
reasonable to assume that this ruling could lead to imposition of criminal liability for failure to act
in other situations when a common-law duty of some extraordinary nature exists.
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The court relied upon In Re TenHoopen206 to support the theory of a com-
mon-law parental duty of protection. TenHoopen, however, did not refer to
criminal liability for a failure to act.20 7 Nonetheless, the North Carolina stat-
utes dealing with criminal liability for failure of parents to care for children 2 8
do support a parental duty theory. The statutes do not, however, directly sup-
port the theory that a parent may be guilty of assault with intent to inflict
serious injury for an omission of action.
The second major theory relied upon by the Walden court is that failure
of a parent to take all reasonable steps to protect his child is an omission that
constitutes "consent and contribution" to a crime. Proof of consent and con-
tribution is normally necessary to support criminal liability on an aiding and
abetting theory.2°9 As mentioned earlier, mere presence is not usually enough
to show consent or contribution to a crime;210 presence plus other factors,
however, such as a special relationship between the parties involved, has tradi-
tionally supported a finding of consent and contribution. 211 Thus, although
the holding in Walden may be characterized as new law to a certain extent, it
is not a complete departure from the previous North Carolina case law on
aiding and abetting.
It is not entirely clear whether the Walden court believed that the parent-
child relationship creates an exception to the general rule of no criminal liabil-
ity for failure to act, or whether the court considered the failure to act as con-
stituting the "consent and contribution" necessary to prove criminal liability
on an aiding and abetting theory. It seems that a combination of the two
theories best supports the Walden result. In any event, what is clear is that
parents must do whatever is reasonable to protect their children from harm:
failure to make a reasonable effort may well subject the parent to criminal
liability.
In State v. Willoughby212 the North Carolina Court of Appeals also dealt
with criminal liability based upon omission of action. Unlike the court in
Walden, however, the court in Willoughby did not find an exception to the
traditional common-law rule that a defendant is not criminally liable for fail-
206. 202 N.C. 223, 162 S.E. 619 (1932).
207. Id. at 224, 162 S.E. at 620.
208. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (1981) (titled "[c]ontributing to delinquency and neglect
by parents and others"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1981) (titled "[c]hild abuse a general
misdemeanor").
209. 306 N.C. at 476, 293 S.E.2d at 787.
210. See supra note 203.
211. See State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709, 249 S.E.2d 429 (1978) (presence plus relationship of
friendship that existed between defendant and perpetrator supported defendant's conviction on
aiding and abetting theory) (quoting State v. Holland, 234 N.C. 354, 358, 67 S.E.2d 272, 275
(1951)). The relationship relied upon to support criminal liability based upon an aiding and abet-
ting theory in Haywood and Holland is one that exists between "multiple" defendants. This "mul-
tiple" defendant relationship can easily be distinguished from the parent-child case. In spite of
this easy distinction, the court's reliance upon Haywood and Holland is not totally misplaced. The
real thrust of the aiding and abetting theory is whether all the particular circumstances support the
theory. A close relationship between persons involved in the crime, regardless of the relationship
those persons bear to the crime, would probably be an important factor in any court's decision.
212. 58 N.C App. 746, 294 S.E.2d 407 (1982).
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Willoughby involved neither a parent-child relationship nor criminal lia-
bility based on an aiding and abetting theory. The State's evidence in Wil-
loughby showed that defendant had purposefully drowned the victim.
Defendant's evidence showed that defendant, an adult male, invited the vic-
tim, also an adult male, to swim. When the victim began to drown, defendant
failed to come to his aid. After defendant was convicted of second degree
murder, he urged on appeal that the trial court had erred in failing to instruct
on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. Since defendant had
proved that his negligent failure to act proximately caused the victim's death,
defendant argued that the involuntary manslaughter instruction should have
been given.214 The appellate court stated that it could find no North Carolina
case involving the issue of liability for manslaughter based upon omission of
action. The court thus followed the common-law rule, which does not impose
liability for manslaughter by omission.2 15 Since no such crime exists in North




213. Id. at 747, 294 S.E.2d at 408.
214. Id. See State v. lanks, 295 N.C. 399, 415-16, 245 S.E.2d 743, 754 (1978), in which the
court states the well established North Carolina rule that when there is some evidence that sup-
ports a lesser included offense, the defendant is entided to an instruction on that offense.
215. 58 N.C. App. at 747,294 S.E.2d at 408. As support for its statement that the common law
did not impose liability for manslaughter by omission, the court cited, Frankel, Criminal Omis-
sions .4 Legal Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 367 (1965); Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE
LJ. 590 (1958); and Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV. L. REv. 615 (1942).
216. 58 N.C. App. at 748, 294 S.E.2d at 408.
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A. Search and Seizure
1. Searches Under Warrant
The North Carolina Court of Appeals handed down seemingly inconsis-
tent opinions in two 1982 cases presenting the issue whether sufficient prob-
able cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant. In State v.
Mavrogianis' the court seemingly opened the door to warrants issued for mul-
tiple locations when police information relates to criminal activity in only one
location. But State v. Lindsey2 pushed that door firmly closed, leaving open
only a small exception for the specific facts of Mavrogianis.
In Lindsey the court of appeals reversed a superior court's denial of de-
fendant's motion to suppress evidence.3 The court noted that search warrants
must be based on more than probable cause in the abstract. There must be
probable cause that the objects sought will be found on the specific premises to
be searched.4 Additionally, the information on which the warrant is issued
must establish that probable cause exists at the time of issuance.5
The search warrant examined by the court authorized the search of de-
fendant's home for marijuana. The court used both of the above requirements
to invalidate the warrant. First, because the information that would have es-
tablished probable cause for the search was more than a year old, 6 the court
held that it was too stale to establish present probable cause for a search of
defendant's home.7 The court noted that marijuana is not "an item expected
to be kept for extended periods of time or designed for long-term use."8 Fur-
ther, recent information that defendant had sold marijuana in various other
locations was deemed insufficient to establish probable cause that the drugs
specified in the warrant would be found in his home.9
The court's careful examination of the facts before it and its intelligent
application of the law of probable cause to those facts produced a wise result.
The court shut the door that had been opened in Mavrogianis with regard to
the necessity for locational specificity in the articulated facts constituting prob-
able cause. In Mavrogianis the magistrate had information that a college stu-
dent was selling drugs out of his dorm room and that he owned an automobile
that he kept on campus.' 0 The court held that, based upon this information,
1. 57 N.C. App. 178, 291 S.E.2d 163 (1982).
2. 58 N.C. App. 564, 293 S.E.2d 833 (1982).
3. Id. at 567, 293 S.E.2d at 835.
4. Id. at 565, 293 S.E.2d at 834.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 567, 293 S.E.2d at 835.
8. Id. at 566-67, 293 S.E.2d at 834-35 (the court distinguished the relatively short period of
time marijuana is kept in one place from the longer period of time such items as business records,
a hatchet, and welder's gloves are kept in one place).
9. Id. at 567, 293 S.E.2d at 835.
10. 57 N.C. App. at 180, 291 S.E.2d at 164.
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probable cause existed for issuance of a warrant to search both the room and
the car.1" The court cautioned that it was not "holding that the possession of
an illicit drug at one place supports a finding of probable cause for the search
of any other place or thing in the possession of the accused."12 Three months
later, in Lindsey, the court proved itself true to its word.
2. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
In State v. Kennedy'3 the court of appeals made a logical, but dangerous,
extension of the concept of legitimate expectation of privacy. The facts
presented were as follows: defendant wrote a letter to a prison inmate, and the
letter was opened and searched for contraband. This search included an ex-
amination of every page to see if contraband was attached. 14 The inspecting
prison official noticed the words "20 gauge shotgun loaded" at the top of the
fourth page of the letter. 15 Suspicious, he proceeded to read the entire letter,
which described an armed robbery committed by defendant. 16 The court
based its holding that the letter was not protected by the fourth amendment on
its finding that defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
letter. 17
The legitimate expectation of privacy doctrine is composed of two subsid-
iary doctrines: the public exposure doctrine and the standing doctrine.' 8 The
court did not attempt to apply the standing doctrine in Kennedy. The public
exposure doctrine generally posits that an object held out to public exposure
cannot be subject to a legitimate expectation of privacy, and thus does not
merit fourth amendment protection. 19 Examples include marijuana offered
for sale to the public, 20 the sound of a person's voice,2 1 and the exterior char-
acteristics of a car.22 Words spoken in a public telephone booth are not held
out to public exposure, however, 2 and even retail stores do not consent to
wholesale searches and seizures of the goods offered.24
11. Id. at 181, 291 S.E.2d at 164.
12. Id.
13. 58 N.C. App. 810, 294 S.E.2d 770 (1982).
14. Id. at 811, 294 S.E.2d at 771.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 812, 294 S.E.2d at 772.
18. C. WHrrFBREAD, CgiMINAL PRocEDuRE 91 (1980).
19. Id. at 91-95.
20. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). Defendant had invited the undercover fed-
eral agent into his house to buy marijuana. The court held that "the home is converted into a
commercial center ... [that] is entitled to no greater sanctity than if [the activity] were carried on
in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street." Id. at 211. A crucial fact was that the agent was
invited into this commercial center to do business. Compare Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442
U.S. 319 (1979); infra text accompanying note 24.
21. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973) (voice exemplars).
22. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592 (1974) (examination of tires and taking of paint
scrapings).
23. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
24. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
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The Kennedy court, after noting the public exposure doctrine,25 based its
conclusion that defendant had no justifiable expectation of privacy in the letter
upon the following rationale: "[O]nce the letter left defendant's hand, headed
for delivery to a prison unit, the defendant's expectation should at least have
been that the letter would be opened and examined for contraband or any
other noticeable characteristics which posed a threat to prison security."'26
The analysis is somewhat circular: if a practice is widespread among govern-
ment officials, one expects them to engage in it; therefore, one has no legiti-
mate expectation that they will not engage in it. Consequently, one has no
legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to items that may be subjected to
that practice; therefore the practice does not violate the fourth amendment.
Although in this particular case the search may have been justifiable on
other grounds,27 the danger in the court's application of the legitimate expec-
tation of privacy analysis is well illustrated. The North Carolina court's anal-
ysis, which removed fourth amendment protection based upon the expected
actions of public offcials, may not have been an intended extension of the
doctrine enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. In the cases decided
by the Supreme Court, removal of fourth amendment protection was based
upon the actions of defendants in consciously exposing the objects in question
to the public. 28 The expected actions of public officials were not a factor. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Kennedy may have strayed from the doc-
trine as it was initially established. Some of the blame must go, however, to
the Supreme Court for establishing that the "guiding principle" of the legiti-
mate expectation of privacy doctrine is whether the defendant has a "reason-
able expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion. ' 29 It might have
been expected that a lower court would look at these words and apply them
literally, without full understanding of the underlying protective policies of the
fourth amendment. This is arguably the result in Kennedy.
3. Stop and Frisk
Two cases involving stop and frisk issues were decided by divided appel-
late courts in North Carolina in 1982. State v. Fox30 involved a questionable
investigatory stop, and State v. Peck31 involved a purported frisk. Both courts
upheld the policemen's actions; both decisions may have eroded the fourth
amendment protections previously embodied in rules governing authorized
stop and frisk police activity.
25. 58 N.C. App. at 812, 294 S.E.2d at 772.
26. Id.
27. It is beyond the scope of this brief commentary to analyze the rules regarding the opening
of prisoners' mail. The rights of prisoners, and perhaps of those corresponding with prisoners, are
- very narrow. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
28. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
29. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,368 (1968); see also C. WrrEBRF.AD, supra note 18, at
101.
30. 58 N.C. App. 692, 294 S.E.2d 410 (1982).
31. 305 N.C. 734, 291 S.E.2d 637 (1982).
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In Peck a campus security officer stopped a car32 and arrested the driver
for driving without a permit. The officer called for assistance, 33 and a state
highway patrolman responded. The patrolman opened the passenger door
and addressed the passenger, Peck. When Peck complained of feeling sick, the
patrolman noticed that he had red eyes, dilated pupils, and mucous on the
comer of his mouth, and that he seemed "cottonmouthed." 34 The patrolman
asked Peck whether he had "dope in here or on [him],"'35 whereupon Peck
stuck his hand in his pants. The patrolman grabbed Peck's hand, and pulled it
out of the pocket. This motion left a corner of a plastic bag protruding from
Peck's pants. The two policemen together got Peck out of the car, and pulled
the plastic bag from his trousers. The bag contained a white powder that
proved to be "MDA," an illicit drug.36
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals37
that the seizure should be upheld on the basis of the plain view doctrine.38
The first requirement of the plain view doctrine is that the officer must be in a
legally justifiable position when he makes the observation.39 If the patrol-
man's reaching into Pecek's pants was an unlawful intrusion, any contraband
brought into the patrolman's view by that unlawful intrusion would be ineligi-
ble for "plain view" treatment.4 The court found that because a frisk was
justified, the patrolman's reaching for Pecek's hand was also justified.41
The classic standards for justifiable frisks were set out in Terry v. Ohio:42
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous,. . . he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weap-
ons which might be used to assault him.43
The purpose of the frisk, then, is to protect the officer and others from weap-
ons, and the officer must reasonably conclude that the person to be frisked
may be armed and dangerous. Sibron v. New York, 44 Terry's companion case,
32. The propriety of the stop was not at issue.
33. The campus security officer called for assistance because he had orders not to leave cam-
pus. Id. at 737, 291 S.E.2d at 639
34. Id. at 738, 291 S.E.2d at 639-40.
35. Id. at 738, 291 S.E.2d at 640.
36. Id.
37. State v. Peck, 54 N.C. App. 302, 283 S.E.2d 383 (1981); see Survey of Developments in
North Carolina Law, 1981-Criminal Procedure, 60 N.C.L. Rav. 1159, 1312 (1982).
38. 305 N.C. at 743, 291 S.E.2d at 642.
39. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-68 (1971) (initial intrusion must be
justified by warrant or exception to warrant requirement).
40. See id. An object's being in plain view at the time it is seized does not necessarily justify
the seizure. As the Court pointed out in Coolidge, "any evidence seized by the police will be in
plain view, at least at the moment of seizure." Id. at 465 (emphasis in original).
41. 305 N.C. at 741, 291 S.E.2d at 641.
42. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
43. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
44. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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emphasized that protection against dangerous suspects is the only permissible
justification for a frisk. The right to frisk is not automatic when a lawful stop
has been made,45 and "a search motivated by a desire to discover evidence of
a crime, rather than weapons, is constitutionally impermissible unless there is
an adequate basis for arrest."'46
In Peck the patrolman testified at trial that he had no reason to believe
that Peck had a weapon when he reached in his pants.47 The court, however,
gave little credit to the patrolman's testimony. The subjective belief of the
police officer does not matter, said the court; the "search or seizure is valid
when the objective facts known to the officer meet the standard required. '48
This is a conclusion of doubtful validity: since the standard is subjective, a
proper motive is a prerequisite to a lawful frisk.49 Indeed, the justification for
the authority to frisk is the police officer's need to protect himself. The stan-
dard is broad enough to allow the police officer to be wrong about the danger
without violating the fourth amendment, as long as the frisk is based upon
facts that support "specific reasonable inferences" that justify the intrusion.50
But as Justice Exum stated in dissent, "[tihe requirement of objective, articul-
able circumstances in a Terry-type, protective seizure is designed to be a limi-
tation on, not a substitute for, the officer's subjective determination of what the
circumstances required. '51
The court in Peck stated that a court is not bound by a patrolman's con-
clusions of law about probable cause, for example. This is certainly true, and
the cases cited in the opinion support this proposition.52 But the proposition is
irrelevant to the question whether a court should adopt a patrolman's conclu-
sions about his motive for a frisk:
Here Officer Cruzan declared, not as a matter of law, but as a matter
of fact, that he had "no reason to believe that Defendant was going
for a weapon." The Court is bound by this declaration of the of-
ficer's best professionalfactual determination. It may not go behind
this determination to justify Officer Cruzan's actions on the basis of
what, upon the objective, articulable circumstances, he, or some
other reasonable officer, might have thought.53
Aside from the faulty analysis of the frisk justification, the court also
wrongly distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Sibron v. New York, 54
as the dissent noted.55 The factual circumstances of Peck and Sibron are re-
45. Id. at 64.
46. C. WHrrEBREAD, supra note 18, at 176 (1980); see Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63-66.
47. 305 N.C. at 738, 291 S.E.2d at 640.
48. 305 N.C. at 741, 291 S.E.2d at 641-42.
49. C. WHrIEBREAD, supra note 18, at 176; see Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63-66.
50. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
51. 305 N.C. at 746, 291 S.E.2d at 644 (Exumn, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 741, 746, 291 S.E.2d at 641-41, 644.
53. Id. at 746, 291 S.E.2d at 644 (Exum, J., dissenting).
54. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
55. 305 N.C. at 746-47, 291 S.E.2d at 644 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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markably similar.56 In both cases, the arresting officer suspected drug activ-
ity.5 7 In both cases, the officer made a somewhat accusatory statement to the
subject, who then thrust his hand inside his clothing.5 8 In both cases, the of-
ficer thrust his hand into the clothing after the subject's hand, pulled the sub-
ject's hand out, and thereby discovered drugs.5 9 Neither officer claimed that
he was searching for weapons or acting to protect himself.60 On these facts,
the Supreme Court held the officer's search of Sibran violative of fourth
amendment guarantees. 61 The North Carolina Supreme Court might well
have followed this authority as anxiously as it does those higher court deci-
sions that narrow fourth amendment protections, 62 and thus have found the
patrolman's search violated the fourth amendment.63
The court of appeals considered the legality of an investigative stop of an
automobile in State v. Fox.64 Defendant was stopped late at night when he
drove slowly down a dead-end street, and then backed up the street. 65 Some
of the business establishments located along the street had suffered repeated
burglaries, and the officer had received a report of a burglary that night.66
Defendant, whose hair was in shoulder-length dreadnaughts, 67 "was dressed
shabbily but drove a 'real nice' 1981 Chevrolet." 68 He appeared to avoid the
officer's gaze when the two cars met, and he did not stop to ask directions. 69
The court upheld the stop on the basis of Terry v. Ohio.7°
Judge Becton, in his well-reasoned dissent, observed that the Supreme
Court holding in Delaware v. Prouse71 directed a different result. In that case
the Court said:
[W]e hold that except in those situations in which there is at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or
56. The Peck majority conceded that there were "certain similarities," and went on to cata-
logue the nearly perfect factual congruence. It then stated, unexplainably, that "Sibron is other-
wise completely dissimilar." 305 N.C. at 738-39, 291 S.E.2d at 640.
57. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45; 305 N.C. at 738, 291 S.E.2d at 640.
58. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45; 305 N.C. at 738, 291 S.E.2d at 640.
59. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45; 305 N.C. at 738, 291 S.E.2d at 640. There is a difference here,
although the Peck court did not mention it. The officer in Sibron had the drugs in his hand when
he pulled it out of his suspect's pocket. The officer in Peck did not; his motions simply caused part
of the plastic bag to come out of the suspect's pants.
60. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 46 n.4; 305 N.C. at 738-39, 291 S.E.2d at 640.
61. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65-66.
62. See, ag., State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 701, 286 S.E.2d 102 (1982) (following New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
63. The court's reasoning as to the justification of the patrolman's search was overly con-
clusory. See 305 N.C. at 739, 742, 291 S.E.2d at 640, 642. No reasoned analysis of the facts
available to the patrolman was made. See id. at 741, 291 S.E.2d 641-42.
64. 58 N.C. App. 692, 294 S.E.2d 410 (1982).
65. Id. at 692, 294 S.E.2d at 411.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 693, 294 S.E.2d at 411.
68. Id. at 695, 294 S.E.2d at 412.
69. Id.
70. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). There is some support for the court's analogy of the automobile stop to
the on-the-street encounter in Terry. See United States v. Brognoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881
(1975).
71. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an
occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of the law, stop-
ping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his
driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment.72
In Fox there was no articulable and reasonable suspicion that defendant had
committed a crime or motor vehicle violation. As Judge Becton noted,
"dressed shabbily but driving a nice car" describes many of us on a late night
trip to the grocery store.73 "The law has yet to deem shoulder-length braids
on males or any other non-mainstream style, even while worn in a Chevrolet,
grounds for a suspicious inference." 74 Defendant's averted gaze, said the dis-
sent, is as likely to have been to avoid the glare of the police car's headlights as
to avoid eye contact.75
The requirement of an articulable and reasonable basis for suspicion is of
course partially motivated by concern that, without such limits, police officers
might act on the basis of ill-founded, unreasonable assumptions in deciding
who is "suspicious" and should therefore be searched. Because the officer in
Fox articulated no reasonable basis for suspicion, the court did the citizenry a
disservice in denying defendant's motion to suppress, and in implicitly ap-
proving the practice of making capricious vehicle stops.
The North Carolina courts should take care not to extend the stop and
frisk authorization beyond its reason for existence. The Supreme Court in
Terry did not rule that an investigative stop is not a seizure of the person, or
that a frisk is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.76 It
merely recognized some of the practical needs of police officers in the field.
The stop and frisk authority does not give carte blanche for investigations of
all citizens of unusual appearance or behavior,77 nor does it automatically jus-
tify a frisk, even when a stop is justified.78
B. Miranda Requirements
In Miranda v. Arizona79 the Supreme Court ruled that the fifth amend-
ment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination requires that certain
warnings be given a defendant before interrogation if any evidence obtained
as a result of custodial interrogation is to be admissable against him.80 The
72. Id. at 663.
73. 58 N.C. App. at 696-97, 294 S.E.2d at 413 (Becton, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 697, 294 S.E.2d at 413 (Becton, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 697, 294 S.E.2d at 413-14 (Becton, J., dissenting).
76. C. WnmnrnE.AD, supra note 18, at 174-75.
77. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
79. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
80. The defendant must be advised that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to questioning if he so
desires.Id. at 444. See also, State v. Crawford, 58 N.C. App. 160,293 S.E.2d 223,disc. rev. denied,
306 N.C. 745, 295 S.E.2d 481 (1982).
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rationale behind the Miranda rule is that custodial interrogations are inher-
ently coercive; the presumption is that inculpatory statements made while in
custody and without representation are involuntary and thus inadmissible
under the fifth amendment.8 ' Uncoerced admissions are admissible, however,
if the defendant makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his
Miranda rights,82 if the statements are made before the individual is in cus-
tody,8 3 or if the statements are "spontaneous" in the sense that interrogation
by the police has not yet begun.84 Several issues can arise when a defendant
alleges that evidence was admitted at trial in violation of his Miranda rights:
(1) whether the defendant was actually in custody so that the rights were trig-
gered; (2) whether the statements were made as a result of interrogation; and
(3) whether the defendant effectively waived his Miranda rights.85 There were
developments in North Carolina case law in each of these areas in 1982.
1. Custody
A defendant must be in custody before his Miranda rights are triggered.86
In State v. Davis87 the North Carolina Supreme Court was confronted with the
isssue of what constitutes custody. In Davis the court disapproved of the rule
previously adopted in State v. Clay,88 and stated that "[tlhe determination
whether an individual is 'in custody' during an interrogation so as to invoke
the requirement of Miranda requires an application of fixed rules of law and
results in a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact."'89
Defendant in Davis contended that his confession to police at the police
station was coerced and admitted into evidence in violation of his fifth amend-
ment right to be free from self-incrimination. 90 Defendant had twice been
given Miranda warnings and had signed a waiver of his rights on both occa-
sions; the presence or adequacy of the warnings was not at issue. After ques-
tioning had begun, however, defendant indicated that he did not wish to
discuss the case further.91 The rule is well-established that:
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
81. 384 U.S. at 457.
82. Id. at 444.
83. Id.
84. See id. See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
85. See Sunderland, Sepf-incrimination and Constitutional Princiles: Miranda v. Arizona and
Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 171 (1979).
86. 384 U.S. at 444. See also Smith, The Threshhold Question in Applyng Miranda: What
Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. REv. 699 (1974). In recent cases, the Supreme
Court has rejected arguments that Miranda should be extended to cover noncustodial circum-
stances. The rationale for Miranda is the presumption of coercion in the custodial environment.
"[S]uch an extension of the Miranda requirements would cut this Court's holding in that case
completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale." Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341, 345 (1976).
87. 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982).
88. 297 N.C. 555, 559, 256 S.E.2d 176, 180 (1979)(determination of custody is a finding of
fact).
89. 305 N.C. at 414-415, 290 S.E.2d at 583.
90. Id at 407, 290 S.E.2d at 579.
91. Id at 406-07, 290 S.E.2d at 579.
0971983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAWA EVIEWV
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his
Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person in-
vokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion,
subtle or otherwise. 92
Defendant argued, based upon this rule, that statements elicited from him af-
ter he indicated that he no longer wished to talk were a product of compulsion
and involuntary as a matter of law.93 The State argued that defendant was not
in custody and, therefore, his Miranda rights had not attached. 94
The facts that gave rise to the custody issue were as follows: Davis was
picked up, given Miranda warnings, and questioned abourt a murder. He was
given a ride home; the officers indicated they would like to meet with him
again later that evening, and he agreed. At that time, he was again given a
ride to the police station. Once more he was informed of his rights, and he
executed a written waiver. When he was questioned and shown photographs
of the body of deceased, defendant then indicated he did not wish to discuss
the case, began to cry, and pushed away the pictures. He asked to go to and
was taken to a bathroom, accompanied by a detective. Davis was still upset
when he returned to the conference room, and he stated that he needed to talk
to someone. The detective said, "Well James, you can talk to us about it."95
The detective gave defendant his written waiver to review, and defendant's
confession followed. The trial court found on these uncontested facts that de-
fendant was not in custody at the time he made the statements, and the
supreme court upheld this determination.96
The Miranda court defined "custodial interrrogation" as questioning by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom in a significant way.97 The test for determining
whether a suspect is in custody has been interpreted to be the same test that is
used for ascertaining whether a person is "seized" for fourth amendment pur-
poses.98 The Davis court applied the standard for custody enunciated in
United States v. Mendenhall,99 a fourth amendment case: "Whether a reason-
able person in the suspect's position would believe that he had been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way
92. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
93. 305 N.C. at 407, 290 S.E.2d at 579.
94. The State's argument is grounded in the rule that "[i]fit be determined that he was not in
custody, then it may be concluded ipsofacto that he was not interrogated for Miranda purposes,
and the reviewing court is not required to consider whether the respondent waived his rights
underMiranda." Id at 409, 290 S.E.2d at 580 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,298 n. 2
(1980)).
95. Id at 407, 290 S.E.2d at 579.
96. Id at 417, 290 S.E.2d at 585.
97. 384 U.S. at 444.
98. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); State v. Simpson, 303 N.C. 439, 279
S.E.2d 542 (1981); State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 259 S.E.2d 843 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
941 (1980).
99. 446 U.S. 554 (1980).
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or, to the contrary, would believe that he was free to go at will." 1° ° The stan-
dard is an objective one, based neither upon the subjective intent of the police
to restrain defendant, nor upon the subjective belief of the defendant about the
probable police reaction should he attempt to leave.10'
Under this test, the court found that a reasonable person, taken for a sec-
ond time to a police station at night, read Miranda rights, and questioned
about a murder, would believe that he was free to go. The court made this
finding even though Davis was not at any time advised that he was free to go,
and was in fact accompanied by a detective each time he left the interrogation
room.
Though the rules of law applied are well-established, the finding of the
Davis court on these facts that as a matter of law defendant was not in "cus-
tody" seems contrary to the result in several Supreme Court cases. Relying on
Beckwith v. United States10 2 the court in Davis emphasized that defendant was
not told he was not free to go.' 03 Beckwith is cited for the propostion that an
individual is not in custody merely because he is the focus of an investigation
at the time of his "interview."'14 It is true that, like Beckwith, Davis had not
been placed under arrest and that "there was no probable cause to arrest [him]
or take him into custody prior to his confession."' 0 5 The cases are clearly
distinguishable, however: in Beckwith defendant himself invited IRS agents
into his home and sat with them when the investigation of his tax returns was
discussed.' 0 6
A case more factually similar to Davis is Oregon v. Mathiason,10 7 in
which the Supreme Court found no custodial interrogation. The Mathiason
Court emphasized, however, that when the suspect voluntarily came to the
location of the interview, he "was immediately informed that he was not under
arrest."'1 8 By contrast, this important communication was not made to de-
fendant Davis.
100. 305 N.C. at 410,290 S.E.2d at 581 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554
(1980)).
101. Many believe that the objective standard is both more sensible and more consistent with
Miranda's rationale than is a subjective standard; the former avoids reliance on self-serving state-
ments by either police or suspects, avoids inquiry into both defendant's and police officer's states
of mind, and frees police from responsibility for the idiosyncrasies of particular suspects. See
United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970); Hunter v.
State, 590 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1979). See also Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Mean-
ing of Miranda, in CRMwNL LAW AND THE CoNsTrrUIoN, 335, 338-51 (1966).
102. 425 U.S. 341 (1976). See 305 N.C. at 408, 409, 290 S.E.2d at 580.
103. 305 N.C. at 417, 290 S.E.2d at 585.
104. 305 N.C. at 408, 409, 290 S.E.2d at 580.
105. Id at 409, 290 S.E.2d at 580.
106. 425 U.S. at 342.
107. 429 U.S. 492 (1977). InMathiason defendant met with police at the officer's invitation at
a highway patrol station close to defendant's home. Defendant was told he was not under arrest
and was free to leave. When confronted with evidence of involvement in a burglary, he confessed.
He was then read his Miranda rights, and a taped confession was made. The Court found the
evidence admissible because defendant was not in custody.
108. Id at 495.
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Dunaway v. New York 109 is another Supreme Court case presenting
analogous facts but reaching a different result. In Dunaway police lacked
probable cause to arrest. They found defendant at a neighbor's house, and he
voluntarily accompanied the police to the station. The Supreme Court found
that Dunaway was in custody for Miranda purposes because he was taken in a
police car to the station, placed in an interrogation room, and "never informed
that he was 'free to go."'110 In light of the decisions in Dunaway and
Mathiason, the Davis result is questionable. The argument made by the dis-
sent in Mathiason is even more persuasive when applied to the Davis case:
Miranda requires warnings to "combat" a situation in which there
are inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist .... [E]ven if [Mathiason] were not in
custody, the coercive elements in the instant case were so pervasive
as to require Miranda-type warnings. Respondent was interrogated
in "privacy" and in "unfamiliar surroundings," factors on which Mi-
randa places great stress. The investigation had focused on
respondent. ' I
Not only are all of these factors present in the Davis case, but there also arises
an additional "coercive element": unlike Mathiason, Davis was never told he
was free to go.
2. Interrogation
Even though made by a suspect in custody, inculpatory statements are not
subject to Miranda protection unless they result from interrogation. Miranda
requires that the term "interrogation" be broadly construed to include "either
express questioning or its functional equivalent."'1 12 The Supreme Court has
defined interrogation, in Rhode Island v. Innis, as "any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory
response from the suspect."' "3
When the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied this definition of in-
109. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
110. Id at 212. But see State v. Roberti, 293 Or. 59, 644 P.2d 1104 (1982) (suspect not in
custody when stopped for speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol: "actual (not po-
tential) custody or significant deprival of freedom is what triggers Miranda safeguards").
111. 429 U.S. at 497-498 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) citedin Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,301,
309 (1980). See State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E.2d 599 (1982), for an example of interroga-
tion without express questioning. See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), in which the
Supreme Court held that an officer's "Christian burial" speech constituted interrogation because it
elicited inculpatory acts and statements from defendant. The evidence was inadmissable because
defendant had previously invoked his right to counsel. But see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291 (1980) in which a conversational remark about the crime by one arresting officer to another
was not interrogation, even though it elicited a confession from defendant.
113. 446 U.S. at 301. For a discussion of the development of the Supreme Court's definition
of interrogation see Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Messiah and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"?
When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. LJ. 1 (1978). See also White, Interrogation Without Question:
Rhode Island v. Innis and U.S. v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1209 (1980).
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terrogation in State v. Sellers'1 4 the court determined that interrogation was
not present. In Sellers, the court addressed for the first time the issue whether
routine questions incident to arrest must be preceded by a reading of Miranda
rights and, as a corollary, whether answers to such questions may be intro-
duced into evidence without a waiver of Miranda rights. 1 5 After defendant
Sellers was arrested for driving while intoxicated he was read, and expressly
refused to waive, his Miranda rights. He was then asked routine questions:
his name, address, general physical traits, place of employment, and date of
birth. With this information, the arresting officer obtained defendant's driving
record, which showed a permanent revocation of his license."16 Defendant
was ultimately convicted of driving without a valid license. On appeal he al-
leged that his fifth amendment rights were violated by the use of this evidence,
which was elicited after he had invoked his right to remain silent.
The court of appeals held that such routine questioning, necessary to
identifying the person in custody, is not the type of interrogation proscribed by
Miranda.1 7 When questions are for identification purposes and do not deal
with the alleged crime per se, responses may be used to obtain other informa-
tion (for example, driving records) even though this other information may
ultimately lead to additional charges. Routine questions that may be reason-
ably expected to produce incriminatory responses, however, constitute interro-
gation within the scope of Miranda."l8 For example, in State v. Blakeiy119
answers given by a defendant charged with drunk driving to questions on an
"alcohol influence report form" were found subject to Miranda.120 Thus, the
rule adopted by the court in Sellers is clearly in accord with the Innis defini-
tion of interrogation, since that definition expressly excludes questioning nor-
mally attendant to arrest and custody.' 2 '
3. Waiver
Miranda requires that "if interrogation continues without the presence of
an attorney, and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
[rights]. ' 122 G.S. 15A-974 outlines the procedures that a trial court must fol-
114. 58 N.C. App. 43, 293 S.E.2d 226 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 749, 295 S.E.2d 485
(1982).
115. Id at 46, 293 S.E.2d at 228.
116. Id
117. Id. at 47, 293 S.E.2d at 229. Other states have reached the same conclusion. See e.g.,
State v. Cozad, 113 Ariz. 437, 556 P.2d 312 (1976); Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491
(1976); People v. Riviera, 26 N.Y.2d 304, 258 N.E.2d 699, 310 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1970). North Caro-
lina has also held that a breathalyzer test is not an interrogation for Miranda purposes. State v.
Sykes, 285 N.C. 202, 203 S.E.2d 849 (1974).
118. 58 N.C. App. at 48, 293 S.E.2d at 229.
119. 22 N.C. App. 337, 206 S.E.2d 352 (1974).
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
122. 384 U.S. 436, 468. See also State v. Biggs, 289 N.C. 522, 223 S.E.2d 371 (1976) (state
must affirmatively show defendant was fully informed of his rights and voluntarily waived them).
See, ag., State v. Williams, 59 N.C. App. 15, 295 S.E.2d 493 (1982), in which the State failed to
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low at a preliminary hearing to determine whether a statement is admissible or
must be excluded because it was obtained by coercion. The statute does not,
however, articulate the quantum of proof required to establish the voluntari-
ness of a statement and, prior to State v. Johnson,123 the North Carolina
Supreme Court had never articulated a standard. 124 In Johnson, the court
adopted the rule that the State must prove voluntariness (i.e., knowing and
intelligent waiver) by a preponderance of the evidence.125
Defendant argued that the State's burden should be that adopted by sev-
eral other jurisdictions: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.126 In Lego v.
Twomez127 the Supreme Court required a minimum showing of voluntariness
by a preponderance of the evidence. The decision left the states free to adopt a
higher standard pursuant to their own laws.128 The Johnson court noted that
"[n]o provision in the North Carolina Constitution expressly or implicitly re-
quires this Court to adopt a higher quantum of proof .... ,,129
In Lego defendant argued that evidence offered at a criminal trial and
challenged on constitutional grounds must be determined admissible beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to give adequate protection to the values that exclu-
sionary rules are designed to protect. 130 The Court found that "[t]he argument
is straightforward and has appeal .... But, from our experience.., no sub-
stantial evidence has accumulated that federal rights have suffered from deter-
mining admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence."' 131
The result of both Lego and Johnson is generated by a balancing of de-
fendant's rights against the societal interest in law enforcement and expedi-
tious judicial proceedings. Miranda itself would seem to demand that the
heavier burden be imposed upon the state. 132 As a practical matter, however,
this has not been the case, and most courts have elected the preponderance
standard permitted by Lego. 133 Further, in spite of the references to "heavy
meet its burden of proving knowing and intelligent waiver by a moderately retarded murder de-
fendant. Compare State v. Cass, 55 N.C. App. 291, 285 S.E.2d 337, disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 396,
290 S.E.2d 336 (1982) in which defendant was found mentally competent to waive his rights in
spite of psychiatric history.
123. 304 N.C. 680, 285 S.E.2d 792 (1982).
124. Id at 684, 285 S.E.2d at 795.
125. Id at 685, 285 S.E.2d at 795. This is the standard to be applied by the trial court in its
preliminary hearing on voluntariness. The Johnson court observed that the standard to be applied
by appellate courts in review of the trial court findings is unaffected by this new rule. Id. at 686,
285 S.E.2d at 796. The appellate standard of review remains the same: the trial court's findings
are conclusive if supported by competent evidence. See, e.g., State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 339,
259 S.E.2d 510, 535 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 918 (1980); State v.
Biggs, 289 N.C. 522, 530, 223 S.E.2d 371, 376 (1976).
126. Among these jurisdictions are California, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. For complete citation see 304 N.C. at
684, 285 S.E.2d at 795.
127. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
128. 404 U.S. at 489.
129. 304 N.C. at 685, 285 S.E.2d at 796.
130. 404 U.S. at 488.
131. Id
132. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
133. See Johnson, 304 N.C. at 684, 285 S.E.2d at 795.
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burden," most courts have held that the testimony of an officer that he gave
the warnings is sufficient and need not be corrobated.134 One possible explana-
tion for this difference between theory and practice is that a violation of Mi-
randa results in absolute exclusion of the inculpatory testimony, no matter
how objectively reliable and probative the evidence is. The lower standard for
a showing of voluntariness serves as a counterbalance to this blanket protec-
tion of the defendant.
State v. Vickers135 is an example of a case in which the State met its bur-
den of showing valid waiver. It is an interesting case because the court found
"interrogation" even though there was no express questioning, and found a
valid waiver even though defendant made no express written or oral statement
to that effect. Defendant was arrested on a charge of arson. He was advised of
his constitutional rights when placed in the squad car, and acknowledged that
he understood them. While driving to the jail the arresting officer remarked
that he did not understand why defendant had committed the crime, and de-
fendant responded that he was giving the community a reason to get rid of
him.136 Upon arrival at the station he was again read his rights, and he signed
a form acknowledging that he understood them. He responded negatively
when asked if he wanted an attorney and confessed to setting the fires.
On appeal defendant argued that the confessions were inadmissible be-
cause the State failed to prove that he had knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to remain silent and his right to counsel when he made the first in-
criminating remark in the squad car.137 The court found the evidence admis-
sible.1 38 The remark of the officer certainly amounted to custodial
interrogation under the Innis test discussed above. The court found that since
defendant was apprised of his right not to talk, and was not coerced or prom-
ised any reward for talking, his voluntary response to the officer's remark
amounted to a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.139 The holding
approves of the recent Supreme Court interpretation of Miranda in North Car-
olina v. Butler' 4° that "[a]n express written or oral statement of waiver of the
right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of valid-
ity of that waiver but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish
waiver." 14 1
The problem with this rule is obvious: if it is true that the custodial set-
ting is so inherently coercive that a suspect's confession is presumed involun-
tary, the same strong presumption arises that a waiver is likewise not
knowingly and intelligently given under these circumstances. Butler indicates
134. MODEL PENAL CODE § 130.4 commentary at 346 (1980). See also Elsen & Rosett, Protec-
dions for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. RaV. 645, 658-59, 666-67.
135. 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E.2d 599 (1982).
136. Id at 92, 291 S.E.2d at 602.
137. Id at 95. 291 S.E.2d at 604.
138. Id. at 96, 291 S.E.2d at 604.
139. Id
140. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
141. Id. at 373.
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that there may be cases in which even an express oral or written waiver "is not
inevitably... sufficient to establish waiver." Defendant Vicker made an in-
culpatory statement shortly after being taken into custody. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court should have followed the subtle hint of Butler and
scrutinized the facts carefully before finding waiver.
C. Right to Counsel
Both the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution
guarantee a criminal defendant's right to counsel. 42 The right to counsel has
been interpreted to include more than mere representation at trial by an attor-
ney; it also encompasses: (1) representation that meets a minimum standard of
competence; 143 (2) a reasonable opportunity for defendant and counsel to in-
vestigate, prepare, and present a defense;'" and (3) the right to an attorney
who functions in the role of an active advocate, unhobbled by divided loyal-
ties. 145 Significant developments concerning all these right to counsel issues
occurred in North Carolina case law in 1982.
1. Standard of Competence
Until recently the standard of effective assistance of counsel in North
Carolina has been the "farce and mockery" standard.146 In order to prove a
violation of his sixth amendment right, a petitioner had to show that his attor-
ney's representation had been so inadequate that his trial became a farce and
mockery of justice.147 The North Carolina Supreme Court has been aware of
the many criticisms of this standard for some time.14 8 In State v. Weaver 149
142. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 19,23. See also State v. Misenheimer, 304
N.C. 108, 120, 282 S.E.2d 791, 799 (1981) (citing the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963)).
143. See, ag., State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 282 S.E.2d 791 (1981). See also Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444,446 (1940) ("The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot
be satisfied by mere formal appointnent").
144. State v. Phillip, 261 N.C. 263, 134 S.E.2d 386, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003, reh'g denied,
379 U.S. 874 (1964); State v. Alderman, 25 N.C. App. 14, 212 S.E.2d 205, cert. denied, 287 N.C.
261, 214 S.E.2d 433 (1975).
145. State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 201 S.E.2d 867 (1974); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 335 U.S.
335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942).
146. In State v. Hughes, 54 N.C. App. 117, 123, 282 S.E.2d 504, 508 (1981), the court of ap-
peals found the general rule to be the "farce and mockery" standard, citing State v. Sneed, 284
N.C. 606, 612, 201 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1974).
147. Hughes, 54 N.C. App. at 123, 282 S.E.2d at 508.
148. See, eg., State v. Richards, 294 N.C. 474, 498, 242 S.E.2d 844, 859 (1978). Criticisms of
the "farce and mockery" standard include: (1) it is too vague, providing little guidance to courts
or practitioners. Erikson, Standards of Competence/for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 233, 239 (1979); (2) it is too narrow, since it may cause costly pretrial errors not
appearing in the record to be overlooked. Note, Ineffective Reresentation as a Basis for Relief
fiom Conviction, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 32 (1977); (3) it is inadequate to meet the
constitutional requirements of the sixth amendment. One respected jurist noted that "the mockery
test requires such a minimum level of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the
sixth amendment." Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. Rav. 1, 28
(1973). For an overview of various standards of competency required of criminal defense lawyers
and a criticism of the "farce and mockery" standard and the standard enunciated in McMann v.
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the court joined a growing number of state courts 150 in expressly rejecting the
"farce and mockery" standard in favor of the higher federal standard recom-
mended by the Supreme Court in Mclann v. Richardson:15 1 representation
must be "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases."
152
Defendant Weaver was convicted of first degree rape and appealed on the
ground that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the trial
court denied his motion for a continuance. 153 On the day set for closing argu-
ments, defendant's lead counsel was unable to attend because of an emer-
gency. Another attorney who had assisted and participated throughout the
trial asked for a continuance because she had not prepared closing argument
and had never before argued to a jury. The court denied the motion and gave
her a brief period in which to prepare.154 Defendant did not contend that
counsel did not present an adequate argument. 155 Defendant argued instead
that counsel's inexperience and failure to request a recording of the closing
argument demonstrated incompetence as a matter of law. Defendant urged
that the court dispel existing confusion and adopt a clear standard for effectve
assistance.
156
Prior cases in which the North Carolina Supreme Court had confronted
the issue were indeed inconclusive. In State v. Misenheimer15 7 the court em-
ployed both the McMann standard and the ABA standards' 58 when "the de-
fendant had not pleaded guilty." In State v. Maher159 the court noted that it
had not yet determined the standard to be used.160 It was assumed in State v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) ("within the range of competency demanded of attorneys in a
criminal case"), see Erickson, supra, cited in State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 121 n. 6, 282
S.E.2d 791, 800 n.6 (1981).
149. 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375 (1982).
150. For recent examples of state court rejection of the "farce and mockery," also called the
"sham" standard, in favor of a reasonableness standard, see, e.g., Meeks v. State, 382 So.2d 673
(Fla. 1980); State v. Rose, 608 P.2d 1074 (Mont. 1980) (replacing "sham" with "reasonably compe-
tent attorney" test); Johnson v. State, 620 P.2d 1311 (Okl. Crim. 1980) (prospectively applying
"reasonably competent assistance" test, replacing outmoded "sham" test); Krummacher v.
Gierloff, 290 Or. 867,627 P.2d 458 (1981) ("the phrase 'farce and mockery ofjustice' can no longer
be deemed adequate to describe the quality of representation to which a defendant is constitution-
ally entitled"). See generally Annot, 2 A.L.R.4TH 27 (1980).
151. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
152. Id. at 771. All federal circuit courts of appeal, with the exception of the Second Circuit,
have adopted the "range of competence" or "customary skill" test. See McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759 (1970). See also Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981--Criminal Pro-
cedure, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1302, 1347 n.411 (1982); Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 218 (1976) (federal court
tests for effective representation).
153. 306 N.C. at 639, 295 S.E.2d at 381 (1982).
154. Id.
155. For a discussion of what a defendant must show to establish a prima facie case of ineffec-
tive assistance based upon an inadequate opening or final argument, see Annot. 6 A.L.R.4TH 16
(1981).
156. 306 N.C. at 640, 295 S.E.2d at 381.
157. 304 N.C. 108, 282 S.E.2d 791 (1981).
158. Id. at 120-21, 282 S.E.2d at 799-800, citing AM. BAR AsS'N STANDARDS RELATING, TO
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1980).
159. 305 N.C. 544, 290 S.E.2d 694 (1982).
160. Id. at 549 n.l, 290 S.E.2d at 697 n.1. In Maher defendant alleged on appeal that he had
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Vickers 161 that the McMann test had been adopted by the court.162 In Weaver
the court resolved this confusion by expressly adopting the McMann "range of
competence" standard.163 Applying this standard to the facts in Weaver, the
court found that neither failure to request a recording of the closing argument
nor inexperience constitutes ineffective assistance. 164 The court also found
that since an indigent does not have a constitutional right to the lawyer of his
choice, his constitutional rights are not violated when he is represented by two
lawyers and an attorney not of his choosing gives the final argument.1 65
The McMann test adopted by the Weaver court offers several advantages
over the "farce and mockery" test. It affords greater protection of the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right because the reviewing court must scrutinize the
particular acts or omissions of the defense attorney; the court is thus not lim-
ited by a requirement that the trial was a farce and mockery of justice in order
to afford relief.166 The test applies not only to the attorney's trial perform-
ance, but also to the entire period of representation. 167 Another advantage is
that the standard is more objective because it is based upon a community stan-
dard of representation. 168 The adoption of the McMann test by the supreme
court may not settle the controversy, however. The new standard is no less
flawed by vagueness than the old, since "[]ike the phrase 'farce and mockery,'
the expression 'community standards of effective representation' has no obvi-
ous intrinsic meaning. Neither formulation provides guidance as to the stan-
dard to be met by defense counsel; both allow an individual court to apply its
own conception of the meaning of effective representation."' 169 McMann has
given rise to varied and conflicting standards for determining competency in
state and circuit courts. 170 As a remedy to this problem, many jurists and
received ineffective assistance, not because of attorney incompetence, but because his attorney was
afforded indadequate time to prepare. Defendant's original counsel withdrew from the case be-
cause of conflict of interest on November 19. Defendant retained new counsel, and the case came
to trial on November 24 after the court denied defendant's motion for a continuance. A new trial
was granted on grounds of ineffective assistance.
161. 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E.2d 599 (1982).
162. Id. at 93-94, 291 S.E.2d at 602-603. In Vickers the court refused to find ineffective assist-
ance when defendant's attorney did not pursue an insanity plea. The court noted that defendant's
counsel had arranged a psychiatric examination for his client, that the examination in fact took
place, and that there were tactical reasons for not pursuing the defense. The court found that
there was not sufficient evidence of insanity to conclude that the attorney was negligent or incom-
petent in choosing not to pursue the insanity plea.
163. 306 N.C. at 640-41, 295 S.E.2d at 382.
164. Id. For the proposition that mere inexperience does not constitute incompetence, see
State v. Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 312, 289 S.E.2d at 335, 338 (1982).
165. 306 N.C. at 640-41, 295 S.E.2d at 382.
166. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1329-30. See also Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978). The standard is subjective to the extent the court must determine
the community standard.
See United States v. Decoster (Decoster III), 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(en bane) for a
discussion of issues arising out of the continuing debate over the appropriate standard of
competence.
169. Id. at 241. For a thorough critique of the standard, see Erickson, supra note 148.
170. 624 F.2d at 251. The McMann court admitted this uncertainty of results, but stated:
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authorities have recommended a more specific test based upon the ABA De-
fense Standards.17 1
In spite of its problems, however, McMann clearly requires a higher level
of competence than that afforded by the "farce and mockery" standard. Its
adoption represents a strengthening of the sixth amendment right to counsel
and affords North Carolina courts the opportunity to develop more clearly
defined guidelines to ensure this fundamental right.
2. Time to Prepare a Defense
In State v. Maher172 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
"relationship between the defendant's sixth amendment guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel of his own choosing and the implicit constitutional guar-
antee that an accused and his counsel shall have a reasonable time to investi-
gate, prepare and present defendant's defense." 1 73 Defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance was based not upon his counsel's competence or per-
formance, but rather upon the allegation that his attorney was denied ade-
quate time to prepare a defense.
The facts giving rise to defendant's claim are as follows: On November
19 the court granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw from the case be-
cause of conflict of interest.17 4 On the same day new counsel was retained and
appeared through his associate. On November 20, the associate was informed
that trial was set for Monday, November 24; the court was advised that coun-
sel would be in federal court at that time, but defendant's motion for continu-
ance was denied. On November 24 counsel appeared, again asked for a
continuance, and advised the court that he was "totally unprepared to render
to this defendant competent, effective assistance of counsel."' 175 The court
again denied the motion, recessed for fifteen minutes, and then proceeded with
the trial. Defendant was convicted and appealed.
[W]e think the matter, for the most part, should be left to the good sense and discretion
of the trial courts with the admonition that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompe-
tent counsel, and that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance
by attorneys ....
379 U.S. at 773. For an overview of the many standards that have been proposed, see Annot., 2
A.L.R.4TH 27 (1980) and Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 218 (1976).
171. See, eg., State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 495-96, 256 S.E.2d 154, 160 (1979); Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540,547 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978). See also Erickson,
supra note 148, at 242-248. For cases applying the ABA standards, see 2 A.L.R.4TH 27, 68-72
(1980).
172. 305 N.C. 544, 290 S.E.2d 694 (1982).
173. Id. at 547, 290 S.E.2d at 696.
174. Defendant was sharing counsel with a codefendant. For recent Supreme Court decisions
regarding deprivation of effective assistance because of joint representation of codefendants, see
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (when trial court improperly requires joint representa-
tion over timely objection of defense counsel, upon showing of conflict of interest, reversal is
automatic, prejudice not required); and Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (when defendant
fails to object to joint representation at trial, on appeal he must show "an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance").
175. 305 N.C. at 546, 290 S.E.2d at 695.
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As a general rule, a trial court's ruling on a motion for a continuance is
reviewable on appeal under the "abuse of discretion" standard.176 The denial
of a continuance when counsel cannot be present or has inadequate time to
prepare, however, risks denial of defendant's right to select counsel and his
right to effective representation by counsel. 177 When a motion to continue is
based upon a constitutional right, such as the right to select 178 and receive
effective representation, denial of the motion is reviewable as a matter of
law.179 Whether a defendant bases his appeal on abuse of judicial discretion
or on denial of a constitutional right, the rule has been that he must show both
errror in the denial of continuance and prejudice before he is entitled to a new
trial. 80
The court in Maher carved out a narrow exception to the general rule that
a defendant must show prejudice to receive a new trial based upon an errone-
ous denial of a motion for continuance. When a defendant alleges denial of
his sixth amendment right to effective assistance because his attorney was
given inadequate time to prepare for trial, prejudice is presumed upon a show-
ing of inadequate time to prepare.' 81 Then, "the burden falls on the State to
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless."' 182 The court
emphasized that when a defendant alleges ineffective assistance based upon
attorney incompetence, defendant must still show prejudice resulting from his
attorney's performance.' 8 3 But "the questions are altogether different" when
it is the court that denies defendant effective counsel by denying "a motion to
continue which is essential to allowing adequate time for trial preparation."' 18 4
176. This rule is well established. See 4 N.C. INDEx 3d, Criminal Law § 91.4 (1976).
177. See Survey of .Developments in North Carolina Law, 1977-Criminal1 rocedure, 56 N.C.L.
Rv. 983, 999 (1978).
178. The North Carolina Supreme Court has affirmed that "[b]oth the State and Federal Con-
stitutions secure to every man the right to be defended in all criminal prosecutions by counsel
whom he selects and retains." State v. Speller, 230 N.C. 345, 351, 53 S.E.2d 294, 298 (1949) (citing
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV and N.C. CONST. art. I, § 11). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932). But see State v. Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 318, 289 S.E.2d 335, 342 (1982) ("defendant's right to
select his own counsel cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure
in courts ofjustice"). It should be noted, however, that an indigent defendant does not have the
right to court-appointed counsel of his choice. See, e.g., State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d
524 (1976); State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976). Generally, the appointment is
left to the court's discretion, assuming competent counsel is appointed. But see Harris v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. 3d 786, 567 P.2d 750, 140 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1977) (court's discretion is limited if
indigent defendant can show an objective reason for his choice). See generally Annot., 66
A.L.R.3D 996 (1975) (indigent's right to particular counsel).
179. State v. Poole, 305 N.C. 308, 318, 289 S.E.2d 335, 342 (1982); State v. McFadden, 292
N.C. 609, 611, 234 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1977). See also State v. Smathers, 287 N.C. 226, 214 S.E.2d
112 (1975); State v. Phillip, 261 N.C. 263, 134 S.E.2d 386 (1964); State v. Lane, 258 N.C. 349, 128
S.E.2d 389 (1962).
180. State v. Burney, 302 N.C. 529, 532, 276 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1981). See also State v. Robin-
son, 283 N.C. 71, 194 S.E.2d 811 (1973).
181. 305 N.C. at 550, 290 S.E.2d at 697-98. The court cited G.S. 15A-1443(b) in support: "(b)
A violation of the defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States is predjudicial
unless the appellate court finds that it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is on
the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1443(b) (1978)





In these cases the burden is shifted to the State to prove absence of prejudice.
The court held that on the facts, when the attorney was retained four days
before defendant's trial, two of which were a weekend, and thereafter was
scheduled to appear in another court, defendant had met his burden of show-
ing inadequate time to prepare.'8 5 Because the State did not meet its burden
of rebutting the presumption of prejudice, defendant was granted a new
trial. 8 6
In applying the above rules, the court attempted to strike a balance be-
tween safeguarding defendant's sixth amendment rights to effective counsel
and encouraging an expeditious and orderly trial.' 87 It is always possible that
a liberal policy favoring continuance will encourage counsel to use his
unavailibility as a delaying tactic.188 When a defendant is required to make
an objective showing that the motion for continuance is necessary for ade-
quate trial preparation, however, the possiblity of dilatory tactics is reduced.
If the motion for continuance is denied and results in inadequate time to pre-
185. Id. See also State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 234 S.E.2d 742 (1977) (defendant's re-
tained counsel unable to attend trial; court denied motion for continuance by associate unfamiliar
with case and ordered associate to represent defendant; defendant denied right to effective assist-
ance and right to counsel of his choice); State v. Alderman, 25 N.C. App. 14,212 S.E.2d 205 (error
to deny motion for continuance made by indigent defendant's counsel when trial proceeded the
day after appointment), appeal dismissed, 287 N.C. 261, 214 S.E.2d 433 (1975); State v. Atkinson, 7
N.C. App. 355, 172 S.E.2d 249 (1970)(denial of motion for continuance held error when counsel
privately retained one hour before hearing). But see State v. Whitfield, 206 N.C. 696, 175 S.E. 93
(1934) (calling of case day or two after counsel appointed held not violative of sixth amendment
when no complicated factual or legal questions involved and no witnesses to locate or interview),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 556 (1934); State v. Williams, 34 N.C App. 408, 238 S.E.2d 668 (1977) (no
violation of sixth amendment rights when principal counsel unable to attend and two associates
familiar with case ordered to proceed with trial).
186. The dissent argued that a new trial should not be granted because defendant had not
carried his burden of showing inadequate time to prepare. 305 N.C. at 552, 553, 290 S.E.2d at 699
(Britt, J., dissenting).
187. See, ag., State v. Little, 56 N.C. App. 765, 290 S.E.2d 293 (1982). In Little defendant had
been granted a new trial. On the day of trial, defendant moved to have his court-appointed coun-
sel withdrawn because of friction over trial tactics and asked for a continuance to give his new
private counsel time to prepare. The court denied the continuance and defendant proceeded to
trial represented by the public defender. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling
and noted:
Our Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the right to be defended by chosen
counsel is not absolute. State v. McFadden, supra Quoting from People x. Brady, 275
Cal. App. 2d 984, 993, 80 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (1969), our Court stated that. . . [d]ue
process is not denied every defendant who is refused the right to defend himself by
means of his chosen retained counsel; other factors, including the speedy disposition of
criminal charges, demand recognition, particularly where defendant is inexcusably dila-
tory in securing legal representation.... State v. McFadden, supra at 613, 234 S.E.2d at
745. In the same vein, the Court observed, "[A]n accused may lose his constitutional
right to be represented by counsel of his choice when he perverts that right to a weapon
for the purpose of obstructing and delaying his trial" Id. at 616, 234 S.E.2d at 747.
56 N.C. App. at 768, 290 S.E.2d at 295.
188. For the federal approach to granting a continuance, see Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d
1238, 1240 (6th Cir. 1971) ("surrounding facts and circumstances" test; factors include length of
delay, convenience to participants, witnesses, and court, whether delay is for legitimate purpose,
whether counsel's associates are sufficiently prepared to proceed). See also Annot., 73 A.L.R.3D
725 (1976) (withdrawal, discharge, or substitution of counsel in criminal case as ground for
continuance).
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pare, prejudice must be presumed. No one can be certain how trial counsel
might have performed had he been given adequate time to prepare for trial.
3. Conflict of Interest
In State v. Loye' 89 the North Carolina Court of Appeals extended to a
new fact situation the reasoning and result of an established rule regarding
ineffective assistance resulting from joint representation of codefendants with
conflicting interests. Since Glasser v. United States190 courts have recognized
that when a single attorney represents two or more defendants, the possibility
of a conflict of interests exists, with consequent abridgement of the sixth
amendment right to effective counsel of at least one defendant.19' The rule
developed in Glasser and subsequent cases is that whenever a trial court im-
properly requires joint representation over timely objection, reversal is auto-
matic; prejudice is presumed upon a showing of conflict of interest. 192 The
rationale for the rule is that the right to effective assistance, "untrammeled and
unimpaired,"'193 is "too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial."'194
State v. Loye is an example of a conflict of interest arising not between
codefendants but rather between a defendant and his attorney. Defendant
pleaded guilty to armed robbery on the advice of his privately retained coun-
sel,195 after damaging testimony was given by an accomplice at trial. Defend-
ant was sentenced to a lengthy prison term.19 6 Shortly thereafter, defendant's
attorney was indicted for felonious receipt of stolen gooods in connection with
189. 56 N.C. App. 501, 289 S.E.2d 860 (1982).
190. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In Glasser the Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction for
conspiracy when his attorney also represented a codefendant, and the trial court was aware of the
conflict but refused to appoint another attorney.
191. Id. at 70, 71. See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 (1978), Joint representa-
tion is suspect because of its potential for inhibition of the attorney's ability to protect adequalely
the interests of each client: what may be in the best interest of one defendant may prejudice the
other. The conflict of interest can arise at any stage: plea bargaining, deciding whether to have
defendants testify, closing argument, or sentencing. The various ways such a conflict can arise and
the difficulty of searching the record for evidence of a conflict are discussed in Geer, Representa.
lion of Multole Crminal Defendants Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilitles of
the Defense Attorney, 62 MwN,. L. REv. 119 (1978); Lowenthal, Joint Representaton in Criminal
Cases: A CiticalAppraisal, 64 VA. L. Rnv. 939 (1978); Tague, Mulple Representation and Con-
flicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L.J. 1075 (197..); Comment, Conflicts of Interests in
Multiple Representation of Criminal Co-Defendants, 68 J. CEUM. L. 226 (1977).
192. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488. The Holloway court noted, however, that joint represen-
tation "is notper se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel....
[l]n some cases, certain advantages might accrue from joint representation." Id. at 482.
In both Holloway and Glasser defendants objected to joint representation. See Cuyler v. Sulli.
van, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), for a modification of the rule when the trial court 'was not advised of
actual or possible conflict of interest. In such a case, a defendant must establish that an actual
conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Id. at 350.
193. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70.
194. Id. at 76. See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23 (1967) (assistance of counsel is
constitutional right so basic to fair trial that infraction can never be harmless error).
195. In Cuyler the Court found that in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance there was "no
basis for drawing a distinction between retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal
justice to defendants who must choose their own lawyers." 446 U.S. at 344, 345.
196. 56 N.C. App. at 501, 289 S.E.2d at 861.
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the same offense for which defendant was convicted. In his application for
post-conviction relief, defendant alleged that the attorney knew the state was
seeking the indictment for felonious receipt and yet failed to advise the court,
the defendant, or co-counsel of the conflict of interest inherent in these circum-
stances. 197 Post-conviction relief was denied after the court found no conflict
of interest. Defendant appealed, alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing
and voluntary because it resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. 198
The court of appeals granted certiorari. 199
Finding no case law on point, the court looked to cases involving ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel resulting from conflict of interest because of joint
representation. The court cited Glasser, Holloway, and Cuyler with ap-
proval.2° ° Though there was a different source of the conflict of interest in
these cases, the court found that the nature of the conflict gave rise to the same
presumption-that the defendant was prejudiced by the divided interests of
his attorney. 20 Since the defendant in Loye had shown a conflict, the court
found that prejudice must be "conclusively presumed" and granted a new
tfial. 2 02
The dissenting judge in Loye would have denied a new trial based on his
belief that defendant failed to meet the stringent farce and mockery stan-
dard20 3 required for relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.2° 4
The dissent's argument did not recognize that there are two distinct issues:
whether the attorney's performance falls below a minimum standard for con-
stitutionally adequate representation, and whether the attorney was hampered
by conflict of interest. The dissent's standard (more correctly, the McMann
standard that recently replaced the "farce and mockery" standard in North
Carolina) would apply to the former, which was not at issue in the case. The
majority properly characterized the issue as conflict of interest and thus looked
not to the attorney's performance, but rather to the actual existence of a con-
flict. Thus, a Glasser-Holloway-Cuyler, rather than a McMann, analysis was
applied.
The majority in Loye, however, oversimplified the rule in these cases by
holding that when a conflict of interest is shown, prejudice is presumed and
197. Id. at 502, 289 S.E.2d at 861.
198. Id.
199. In granting certiorari, the court cited Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977); G.S. 15A-
1420(c); State v. Roberts, 41 N.C. App. 187, 254 S.E.2d 216 (1979) (a defendant is entitled to
collaterally attack judgment on guilty plea on grounds that it was not knowingly and voluntarily
given).
200. 56 N.C. App. at 503, 504, 289 S.E.2d at 862.
201. Id. at 504, 289 S.E.2d at 862.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 514, 289 S.E.2d at 867 (Martin, J., dissenting).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has since replaced the farce and mockery standard for
finding ineffective assistance with the federal McMann standard. See supra notes 149-66 and ac-
companying text.
204. The dissent noted the presence of an able co-counsel who had no involvment in, or
knowledge of, the conflict of interest arising from the pending indictment and whose assistance
was presumably "effective." 56 N.C. App. at 505, 289 S.E.2d at 863 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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relief is automatic. Although this is a correct statement of the rule in Glasser
and Holloway, Cuyler modified the rule. A showing of conflict of interest is
sufficient (and a showing of actual prejudice is not necessay) only if defendant
objected to the conflict at trial and the court improperly required joint repre-
sentation.20 5 A defendant who raises no objection at trial "must demonstrate
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance. 206
In Loye defendant did not raise the conflict of interest at trial, and if the
Supreme Court cases cited by the court of appeals are to be applied by direct
analogy, he should have been required to show an actual prejudice. The pecu-
liar fact situation of Loye, however, demands the more liberal basis for relief
articulated in Glasser and Holloway. It was defense counsel's unrevealed self-
interest that gave rise to the conflict. When joint representation is the source
of conflict, the attorney is still presumed to make a good faith effort on behalf
of both defendants. By contrast, when the source of conflict is attorney self-
interest, not only is the potential for prejudice greater, but the fact of the con-
flict is more likely to remain undisclosed. The greater danger of unremedied
abridgement of the constitutional right to effective counsel justifies the court's
finding that defendant need not show prejudice to receive a new trial.
D. Compelling Psychiatric Examinations
The question whether a trial judge has discretionary authority to compel
an unwilling prosecution witness to submit to a psychiatric examination, when
there is evidence that the examination may reveal mental deficiencies or de-
fects bearing on the witness' credibility, has been answered in the affirmative
in most jurisdictions addressing the issue.20 7 The North Carolina Supreme
Court first confronted the issue in State v. Looney.208 In Looney the court
rejected the reasoning of decisions from other jurisdictions,20 9 and held that
defendant's need for the court-ordered exam was outweighed both by -the
jury's ability to assess credibility without the aid of expert testimony210 and by
the great burden upon witnesses ordered to submit to such examinations. 2 11
In so holding, however, the Looney court left open the question whether a trial
205. As the Cuyler court stated:
[A] defendant who objects to multiple representation must have the opportunity to show
that potential conflicts impermissibly imperil his right to a fair trial. But unless the trial
court fails to afford such an opportunity, a reviewing court cannot presume that the
possibility for conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
446 U.S. at 348.
206. Id.
207. See cases cited in Note, State v. Looney: Defendants' Needfor Court-Ordered Psychiatrle
Evaluation of Ittnesses' Credibility Outweighed by Witnesses' Right to Privacy, 57 N.C.L. Rv.
448, 453 n.37 (1979). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.3D 1433 (1968). For an example of the judicial
authority to compel psychiatric examination of witnesses, see United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d
1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
208. 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612 (1978).
209. Id at 18-28, 240 S.E.2d at 622-27.
210. Id at 18, 27, 240 S.E.2d at 622, 627.
211. Id at 26-27, 28, 240 S.E.2d at 626, 627.
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judge might under some circumstances properly compel psychiatric examina-
tion of an unwilling witness. 212
In the recent case of State v. Clontz2 13 the North Carolina Supreme Court
again had occasion to address the propriety of court-ordered psychiatric exam-
inations of witnesses. In Clontz defendant was charged with second degree
rape of a mentally retarded woman afflicted with cerebral palsy.214 Defend-
ant's indictment rested upon two alternative theories: (1) defendant had vagi-
nal intercourse with the victim by force and against her will;215 or (2)
defendant had vaginal intercourse with a victim who was either "mentally de-
fective, mentally handicapped, or physically helpless." 216 Defendant's pretrial
motion to compel the prosecutrix to submit to a psychiatric examination to
determine her credibility as a witness was denied, 217 as was his motion to sup-
press the victim's testimony.218
Defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to order the psychiatric exam-
ination.219 Borrowing heavily from the language of Looney, the court of ap-
peals upheld the conclusion of the trial judge.220 Judge Becton argued in
dissent that the Looney decision did not mandate a ruling that judges had no
212. Although the supreme court did not expressly hold that ordering a psychiatric examina-
tion would be beyond the authority of a trial judge, it strongly implied its disapproval of the
practice and noted that, absent legislative decree, the court should not bestow upon trial judges
such discretion. Id at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627. The specific holding of the Looney court was that if
trial judges had the authority to order psychiatric examination of a witness, the trial judge in that
case did not abuse his discretion by refusing to order an examination. Id
In a concurring opinion, Justice Exum expressed the belief that North Carolina law should
comport with "the well-considered opinions on the subject" from other jurisdictions and recognize
the judicial authority to order psychiatric examinations when the defendant can make a "strong
showing" that the examination will disclose a mental condition which subjects a witness' compe-
tence or credibility to serious question. Id at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628.
For a thorough analysis of the Looney opinion, see Note, supra note 208.
213. 305 N.C. 116, 286 S.E.2d 793 (1982).
214. Id at 116-17, 286 S.E.2d at 793.
215. Id at 124, 286 S.E.2d at 797 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.5(a)(1) (1981)).
216. Id (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.5(a)(2) (1981)).
217. Id at 116, 286 S.E.2d at 793.
218. Id at 118-19, 286 S.E.2d at 794-95. In support of his motion to suppress the victim's
testimony, defendant offered the testimony of a clinical psychologist who tested the victim six
months before the rape and nine months prior to trial in connection with the victim's application
to the North Carolina Department of Vocational Rehabilitation. The psychologist testified that
the victim had a "tendency to project blame onto others and was afraid of men, believing them to
be people who 'come to get you or hurt you, rape you.' "I1d at 118, 286 S.E.2d at 794. He further
testified, however, that the victim had the ability to understand, remember, and relate facts while
under oath. Id at 118-19, 286 S.E.2d at 794-95. The trial judge also heard testimony from the
victim and reviewed an affidavit executed by defendant's attorney before concluding that the vic-
tim was able to understand and relate under oath the facts to which she attested and therefore was
a competent witness. Id
219. Id at 117, 286 S.E.2d at 794.
220. State v. Clontz, 51 N.C. App. 639, 641, 277 S.E.2d 580, 581 (1981). To support its denial
of defendant's motion, the court of appeals cited Looney:
To require a witness to submit to a psychiatric examination, by a psychiatrist not selected
by the witness, is much more than a handicap to the party proposing to offer him or her.
It is a drastic invasion of the witness' own right of privacy. To be ordered by a court to
submit to such an examination is, in itself, humiliating and potentially damaging to the
reputation and career of the witness.
Id. at 640, 277 S.E.2d at 581 (quoting 294 N.C. at 26-27, 240 S.E.2d at 626.
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discretionary authority to compel psychiatric examinations.221 Rather, he felt
that the balancing of interests between a defendant's need to determine a wit-
ness' credibility and competence, and the courts' desire to protect the witness'
right to privacy, necessarily comtemplates some situations in which a defend-
ant's needs will prevail.222 Judge Becton contended that the facts of the
Clontz case presented precisely the proper circumstances for the exercise of
such judicial discretion.223
On oral argument before the supreme court, defendant contended that the
psychiatric examination should have been compelled not only to ascertain the
credibility of the prosecutrix, but also to determine whether she was "mentally
defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically handicapped" as required by
the statute under which he was convicted.224 Because this theory was raised
for the first time on oral argument, however, the supreme court refused to
consider it.225
In upholding the court of appeals decision, the supreme court resolved
much of the ambiguity that had shrouded the Looney opinion,226 stating un-
equivocally that, absent legislative decree, trial judges have no authority to
order unwilling witnesses to submit to psychiatric examination.227 The court
pointed to several factors in support of this decision. First, the court noted
that the possible benefits of such an examination for the defendant were out-
weighed by the substantial invasion of the witness' privacy.228 The court ad-
ded that if such authority were to be granted, it should derive from legislative
mandate.229 The court also relied on the traditional rule that it is the proper
province of the jury to decide the question of witness credibility.230 A fourth
factor was the court's concern that to recede from the holding of Looney
would contravene recently articulated legislative policy.231 Finally, the court
mentioned that court-ordered psychiatric examination of witnesses would de-
ter victims from reporting sex crimes.232
221. 51 N.C. App. at 643-44, 277 S.E.2d at 582 (Becton, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 644, 277 S.E.2d at 582.
223. Id
224. 305 N.C. at 118, n.1, 286 S.E.2d at 794, n.1.
225. Id In his dissent, Justice Exum conceded that the majority was "on sound ground" in
refusing to hear this aspect of defendant's argument. Id at 125-26, 286 S.E.2d at 798.
226. See Note, supra note 208. Trial Judge Albright read Looney to foreclose any opportunity
for judicial discretion in compelling psychiatric examination of witnesses. 305 N.C. at 116, 286
S.E.2d at 793. While Judges Vaughn and Wells of the court of appeals agreed, 51 N.C. App. at
641, 277 S.E.2d at 581, Judge Becton argued in dissent that a proper reading of Looney would
permit court ordered examinations in certain rare instances, a view specifically advocated by Jus-
tice Exum in his concurrence inLooney. 51 N.C. App. at 643, 277 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Looney,
294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628 (Exum, J., concurring)).
227. 305 N.C. at 123-24, 286 S.E.2d at 797.
228. Id at 120, 286 S.E.2d at 795 (quoting Looney, 294 N.C. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627).
229. Id
230. Id at 121, 286 S.E.2d at 796 (quoting Looney, 294 N.C. at 26, 240 S.E.2d at 626).
231. Id at 122-23 ,286 S.E.2d at 796-97. G.S. 8-58.6, the "Rape Victim Statute," enacted just
prior toLooney, has as one of its stated purposes the prevention of unnecessary intrusion into the
privacy of sex crime victims. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (1981).
232. 305 N.C. at 123, 286 S.E.2d at 797.
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In dissent, Justice Exum reiterated his contention, first expressed in his
concurrence in Looney,23 3 that trial judges should be vested with discretion to
order psychiatric examinations. 234 Justice Exum argued that such examina-
tions are particularly appropriate when the mental condition of the prosecutrix
is an element of the state's case.235 Justice Exum was not persuaded by the
majority's argument that the presence of expert psychological testimony might
invade the juries' province as the "lie detector in the courtroom."'236 The dis-
sent noted that such testimony would be considered by the trial judge in the
context of a preliminary determination of the witness' competence to testify.
Because this hearing would never be conducted in the jury's presence, it would
present no danger of jury prejudice.237
The significance of the Clontz decision lies in the certainty of the holding.
The opinion eliminates the confusion created by the equivocal language of
Looney about North Carolina law regarding court ordered psychiatric exami-
nations of witnesses. The strict position taken by the Clontz court, however,
does not comport with the recent trend favoring judicial discretion in ordering
psychiatric examinations3a 8 The court adopted a rule that places a premium
on protecting the privacy rights of witnesses and preserving the sanctity of jury
determinations on the credibility of such witnesses. Undoubtedly, these are
noble goals. The position advocated by Justice Exum and Judge Becton, how-
ever, seems more tenable. This approach gives trial judges discretion to com-
pel examinations only upon a strong showing by the defendant that an
evaluation would reveal a mental condition raising serious doubts about a wit-
ness' credibility.239 Most jurisdictions that have confronted the issue have
adopted this rule.24° As Justice Exum observed, the procedure would allow
only the judge to hear the expert psychiatric testimony, thereby eliminating
any danger of confusing or prejudicing the jury.241 Finally, as Judge Becton
noted in his dissent in Clontz, when the state does not object to questioning
that reveals in explicit detail the "most personal and private relations and past
history"242 of the prosecutrix, the state should not be permitted to argue that
compelling psychiatric examination would seriously invade her remaining
right to privacy.243
233. 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628.
234. 305 N.C. at 124-25, 286 S.E.2d at 798 (citing Looney, 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628).
235. Id. Justice Exum conceded that ordering an examination to evaluate the possibility of
mental deficiency at the time of the alleged rape was not properly before the court and thus could
not be considered as a justification in this case. Id
236. Id at 121, 286 S.E.2d at 796 (quoting Looney, 294 N.C. at 26, 280 S.E.2d at 626, quoting
United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974)).
237. Id at 126, 286 S.E.2d at 798 (Exum, J., dissenting).
238. See, eg., Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1977).
239. 294 N.C. at 29, 240 S.E.2d at 628 (Exum, J., dissenting).
240. See supra note 208.
241. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
242. 51 N.C. App. at 645, 277 S.E.2d at 583 (quoting Looney, 294 N.C. at 27, 240 S.E.2d at
627).
243. 51 N.C. App. at 645, 277 S.E.2d at 583.
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E. Unanimous Verdict
The right of an accused to a unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases is
guaranteed in North Carolina by both constitution 244 and statute.2 45 In order
to return a verdict of guilty, the jury must unanimously agree that the state has
proved every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.246 Relying
upon a technical reading of these protections, defendant in State v. Hall247
asserted that he was denied his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict.24
In Hall defendant was charged on a three-count bill of indictment with
armed robbery in violation of G.S. 14-87, kidnapping in violation of G.S. 14-
39, and felonious assault in violation of G.S. 14-32(a). 249 The uncontested
facts250 showed that when defendant and an accomplice robbed a Texaco sta-
tion, they took forty dollars from an attendant and cash, gas, cigarettes, and
wine from the station.251 The trial judge instructed the jury that to find de-
fendant guilty of armed robbery, it must find, as one element of the crime,
"that the defendant, individually or acting together with another, took prop-
erty from the person of [the attendant] or in his presence." 252
Defendant contended that the evidence offered by the state showed two
counts of armed robbery: one of the attendant and one of the service sta-
tion.253 Given the nature of the offenses and the instruction of the trial judge
on only one act of robbery, defendant argued that the possibility of six jurors
finding him guilty of the first instance of robbery, and six other jurors of the
second, violated his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict.254 The
supreme court, per Justice Huskins, found this argument "imaginative but
wholly unpersuasive." 255 Justice Huskins noted that the trial judge properly
instructed the jury on the unanimity requirement and that the evidence over-
244. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 provides that no person shall be convicted for any crime "but by
the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court."
245. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235(a) (1978) provides that "[b]efore the jury retires for deliber-
ation, the judge must give an instruction which informs the jury that in order to return a verdict,
all 12 jurors must agree to a verdict of guilty or not guilty." See also State v. Williams, 286 N.C.
422, 212 S.E.2d 113 (1975).
246. Seelnre Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
247. 305 N.C. 77, 286 S.E.2d 552 (1982).
248. Id. at 86-87, 286 S.E.2d at 558.
249. Id. at 79, 286 S.E.2d at 553-54.
250. Id. at 80, 286 S.E.2d at 554. The defendant confessed to the robbery and offered no
evidence at trial. See id. at 81, 286 S.E.2d at 555.
251. Id. at 79-80, 286 S.E.2d at 554. The defendants then forced the service station attendant
into their vehicle, drove him down an interstate service road, pushed him from the car, and shot
him in the back. Id. at 80-81, 286 S.E.2d at 554-55.
252. Id. at 86, 286 S.E.2d at 557-58. G.S. 14-87(a) provides that:
Any person or persons who, having in possession or with the use or threatened use of any
firearms ... , whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes
or attempts to take personal property from another or from any place of business, resi-
dence or banking institution or any other place where there is a person or persons in
attendance ... shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (a) (1981).
253. 305 N.C. at 86, 286 S.E.2d at 558.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 87, 286 S.E.2d at 558.
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whelmingly supported the conviction. 256 The court concluded that "the com-
pelling inference" was that the verdict rested not upon partial agreement on
the offenses committed, but rather upon a belief that defendant was guilty of
both.
2 5 7
In reaching its decision, the court reviewed several cases in which the
factual setting gave rise to the question whether a single act or multiple acts of
robbery occurred.258 Ultimately, however, the court found it unnecessary to
characterize defendant's offense in Hall as belonging to either category.259
Apparently, therefore, the determinative issue is not whether single or multiple
acts of robbery may be proved. Rather, under the Hall analysis, critical fac-
tors are whether the trial judge clearly states the necessity for a unanimous
verdict, whether there is any indication of confusion or misunderstanding by
the jury, and whether the evidence supports the verdict rendered.260 If these
factors are present, the court seems willing to overlook the tenuous possibility




258. The court noted State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E.2d 649 (1974) (taking of an em-
ployer's property in presence of two employees held a single act of robbery); State v. Gibbs, 29
N.C. App. 647, 225 S.E.2d 837 (1976) (forcing an employee into a separate room to rob her and
then returning to storeroom to take money held two acts of robbery); State v. Johnson, 23 N.C.
App. 52, 208 S.E.2d 206 (armed robbery of two people at same time and place held two acts of
robbery), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 339, 210 S.E.2d 59 (1974).
The court also considered State v. Sellars, 52 N.C. App. 380, 278 S.E.2d 907 (1981), in which
the robberies of the prosecuting witness and of the business at which the witness worked were held
to constitute only a single act of robbery. Although the court noted that the facts of Sellars were
similar to those before the court in Hall, the majority "purposely express[ed] no opinion as to the
correctness of the Sellars opinion. . . ." 305 N.C. at 88, 286 S.E.2d at 558.
The question whether the factual situation present in Hall establishes a single or double count
of armed robbery seems finally to have been resolved by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Beatty, 306 N.C. 491, 293 S.E.2d 760 (1982). In Beatty defendant was tried upon two
indictments, each charging him with armed robbery. The first count rested upon the robbery of an
ABC store, and the second upon the robbery of the store manager. Defendant argued that the
second count of robbery should be quashed to prevent multiple prosecution for the same offense.
Id. at 496, 293 S.E.2d at 764. The supreme court, observing that the determinative issue was
"[w]hether the facts alleged in the second indictment, if given in evidence, would have sustained a
conviction under the first indictment" or "whether the same evidence would support a conviction
in each case," agreed with defendant. Id. at 496, 293 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting State v. Hicks, 233
N.C. 511, 516, 64 S.E.2d 871, 875 (1951)). The court concluded that the facts alleged in the second
indictment, which charged defendant with armed robbery of the store manager, would also have
sustained the conviction of robbery of the store, because all the necessary elements for each of-
fense were the same. Id. at 500-01, 293 S.E.2d at 766. Essential to the court's holding was the
consideration that there was only one person present and thus, only one "threatened use of a
firearm" or assault, which is the main element of the offense. Id.
Beatty may be distinguished from Hall because the defendant in Beatty was charged with two
counts of armed robbery rather than one, and because he raised the defense of double jeopardy
instead of deprivation of the right to a unanimous verdict. Nonetheless, with respect to whether
the robbery of both a business and its lone attendant gives rise to a single or double count of
armed robbery, the court's holding in Beatty seems equally applicable to the facts of Hall.
259. "Here, regardless of whether defendant committed one armed robbery or two, the evi-
dence amply sustains a conviction for either or both.' 305 N.C. at 88, 286 S.E.2d at 559.
260. Id. at 88-89, 286 S.E.2d at 558-59.
261. The court stated:
Whether the verdict in this case was (1) a conviction for robbing [the attendant] of $40,
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Analysis similar to that employed in Hall prevailed in the recent North
Carolina Supreme Court case of State v. Jordan. 262 In Jordan the court ad-
dressed the question whether the use of a disjunctive in an instruction violated
defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict.263 The defendant was charged
with first degree burglary in violation of G.S. 14-51.264 The trial judge in-
structed the jury that to find defendant guilty, it must conclude that he in-
tended "to commit rape and/or first degree sexual offense" at the time of the
breaking or entering.265 Defendant contended that this instruction created the
possibility that no unanimous agreement existed about which felony was in-
tended, although each juror might believe defendant intended to commit one
or the other of the felonies. 266 In rejecting this argument, the court reiterated
(without alluding to) the view expressed in Hall that the entire jury instruction
must be examined to determine whether the trial judge properly apprised the
jury of the unanimity requirement. 267 The court offered the admonition that
"[w]hile the defendant is correct as to the technical meaning of the instruction,
the court must neither forget nor discount the common sense and understand-
ing of the court and the jurors. '268
or (2) a conviction for taking money and other property of Wright's Texaco Station from
the presence of [the attendant] who was in possession of those goods and acting as the
other's alter ego, or (3) a conviction for both, is entirely immaterial . . .. [Ilf it be
conceded that the defendant committed two armed robberies as argued in his brief and
he got a free ride for one of them, it was a result favorable to him and affords no ground
for complaint.
Id. at 88, 286 S.E.2d at 559.
Hall was followed in State v. Yancey, 58 N.C. App. 52, 293 S.E.2d 298 (1982). In Yancey
defendant was charged with misdemeanor larceny for allegedly taking four items from the vic-
tim's home. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could find defendant guilty if it determined
that he had stolen any of the four items. Id. at 58, 293 S.E.2d at 302. Defendant contended that
this instruction violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict because, while the jury may be in
agreement as to the fact that one of the items was stolen by defendant, it may disagree as to which
item defendant took, therefore, there would be no unanimous verdict about the theft of any single
item. Id. Without analyzing the merits of defendant's argument, the court of appeals tersely
observed that it was bound by Hall to overlook this assignment of error. Id.
See also State v. Thompson, 57 N.C. App. 142, 291 S.E.2d 266 (1982). Defendants were
charged with armed robbery of a restaurant. The trial judge instructed the jury that if the prop-
erty of the restaurant had been taken in the presence of employees, then it could properly find
defendants guilty. Id. at 146, 291 S.E.2d at 268. Defendants argued that the charge violated their
right to a unanimous verdict, because the jury may agree about the fact of the robbery, but may
disagree about which employees were present and unconsenting. Id. In rejecting this argument,
the court noted that "[t]he gravamen of the offense is the taking of... property. . . by the use or
threatened use of a firearm," and so long as the jurors agree that the property was taken in the
presence of one of the employees, the verdict is unanimous. Id.
262. 305 N.C. 274, 287 S.E.2d 827 (1982).
263. Id. at 279, 287 S.E.2d at 831.
264. G.S. 14-51 provides in part:
There shall be two degrees in the crime of burglary as defined at the common law. If the
crime be committed in a dwelling house, or in a room used as a sleeping apartment in
any building, and any person is in the actual occupation of any part of said dwelling
house or sleeping apartment at the time of the commission of such crime, it shall be
burglary in the first degree ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1981).
265. 305 N.C. at 279, 287 S.E.2d at 831.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. See also State v. Rush, 56 N.C. App. 787, 290 S.E.2d 383 (1982), in which the court of
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F Failure to Object to Improper Jury Charge
In State v. Bennett269 the court of appeals considered whether a defendant
must object to a disputed jury instruction in order to preserve his assignment
of error. In deciding this issue the court examined the conflict between rule
10(b)(2) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which precludes a party from
assigning as error any jury charge unless it is objected to before the jury re-
tires, and G.S. 15A-1446(d)(13), 270 which likewise requires an appropriate ob-
jection or motion in order to preserve an assignment of error but excepts from
that general rule errors of law in the charge to the jury. Noting that the
supreme court in State v. Elam271 held G.S. 15A-1446(d)(6) violated article
IV, section 13(2) of the North Carolina Constitution272 and that rule 10(b)(2)
was to be considered authoritative, the Bennett court expanded Elam by de-
claring that rule 1O(b)(2) "has by preemption abrogated G.S. 15A-
1446(d)(13)." 273
The Bennett court also considered a conflict between rule 21 of the Rules
of Trial Court Procedure and G.S. 15A-1231(b). Rule 21 requires every trial
judge to conduct an instruction conference at the close of evidence. G.S. 15A-
1231(b), however, requires the judge to hold an instruction conference only if
requested by either party.274 The court held that because G.S. 15A-1231(b)
"clearly contemplates that defendant was required to request an instruction
conference as a prerequitite for assigning error to the trial court's failure to
conduct one," 275 G.S. 7A-34, which forbids the Supreme Court to prescribe
trial court rules inconsistent with acts of the General Assembly, requires that
appeals held that the use of a disjunctive in the jury instruction on charges of felonious breaking
and entering in violation of G.S. 14-54(a) did not abridge defendant's right to a unanimous jury
verdict. Id. at 791, 290 S.E.2d at 386. The trial judge instructed the jury that in order to find
defendant guilty on this count, it must determine that he "broke or entered" the victim's residence.
Id. (emphasis in original). In upholding the jury instruction, the court of appeals noted that
submitting the charge on alternative propositions was proper under G.S. 14-54(a). Id. See State
v. Boyd, 287 N.C. 131, 145, 214 S.E.2d 14, 22 (1975). For examples of similar holdings under G.S.
14-54, see State v. Brown, 266 N.C. 55, 145 S.E.2d 297 (1965); State v. Vines, 262 N.C. 747, 138
S.E.2d 630 (1964); State v. Best, 232 N.C. 575, 61 S.E.2d 612 (1950); State v. Mumford, 227 N.C.
132, 41 S.E.2d 201 (1947); State v. Houston, 19 N.C. App. 542, 199 S.E.2d 668, cert. denied, 284
N.C. 426, 200 S.E.2d 662 (1973).
The Jordan court similarly rejected defendant's contention that the jury charge on felonious
larceny violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict when the trial judge instructed that the jury
need only find "either that the Defendant Rush took the reel to reel tape player, and other stereo
equipment from the building after a breaking or entering, or that the reel to reel tape player and
other stereo equipment was worth more than four hundred dollars." 56 N.C. App. at 792, 290
S.E.2d at 386 (emphasis in original). The court cited no authority for its holding that the trial
court did not err in allowing these alternative propositions to be stated together, but the supreme
court decisions in Hall and Rush, as well as the court of appeals opinion in Yancey, support this
conclusion.
269. 59 N.C. App. 418, 297 S.E.2d 138 (1982), disc. rev. granted, 307 N.C. 469, 299 S.E.2d 222
(1983).
270. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446(d)(13)(Supp. 1981).
271. 302 N.C. 157, 273 S.E.2d 661 (1981).
272. N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 13(2) gives the Supreme Court the exclusive authority to make
rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division.
273. 59 N.C. App. at 423, 297 S.E.2d at 141.
274. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1231(b) (1978).
275. 59 N.C. App. at 423, 297 S.E.2d at 141.
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rule 21 give way to G.S. 15A-1231(b).276
Bennett, then, contains two important clarifications for the practitioner
interested in preserving a possible appeal. First, if counsel wants to assign as
error "any portion of the jury charge or omissions therefrom," he must object
to that instruction before the jury retires. Failure to so object will constitute a
waiver of the right to assert the allegedly faulty charge on appeal. Second,
counsel may not assign as error the trial court's failure to conduct an instruc-
tion conference unless counsel has requested one.
G. Sentencing
1. Fair Sentencing Act
A primary purpose of the Fair Sentencing Act277 is to ensure that
sentences imposed upon persons convicted of a crime278 are "commensurate
with the injury the offense has caused, taking into account factors that may
diminish or increase the offender's culpability." 279 To aid judges in accom-
plishing this goal, the legislature enacted G.S. 15A-1340.4, which provides de-
tailed guidelines that judges must follow in determining an appropriate
sentence.280 Court of appeals cases decided in 1982 indicate that some trial
courts are encountering difficulty interpreting and following those guidelines,
thus demonstrating confusion in the implementation of the Fair Sentencing
Act.
Section 15A-1340.4 of the Act provides that "[ijf the judge imposes a
prison term. . . he must impose the presumptive term provided. . . unless,
after consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors, or both, he decides to
impose a longer or shorter term. .. 281 Although judicial discretion in sen-
tencing is preserved through this consideration of aggravating and mitigating
factors, the legislature did not intend for that discretion to be unbridled.
Before a judge may impose a sentence that is longer or shorter than the pre-
sumptive term, he must consider each of the sixteen aggravating and fourteen
mitigating factors listed in G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(1) and (2).282 In addition, he
may consider other aggravating or mitigating factors only upon a finding that
they are "proved by the preponderence of the evidence and that they are rea-
sonably related to the purposes of sentencing." 283 It is this system of positives
and negatives that has caused confusion. Most of the cases considered on ap-
peal dealt in some respect with the statute's mandate to consider aggravating
276. Id.
277. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.1-.7 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
278. G.S. 15A-1340.1(a) provides that the Act shall only apply to "persons convicted of felo-
nies, other than Class A and Class B felonies."
279. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
280. Under G.S. 15A-1340.4(f) prison terms ranging from one to fifteen years are presumed
for specific classes of felonies.
281. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
282. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a)(1),(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
283. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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and mitigating factors and the discretionary outcome of that consideration. 28 4
The types of errors alleged on appeal and the courts' varying disposition
of them raise the question whether the guidelines of the Act are used as in-
tended (as modifiers of a presumptive sentence), or whether they are instead
being circumvented by the exercise of the courts' discretion. That discretion
was clearly preserved and clarified by the court of appeals in State v. Davis.285
Defendant appealed the trial court's decision not to reduce his prison sentence
after deleting one of the aggravating factors it had found earlier. The court of
appeals upheld the judge's right to use discretion in weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors, and interpreted G.S. 15A-1340(a) as follows:
The discretionary task of weighing mitigating and aggravating fac-
tors is not a simple matter of mathematics. For example, three fac-
tors of one kind do not automatically and of necessity outweigh one
factor of another kind. The number of factors found is only one con-
sideration in determining which factors outweigh others. Although
the court is required to consider all statutory factors to some degree,
it may very properly emphasize one factor more than another in a
particular case.286
This statement of the law serves as a refrain throughout the pertinent cases287
and the message is clear: the court's discretion in sentencing is modified very
little by the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act.
One check on trial court discretion, of course, is the power of appellate
courts to remand for resentencing when the trial court commits errors that are
expressly forbidden by the Act. Unfortunately, there is some disagreement
among judges as to when remand is required. The following cases exemplify
this disagreement.
284. See, ag., State v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 330, 293 S.E.2d 658 (1982) (upholding trial court's
discretion in failing to reduce prison term after deleting a previously found aggravating factor);
State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 295 S.E.2d 621 (1982) (erroneous consideration of aggravating
factors must cause reversible prejudice to defendant before remand for resentencing will be al-
lowed); State v. Leeper, 59 N.C. App. 199, 296 S.E.2d 7 (1982) (fourteen year minimum sentence
required by G.S. 14-87(d) for robbery with firearms or other dangerous weapons controls over
twelve-year presumptive sentence set by Fair Sentencing Act for Class D felonies; mitigating fac-
tors make no difference); State v. Morris, 59 N.C. App. 157, 296 S.E.2d 309 (1982) (an element of
the offense in question cannot be used as a factor in aggravation; but no finding of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances is required when a presumptive sentence is imposed by a controlling
statute that conflicts with the Fair Sentencing Act); State v. Goforth, 59 N.C. App. 504, 297 S.E.2d
128 (1982) (the same item of evidence may not be used to prove more than one factor in aggrava-
tion; court did not award retrial because defendant was not prejudiced); State v. Jones, 59 N.C.
App. 472, 297 S.E.2d 132 (1982) (remanding for resentencing because trial judge relied on the
same evidence to prove a fact in aggravation that was necessary to prove an element of the of-
fense); State v. Thobourne, 59 N.C. App. 584, 297 S.E.2d 774 (1982) (remanding for resentencing
on finding that consideration of the following two aggravating factors was "punishment" for a
"potential infringement on (defendant's) right to plead not guilty": (1) defendant did not at any
time render assistance to the arresting officer or the District Attorney; (2) defendant did not offer
aid in the apprehension of other felons).
285. 58 N.C. App. 330, 293 S.E.2d 658 (1982).
286. Id at 333, 293 S.E.2d at 661.
287. State v. Ahearn, 59 N.C. App. 44, 50, 295 S.E.2d 621, 625 (1982); State v. Morris, 59 N.C.
App. 157, 162,296 S.E.2d 309, 313 (1982); State v. Goforth, 59 N.C. App. 504, 507, 297 S.E.2d 128,
130 (1982); State v. Jones, 59 N.C. App. 472, 476, 297 S.E.2d 132, 135 (1982); State v. Thobourne,
59 N.C. App. 584, 591, 297 S.E.2d 774, 779 (1982); State v. Abee, 60 N.C. App. 99, 104, 298 S.E.2d
184, 187 (1982).
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State v. Ahearn288 involved an appeal from conviction of felonious child
abuse. The age of the victim was both a necessary element of felonious child
abuse289 and an aggravating factor considered by the court in sentencing.
Though G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(1) expressly forbids using evidence necessary to
prove an element of an offense to prove a factor in aggravation, the court of
appeals did not remand for resentencing. The court's decision was based upon
defendant's failure to show that "had the court not considered the erroneous
findings in aggravation a different result would have been reached in the
court's balancing process." 290 Judge Wells registered a dissent to this holding.
Similarly, in State v. Abee,291 on appeal from conviction of second-degree sex-
ual offense, defendant correctly asserted that aggravating factors292 were im-
properly considered because they were also evidence necessary to prove an
element of the offense. Nonetheless, following the logic of Ahearn, the court
of appeals found no reversible error. Judge Johnson, distinguishing,4hearn in
dissent,293 argued that the trial court had "no discretion to even consider evi-
dence necessary to prove an element of the offense" in determining aggrava-
tion and concluded he would hold that "consideration of evidence necessary to
prove an element of the offense to prove any factor in aggravation violates the
intent and spirit of basic fairness of the Fair Sentencing Act and is, therefore,
reversible per se." 294
Any guidance to be found in these and the other 1982 Fair Sentencing
Act cases 295 is minimal at best. Trial judges may be sure that they will con-
tinue to have wide discretion in applying aggravating and mitigating factors to
the presumptive sentences provided in G.S. 15A-1394.4(f). Whether or not the
exercise of such discretion will survive appeal will depend upon whether the
purposes of the Act are to be meticulously served or blatantly thwarted,
whether any of the defendant's fundamental rights have been violated,
whether competing statutory sentencing provisions are present that override
the Act, and whether defendant's case has been prejudiced. However unclear
the guidance provided until now, it seems certain that the North Carolina
Supreme Court will be called upon to interpret more precisely the guidelines
and requirements of the Fair Sentencing Act.
2. Capital Punishment
G.S. 15A-2000(b) and (C) 2 9 6 provide the procedure that must be followed
288. 59 N.C. App. 44, 295 S.E.2d 621 (1982).
289. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-318.4 (1981).
290. 59 N.C. App. at 50, 295 S.E.2d at 625.
291. 60 N.C. App. 99, 298 S.E.2d 184 (1982).
292. The aggravating factors included reported acts of fellatio.
293. The issue in,4hearn, Judge Johnson noted, was whether to remand for sentencing upon
"consideration of some aggravating factors not supported by the evidence" or "the discretionary
task of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors to increase or reduce sentences from the pre-
sumptive term." 60 N.C. App. at 106, 298 S.E.2d at 188 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
294. Id.
295. See cases cited supra note 285.
296. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b), (c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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by a jury in all cases in which the death penalty may be authorized. Subsec-
tion (b) provides in part that the the jury:
(a)fter hearing the evidence, argument of counsel, and instructions of
the court, ... shall deliberate and render a sentence recommenda-
tion to the court, based upon the following matters:
(1) Whether any sufficient aggravating circumstance or circum-
stances as enumerated in subsection (e) exist;
(2) Whether any sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances
as enumerated in subsection (f), which outweigh the aggravating cir-
cumstance or circumstances found, exist; and
(3) Based on these circumstances, whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or to imprisonment in the State's prison for life.
When the jury unanimously recommends the death sentence subsection (c)
requires that a signed writing be presented to the court showing the following:
(1) The statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which
the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) That the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances
found by the jury are sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition
of the death penalty; and,
(3) That the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insuffi-
cient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances
found.
These sections have been interpreted in four recent supreme court cases to
mean that if the conditions enumerated in subsections (b) and (c) are satisfied,
then the jury has a duty to recommend a sentence of death.297
In State v. Pinch,298 the first of these cases, defendant was convicted of
first degree murder. The judge in his instructions advised the jury that it had a
duty to recommend the death penalty if it found the following: "(1) that one
or more statutory aggravating circumstances existed; (2) that the aggravating
circumstances were substantial enough to warrant the death penalty; and (3)
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt."299 The judge also advised the jury that if it did
not find each of these criteria to be met, its duty was to recommend life impris-
onment.3°° Defendant appealed, claiming that the instruction was prejudicial
because it did not give the jury the option of recommending a life sentence
"notwithstanding its earlier findings." 301 In upholding the trial court's in-
structions the supreme court said that the jury has no such option and noted
that the exercise of such "unbridled discretion" would be to "revert to a system
pervaded by arbitrariness and caprice. '302 After Pinch the supreme court up-
297. State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 34,292 S.E.2d 203,227 (1982); State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656,
688-90 , 292 S.E.2d 243, 262-63 (1982); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 710, 292 S.E.2d 264, 276
(1982); State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 184, 293 S.E.2d 569, 590 (1982).
298. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 (1982).
299. Id at 32-33, 292 S.E.2d at 226-27.
300. Id. at 33, 292 S.E.2d at 227.
301. Id
302. Id (quoting State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 35, 257 S.E.2d 569, 590 (1979)).
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held three similar jury instructions in State v. Williams,30 3 State v. Smith, 304
(both decided June 2, the same day as Pinch), and State v. Brown30 5 (decided
July 13). In all four of these decisions Justice Exum dissented from the major-
ity's interpretation of G.S. 15A-2000(b) and (c),30 6 but expressed that dissent
in full in Pinch only. The Pinch dissent is complete and well reasoned; it may
well indicate that the majority's new interpretation 3o7 of subsections (b) and
(c) is not yet settled.
In his dissent in Pinch Justice Exum condemned the majority's reasoning
as "a cursory treatment and a barebones analysis," and stated that G.S. 15A-
2000 in no way provides that a jury has the duty to return a death sentence.308
He further noted that the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that
G.S. 15A-2000 can survive constitutional attack without being construed as a
mandate to the jury to recommend death in the circumstances described
above. 309 Noting that in G.S. 15A-2000(b) and (c) the legislature "sought to
strike a balance between fairness to the individual defendant and consistency
among the cases in which the death penalty is imposed, 310 Justice Exum de-
scribed the statute as one that, when properly construed, "avoids the two ex-
tremes of mandatory death penalties (and) unbridled discretionary action by
juries."31 Emphasizing that jury recommendations are supposed to be "based
on [the] considerations [of subsections (b) and (c)] not decreed by them," he
concluded that nothing in the statutory scheme suggests legislative intent
either to require the death sentence or to permit the jury to ignore "the deline-
ated considerations in its deliberations. '312
Justice Exum noted that the majority's interpretation in Pinch is a "logical
trap [that] is easily sprung' 313 and admitted that in his dissent in State v.
Rook,3 14 he had "lapsed into the same fallacy:" after reading the appellate
briefs, listening to oral argument, and conducting his own research, he became
303. 305 N.C 656, 688-90, 292 S.E.2d 243, 262-63 (1982).
304. 305 N.C. 169, 170, 292 S.E.2d 264, 276 (1982).
305. 306 N.C. 151, 184, 293 S.E.2d 569, 590 (1982).
306. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230 (Exum, J., dissenting); Williams, 305 N.C. at 691,
292 S.E.2d at 264 (Exum, J., dissenting); Smith, 305 N.C. at 712, 292 S.E.2d at 277 (Exum, J.,
dissenting); Brown, 306 N.C. at 186, 293 S.E.2d at 591 (Exum, J., dissenting).
307. 306 N.C. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230 (Exum, J., dissenting). Justice Exum noted in an intro-
ductory remark that he found himself "in strong disagreement with the majority on an ex-
trememly important new question dealing with the construction of our death penalty statute." Id.
308. Id
309. Unsuccessful constitutional attack could be based upon the assertion that the jury is al-
lowed to decide between life and death at its own "unbridled" discretion. See Bullington v. Mis-
souri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
310. 306 N.C. at 40-41, 292 S.E.2d at 231. Justice Exum further noted that the supreme court
had three years earlier in State v. Johnson recognized that "neither unbridled, unguided discretion
nor the absence of all discretion in the imposition of the death penalty is constitutionally permit-
ted." Id. at 38, 292 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 58, 257 S.E.2d 597, 607(1979)).
311. 306 N.C. at 41, 292 S.E.2d at 231.
312. Id at 41, 292 S.E.2d at 232 (emphasis in original).
313. Id
314. 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038, (1982).
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convinced his position in Rook had been wrong.315 Obviously the statutory
interpretation at issue is thought provoking and open to judicial wavering (as
evidenced by Justice Exum's own turnabout). Because Justice Exum's posi-
tion in Pinch, Williams, Smith, and Brown is as well reasoned as that of the
majority, and because any doubts about the proper construction of the statute
should be resolved in favor of fairness to defendants and the preservation of
human life, it seems likely that Justice Exum's view may gain support. In any
event, the present split on the death duty issue will continue until the majority









North Carolina courts have employed two definitions of hearsay: evi-
dence is hearsay (1) "when its probative force depends, in whole or in part,
upon the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it;"' and (2) "whenever the assertion of any
person, other than that of the witness himself in his present testimony,. . . is
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the evidence so offered is
hearsay."'2 Hearsay evidence that does not fall within a recognized exception
to the hearsay rule is inadmissible.3
Since 1905 North Carolina courts have recognized a hearsay exception for
business records 4 To be admissible under this exception entries must have
been made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the transac-
tion involved, and must be authenticated by a witness familiar with them and
the system under which they were made.5 The business records exception is
based upon the assumption that such records are inherently trustworthy be-
cause their accuracy is ensured by business necessity.6
The business records exception was first applied in North Carolina to
records that were assumed to be trustworthy because the businesses involved
could not function effectively without accurate records.7 Admission of these
business ledgers is further safeguarded by the fact that financial records must
balance. Some items less inherently trustworthy than ledgers may also be ad-
mitted under the business records exception if the court considers the circum-
stances surrounding their execution sufficiently indicative of trustworthiness.
Such items include school attendance records,8 motel registration cards,9
1. Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 58 N.C. App. 414, 431, 293 S.E.2d 901, 912
(1982) (quoting 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 138, at 551-5.2 (2d
rev. ed. 1982)).
2. Cameron, 58 N.C. App. at 431, 293 S.E.2d at 912; H. BRANDIS, supra note 1, § 138, at
552-53.
3. Cameron, 58 N.C. App. at 431,293 S.E.2d at 912; H. BRANDIS, supra note 1, § 138, at 553.
4. See Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 138 N.C. 42, 50 S.E. 452 (1905).
5. See Dairy & Ice Cream Supply Co. v. Gastonia Ice Cream Co., 232 N.C. 684, 686, 61
S.E.2d 895, 897 (1950); State v. Barbour, 43 N.C. App. 143, 151, 258 S.E.2d. 475, 480 (1979); H.
BRAWNis, supra note I, § 155, at 617.
6. See Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 138 N.C. at 51, 50 S.E. at 455.
7. See, eg., State v. Dunn, 264 N.C. 391, 141 S.E.2d 630 (1965) (ledger sheet identified by
witness as made by his secretary); State v. Shumaker, 251 N.C. 678, 111 S.E.2d 878 (1960) (deposit
slips); Smith Builders Supply, Inc. v. Dixon, 246 N.C. 136, 97 S.E.2d 767 (1957) (accounts and
ledgers prepared in regular course of business authenticated by account supervisor); Breneman
Co. v. Cunningham, 207 N.C. 77, 175 S.E. 829 (1934) (books of account iliquidation proceed-
ing); Edgerton v. Perkins, 200 N.C. 650, 158 S.E. 197 (1931)(bank ledger produced by cashier and
bank vice-president); Flowers v. Spears, 190 N.C. 747, 130 S.E. 710 (1925) (records of bank branch
authenticated by cashier of main branch); Stewart v. R.R., 141 N.C. 253, 53 S.E. 877 (1906)(time
table and train sheets); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 138 N.C. 42, 50 S.E. 452
(1905) (record of train positions telegraphed to train dispatcher from station agents); State v. Bar-
bour, 43 N.C. App. 143, 258 S.E.2d 475 (1979) (bank ledger authenticated by assistant cashier with
no personal knowledge or entries).
8. See State v. Brunson, 285 N.C. 295, 204 S.E.2d 661 (1974) (public school attendance
records authenticated by records custodian, rather than by recording teacher).
apartment complex housing records, 10 and daily work reports prepared on a
construction site." Social services case history records 12 and hospital staff
meeting minutes1 3 were added to this list in 1982.
In re Smith 14 was a proceeding initiated by the Durham County Depart-
ment of Social Services to terminate the parental rights of a mother. The De-
partment had records of the parent's case history dating back to 1971. Two
social workers testified about matters in the mother's case history that had
been recorded prior to June 1979. Although neither of the social workers had
any personal knowledge about the basis for entries made before that date, one
of them authenticated the case history records as having been made in the
regular course of business at or near the time of the transactions involved. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the case history records
were properly admissible under the business records exception.'
5
In Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hospital1 6 two podiatrists sued two
orthopedic surgeons and a hospital for conspiring to deny them hospital staff
privileges. During a hospital staff meeting, one of the orthopedic surgeons had
made disparaging remarks about podiatry. The court of appeals upheld the
trial court's determination that the minutes of that meeting were admissible
under the business records exception, and noted that "[t]he need for accuracy
in these records is as important as that required of hospital patient records."'
17
While the court may have overstated the importance of the minutes, it was
probably correct in upholding their admission. Although the minutes of the
staff meeting amounted to little more than a record of opinion, they were
properly authenticated as having been made in the regular course of business,
contemporaneously with the transactions recorded.18
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has hesitated to extend the business
records exception to summary-type documents lacking the inherent safeguards
of trustworthiness associated with ledgers and similar records.' 9 In stating the
9. See State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503,243 S.E.2d 338 (1978) (error because manager did not
purport to identify defendant as the man who signed the card).
10. See State v. Carr, 21 N.C. App. 470, 204 S.E.2d 892 (1974) (residence records authenti-
cated by manager who had been hired after records were made).
11. See S.J. Groves & Sons v. State, 50 N.C. App. 1, 273 S.E.2d 465 (1980) (daily work
reports and cost compilations based on such reports), cert. denied, 302 N.C. 396, 279 S.E.2d 353
(1981).
12. See In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 287 S.E.2d 440, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d
212 (1982).
13. See Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 58 N.C. App. 414,293 S.E.2d 901 (1982).
14. 56 N.C. App. 142, 287 S.E.2d 440, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d 212 (1982).
15. Id. at 148, 287 S.E.2d at 444.
16. 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901 (1982).
17. Id. at 432, 293 S.E.2d at 912. The business records exception had been extended to hospi-
tal patient records in Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
18. 58 N.C. App. at 433-34, 293 S.E.2d at 913.
19. See, e.g., Ray D. Lowder, Inc. v. Highway Comm., 26 N.C. App. 622, 217 S.E.2d 682
(court did not admit compilation made, probably for use in litigation, four years after events,
summarizing incomplete daily reports, subject to compiler's personal judgment and memory), cert.
denied, 288 N.C. 393, 218 S.E.2d 467 (1975); Thompson Apex Co. v. Murray Tire Serv. Inc., 4
N.C. App. 402, 166 S.E.2d 864 (court did not admit results of quality control tests without evi-
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test for admissability of these documents, the court of appeals has added a
requirement that the entries they contain be based upon the personal knowl-
edge of the preparer.20 The justification for such a requirement is questiona-
ble. Personal knowledge of the preparer has never been required so long as
the entries are duly authenticated as having been made in the regular course of
business, contemporaneously with the transactions recorded.21 This new test,
which confuses personal knowledge with trustworthiness, was applied in Pied-
mont Plastics, Inc. v. Mize Co. 22
in Piedmont third party defendants sought to introduce a tally sheet of
service calls that was based upon the work orders of repairmen. A witness
testified that he was responsible for servicing the equipment involved, that the
tally sheet was kept in the regular course of business, and that he regularly
made entries on the sheet contemporaneously with the repairs. The work or-
ders themselves were not offered into evidence. The court of appeals upheld
the trial court's exclusion of the tally sheet, and stated that the business records
exception required the entries to be: (1) made in the regular course of busi-
ness; (2) made contemporaneously with the events recorded; (3) original; and
(4) based upon the personal knowledge of the individual making them.23 The
court stated that "to render the tally sheet admissible, the sources of informa-
tion from which it was drawn, the method of its compilation, and the circum-
stances surrounding the entire matter, must have been such as to indicate its
trustworthiness." 24
In concentrating upon the trustworthiness of the tally sheet (and requiring
personal knowledge as an indicator of trustworthiness), the court ignored what
should have been its basic inquiry: whether the tally sheet was a business
record at all. The court could have reached the same result by stating that in
the absence of supporting data, it was unable to determine whether the tally
sheet was kept in the regular course of business; thus, the tally sheet was inad-
missible because it had not been shown to be a business record.25
dence of who had performed tests or what procedures were followed), cert. denied, 275 N.C. 501,
166 S.E.2d 864 (1969).
20. See SJ. Groves & Sons v. State, 50 N.C. App. at 65-66, 273 S.E.2d at 499; Ray D.
Lowder, Inc. v. Highway Comm., 26 N.C. App. at 652, 217 S.E.2d at 699.
21. See, eg., Brunson, 285 N.C. 295, 204 S.E.2d 661 (authentication by custodian of attend-
ance records, rather than by recording teacher); Dunn, 264 N.C. 391, 141 S.E.2d 630 (ledger sheet
identified by witness as made by his secretary); Smith Builders Suppy Inc., 246 N.C. 136, 97
S.E.2d 767 (authentication of accounts and ledgers by account supervisor who had no personal
knowledge of entries); Edgerton, 200 N.C. 650, 158 S.E. 197 (bank ledger authenticated by cashier
and bank vice-president); Flowers, 190 N.C. 747, 130 S.E. 710 (records of bank authenticated by
cashier of main branch); Barbour, 43 N.C. App. 143,258 S.E.2d 475 (bank ledger authenticated by
assistant cashier with no personal knowledge of entries): Carr, 21 N.C. App. 470, 204 S.E.2d 892
(apartment residence records authenticated by manager employed after records were made).
22. 58 N.C. App. 135, 293 S.E.2d 219 (1982).
23. Id. at 137, 293 S.E.2d at 221. The court quoted the requirements from Lowder, 26 N.C.
App. at 650, 217 S.E.2d at 699: the record is deemed admissible if "(1) the entries are made in the
regular course of business; (2) the entries are made contemporaneously with the events recorded;
(3) the entries are original entries; and (4) the entries are based upon the personal knowledge of
the person making them."
24. 58 N.C. App. at 137, 293 S.E.2d at 221.
25. Although the court in .Lowder spoke in terms of requiring personal knowledge, it rested
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Piedmont may be a case that was decided the right way for the wrong
reason. But the danger that the business records exception will be misapplied
by requiring personal knowledge extends beyond the case itself. As noted
above, North Carolina courts had never before required that the preparer of a
business record have personal knowledge of the facts upon which the entries
are based. Nonetheless, the case upon which the personal knowledge require-
ment in Piedmont is based, Ray 0. Lowder Inc. v. Highway Commission,2 6 has
already been cited in Strong's Evidence Index for the proposition that personal
knowledge of the preparer is required for a document to qualify under the
business records exception.27 While this statement accurately restates the
holding in Lowder, courts and practitioners need to guard against allowing
this overstated and ill-advised requirement to become the new general rule.2 8
In a related development, the supreme court seems to have adopted a
hearsay exception for statements with a "reasonable probability of truthful-
ness." In State v. Davis,29 a murder prosecution, time of death was in issue.
The court upheld the use of an entry in the victim's diary to prove she was still
alive at the time the entry was made.3 0 The court cited State v. Vestal3 ' for the
proposition that exceptions to the rule against hearsay are justified when the
evidence is necessary and has a reasonable probability of truthfulness. 32 Ap-
plying these criteria, the court found that the evidence was necessary (since the
victim was dead), and almost certainly truthful (since the victim would have
had no reason to lie about the time she had awakened).33 This exception is
its decision upon a determination that the report in question did not satisfy the business records
exception because it was made neither in the regular course of business nor contemporaneously
with the events recorded. 26 N.C. App. at 650, 217 S.E.2d at 699-700.
26. 26 N.C. App. 622, 217 S.E.2d 682, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 393, 218 S.E.2d 467 (1975).
27. 6 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDaX 3D Evidence § 29.2, at 79 (1977).
28. Proposed N.C.R. EvID. 803(6) provides a statutory business exception:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness: (6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, ordiagnoses, made at or near the time, by or from information transmitted by, a person
with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, rec-
ord, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other quali-
fied witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term 'business' as used in this para-
graph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH Comm., REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA GEN. AsSEMBLY OF 1983 ON
THE LAWS OF EvIDENcE, at 82-84 (1982). Although the rule requires a basic level of trustworthi-
ness, it does not require that the preparer have personal knowledge of the entries. Id.
29. 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982).
30. Id. at 420-21, 290 S.E.2d at 586-87.
31. 278 N.C. 561, 582, 180 S.E.2d 755, 769 (1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
32. 305 N.C. at 420, 290 S.E.2d at 587. The court in Vestal was faced with the question
whether a widow should be allowed to testify about a conversation with her deceased husband
before he left on a trip. Although stating seemingly broad criteria for admissibility of hearsay
evidence (necessity and reasonable probability of truthfulness), the court found the husband's
statements admissible under the traditional exception allowing declarations of a decedent to show
his intention. Thus, the admission of the diary in Davis solely on the basis of necessity and relia-
bility represents the extension of previous law.
33. Id. at 420-21, 290 S.E.2d at 586-87.
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similar to the final exception in Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804,34 and
represents a sensible solution to the problem presented when trustworthy evi-
dence does not readily fit into a recognized hearsay exception.
B. Impeachment
Evidence of prior misconduct may be used for impeachment purposes in
North Carolina. 35 Although the avowed purpose of such evidence is to dis-
credit a witness' testimony by attacking his credibility,36 inquiry is not limited
to acts that reflect negatively on credibility. A witness may be impeached by
the introduction of any criminal conviction;37 there is no requirement of a
preliminary determination that the conviction is of a type reflecting negatively
on credibility. Furthermore, a witness may be questioned about prior acts re-
flecting negatively upon general moral character.38
Because evidence of prior misconduct is admissible, if at all, only for im-
peachment purposes in these cases, the jury is limited to consideration of the
witness' answers to the cross-examiner's questions.3 9 Theoretically, the ques-
tions themselves are not to be considered in evaluating witness credibility.
Thus, when a witness denies an act, his credibility is ostensibly unimpeached.
North Carolina courts have recognized the potential for serious abuse in the
actual application of this procedure. 4° Two policing doctrines are designed to
34. FED R. EvlD. 803(24) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general pur-
poses of these rules and the interests ofjustice will best be served by the admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this excep-tion unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party suffidently in advance
of trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair olpportunity to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address
of the dedlarant.
FaD. R. EvmD. 804(5) is identical to FED. R. EvID. 803(24). Proposed N.C.R. EvID. 803(24)
differs from FED. R. Evw. 803(24) only in that the North Carolina rule would require written
notice to the adverse party, and that such notice must be given sufficiently in advance of offering
the statement (rather than t erto provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet the statement. LAo IVE RESEARCH COMM., REPORT TO THE NORTH CARO-
LINA GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1983 ON THE LAWS OF EvIDENCE, at 88 (1982). Proposed N.C.R. EvID.804(5) is identieal with proposed N.C.R. EvD. 803(24). Id.
35. See H. BLRAnDIS, supra note 1, § 111, at 407, § 112, at 411.
36. Id. at § 38; State v. Purcell, 296 N.C. 728, 733, 252 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1979).
37. See Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967).
38. See State v. Purcell, 296 N.C. at 733. 252 S.E.2d at 775.
39. See State v. Finch, 293 N.C. 132, 142, 235 S.E.2d 819, 825 (1977). Thus, an actual record
of convictions may not be introduced to contradict a witness' testimony. State v. Monk, 286 N.C.
509, 517, 212 S.E.2d 125, 132 (1975). State v. Daniels, 59 N.C. App. 442, 446, 297 S.E.2d 150, 153
(1982).40. The possibility for such abuse has been frequently noted. S.nee, e., Ingle v. Roy Stone
Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276,281-82, 156 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1967); State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 332,
30 S.E.2d 230,232 (1944); Comment, Impeachment of the CriminalDefendant by 2 rior , cquittals-
Beyond the Bounds of Reason, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 561 (1981); Note, The Fourth Circult
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limit prejudice: the trial judge has discretionary control over the scope of the
cross-examination,41 and the questions must be asked in good faith.42
In 1971, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that prior arrests, indict-
ments, and accusations of misconduct not connected with the case at bar were
inadmissible for impeachment purposes.43 The court, however, continued to
allow questions about the conduct underlying these events.4 Two cases de-
cided in 1982 by the supreme court illustrate this use of prior "bad acts."
In State v. Shane45 a defendant charged with sex crimes was asked on
cross-examination whether he had resigned from the intelligence unit of the
Fayetteville Police Force because of allegations of sexual misconduct. The
supreme court held that the question was improper because it did not ex-
pressly and directly ask whether the defendant had actually committed a cer-
tain moral or legal infraction.46 The court implied that a question about a
particular act would have been appropriate.47
In State v. Sparks48 defendant, a former convict, was prosecuted for com-
mitting a first-degree sex offense involving anal intercourse with his son. The
prosecutor, ostensibly for the purpose of impeaching defendant's testimony,
asked defendant whether he had become "acquainted with" consensual anal
intercourse while in prison.49 The supreme court held that the specific ques-
tion was improper because it did not identify a specific instance of criminal or
degrading conduct on the part of defendant.50 Again, the negative implication
was that a properly framed question would have been permissible.
5
'
Although the court refused to enlarge the scope of permissible inquiry for
impeachment purposes, its decisions in Shane and Sparks remain troubling.
The decisions imply that questions about a particular prior sex offense would
be appropriate to impeach a witness charged with a different sex offense, de-
spite the limited relevance of such acts to the question of veracity and the
strong possibility of substantive prejudice.
Two factors have weakened the effectiveness of the professed good faith
Threatens Impeachment With Prior Acts of Misconduct in North Carolina, 15 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 447 (1979); Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981-Evidence, 60 N.C.L. REv.
1359-61 (1982); Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980-Evidence, 59 N.C.L. REv.
1176-80 (1981); Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1978-Evidence, 57 N.C.L. REv.
1069-77 (1979).
41. State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 675, 185 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1971); H. BRANDIS, supra note
1, § 111, at 409-10.
42. State v. Williams, 279 N.C. at 675, 185 S.E.2d at 181; H. BRANDis, supra note 1, § 111, at
408-10.
43. State v. Williams, 279 N.C. at 672, 185 S.E.2d at 180. The court of appeals recently
reiterated this rule. See State v. Woodrup, 60 N.C. App. 205, 207, 298 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1982).
44. See, e.g., State v. Gainey, 280 N.C. 366, 373, 185 S.E.2d 874,879 (1971); Williams, 279
N.C. at 675, 185 S.E.2d at 181.
45. 304 N.C. 643, 285 S.E.2d 813 (1982).
46. Id. at 651, 285 S.E.2d at 818.
47. Id. at 651, 285 S.E.2d at 818.
48. 307 N.C. 71, 296 S.E.2d 451 (1982).
49. Id at 72, 296 S.E.2d at 453.
50. Id at 77-78, 296 S.E.2d at 455.
51. Id at 77-78, 296 S.E.2d at 455.
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limitation upon the use of prior acts for purposes of impeachment. First,
North Carolina courts have adopted a broad view of what constitutes a ques-
tion asked in good faith.52 Second, North Carolina courts have made it diffi-
cult for a litigant to raise the issue of good faith on appeal.53 Both of these
propositions were illustrated in State v. Robertson . 4
In Robertson defendant was charged with larceny by trick involving the
purported sale of marijuana. On cross-examination, the district attorney
asked defendant whether on three prior occasions he had sold drugs and
whether on one prior occasion he had stolen a diamond ring. The court of
appeals first held that the questions were appropriate because they related to
specific bad acts.55 The court then held that the prosecutor asked the ques-
tions about prior drug sales in good faith. It justified this determination by
noting that the state had a good reason to ask about prior sales because the
case at bar involved marijuana.5 6 The court did not address the argument that
the good faith requirement is meant to ensure that there is some basis in fact
for the actual occurrence of the prior acts subject to question. By deciding that
questions about prior acts similar to the one at issue were asked for good rea-
son, and equating good reason with good faith, the court opened the door for
such acts to be raised in the very situation in which their use has the most
potential for substantive prejudice.
While the Robertson court acknowledged that the record was silent as to
whether the district attorney had any information upon which to base his
question about the theft of the ring, it observed that the burden was upon the
defendant on appeal to affirmatively show that the question was asked in bad
faith.57 Since the defendant had not done so, the court held that the trial court
committed no error.58
The proposed North Carolina Rules of Evidence,59 while allowing con-
52. See State v:Royal, 300 N.C. 515, 268 S.E.2d 517 (1980) (inquiry about prior criminal act
based on charge that had been dismissed at probable cause hearing); State v. Herbin, 298 N.C,
441, 259 S.E.2d 263 (1979) (questions about whether defendant had committed rape, even though
defendant had been convicted only of lesser included offense of assault on a female); State v. Ross,
295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978) (questioning about drugs discovered in search subsequently
held illegal, no discussion of the sufficiency of the factual basis for the questioning).
53. See State v. Dawson, 302 N.C. 581, 586, 276 S.E.2d 348, 352 (1981) (questions of prosecu-
tor considered proper unless record shows questions asked in bad faith). It is difficult to show
abuse of good faith when the record of purported convictions is inadmissible. See State v. Monk,
286 N.C. 509, 517, 212 S.E.2d 125, 132 (1975); State v. Daniels, 59 N.C. App. 442, 446, 297 S.E.2d
150, 153 (1983).
54. 55 N.C. App. 659, 286 S.E.2d 612 (1982).
55. Id at 662, 286 S.E.2d at 613-14.
56. Id at 662, 286 S.E.2d at 614.
57. Id
58. Id
59. Proposed N.C.R. EviD. 609(a): "General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credi-
bility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than 60
days confinement shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during
cross-examination or thereafter." LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM. REPORT TO THE NORTH CARO-
LINA GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1983 ON THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE, at 59 (1982). Cf. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)
(evidence of prior conviction admissible if(1) punishable by death or imprisonment for more than
one year and probative value outweighs prejudice, or (2) conviction involves dishonesty or false
statement).
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tinued broad use of prior convictions, would permit a record of convictions to
be entered into evidence. This much-needed modification would be useful
when a witness with a record denies a prior conviction, as well as when a
witness who was previously found not guilty of a crime is questioned about a
conviction. In both cases, admission of the record into evidence allows the
jury to evaluate the witness' testimony in light of the official record.
The proposed rules purport to limit inquiry into prior acts to those con-
cerning character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 60 The danger exists, how-
ever, that in interpreting Rule 608(b) the North Carolina courts might read
"acts concerning character for truthfulness or untruthfulness" so broadly as to
continue much of the current practice. In light of the obvious danger of highly
prejudicial substantive use of this evidence by the jury, such a development
would be unfortunate.
C. Privileges
In 1981 the North Carolina Legislature enacted a statute that restricts the
admissibility of records, proceedings, and other materials generated by medi-
cal review committees in civil actions against providers of health services.6 1 In
Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hospita 62 filed before, but decided after,
the enactment of G.S. 131-170, the court of appeals created a similar privilege
at common law. In effect, the court's decision allowed the statute to be applied
retroactively.63 An analysis of the decision reveals the questionable basis
60. Proposed N.C.R. EviD. 608(b):
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as pro-
vided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another wit-
ness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with re-
spect to matters which relate only to credibility.
LEGISLATIvE RESEARCH Comm. REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA GEN. ASSEMBLY oF 1983 ON
THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE, at 56-57 (1982). The proposed rule tracks the language of FED. R. EVID.
608(b).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131-170 (Supp. 1981):
The proceedings of, records and materials produced by, and the materials consid-
ered by a committee are not subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any
civil action against a provider of professional health services arising out of the matters
which are the subject of evaluation and review by the committee, and no person who was
in attendance at a meeting of the committee shall be required to testify in any civil action
as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of the
committee or its members. However, information, documents, or records otherwise
available are not immune from discovery or use in a civil action merely because they
were presented during proceedings of the committee nor should any person who testifies
before the committee or who is a member of the committee be prevented from testifying
as to matters within his personal knowledge, but the witness cannot be asked about his
testimony before the committee or opinions formed by him as a result of the committee
hearings.
62. 58 N.C. App. 414, 293 S.E.2d 901 (1982).
63. While the court in Cameron was retroactively applying the terms of a statute by creating
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upon which the medical review committee privilege rests, and illustrates how
this privilege is unusual.
In Cameron two podiatrists sued two orthopedic surgeons and a hospital
for conspiring to deny them hospital staff privileges. Prior to the presentation
of evidence, counsel for the hospital objected to plaintiffs' request to review
certain documents the trial judge had ordered defendant hospital to produce.
The judge sustained the objection based upon an assertion of the attorney-
client privilege.64 While the court of appeals did not endorse the hospital's
assertion of this privilege, it upheld the trial court's exclusion of the docu-
ments.65 The court observed that the documents would have been excluded
under G.S. 131-170, and determined that even though the law of privileged
communications with respect to medical review committees was unsettled at
the time the case was filed, the policy enunciated in G.S. 131-170 was
grounded in the common law.66 Thus, the court recognized a common law
privilege that embodies the protections of G.S. 131-170.67 The court identified
the policy underlying the privilege as one that seeks to encourage medical staff
candor and objectivity by protecting committee records from public access.68
The court labeled the privilege as a qualified one, and stated that a quali-
fied privilege arises when: (1) a communication is made in good faith; (2) the
subject and scope of the communication is made in good faith; (3) the commu-
nication is made to a person or persons having a corresponding interest, right,
or duty.69 The court found a qualified privilege in Cameron because the docu-
ments for which protection was sought recorded good faith communications of
the hospital committees in which those present had a corresponding interest in
the administration of the hospital.70
Historically, courts have allowed a defense of qualified privilege to be
raised in defamation cases, 71 since the law views certain statements that would
a common law privilege, the court in State v. Funderbunk, 56 N.C. App. 119, 286 S.E.2d 884
(1982), retroactively applied the rule announced in State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450
(1981), which limited the common law privilege against adverse spousal testimony to testimony
involving confidential communications within the marriage. For a detailed discussion of the Free-
man case, see Note, Evidence-State v. Freemar Adverse Marital Testimony In North Carolina
CriminalAction" Can Spousal Testimony Be Compelled?, 60 N.C.L. Rav. 874 (1982).
64. The documents were records of a hospital review committee. The defendant argued that
the records were privileged because of the subject matter of the meetings and because counsel was
present at committee meetings. The trial court accepted the latter argument. 58 N.C. App. at 435,
293 S.E.2d at 914.
65. Id at 438, 293 S.E.2d at 915.
66. Id at 439, 293 S.E.2d at 915.
67. In contrast, the supreme court had earlier refused to extend the physician-patient privi-
lege to communications between a patient and his optometrist. In State v. Shaw, 305 N.C 327, 289
S.E.2d 325 (1982), the court stated, "[tihe physician-patient privilege is limited to those authorized
to practice physic (i.e. medicine or surgery). An optometrist is not a licensed physician and is not
authorized to practice medicine or surgery." Id at 334, 289 S.E.2d at 329.
68. 58 N.C. App. at 438, 293 S.E.2d at 914.
69. Id at 439, 293 S.E.2d at 915 (quoting Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 720, 260 S.E.2d 611,
614 (1979)).
70. Id at 439, 293 S.E.2d at 915.
71. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 115 (4th ed. 1971).
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otherwise be defamatory as deserving of protection.7 2 Indeed, all the cases
cited by the court in Cameron to support its holding that medical committee
records were protected by a qualified privilege involved defamation.73 If a
qualified privilege for review committee records is justified at all, it would be
to protect those who have spoken frankly at a committee meeting from being
sued for defamation by the staff member whose credentials they were review-
ing. The so-called qualified privilege in Cameron and G.S. 131-170, however,
does not operate like a traditional qualified privilege. It does not work to pro-
tect someone who has made an otherwise defamatory statement from suit by
the person defamed; instead, it operates to protect someone who has not made
a defamatory statement (either the hospital or the staff member being re-
viewed), from someone (a member of the public) who is not seeking to charge
him with defamation.
The privilege for medical review committee records is unusual in another
respect. Typical privileges are personal to the party protected by them,74 and
may only be waived with that party's consent.75 The review committee privi-
lege may be viewed as protecting either the hospital's interest in a forum that
encourages medical staff candor (directly), or the staff member whose conduct
is in question (indirectly). One would expect that the privilege could only be
waived by one of these parties. Yet any person present at a committee meeting
apparently may waive the privilege.76
In enacting G.S. 131-170, the legislature apparently was seeking to bal-
ance the hospital's interest in a forum that encourages medical staff candor
with a public plaintiff's interest in discovering the results of an internal investi-
gation relevant to his case. Instead of creating a blanket protection for all
72. A defendant is privileged to publish anything that reasonably appears to be necessary to
defend his own reputation against the defamation of another. Id at 786. A defendant is also
privileged to defend the reputation of another when a legal relationship exists between the two.
Id at 787. A conditional privilege is recognized in many cases when the publisher and recipient
have a common interest and the communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or
further that interest. Id at 789. Communications to one who may act in the public interest and
fair comment upon matters of public concern are similarly protected. Id at 791-92.
73. See Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979) (defendant school principal
unsuccessfully asserted qualified privilege in defense of statements that school cafeteria manager
was distributing alcoholic beverages on school premises); Stewart v. Nation-Wide Check Corp.,
279 N.C. 278, 182 S.E.2d 410 (1971) (statements made by defendant's agent to plaintif's relatives
accusing plaintiff of embezzlement; held, not qualifiedly privileged); R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 270 N.C. 160, 154 S.E.2d 344 (1967) (defense of qualified privilege extended
to reasonable statements made in good faith by a labor union in the course of a campaign to solicit
members or to establish itself as authorized representative of employees); Alexander v. Vann, 180
N.C. 187, 104 S.E. 360 (1920) (no qualified privilege for letter defaming deputy sheriff when accu-
sations not related to deputy sheriffs official duty).
74. See C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72, at 152 (2d ed. 1972)
(describing husband/wife, attorney/client, and physician/patient privileges).
75. See id at §§ 83, 93, 103.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. 131-170 states in part: "[N]o person who was in attendance at a meet-
ing of the committee shall be required to testify in any civil action as to any evidence or other
matters produced or presented during the proceedings of the committee or its members"(emphasis
added). By negative implication it may be assumed that such a person may testify about these
matters if they desire. The court in Cameron held that certain staff meeting minutes were properly
admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule because they were authenticated
by someone who was a witness to those meetings. 58 N.C. App. at 436, 293 S.E.2d at 914.
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relevant internal communications, the legislature left open the possibility that
a plaintiff could have access to review committee proceedings if he could get a
participant in those proceedings to testify as to matters within his personal
knowledge. Given the dynamics of the peer review system, however, one may
question whether the legislature (and the court of appeals) has afforded suffi-
cient consideration to the interest of the injured outsider.
D. Destruction of Evidence
Whenever law enforcement officers lose or destroy evidence, the possibil-
ity of a deprivation of discovery and due process rights as well as the right of
confrontation arises. In State v. Anderson77 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals considered all three possibilities to determine whether the partial de-
struction of a large crop of marijuana violated the rights of defendants who
had allegedly grown it. Law enforcement officers had discovered the growing
marijuana, and had cut, stacked, and weighed it.78 Because of a lack of storage
facilities, the officers photographed the stacks of marijuana, took three or four
pounds of random samples from the plants for S.B.I. analysis, and burned the
remainder.79
Defendants first claimed violation of their discovery rights under G.S.
15A-903(e).80 Under that statute, the court must order the prosecutor to per-
mit the defendant "to examine, and test. . . any physical evidence, or a sam-
ple of it, available to the prosecutor if the State intends to offer the evidence
... -)81 In dismissing this claim since defendants did in fact have a sample,
the court emphasized that the statute did not require the preservation of all
physical evidence.82 Second, defendants claimed that the destruction of evi-
dence denied them their rights of confrontation under article 1, section 23 of
the North Carolina Constitution.8 3 Again, the court denied this claim, ex-
plaining that the provision guaranteed defendants in criminal trials only the
right to confront opposing witnesses and their accusers with other testimony.84
Finally, the court examined the alleged infringement of due process rights
under the state and federal constitutions. The court implied that when evi-
dence has been destroyed, it would reverse defendants' conviction only if (1)
the government had acted in bad faith or (2) defendants were prejudiced by
77. 57 N.C. App. 602, 292 S.E.2d 163 (1982).
78. Weight of the seized marijuana was one of the essential elements of the crime charged.
The indictment alleged that the weight of the marijuana exceeded 2,000 pounds in violation of
G.S. 90-95(h)(I)(c). The weight element upon a charge of trafficking in marijuana becomes more
critical if the state's evidence of the weight approaches the minimum weight charged. 57 N.C.
App. at 602-03, 292 S.E.2d at 163.
79. 57 N.C. App. at 603, 292 S.E.2d at 167.
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. 15A-903(e) (1978).
81. Id
82. 57 N.C. App. 609, 292 S.E.2d at 167. (emphasis added)
83. N.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 23 provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, every person
charged with crime has the right to be informed of the accusation and to confront the accuser and
witnesses with other testimony ... "
84. 57 N.C. App. 610, 292 S.E.2d at 168.
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the loss of evidence.85 The court easily determined that the officers had acted
in good faith, but it found the question whether defendants were prejudiced by
the loss of evidence more difficult to decide. With no North Carolina cases on
point, the court considered cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.86 In similar cases involving partial destruction of seized mari-
juana, the Ninth Circuit held that the destruction did not violate due process
rights when random samples of the evidence were preserved.87 Thus, defend-
ants' opportunity to test independently the random samples of physical evi-
dence was apparently determinative in the court's failure to find a due process
violation inAnderson. As long as the samples were retained, defendants could
establish whether the evidence was in fact marijuana and determine the ap-
proximate gross weight of all the evidence before it was destroyed.88
The court's emphasis in Anderson upon the ability to test evidence inde-
pendently contrasts markedly with another destruction of evidence case, State
v. Hudson.89 The Hudson court refused to find a constitutional violation of
defendant's rights when the police inadvertently destroyed evidence, thereby
preventing an independent analysis by defendant. In this case police found
blood-stained paper towels on top of a knife handle at the scene of a murder.
A laboratory analysis showed the blood stains had an enzyme component
matching that found in defendant's blood. When defendant was arrested, he
had a cut on each hand, and items found in his room had blood spots com-
posed of a similar enzyme.90 Although defense counsel was probably aware in
December that the police had the paper towels, it did not request them until
mid-June. After obtaining an order to conduct an independent analysis of the
bloodstains, defense counsel learned that the police had inadvertently de-
stroyed the paper towels a few days previously.91
To decide whether defendant's rights had been violated, the court applied
the same two-pronged test articulated in Anderson. It concluded that the po-
lice had acted in good faith and that defendant was not prejudiced by the
destruction of evidence.92 The court noted that defendant would have a full
opportunity to cross-examine any expert witness called by the State and to
challenge the admissibility of the evidence on other grounds. 93 Perhaps a
85. Id
86. Id
87. See United States v. Benedict, 647 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 648 (1981);
United States v. Young, 535 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976); United States v.
Hediden, 508 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1974).
88. See supra note 78. Defendants contended that the stalks of the marijuana plants (which
do not qualify as "marijuana") were mature. If this contention were true, the weight of the mature
stalks could possibly reduce the total weight of the "marijuana" below 2000 pounds. The court
held that defendants bore the burden of showing that the stalks were mature or that any part of
the material seized did not qualify as "marijuana" as defined by G.S. 90-87(16).. 57 N.C. App. at
608, 292 S.E.2d at 167.
89. 56 N.C. App. 172, 288 S.E.2d 383 (1982).
90. Id at 175-76, 288 S.E.2d 384-85.
91. Id at 176-77, 288 S.E.2d at 385.
92. Id at 177, 288 S.E.2d at 386.
93. Id at 177-78, 288 S.E.2d at 386.
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more persuasive factor in the court's conclusion, however, was defense coun-
sel's delay in requesting the paper towels. The court apparently reasoned that
defendant was not prejudiced by the destruction because if he had acted "in a
timely fashion he could have had the independent analysis." 94
The rationale underlying the Anderson decision was the defendants' abil-
ity, if not right, to test the marijuana sample independently. Arguably, the
defendant in Hudson should have had the same right. Although unlikely, in-
dependent analysis of the blood-stained towels may have indicated a blood
type of neither defendant nor victim, which would have suggested someone
else committed the crime. Fundamental fairness would seem to require that a
criminal on trial for his life be given the right to have an expert of his choosing
examine a piece of critical evidence, the nature of which is subject to varying
expert opinion.95 This conclusion is logical since the only means by which a
defendant can defend himself against expert testimony by the State is to pres-
ent expert testimony of his own.96 The Anderson decision implicitly recog-
nized this fact, but the Hudson case expressly denied it. A clear statement
upon the issue by the North Carolina courts is badly needed.
Further, in cases similar to Anderson, in which evidence is destroyed pur-
posefully, procedural safeguards should be followed. Destruction of evidence
should occur only after law enforcement officers have petitioned and received
an order emcompassing the particular items. In addition, the defendant
should be given notice and an opportunity to petition for access to evidence
that has been seized. Since even partial destruction of evidence can be judged
prejudicial and lead to reversal, these measures would ultimately aid law en-
forcement officers and protect defendants.
E. Rape Victim Shield Statute
North Carolina's Rape Victim Shield Statute, G.S. 8-58.697 is "nothing
more. . . than a codification of this jurisdiction's rule of relevance as that rule
applies to the past sexual behavior of rape victims."98 Enacted in 1977, the
statute declares that the "sexual activity99 of the complainant other than the
sexual act which is at issue in the indictment on trial"100 is irrelevant. In order
94. Id
95. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized this right. See White v. Maggio, 556
F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1977); Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975).
96. See State v. Barnard, 287 So. 2d 770, 776 (La. 1973) (Barhana, J., dissenting).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (1981). See Survey ofDevelopments in Norh Carolina Law-
Evidence, 56 N.C.L. REv. 1069 (1978).
98. State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 37, 269 S.E.2d 110, 113 (1980). Prior to the enactment of
this statute, the prosecuting witness' general reputation for unchastity was admissible during a
rape trial for the purpose of attacking her credibility and showing her proneness to consent to
sexual acts. Testimony of specific acts of unchastity with someone other than defendant, however,
was deemed incompetent. State v. Banks, 295 N.C. 399, 245 S.E.2d 743 (1978).
99. In State v. Bridwell, 56 N.C. App. 572, 289 S.E.2d 842 (1982), the court ruled that evi-
dence of the use of contraceptive pills at the time of the alleged rape was evidence of "sexual
activity" within the meaning of G.S. 8-56.8 and was therefore excluded by the statute.
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (1981).
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to protect the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses,10
however, the statute provides four exceptions. Inquiry into a victim's sexual
history is allowed if that evidence tends to show that (1) the victim and her
assailant had sexual relations prior to the alleged rape; (2) the acts charged
may not have been committed by the defendant; (3) the sexual history tends to
prove a pattern of sexual behavior from which consent may be inferred in the
present case; or (4) it appears that the victim fantasized the alleged rape.10 2
The obvious effect of the statute is to bar much of the evidence of the
complainant's prior conduct that previously had been admissible. 10 3 Al-
though evidence of the complainant's reputation for general moral character
apparently continues to be admissible,1° 4 the statute bars "volunteering" of
testimony by a witness about any aspect of the complainant's sexual behav-
ior.10 5 Until recently, however, the statute's effect upon the admissibility of
evidence of sexual activity submitted for impeachment purposes was less
certain.
The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the impeachment issue in
State v. Younger.1° 6 The complainant in Younger told the examining physi-
cian that she was sexually active with a boyfriend and had last had sex one
month prior to the alleged rape. She later testified at trial, however, that she
had sex on the night of the alleged rape with defendant's roommate. Although
defendant contended that he should be allowed to challenge the complainant's
credibility based upon those two inconsistent statements, the trial judge for-
bade cross-examination of the witness about her statement to the physician.
The judge concluded that defendant's question amounted to nothing less than
evidence of complainant's sexual behavior, making it irrelevant to any issue in
the case, according to G.S. 8-58.6.107
101. The defendant in State v. Bridwell challenged the constitutionality of the rape victim
shield statute. 56 N.C. App. at 572, 289 S.E.2d at 842 (1982). The appellate court easily disposed of
the constitutional argument on the authority of State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 269 S.E.2d 110
(1980). In that case the court held that the statute did not deny the defendant his sixth amendment
right to confront a witness. The court upheld the statute, stating: (1) that "there [was] no constitu-
tional right to ask a witness questions that are irrelevant;" (2) that the statute was "primarily
procedural and does not alter any of the defendant's substantive rights;" and (3) that the statute
was supported by "valid policy reasons, aside from relevence questions. ... Id.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(b) (1981). In addition, the proponent must secure a ruling
before asking any question in the presence of the jury. To determine the relevancy of such evi-
dence, the court is to conduct an in camera hearing, with counsel for the complainant present. In
the hearing, the proponent of the evidence must establish the basis of admissibility, and if the
court finds it admissible, the court must specify the question permissible. The hearing record is
open to all parties, the complainant, and their attorneys. Id. § 8-56.6 (c) and (d).
103. H. BRANDIS, supra note 1, § 105, at 391. See, e.g., State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 269
S.E.2d 110 (1980) (upholding exclusion of evidence of three different semen stains found on com-
plainant's clothing); State v. Smith, 45 N.C. App. 501, 263 S.E.2d 371, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C.
104, 273 S.E.2d 309 (1980) (statute barred evidence of sexual activity between complainant and
others and of discussion between complainant and defendant of sexual problems of complainant
and defendant's brother). See also State v. Joyner, 301 N.C. 18, 269 S.E.2d 125 (1980); State v.
McLendon, 49 N.C. App. 459, 271 S.E.2d 552 (1980).
104. H. BRANDIS, supra note 1, § 105, at 392.
105. Id
106. 306 N.C. 692, 295 S.E.2d 453 (1982).
107. Id at 695, 295 S.E.2d at 455.
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Reversing this decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
trial judge had miscontrued the scope of the statute by "treating it as the sole
gauge for determining whether evidence is admissible."108 The court noted
that "inconsistent statements are. . . an issue common to all trials," and that
the statute "was not intended to act as a barricade against evidence which is
used to prove issues common to all trials."1 9 The court explained that de-
fendant was not attempting to impeach the credibility of the witness by re-
vealing acts of prior sexual conduct; rather, he was challenging her credibility
through her own prior inconsistent statements.110 As a result, "the fact that
this question includes a reference to previous sexual behavior does not prevent
its admission into evidence, instead the sexual conduct reference goes to the
degree of prejudice which must be balanced against the question's probative
value." 11
Apparently the court in Younger reached its conclusion by interpreting
the meaning of "sexual behavior" as it is stated in G.S. 8-58.6. Statements that
refer to past sexual activity of a complainant are not in themselves identified
as evidence of "sexual behavior," and therefore are admissible. This reasoning
is consistent with the logic in State v. Baron,11 2 in which the court of appeals
concluded that evidence of complainant's falsely accusing others of improper
sexual advances on previous occasions was not rendered inadmissible by the
rape victim shield statute. In Baron the trial court interpreted "sexual behav-
ior" to include these prior statements. 13 It consequently determined that evi-
dence sought to be elicited should have been excluded "in the absence of
'expert psychological or psychiatric opinion that the complainant fantasized or
invented the act or acts charged.' 114 The appellate court held that %while the
prior statements may have referred to sexual activities, they were not "sexual
behavior or activity" as contemplated by the legislature when it enacted G.S.
3-58.6.115
Younger and Baron both clarify the extent to which evidence of prior
sexual conduct may be admitted for impeachment purposes. Prior to these
decisions, such evidence seemed admissible only if it impeached the complain-
ant's testimony regarding her consent. 1 6 Such evidence, even though techni-
cally limited to statements about prior sexual activity, now appears admissible
in order to attack the general credibility of the prosecuting witness. Due to
their extremely prejudicial nature, however, the probative value of such state-
ments should be carefully weighed before they are admitted. Arguably, the
court in Younger failed to evaluate adequately both the prejudicial and collat-
108. Id at 698, 295 S.E.2d at 456.
109. Id
110. Id at 698, 295 S.E.2d at 457.
111. Id
112. 58 N.C. App. 150, 292 S.E.2d 741 (1982).
113. Id at 154, 292 S.E.2d at 743.
114. Id (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §8-58.6(b)(4) (1981)).
115. Id
116. H. BAlNDIs, supra note 1, § 105, at 390.
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eral nature of the prosecuting witness' statements. Thus, while the Younger
court correctly decided that, as a general rule, statements of prior sexual activ-
ity may be admissible for impeachment purposes, it probably should not have
admitted such evidence in that particular instance.
F. Deadman's Statute
G.S. 8-51,117 the so-called "Deadman's Act,"1 18 prohibits a party or inter-
ested person from testifying in his own interest against the personal represen-
tative of a deceased about a personal transaction or communication between
the witness and the deceased. 19 An opposing party may "open the door" to
such testimony, however, either by testifying himself or by introducing the
testimony of the deceased.' 20
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish 121 the North Carolina Supreme
Court rejected the argument that any testimony by a personal representative
about a transaction between the deceased and a party opens the door to all
testimony by that party about the transaction.' 22 Defendant in Wachovia had
signed a lease with the decedent which provided that defendant could renew
the lease by giving the decedent written notice. Defendant maintained that the
decedent had allowed him to renew the lease on two occasions after giving
only oral notice. When the decedent's executors refused to allow defendant to
renew the lease for a third time because he gave them only oral notice, defend-
ant claimed that decedent's acceptance of oral notice operated as a waiver of
the requirement for written notice that was binding on his executors. The par-
ties had stipulated that the decedent had received "notice" on prior occasions,
but did not specify whether that notice was oral or written. While the trial
court viewed the executors' stipulation as "testimony," and allowed defendant
to testify that he had given oral notice, it restricted his testimony to matters
related to the ambiguity in the stipulation. The Supreme Court upheld the
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1981):
Upon the trial of an action, or the hearing upon the merits of a special proceeding, a party or
a person interested in the event, or a person from, through or under whom such a party or inter-
ested person derives his interest or title by assignment or otherwise, shall not be examined as a
witness in his own behalf or interest, against the executor, administrator or survivor of a deceased
person, or the committee of a lunatic, or a person deriving his title or interest from, through or
under a deceased person or lunatic, by assignment or otherwise, concerning a personal transaction
or communication between the witness and the deceased person or lunatic; except where the exec-
utor, administrator, survivor, committee or person so derivingtitle or interest is examined in his
own behalf, or the testimony of the lunatic or deceased person is given in evidence concerning the
same transaction or communication. Nothing in this section shall preclude testimony as to the
identity of the operator of a motor vehicle in any case.
118. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417, 431, 293 S.E.2d 749, 758
(1982).
119. Davis v. Flynn, 57 N.C. App. 575, 576-77, 291 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1982); Etheridge v. Ether-
idge, 41 N.C App. 39, 41, 255 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1979). The statute also applies to transactions
between the witness and a lunatic, and the disqualification extends to persons who are successors
in interest to a party or interested person. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1981).
120. See H. BRANDIS, supra note 1, §75, at 280. The "testimony" of a deceased person that
will open the door for the other party includes his deposition or his testimony at a former trial. Id
121. 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749 (1982).
122. Id at 432, 293 S.E.2d at 758-59.
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trial court's determination that G.S. 8-51 disqualified defendant from testify-
ing that the decedent had told him that written notice was not necessary. 123
One justification advanced for the Deadman's Act is that it operates as a
"shield" to protect a dead or insane person's estate against fraudulent and
unfounded claims.124 A corollary to this view is that the Act is not meant to
operate as a "sword" with which the estate might attack the surviving party.' 25
These propositions were correctly distinguished and properly applied by the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Burns v. McElroy.126
In Burns plaintiff claimed that the decedent's estate owed him $9000 for
personal services performed for the decedent. The decedent's executor denied
the claim, and counterclaimed to recover a check for $4500; the executor
claimed plaintiff had wrongfully retained the check after receiving it from the
decedent for safekeeping. The executor admitted in his answer that the check
had been delivered to plaintiff. The trial court refused to allow the plaintiff to
testify about transactions between the decedent and himself,127 and directed a
verdict for the executor on the counterclaim. 128
The court of appeals first considered the Act as it applied to plaintifi's
claim against the estate. In holding that the executor's admission that the
check had been delivered did not open the door for plaintifi's testimony that
the check was in partial payment for his services, the court noted that the
executor was not using the Act as a sword to silence the plaintiff.129 Rather,
the Act was operating to shield the estate from the testimony of a surviving
party claiming against it.
Turning to the Act's effect upon the counterclaim for recovery of the
check, the court held that because the executor had the burden of showing that
plaintiffs possession of the check was wrongful, the trial court had erred in
directing a verdict for the executor.130 The court recognized that it would be
unfair to allow the Act to be used as a sword to silence plaintiff when the
executor was trying to take something from him.131
The Deadman's Act did not bar testimony in another 1982 case, although
the facts were somewhat similar to Burns. In Davis v. 1rynn 132 a husband and
wife claimed they were entitled to collect from the decedent's estate for per-
123. Id
124. Carswell v. Greene, 253 N.C. 266, 270, 116 S.E.2d 801, 804 (1960); H. BRANDIS, supra
note 1, § 66, at 258-59 n.62.
125. Carswell v. Greene, 253 N.C. at 266, 116 S.E.2d at 804.
126. 57 N.C. App. 299, 291 S.E.2d 278 (1982).
127. Id at 301, 291 S.E.2d at 280.
128. Id at 302, 291 S.E.2d at 280.
129. Id at 303, 291 S.E.2d at 281. The court also noted that (1) the admission in the executor's
answer was not "testimony"; (2) because the admission supported plaintiffs claim that he was at
some point in rightful possession of the check, it was not made on the executor's "own behalf';
and (3) the admission was forced by the requirement that the executor fie an answer;, tradition-
ally, testimony by the personal representative had to be voluntary to open the door to a plaintiffs
testimony. Id at 303, 291 S.E.2d at 281.
130. Id at 304, 291 S.E.2d at 282.
131. Id at 304, 291 S.E.2d at 281.
132. 57 N.C. App. 575, 291 S.E.2d 818 (1982).
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sonal services each had provided to the decedent. Although the case raised the
same concerns about fraudulent or unfounded claims as did Burns,133 the
court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision allowing both the husband
and wife to testify.' 34 The husband testified about transactions between his
wife and the decedent; the wife testified about transactions between her hus-
band and the decedent. The court held that nothing in the statute prohibited
such testimony: neither the husband nor his wife had testified to any personal
transactions that he or she had had with the decedent. 135 If one were to glean
any moral from reading Burns and Davis together, it might be this: If you are
going to work for someone and expect to be paid after his death, bring your
spouse along to help.
Such problems have not gone unnoticed. For over fifty years, North Car-
olina scholars have sought the abolition of the Deadman's Act. 136 Dean
Brandis has stated, "[T]he statute has fostered more injustice than it has pre-
vented and has led to an unholy waste of the time and ingenuity ofjudges and
counsel. This situation calls for more than legislative tinkering. What is
needed is repeal of the statute."' 137 Repeal of the statute may be in the offing.
The Legislative Research Commission has recommended that if Rule 601 of
the proposed North Carolina Evidence Code is adopted, the "Deadman's Act"
should be repealed.' 3
8
G. Methods of Proof
1. Polygraphst
North Carolina courts have consistently held that results of polygraph
examinations either for 139 or against"4° a party are inadmissible. Inherent in
the courts' reasoning is the belief that there is no "general scientific recognition
133. 57 N.C. App. 299, 291 S.E.2d 278.
134. 57 N.C. App. at 579, 291 S.E.2d at 820.
135. Id at 579, 291 S.E.2d at 820.
136. See H. BRANDIS, supra note 1, § 66, at 258-59 n.62; Blakey, Moving Towards An Evidence
Law Of GeeralPrinciples: Several Suggestions ConcerningAn Evidence Code For North Carolina,
13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1 (1981); Proposals For Legislation In North Carolina, 11 N.C.L. Rav. 51, 61-
63 (1932).
137. H. BRANDIS, supra note 1, § 66, at 259 n.62.
138. See LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH Comm., REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA GEN. ASSEM-
BLY OF 1983 ON THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE, at 49 (1983). Proposed N.C.R. EVID. 601 would
provide:
(a) General Rule. Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise pro-
vided in these rules.
(b) Disqualification of Witness. A person is disqualified to testify as a witness when the
court determines that he is (1) incapable of expressing himself concerning the matter as
to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand
him, or (2) incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.
t Editor's Note: State v. Meadows, 306 N.C. 683, 295 S.E.2d 394 (1982), discussed infra
notes 145-151 and accompanying text, has been expressly overruled in State v. Grier, 307 N.C.
628, 645, 300 S.E.2d 351, 361 (1983) (polygraph results never admissible; no exceptions).
139. See, ag., State v. Sauls, 291 N.C. 253, 230 S.E.2d 390 (1976), cert. denied, (defendant not
entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered polygraph test, since such tests are inadmissi-
ble) 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
140. See, ag., State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jackson, 287
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of the efficacy of such tests." 141 In addition, courts have refused to admit such
evidence because it distracts the jury from the real issues before it and permits
the defendant to have extrajudicial tests made without having to submit to a
similar test by the prosecution.142 Despite these criticisms, some courts have
allowed one exception to the general rule of inadmissibility: when a defendant
voluntarily and knowingly enters into a valid stipulation concerning the ad-
missibility of a lie detector test, the trial court has discretion to admit the re-
sults into evidence if the court finds that the examiner's qualifications and the
conditions of test administration are acceptable.' 43
Adopting a standard established in other jurisdictions, 144 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in State v. Meadows145 held that the parties involved must
strictly comply with the provisions of the stipulation governing the admissibil-
ity of lie detector tests. In Meadows the State and defendant stipulated that
defendant would submit to a polygraph examination and that the results
would be admitted into evidence provided a number of conditions were met.
One of the conditions was that the prosecuting witness would also "submit
herself to a similar polygraph examination under the same terms, conditions
and stipulations governing the defendant's examination" 146 and that her re-
sults would also be allowed into evidence. The stipulation further provided
that the polygraph procedures, the wording of the test questions, and the ex-
amination conditions would be at the polygraphist's sole discretion. After test-
ing the prosecuting witness, however, the polygraphist declared the results
inconclusive because of an emotional upset caused by an encounter with de-
fendant immediately before testing. The examiner therefore repeated the test,
whereupon the witness "passed" the polygraph.' 47
N.C. 470, 215 S.E.2d 123 (1975); State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961); State v.
Fowler, 29 N.C. App. 529, 225 S.E.2d 110 (1976).
141. State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 708, 120 S.E.2d 169, 172 (1961).
142. Id The court in Foye also noted that the results have been held inadmissible be6ause
"the lie detecting machine could not be cross-examined." Id
143. State v. Steele, 27 N.C. App. 496, 500, 219 S.E.2d 540, (1975). Specifically, the court held
that lie detector tests were admissible subject to the following qualifications: (1) that the county
attorney, defendant and his counsel all sign a written stipulation providing for defendant's sub-
mission to the test and for the subsequent admission at trial of the graphs and the examiner's
opinion thereon on behalf of either defendant or the State. (2) that notwithstanding the stipulation
the admissibility of the test results is subject to the discretion of the trial judge, i.e. if the tnal judge
is not convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test was conducted under proper condi-
tions he may refuse to accept such evidence. (3) that opposing party should have the right to cross-
examine the examiner respecting his qualifications, training, and conditions under which the test
was taken, possibilities of error, and any other matter deemed pertinent, subject to the trialjudge's
discretion. (4) that the judge should instruct the jury that the evidence only indicates that at the
time of the examination the defendant was not telling the truth. Id See also State v. Williams, 35
N.C. App. 216,214 S.E.2d 156 (1978). The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, did not hold
polygraph examinations admissible under these specific qualifications until State v. Milano, 297
N.C. 485, 256 S.E.2d 154 (1976).
144. The court recognized Chambers v. State, 146 Ga. App. 126, 245 S.E.2d 467 (1978), Butler
v. Florida, 228 S.E.2d 421 (Fla. Dist. App. 1969), and People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235
N.W.2d 581 (1975).
145. 306 N.C. 683, 295 S.E.2d 394 (1982).
146. Id at 685, 295 S.E.2d at 395.
147. Id
1144 [Vol. 61
The court held that in giving her the second examination, the
polygraphist violated the provision of the stipulation that required that both
defendant and prosecuting witness take a "similar polygraph examination
under the same terms [and] conditions."' 148 Strictly construing the terms, the
court concluded that the stipulation requiring "similar tests," and "same con-
ditions" meant that if one party was given two completed tests for whatever
reason, the other party had to be given two tests at approximately the same
time and place in the same manner by the same operator. Further, the stipula-
tion granting the polygraphist sole discretion with regard to the manner in
which the tests be conducted did not override the stipulation that the tests be
"similar" and "under the same terms [and] conditions."' 149
Although North Carolina courts have never before expressly required a
strict compliance standard, they have indicated that such stipulations would be
construed narrowly. Most notably, in State v. Milano 150 the supreme court
held that polygraph results unfavorable to defendant but acquired pursuant to
stipulation of admissibility could be admitted against defendant. Defendant
was not entitled to enter into evidence the favorable results of a psychological
stress evaluation, a test also designed to indicate the presence or absence of
deception, however, because the stipulation did not by its terms cover the lat-
ter test.151 The implied requirement of strict compliance in Milano followed
by the similarly expressed requirement in Meadows obviously indicates the
court's desire to protect fully the interests of the stipulating parties. More im-
portantly, though, the standard suggests the court's continuing skepticism of
the trustworthiness of polygraph tests and consequent reluctance to find such
evidence admissible.
2. Handwriting Comparison
Since the 1908 decision of Martin v. Knight 152 North Carolina courts have
allowed an opinion witness in cases involving handwriting comparisons to
show both the disputed and genuine writings to the jury and explain the rea-
sons for his opinion. 153 In Martin the court made it clear that even after com-
parison testimony was admitted, the jury would not be permitted to make its
own comparison of the documents in the jury room;154 the jury was to rely
solely on what it heard and saw while the opinion witness testified. In 1913,
however, the North Carolina legislature followed the Martin court's sugges-
148. Id at 687, 295 S.E.2d at 397.
149. Id
150. 297 N.C. 485, 256 S.E.2d 154 (1979).
151. Id at 500, 256 S.E.2d at 162-63.
152. 147 N.C. 564, 61 S.E. 447 (1908). Prior to Martin, when the authenticity of a document
was challenged the jury could not examine the documents either during or after the witness' testi-
mony. See, e.g., Fuller v. Fox, 101 N.C. 119, 7 S.E. 589 (1888); Outlaw v. Hurdle, 46 N.C. (1
Jones) 150, 165 (1853) ("A jury is to hear the evidence but not see it.").
153. 147 N.C. at 577-78, 61 S.E. at 452.
154. Id at 579-80, 61 S.E. at 452. See Nicholson v. Lumber Co., 156 N.C. 59, 72 S.E. 86
(1906); Boyd v. Leatherwood, 165 N.C. 614, 81 S.E. 1025 (1914).
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tion and enacted G.S. 8-40155 which allowed juries to compare documents for
themselves. While it represented a definite step forward, the wording of the
statute left unclear whether juries still had to hear opinion testimony before
making a handwriting comparison. In State v. LeDuc 156 the supreme court
finally addressed the question, and held that the statute does not prohibit
handwriting comparisons by the jury without the aid of lay or expert opinion.
In reaching its decision, the court reversed not only the lower court opinion in
LeDuc,157 but also an earlier court of appeals case158 that had stated: "neither
G.S. 8-40, nor our rules of evidence, permits the jury, unaided by competent
opinion testimony to compare writings to determine genuineness."' 59 The
supreme court noted that "the statute does not mandate that writings be sub-
mitted only with evidence of witnesses; it merely states that writings and testi-
mony may be submitted to the trier of fact as evidence of the authenticity of a
contested document."160
In view of the changing character of the average juror, the LeDuc deci-
sion was long overdue. The common law rule prohibiting jury comparison of
handwriting without opinion testimony was a direct result of a period in which
many jurors had little or no education. Certainly, increased education and
common exposure has improved the ability of today's juror to make such com-
parisons. As the court noted, with the widespread use of credit cards and trav-
elers' checks, merchants and others in the field of commerce are frequently
confronted with the necessity of comparing signatures. 161 In addition, the de-
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-40 (1981) states:
[I]n all trials in this State, when it may otherwise be competent and relevant to
compare handwritings, a comparison of a disputed handwriting with any writing proved
to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnesses,
and such writings and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to
the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute.
North Carolina courts have interpreted this statute on several occasions. In Fourth Nat'1
Bank v. McArthur, 168 N.C. 48, 84 S.E. 39 (1915), the new statute was held to allow a party to
hand the jury the disputed document. The statute thus permitted independent examination, while
the previous rule only allowed a witness to show the documents to the jury as he explained his
testimony.
In Newton v. Newton, 182 N.C. 54, 108 S.E. 336 (1921), the court held that the statute
changed the common law rule regarding permissible standards of comparison. The court con-
cluded that under G.S. 8-40 testimony could be used to persuade the judge that "there isprima
facie evidence.., of the genuineness of writing admitted as a basis of comparison, and then the
testimony of the witnesses and the writings... themselves are submitted to the jury." Id at 55,
108 S.E. at 336.
The court in Gooding v. Pope, 194 N.C. 403, 140 S.E. 21 (1927), refused to interpret the
statute restrictively, thereby allowing the jury to examine with a magnifying glass the handwriting
on a contested receipt and on paper with genuine signatures.
156. 306 N.C. 62, 291 S.E.2d 607 (1982).
157. 48 N.C. App. 227, 269 S.E.2d 220 (1980).
158. State v. Simmons, 8 N.C. App. 561, 174 S.E.2d 627 (1970).
159. Id at 563, 174 S.E.2d at 629.
160. 306 N.C. at 72, 291 S.E.2d at 613. To establish the new rule, the court also had to address
common law rules of evidence that prohibited jury comparison of handwritings without aid of
testimony. Rather than trying to distinguish past case law, the court simply explained that it
possessed "the authority to alter judicially created common law when it deems it necessary in light
of experience and reason.' Id at 73, 291 S.E.2d at 614 (quoting State v. Freeman, 392 N.C. 591,
594, 276 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1981)).
161. 306 N.C. at 73, 291 S.E.2d at 614.
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cision reflects a natural (albeit slow) progression in the development of law
governing handwriting comparisons. By enacting G.S. 8-40, the legislature
took the first step in giving juries greater responsibility. Given the courts'
growing confidence in the abilities of modem jurors, it was inevitable that the
North Carolina courts would eventually vest juries with the power to compare
handwriting samples without the aid of expert or lay opinion. The growing
tendency in other jurisdictions to allow juries to make such comparisons un-
aided by opinion testimony also encouraged the North Carolina courts to
change prior common law.162
3. Fingerprints
When the State relies upon fingerprints found at the scene of a crime,
there must be substantial evidence of circumstances from which the jury could
find that the fingerprints could have been impressed only at the time the crime
was committed. 163 If the State cannot present such evidence, it cannot with-
stand a motion to dismiss.' 64 The court determines what evidence is substan-
tial, 165 and the form of the evidence is immaterial. Acceptable evidence has
included denials by the defendant that he has ever been on the premises, 166
voice identification by the victim,167 and fruits' 68 or instrumentalities169 of the
crime found in the defendant's possession. In State v. Berry170 the North Car-
olina Court of Appeals considered whether testimony from the prosecuting
witness that she did not know the defendant and had given no one permission
to enter her house while she was away was sufficient to convict the defendant
of breaking and entering.
In Berry the prosecuting witness testified that she had left her house for
several hours and upon her return found the doors open and the window
panes broken. A police officer found one identifiable latent print that he testi-
fied belonged to defendant. The court concluded that the fingerprint, when
considered with the victim's testimony, was sufficient evidence to convict de-
fendant: the victim's testimony was substantial evidence of the circumstances
from which the jury could find that the fingerprint could have been impressed
only at the time of the crime. 171
In addition to her statements that she did not know defendant and that he
162. See, ag., Parker v. State, 12 Md. App. 611, 280 A.2d 29 (1971); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 24
Wash. 2d 701, 166 P.2d 938 (1946); FED. R. EviD. 901(b)(3), CAL. EviD. CODE § 1417 (West 1966).
But see Clark v. State, 114 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1959).
163. State v. Scott, 296 N.C. 519, 251 S.E.2d 414 (1979); State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231
S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. Miller, 289 N.C. 1, 220 S.E.2d 572 (1975); State v. Jackson, 284 N.C.
321, 200 S.E.2d 626 (1973).
164. State v. Miller, 289 N.C. 1, 4, 220 S.E.2d 572 (1975).
165. State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 93 S.E.2d 431 (1956).
166. State v. Miller, 289 N.C. 1, 220 S.E.2d 572 (1975); State v. Foster, 282 N.C. 189, 192
S.E.2d 320 (1972).
167. State v. Jackson, 284 N.C. 321, 200 S.E.2d 626 (1973).
168. State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977).
169. State v. Huffman, 209 N.C. 10, 182 S.E. 705 (1935).
170. 58 N.C. App. 355, 293 S.E.2d 650 (1982).
171. Id at 357, 293 S.E.2d at 652.
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had no permission to enter her house, the prosecuting witness also stated that
her children occasionally came home when she was not present. 172 This fact
was crucial to Judge Whichard's dissenting opinion, which stressed that the
state's evidence did not exclude the possibility that defendant visited the house
at the behest of the victim's children.173 In considering this argument, the
court examined two apparently conflicting North Carolina Supreme Court
cases that concerned fingerprint evidence. In the first, State v. Scott, 17 4 the
victim's niece lived in the house with him but left each morning for the day.
Although she testified that to her knowledge defendant had never been in the
house, the court held that the evidence of circumstances was inadequate to
conclude that the prints could have been placed there only at the time of the
crime.175 In State v. Tew,176 on the other hand, the court reached the opposite
conclusion. The court in Tew based its decision on the grounds that the pro-
prietor of a service station testified that she personally attended the station and
that to her knowledge the defendant had never visited her station. 177
The dissent found Scott to be the controlling authority.1 78 Judge
Wichard argued that without evidence that the children had not granted de-
fendant access, the State could not substantially exclude the possibility that
defendant had visited the home with one of the children.179 Relying on Tew,
the majority found otherwise. At the heart of the majority decision was the
belief that
"when the sole occupant of a house has testified that he or she
does not know the defendant and to his or her knowledge the defend-
ant has never been in his or her home, the State [need not] put on
evidence from every person who might have brought a visitor to the
house that he or she has not invited the defendant to the house."'180
The conflict between the majority and dissent demonstrates the underly-
ing question presented in Berry: when defendant's fingerprints are the only
evidence linking defendant to the crime, must all who have access to the scene
of the crime testify about their aquaintance with defendant? The majority
appears to suggest that a rule requiring testimony from persons other than the
sole occupant would be too burdensome and would lead to abuse. Arguably,
the majority has created a rule that is procedurally easy to apply, but may
produce unjust results. If those who have access to a home are limited in
number, as was the case in Berry, hearing testimony from all who have access
could be easily required and possible injustice easily averted. Unfortunately,
the rule in Berry fails to recognize this alternative.
172. Id at 357, 293 S.E.2d at 651.
173. Id at 359, 293 S.E.2d at 653 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
174. 296 N.C. 519, 251 S.E.2d 414 (1979).
175. I. at 526, 251 S.E.2d at 419.
176. 234 N.C. 612, 68 S.E.2d 291 (1951).
177. Id at 617-18, 69 S.E.2d at 295.
178. 58 N.C. App. 355, 358, 293 S.E.2d 650, 652 (Whichard, J., dissenting).
179. Id at 359, 293 S.E.2d at 653.
180. Id at 357, 293 S.E.2d at 652.
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4. Scientific Proof
North Carolina courts generally find scientific methods of proof admissi-
ble when the accuracy and reliability of the process involved has been estab-
lished and recognized by either judicial notice or to the satisfaction of the
court through expert testimony.181 Following this rule, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1981 in State v. Temple18 2 held that a dentist's expert testi-
mony identifying bite marks on a murder victim's skin was admissible. The
expert in Temple formed his opinion on the basis of a comparison between
defendant's dental impressions from a plaster cast and the actual wound of the
victim.183 In State v. Greenis4 the North Carolina Supreme Court not only
reaffirmed this decision, but extended it to include a comparision between the
defendant's dental impression and a photograph of the victim's wound.' 85
Although the court had never addressed this specific issue, its decision to
admit such evidence for comparison was a logical and predictable result. In an
earlier decision, State v. Hunt, 8 6 the supreme court held "that a photograph
of a shoe sole impression, when shown by extrinsic evidence to represent, de-
pict or portray accurately the shoe sole print it purports to show, is admissible
as substantive evidence .,187 At the time, the decision created an exception to
the general rule in North Carolina that photographs are admissible only for
the limited purpose of illustrating a witness' testimony and not as substantive
evidence.18 8 In 1981, however, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted
G.S. 8-97,189 allowing the introduction of photographs as substantive evi-
dence. Given the Temple decision and the new statute, it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, for the court to justify a refusal to compare dental
impressions and a photograph of the wounds.
In addition, the court was probably persuaded to admit the evidence be-
cause this method of comparison' 90 has been gaining judicial acceptance in
181. See, eg., State v. Powell, 264 N.C. 73, 140 S.E.2d 705 (1965); H. 3RADIs, supra note 1,
at § 86.
182. 302 N.C. 1,273 S.E.2d 273 (1981). The Temple decision is significant because admissibil-
ity of evidence identifying the accused by his bite marks was first addressed in North Carolina in
that case.
183. The expert concluded that defendant's teeth caused the bite marks found on the victim's
body. 302 N.C. at 12, 273 S.E.2d at 280. On appeal, the supreme court rejected defendant's
argument that the testimony was inadmissible because it was based on unreliable mathematical
probability. The court relied upon the expert's years of practice and not upon mathematical
probabilities. Id.
184. 305 N.C. 463, 290 S.E.2d 625 (1982).
185. Defendant had requested that the court reconsider its holding in Temple or distinguish it
from the facts in Green.
186. 297 N.C. 447, 255 S.E.2d 182 (1979).
187. Id at 451, 255 S.E.2d at 185. In Hunt the prosecution introduced photographs of shoe
print impressions taken at the scene of the crime, and of impressions taken from shoes seized from
defendant's home. The photographs were compared by an expert witness who noted the similari-
ties between the two impressions.
188. See Honeycutt v. Cherokee Brick Co., 196 N.C. 566, 146 S.E. 227 (1929). For a discus-
sion on the early development of this rule in North Carolina, see Gardner, The Camera Goes to
Court, 24 N.C.L. REv. 233 (1946).
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-97 (1981).
190. There are varying methods used by experts for bite mark identification. Apparently, the
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other jurisdictions. Since the leading case of People v. Marx191 courts have
recognized that bite mark identification, whether it entails a comparison of the
defendant's dental impressions with photographs 192 or casts 193 of the wound,
is an applied scientific and professional technique. 194 After waiting so long to
recognize photographs as substantive evidence, it is encouraging to note the
North Carolina courts' ready acceptance of this new, but proven, scientific
method.
5. Tape Recordings
Tape recordings, if related to otherwise competent evidence, are admissi-
ble if a proper foundation is laid for their admission. 195 The North Carolina
Supreme Court enumerated the steps necessary for authentication of a tape
recorded confession in State v. Lynch. 196 In Lynch the court specifically ap-
plied the steps necessary to lay a proper foundation for admission of a defend-
ant's recorded confession or incriminating statements made to law
enforcement officers. Eight years later, in State v. Detter,197 it applied the
same steps to authenticate a recorded conversation between a defendant and
one who later became a witness for the State. In both instances, the Lynch
requirements were applied to tape recordings made by witnesses with the aid
or knowledge of law enforcement officers. In the recent case of State v.
Jarvis,198 however, the court of appeals concluded "that the requirements for
admitting into evidence tape recordings made by witnesses after police inter-
expert in Green used the Sorup method. The expert makes a dental cast, applying printers ink to
the incised surfaces and transferring the imprint onto transparent paper. This transparency is then
superimposed upon a life-size photograph of the bite mark for comparison.
Similar to the Sorup method, the Furness method compares an enlarged photograph of the
bite mark with a photograph of the front and top view of the casts of the defendant's dental
impressions. Presumably, North Carlina courts would recognize this method as well. For a brief
discussion on the different methods used for bite mark identification, see State v. Sager, 600
S.W.2d 541, 570 (Mo. App. 1980).
191. 54 Cal. App.3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975).
192. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 75 Cal. App. 3d 384, 142 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1977); State v. Sager
600 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1982); People v. Smith, 110 Misc. 2d
118, 443 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1981); State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979).
193. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975).
194. Id at 111-12, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
195. Levi v. Justice, 27 N.C. App. 511, 219 S.E.2d 518 (1975).
196. 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E.2d 561 (1971). According to Lynch, the trial court, upon objection to
the introduction of the recording, must conduct a voir dire to determine (1) that the recorded
testimony was legally obtained and otherwise competent; (2) that the mechanical device was capa-
ble of recording and that it was functioning properly at the time of the recording; (3) that the
operator was competent and operated the machine properly; (4) that the recorded voices can be
identified; (5) that the recording is accurate and authentic; (6) that the defendant's statement was
recorded and no changes, additions or deletions have been made; and (7) that there was a proper
custody and manner of preserving the recording since it was made. Id. at 17, 181 S.E.2d at 571.
See also State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979); State v. Harmon, 31 N.C. App. 368,
229 S.E.2d 233 (1976). The Lynch court further emphasized that a voir dire enables the trialjudpe
to determine whether the tapes are audible, intelligible, or fragmentary and whether they contain
improper or prejudicial matter. In addition, the voir dire provides counsel the opportunity to
object to portions of the tape that he believes to be incompetent. 279 N.C. at 17-18, 181 S.E.2d at
571.
197. 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979).
198. 56 N.C. App. 678, 290 S.E.2d 228 (1982).
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vention, should strictly apply to cases in which tape recordings are made by
victims of an alleged crime before the police have intervened." 199
After extensive voir dire, the trial court in Jarvis allowed the State to put
into evidence a tape recording allegedly made by the prosecuting witness
while defendant was forcing her to have sexual intercourse. On appeal, de-
fendant contended that the court erred in allowing the prosecuting witness to
testify that the recording accurately reproduced everything that happened and
that the recorder was capable of recording when she made the tape. Noting
that the Lynch decision required the trial court to establish these facts in order
to authenticate the tapes, the appellate court found that the prosecuting wit-
ness was the only person capable of producing evidence on these points. Thus,
calling the defendant's contention "patently absurd, ' '2°° the court upheld the
admission of the testimony of the prosecuting witness.
The court of appeals in State v. Shook 201 also applied the Lynch require-
ments to determine whether defendant was prejudiced by admission of a tape
recorded conversation between her and a vice squad detective. During exami-
nation, the detective revealed that large portions of the tapes were either inau-
dible or unintelligible. The trial court, after hearing one tape, asked him
whether the recording would be audible if a different type of listening device
were used. The appellate court concluded that the court's remark was prejudi-
cial since it may have given the impression that the court believed the tape to
be accurate. 202 Further, the court noted that since the publicity surrounding
the Watergate hearings and particularly the infamous "gap" in the Nixon
tapes, the public may be inclined to view such gaps or inaudible portions in a
taped conversation between an accused person and others as evidence that
incriminates the accused.203
Prior to Shook, a recording that was partially inaudible, or a recording
that did not include an entire conversation, was generally admissible unless
the unintelligible portions or admissions were so substantial as to render the
recording as a whole untrustworthy as evidence. 2°4 The Shook'decision, how-
ever, seems to alter this proposition drastically by implying that any gaps
make tape recordings automatically inadmissible by failing to meet the Lynch
requirements.
H. Opinion Testimony
Unlike most jurisdictions, North Carolina has maintained the rule that
prohibits opinion testimony on the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.205
199. Id. at 681-82, 290 S.E.2d at 231.
200. Id. at 682, 290 S.E.2d at 231.
201. 55 N.C. App. 364, 285 S.E.2d 328 (1982).
202. Id. at 367, 285 S.E.2d at 330.
203. Id.
204. For cases upholding this general rule, see Annot., 57 A.L.R.3D 746, 752 (1979).
205. See, e.g., Love v. Hall, 227 N.C. 541, 42 S.E.2d 670 (1947) (error to admit direct testi-
mony about amount of damages from breaking of contract); State v. Carr, 196 N.C. 129, 144 S.E.
698 (1928) (testimony of medical expert that he did not believe it possible for deceased to have
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The state courts have reasoned that such testimony would usurp or invade the
province of thejury.2°6 In recent years, however, commentators have attacked
the rule as irrational,207 since the jury is as free to reject opinion testimony as
any other testimony and usually resolves disputed questions of fact and opin-
ion.208 Perhaps because of this criticism, North Carolina courts have partially
circumscribed the traditional rules in this area.2°9 For example, an expert tes-
tifying without personal knowledge of the facts may now give more positive
opinion about causation than was previously allowed.210 In addition, admissi-
bility of expert opinion no longer depends strictly upon whether it invades the
jury's province; instead, it is evaluated primarily according to whether "the
witness because of his expertise is in a better position to have an opinion on
the subject than is the trier of fact."211
The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Hunt212 has indicated,
however, that these circumscriptions may not have gone far enough. The case
involved a homicide, and a doctor testified that the body of the deceased did
not bear the customary "hesitation marks" that he had personally observed in
his examination of persons who had attempted suicide by slashing their wrists.
Defendant appealed on the grounds that the expert witness had improperly
answered the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. Since the Hunt court
concluded that the doctor had not stated an opinion on the ultimate issue, it
had no reason to question the continuing validity of the ultimate issue rule.
Nevertheless, the court implied that, given the opportunity, it would overturn
the rule.
The growing acceptance of Federal Rule of Evidence 704 may be par-
fired gun that inflicted fatal wound invading the province of jury and therefore was reversible
error); State v. Meteaff, 18 N.C. App. 28, 195 S.E.2d 592 (1973) (error to admit expert testimony
that deceased could not have shot herself); Daly v. Weeks, 10 N.C. App. 116, 178 S.E.2d 30 (1970)
(expert witness may not give opinion about amount of damages for breach of contract since it is
ultimate issue to be determined by jury).
206. See, eg., State v. Fulton, 299 N.C 491, 263 S.E.2d 608 (1980) ("[olrdinarly, opinion
evidence of a non-expert witness is inadmissible because it tends to invade the province of the
jury."); State v. Summerlin, 232 N.C. 333, 60 S.E.2d 322 (1950); Marks v. Cotton Mills, 135 N.C.
287, 47 S.E. 432 (1904); State v. Williams, 34 N.C. App. 408, 238 S.E.2d 668 (excluding psychia-
trist's testimony about defendant's reliability as informant was proper since opinion invaded prov-
ince ofjury), rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 293 N.C. 743, 241 S.E.2d 72 (1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 906 (1978)
207. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1921, 1929 (J. Chadbourn 1978); C. McCoRMICK, LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 12 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); Blakey, Examination of Expert Witnesses in North
Carolina, 61 N.C.L. REV. 2, 4 (1982)
208. H. BRANDIS, supra note 1, § 126, at 479-80.
209. See ag., State v. Miller, 302 N.C. 572, 580, 276 S.E.2d 417, 422 (1981); State v. Powell,
238 N.C. 527, 530, 78 S.E.2d 248, 250-51 (1953).
210. See State v. Atkinson, 298 N.C. 673, 259 S.E.2d 858 (1979) (injuries and shock from
assault contributed to death by heart attack); State v. Dawson, 278 N.C. 351, 180 S.E.2d 140
(1971) (blow from blunt instrumentality caused skull fracture); Hollman v. Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240,
159 S.E.2d 874 (1968) (electric shock caused blurred vision); Lockwook v. McCaskill, 262 N.C.
663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964) (whether accident was contributing cause of amnesia and depression);
State v. Knight, 247 N.C. 754, 102 S.E.2d 259 (1958) (exertion, fear, and anger, rather than blows,
caused death).
211. See State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559,568-69,247 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1978). See also State v.
Brown, 300 N.C. 731, 268 S.E.2d 201 (1980); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 255 S.E.2d 373 (1979).
212. 305 N.C. 238, 287 S.E.2d 818 (1982).
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tially responsible for the court's position. That rule states that opinion testi-
mony otherwise admissible cannot be excluded because it embraces "an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."'2 13 The abolition of the ulti-
mate issue rule under rule 704, however, still does not admit all opinion testi-
mony. Opinion must be offered through either a lay person with personal
knowledge of the facts or through an expert with special qualifications, and it
must be helpful to the trier of fact.2 14 As the advisory committee for the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence noted, the provisions offer ample assurance against the
admission of opinion that would merely tell the jury which result to reach.2 15
A rule more related to the underlying evidentiary policy is certainly attractive.
The logical appeal of rule 704, coupled with the clear majority trend in its
direction, is substantial incentive to both court and legislature to modernize
this antiquated rule.
Z Introduction into Evidence
Although North Carolina courts often have been required to decide
whether an object has been introduced into evidence, 2 16 they had never estab-
lished an actual test for that determination until State v. Hall.2 17 In an at-
tempt to impeach the state's witness, defendant in Hall used a sweatshirt as an
exhibit. During cross-examination defendant's counsel first questioned the
witness as to the colors of the sweatsuit allegedly worn by defendant at the
time of the crime. He then handed a sweatsuit to the witness and asked him to
describe its colors. The suit was never given to the jury. The trial court con-
cluded that defendant had offered the suit into evidence and therefore lost his
right to make the final closing argument 2 18 under rule 10 of the Superior and
District Courts Rules.219
The court of appeals held that the trial court's refusal to allow defendant
to argue last was reversible error since he had not in fact put the suit into
evidence.220 It concluded that defendant did "not offer the sweatsuit for the
purpose of impeachment but attempted to impeach the witness by cross-exam-
213. FED. R. EvID. 704.
214. FED. R. EvD. 701 & 702.
215. FED. R. EvmD. 704 advisory committee notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 289 (1972).
216. See, ag., State v. Knight, 261 N.C. 17, 134 S.E.2d 101 (1964) (when defendant had prose-
cuting witness identify television interview he had given, and then showed interview to jury for
purpose of impeaching, defendant was offering interview into evidence). State v. Baker, 34 N.C.
App. 434, 238 S.E.2d 648 (1977) (defendant introduced picture into evidence when State witness
identified it on cross-examination and defendant made motion to introduce it into evidence).
217. 57 N.C. App. 561, 291 S.E.2d 812 (1982).
218. Id. at 560, 291 S.E.2d at 813.
219. Rule 10, General Rule of Practice for the Superior and District Courts in North Carolina
provides:
In all cases, civil or criminal, if no evidence is introduced by the defendant, the right to
open and close the argument to the jury shall belong to him. If a question arises as to
whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the final argument to the jury, the court shall
decide who is so entitled, and its decision shall be final.
220. 57 N.C. App. at 565, 291 S.E.2d at 815.
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ining him as to the sweatsuit." 221 To explain the fine line of distinction, the
court for the first time described the test for determining whether an object has
been placed into evidence. The proper test, according to the court, is whether
a party has offered the object either as substantive evidence or as evidence
"that the jury may examine . . . and determine whether it illustrates, cor-
roborates, or impeaches the testimony of a witness." 222
In view of the prior seemingly inconsistent decisions in North Caro-
lina,223 this expressed test is long overdue. As North Carolina courts have
applied different standards to determine whether an exhibit has been admit-
ted, the Hall test should finally end the confusion.
ROBERT M. DIGIOVANNI
LEIGH L. PURYEAR
221. Id. at 564, 291 S.E.2d at 814.
222. Id.
223. The courts have been inconsistent in their decisions regarding the jury's examination of
the exhibit. See, eg., State v. Spillars, 280 N.C. 341, 185 S.E.2d 881 (1972) (when a document is
admitted, it is presumed that its contents are made known to the jury as long as the jury is in the
courtroom); Pence v. Pence, 8 N.C. App. 484, 174 S.E.2d 860, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 111, -
S.E.2d - (1970) (when defendant offered medical records as corroboration of her contentions
about her medical treatment, judge told jury it was not necessary to read the exhibit).
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VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. The Parent-Child Relationship
1. Termination of Parental Rights
"A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to termi-
nate his or her parental status is... a commanding one."' It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that there has been much litigation concerning the
interpretation of North Carolina's statute providing for the termination of pa-
rental rights.2 In In re Moore3 the North Carolina Supreme Court focused
upon the portion of the statute allowing termination of parental rights because
of neglect. Mrs. Moore's twin children had been placed in foster homes in the
mid-1970s after the Department of Social Services (DSS) alleged neglect. Mrs.
Moore visited the children several times in those years, but during a three-year
period there were no visits to the foster homes nor any communication with
the children at all. Mrs. Moore at no time paid anything for the cost of the
children's foster care.
While the court found that the grounds for termination of parental rights
had been met under G.S. 7A-289.32(2),(3), and (4),4 its treatment of the ne-
glect aspect of the case is most noteworthy, if only for the confusion it creates.
Under G.S. 7A-517(21) a child is neglected if he or she does not receive proper
care, discipline, supervison, or medical treatment.5 The court found that while
1. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-289.22 to -289.34 (1981 & Supp. 1982). See, e.g., Lassiter v.
Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (limited constitutional right to appointed counsel in
termination hearings). But see In re Ferguson, 50 N.C. App. 681, 274 S.E.2d 879 (1981) (no right
to jury trial in termination hearings); In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981)
(statute not unconstitutionally vague).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32, which defines six grounds for the termination of parental
rights states, in part:
The court may terminate the parental rights upon a finding of one or more of the following:
(2) The parent has abused or neglected the child. The child shall be deemed to be
abused or neglected if the court finds the child to be an abused child within the
meaning of G.S. l10-117(1)(a), (b), or (c), or a neglected child within the meaning
of G.S. 7A-278(4).
(3) The parent has willfully left the child in foster care for more than two consecutive
years without showing to the satisfaction of the court that substantial progress has
been made within two years in correcting those conditions which led to the removal
of the child for neglect, or without showing positive response within two years to
the diligent efforts of a county department of social services, a child-caring institu-
tion or licensed child-placing agency to encourage the parent to strengthen the pa-
rental relationship to the child or to make and follow through with constructive
planning for the future of the child.
(4) The child has been placed in the custody of a county department of social services,
a licensed child-placing agency, or a child-caring institution, and the parent, for a
continuous period of six months next preceding the filing of the petition, has failed
to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the child.
3. 306 N.C. 394, 293 S.E.2d 127 (1982).
4. Id. at 404-05, 293 S.E.2d at 132-33. The court also affirmed that these statutory grounds
were not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
5. The statute specifies that neglect should be defined according to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
278(4) (1969), but this section was superseded by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (1979):
Neglected Juvenile. -Ajuvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or disci-
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the children were in her custody, Mrs. Moore failed to care properly for them,
and after they were placed under DSS supervision she made little effort to visit
or provide for them.6 Justice Carlton's dissent, however, noted that the only
neglect revealed by the record had occurred almost five years before the peti-
tion to terminate was filed. Carlton based his dissent upon the premise that
the statutory provision refers to neglect that occurred "within a reasonable
period prior to the filing of the petition to terminate."7
The court of appeals in a subsequent case, In re Warren,8 carried the
majority's reasoning in Moore to an extreme by holding that "DSS presented
sufficient grounds for terminating parental rights by merely showing that the
twins had earlier been adjudicated to be neglected." 9 Although the court
based its holding partially uponMoore, the majority in Moore never discussed
the issue of when neglect must have taken place, much less whether a prior
adjudication of neglect operates as an estoppel as to the issue of neglect.
Since in both Moore and Warren there were other grounds upon which a
court could base a finding that parental rights should be terminated, the courts
did not have to justify their holding solely on the issue of prior neglect. But
the language in Warren concerning this matter raises serious statutory and
constitutional questions. First, it is doubtful that the legislature intended to
allow courts to terminate parental rights because of a parent's neglect in the
distant past. Justice Carlton argues this point convincingly in his dissent in
Moore.i0 Second, it is doubtful that the Warren interpretation could with-
stand a constitutional attack on due process grounds. For the neglect to have
any rational relation to the state's interest in terminating parental rights, it
must have occurred within a reasonable time of the proceedings seeking to
pline from his parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker, or who has been abandoned; or
who is not provided necessary, medical care or other remedial care recognized under
State law, or who lives in an environment injurious to his welfare, or who has been
placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
6. Abandonment is clearly a part of "neglect" as well, according to the definition of a ne-
glected child in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (1979). See In re Apa, 59 N.C. App. 322, 296
S.E.2d 811 (1982); In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 287 S.E.2d 440 (1982).
7. 306 N.C. at 409, 293 S.E.2d at 135. He added that any other interpretation would be
unconstitutional on due process grounds. If the "reasonable time period" test were not applied, it
would be questionable whether the purpose of the statute--to remove neglected children from
harmful parents--would be carried out. The state could terminate parental rights at any time;
even if the neglect occurred many years before the petition to terminate. Id. at 409-410, 293
S.E.2d at 135-36.
8. No. 8229DC505 (N.C. App. Dec. 7, 1982) (unpublished opinion).
9. Id. at 6.
10. Justice Carlton stated in Moore:
[A] parent who might be neglectful as contemplated by the statute, to a one-year old
child resulting from that parent's alcoholism, might well be reformed and be capable of
becoming a model parent several years later. In such a case, it would be surely unjust to
allow that parent's parental rights to be terminated some four or five years later on the
basis of his or her prior conduct. In this example, if the DSS had received custody of the
child at the time the parent was neglectful due to his or her alcoholism and had not
instituted an action for termination of parental rights due to the resulting neglect within
a reasonable time after receiving custody, then I do not believe that this statutory ground
should have any application whatsoever to a later proceeding to terminate parental
rights.
306 N.C. at 409, 293 S.E.2d at 135 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
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terminate these rights.1 The supreme court should reconsider Justice Carl-
ton's dissent in Moore and hold that for purposes of G.S. 7A-289.32(2), the
neglect must have occurred within a reasonable period prior to the filing of the
petition to terminate.12
Another ground for termination of parental rights is willfully leaving a
child in foster care for more than two years without showing positive response
to the diligent efforts of social workers to correct the conditions that make the
parent unfit to be a custodian. 13 In re Wilkerson 14 required the court of ap-
peals to interpret this portion of the termination statute. First, the entrusting
of the child to foster care must be willful. This does not mean that the parent
must desire that the child remain in foster care; rather, the parent must take
some action-or willfully abstain from some action-that causes the child to
remain in foster care. In Wilkerson the father was employable but failed to
obtain regular employment sufficient to support his child. Similarly, the father
did not take advantage of alcohol counseling that was made available to him.
The court held that "by failing, for more than six years, to take steps to be-
come responsible so as to be able to remove [their son] from foster care, re-
spondents clearly fulfilled the willfulness requirement."'15 Second, there must
be diligent efforts on the part of social workers to improve the familial situa-
tion. These efforts must continue regularly over the two-year statutory period,
and must include treatment of the problems that led to the initial withdrawal
of custody, as well as specific suggestions regarding how custody may be
regained. 16 Finally, there must be a lack of progress over the two-year period.
This requirement means that the parent must have failed to comply with the
specific suggestions made by the social workers or to make other significant
improvements in the conditions that caused the child to be removed from his
or her custody.17
Another ground for terminating parental rights is the failure of a parent
to pay a reasonable portion of the child's foster care costs for sb months prior
to the filing of the petition.' 8 In re Bigers,19 a 1981 court of appeals case,
11. Id. at 409, 293 S.E.2d at 136.
12. It is important to note that the majority in Moore neither accepted nor rejected Justice
Carlton's argument on this issue. It simply held that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the
finding of neglect. Id. at 404-05, 293 S.E.2d at 132-33.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(3) (1981).
14. 57 N.C. App. 63, 291 S.E.2d 182 (1982).
15. Id. at 68, 291 S.E.2d at 185.
16. Id. at 69, 291 S.E.2d at 185. In this case, the social workers arranged home visits and
made available parenting programs, psychological therapy, and alcoholic rehabilitation. They
also encouraged a strengthening of the relationship between parent and child. Their efforts were
continuous throughout the six-year period the child was in foster care. Id.
17. Id. Mrs. Wilkerson failed to attend the parenting classes, psychological therapy, and
alcoholic rehabilitation. Mr. Wilkerson enrolled in an alcohol rehabilitation program but left
without finishing it. Both parents showed a lack of interest in visiting the children regularly and
did not appreciate the efforts of the social worker in this area. Id. at 67, 291 S.E.2d at 184. For
other 1982 cases in which G.S. § 7A-289.32(3) was used to terminate parental rights, see In re
Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293 S.E.2d 127 (1982); In re Burney, 57 N.C. App. 203, 291 S.E.2d 177
(1982); In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 287 S.E.2d 440 (1982).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(4) (1981).
19. 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981).
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made clear that in determining what a "reasonable" amount is, the judge must
consider both "the amount of support necessary to 'meet the reasonable needs
of the child'" and "the relative ability of the parties to provide that
amount." 20 This consideration of earning capacity was the focus of In re
Bradley.21 Mr. Bradley, a prisoner on work release, contributed to his chil-
dren's care until he lost his work release status as punishment for returning
intoxicated to prison. The court stated:
Where, as here, the parent had an opportunity to provide for some
portion of the cost of care of the child, and forfeits that opportunity
by his or her own misconduct, such parent will not be heard to assert
that he or she has no ability or means to contribute to the child's care
and is therefore excused from contributing any amount.22
Although Judge Becton's dissent did not challenge the idea that potential
earning capacity should be considered in determining "ability to pay," it did
suggest that the nonpayment must be "willful. ' 23 In other words, the state
must prove that the parent has intentionally forfeited his potential earning ca-
pacity before that capacity can be considered as part of his ability to pay, a
level of proof not met in Bradley. Becton's argument is especially persuasive
when one considers that prison officials have broad discretion in granting or
denying work release status. Prisoners are entitled to very limited due process
rights in the disciplinary and classification hearings that control work release
status. When and if work release privileges are revoked, the inmate has no
means with which to support his family. Therefore, the court should make an
independent determination whether the inmate has intentionally forfeited his
potential earning capacity in these situaitons.
2. Adoption
One of the legislative policies declared by the General Assembly in the
Termination of Parental Rights Act is to provide a permanent plan of car6 for
children.24 This policy favors a stable, permanent home situation for a child
rather than a series of foster home placements. To pursue this purpose, the
legislature added two important sections to the Act in 1982.25 Together, these
sections provide that after parental rights have been terminated, the DSS or
licensed child-placing agency must make diligent efforts to place the child for
adoption. Until the child has been adopted, the judge must hold periodic re-
views every six months to determine whether "every reasonable effort is being
20. Id. at 341, 274 S.E.2d at 242.
21. 57 N.C. App. 475, 291 S.E.2d 800 (1982).
22. Id. at 479, 291 S.E.2d at 800.
23. Id. at 481, 291 S.E.2d at 804 (Becton, J., dissenting).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.22(2) (1981) states:
(2) It is the further purpose of this Article to recognize the necessity for any child to
have a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age, while at the same time recop-
nizing the need to protect all children from the unnecessary severance of a relationship
with biological or legal parents.
25. For the wording of these sections, see infra note 26.
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made to provide for a permanent plan."'26 The judge will either affirm the
adequacy of the steps taken, or require specific additional steps to be taken by
the DSS or licensed child-placing agency. In this way, early adoption is
encouraged. 27
Judicial encouragement of adoption in 1982 was also evident inAdoption
of Kasim.28 In that case, the husband and wife separated after the filing of
their adoption petition, and the husband withdrew from the petition. At this
point, the natural mother attempted to withdraw her consent to give the child
up for adoption. The court held that once the six-month statutory period had
passed, the right of the natural parents to revoke their consent to adoption
terminated. Thus, the natural mother had no right to intervene in the adop-
tion proceeding.29 The court also ruled that since a single parent can adopt in
North Carolina, the withdrawal of one adoptive parent from the petition does
not automatically invalidate the petition?30 The court of appeals emphasized
that the trial court had wide discretion in deciding whether to dismiss the peti-
tion. The key issue in such a determination should be what action would be in
the best interest of the child.31
3. Other Developments
The question arose in Wake County v. Townes32 whether a defendant in a
civil paternity suit is consitutionally entitled to counsel to preserve his due
process rights. While the trial court ruled that there was no constitutional
right to counsel in a civil paternity suit, the court of appeals reversed and held
that there was an absolute right to counsel in such hearings.33 The North
Carolina Supreme Court took an intermediate view, and applied a case-by-
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31(c)(1) (Interim Supp. 1982) reads in part:
(cl) Should the court issue an order terminating the parental rights of a parent, the
court shall schedule a review hearing to be conducted within six months after the entry
of the order terminating parental rights. The purpose of the review is to ensure that
every reasonable effort is being made to provide for a permanent plan for the child
which is in the best interest of the child.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.35(a) (Interim Supp. 1982) provides that these reviews shall be contin-
ued "at least every six months thereafter until the child has been placed for adoption."
27. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has made it clear that the Department of Social
Services has wide discretion in overseeing and supervising the adoption of minor children in its
care. In Jenkins v. Craven County Dept. of Social Services, No. 8135CI088 (N.C. App. Dec. 21,
1982) (unpublished opinion), the court said, "[The Department of Social Services] must be given
the liberty to make the proper placement in keeping with the best interests of these children. This
decision should normally be made by the Department and while reviewable by the courts, must be
presumed to have been made in good faith."
28. 58 N.C. App. 36, 293 S.E.2d 247 (1982).
29. Id. at 40, 293 S.E.2d at 250. The court cited N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-11 (1976) for this
finding, and stated, "The purpose of this statute seems obvious: to give stability to the adoptive
process." Id.
30. 58 N.C. App. at 42,293 S.E.2d at 247. This result holds true even though the spouse must
join the action if the petitioner for adoption has a spouse competent to join in the petition. Id. at
41, 293 S.E.2d at 251. In this case, however, the husband withdrew because he and his wife were
separating and in the process of divorce.
31. Id. at 42, 293 S.E.2d at 251.
32. 306 N.C. 333, 293 S.E.2d 95 (1982).
33. Id. at 335, 293 S.E.2d at 97.
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case test 34 similar to the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services.35 This test requires the trial judge to consider
the complexity of the particular issues and evidence to be presented, and the
ability of the defendent to conduct his own defense. If fundamental fairness
requires that he be provided counsel, the judge must so hold.36
B. Separation Agreements
The court of appeals held in Henderson v. Henderson37 that a separation
agreement adopted by the court is enforceable by civil contempt, even if the
terms of the agreement provide that the alimony provisions are not modifiable.
Normally, a separation agreement is either "adopted" (meaning the agreement
loses its contractual nature, becoming an order of the court which is both mod-
ifiable and enforceable by contempt) or merely "approved" (meaning the
agreement is not modifiable without the consent of the parties, and is enforce-
able only as an ordinary contract),?8 In Henderson the trial judge expressly
adopted the agreement as a court order, but the terms of the agreement specifi-
cally provided that the alimony provisions were nonmodifiable. After defend-
ant husband had defaulted on alimony payments, plaintiff brought an action
for civil contempt. Defendant argued that because the agreement provided for
nonmodifiable alimony payments and contemplated a full and final settle-
ment, the court could not enforce the provisions through civil contempt pro-
ceedings.3 9 The court refused to accept this argument, holding that "it is not
the intent of the parties, but the intent of the judges [in choosing to adopt or
approve the agreement] which controls."4 The court further stated that the
questions of enforcement and modification were separate determinations. 41
34. Id.
35. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). InLassiter, a North Carolina case concerning the right to counsel in
proceedings for the termination of parental rights, the United States Supreme Court held that the
court must appoint counsel to indigents in these proceedings if it would be necessary under the
totality of the circumstances to ensure fundamental fairness. Id. at 32-33. North Carolina has
since provided by statute that all indigent persons must be provided counsel for these proceedings.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(a)(1) (1981).
36. 306 N.C. at 340-41, 293 S.E.2d at 100. The court added that the presumption is that the
defendant is not entitled to the appointment of counsel in a proceeding which does not present an
immediate threat to personal liberty. d. at 335-36, 293 S.E.2d at 97-98. This presumption, how-
ever, must be taken in light of the court's earlier explanation of due process and fundamental
fairness:
[Djue processpresumptively requires the appointment of legal counsel to represent an
indigent defendant # his actual imprisonment, or comparable confinement, is a likely
result in thepresent proceeding concerned. [citations omitted]. This essential guarantee
of fundamental fairness means quite simply that an indigent person cannot be sent to
jail, in any later proceeding to enforce the support order, unless he had the benefit of
legal assistance and advocacy at the proceeding in which paternity was determined.
Id. (emphasis in original).
37. 55 N.C. App. 506, 286 S.E.2d 657, aft'd, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983).
38. Id. at 510-11, 286 S.E.2d at 661.
39. Id. at 509, 286 S.E.2d at 660.
40. Id. at 511, 286 S.E.2d at 661.
41. Id. at 512,286 S.E.2d at 662. The court noted that it was possible to enforce a nonmodifi-
able separation agreement by civil contempt if the dependent spouse had first obtained a decree of
specific performance. This procedure was first upheld in North Carolina in Moore v. Moore, 297
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Although an adopted separation agreement is ordinarily modifiable, there are
situations in which it may not be, and an agreement of nonmodifiability falls
within that class.42 Thus, once it has been determined that the lower court
adopted a separation agreement, (and adoption is normally presumed), the
agreement is enforceable by civil contempt, notwithstanding provisions in the
agreement for nonmodifiable property settlements or alimony.43 This result
furthers the important public policy of aiding the enforceability of alimony
payments.44
Harris v. Harris45 considered the question whether the court could order a
husband to assign his army retirement pay to comply with an order of specific
performance in a separation agreement. The court held that according to fed-
eral caselaw46 the Army retirement pay could not be assigned or garnished.47
Although Mrs. Harris could sue for arrearages, the court could not order an
assignment of the retirement pay. After this case was decided, however, Con-
gress passed the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, effective
February 1, 1983, allowing state courts to garnish up to fifty percent of mili-
tary retirement pay, subject to certain limitations.48 Presumably Mrs. Harris
can now obtain a court order to garnish her husband's pay prospectively.49
Nevertheless, the impact of this change in federal law is minimal in North
Carolina, since the Equitable Distribution Act50 specifically excludes retire-
ment rights from marital property available for distribution.51 When a valid
N.C. 14,252 S.E.2d 735 (1979), and discussed further in Williford v. Williford, 56 N.C. App. 610,
289 S.E.2d 907 (1982). The Henderson court said, "[lit seems appropriate to recognize a distinc-
tion between modification and enforcement of these judgments and to permit a court to do di-
rectly what it may do indirectly." 55 N.C. App. at 512, 286 S.E.2d at 662.
42. 55 N.C. App. at 512-13, 286 S.E.2d at 662. Also, if the property settlement and alimony
payments are mutually dependent, the alimony is not modifiable. See White v. White, 296 N.C.
661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979).
43. 55 N.C. App. at 512-13, 286 S.E.2d at 662.
44. Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979), was the most important North
Carolina case simplifying the enforceability of alimony payments. Moore provided that even if
the separation agreement is only "approved" by the court, the dependent spouse can obtain a
decree of specific performance on the contract and then fie a civil contempt suit if the supporting
spouse refuses to comply. In reaching this result, the Moore court stressed the importance of an
adequate remedy enabling the dependent spouse to enforce the separation agreement.
45. 58 N.C. App. 175, 292 S.E.2d 775 (1982).
46. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (holding that military retirement pay is a
personal entitlement and not subject to property division upon divorce).
47. 58 N.C. App. at 179-80, 292 S.E.2d at 778.
48. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982). That section reads in pertinent part:
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order with respect to
the payment of a portion of the retired or retainer pay of a member to the spouse or
former spouse of the member, the Secretary shall, subject to the limitation of this section,
make payments to the spouse or former spouse in the amount of the disposable retired or
retainer pay of the member specifically provided for in the court order ....
(e)(1) The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable
under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable retired or retainer
pay.
49. Mrs. Harris is presently attempting to obtain such an order. Law Seeks to Give Military
Ex-wives a Fairer Shake, Raleigh News and Observer, Feb. 9, 1983, at 14A, col. 1.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp 1981).
51. Id. at § 50-20(b)(2) ("Vested pension or retirement rights and the expectation of non-
vested pension or retirement rights shall be considered separate property.").
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separation agreement specifically awards a spouse a portion of military pay,
the court can order such pay garnished and require that up to fifty percent be
paid directly to the dependent spouse.52
In Harris v. Harris,53 the court of appeals held that prior enforcement of a
child support provision in a separation agreement did not prevent the trial
court from making a later award of alimony. Relying upon the language of
the contract itself,54 the court held that the separation agreement releasing the
husband from his marital support obligation, did not bar the defendant from
suing for alimony pursuant to a later breach of the contract.55 The court
stated that the effect of the alimony award was to rescind the agreement, but
that it did not eradicate the debt that arose from plaintiffs failure to meet the
child support obligations established in the agreement.5 6 Thus, although the
defendant wife was obligated to restore to the plaintiff husband any benefits
she had received under the contract, a prior child support judgment for plain-
tiff's debt was not a component of that restitution.57
The appeals court also held that if an agreement to rescind a separation
agreement is supported by the consideration of a release of a spouse's parental
rights, the attempted rescission is void as against public policy. In Foy v.
Foys8 plaintiff sued for enforcement of a separation agreement in which de-
fendant had agreed to pay plaintiff $10,000 in monthly installments. Defend-
ant offered as a defense an agreement signed by the parties in which plaintiff
agreed to relinquish her rights under the agreement in exchange for defend-
ant's waiver of his parental rights in his adopted son.59 The court held that
relinquishment of parental rights could not constitute valid consideration since
such an agreement would deprive the court of its power to act in the best
interests of the child.60
52. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982).
53. 58 N.C. App. 314, 293 S.E.2d 602 (1982).
54. Paragraph 19 of the separation agreement provided:
Breach. Ifthe Husband breaches anyprovision ofthis agreement, the Wife shall have the
right, at her election, to sue for damages for such breach, rescind this agreement, and
maintain an action for separation or alimonypendente life orpermanent, or seek other
remedies or relief as may be available to her.
Id. at 317, 293 S.E.2d at 604 (emphasis added by the court).
55. 58 N.C. App. at 318, 293 S.E.2d at 605. The court also referred to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.6(b) (1976) which provides: Alimony, alimony pendente lite, and counsel fees may be barred
by an express provision of a valid separation agreement so long as the agreement is performed. 58
N.C. App. at 317, 293 S.E.2d at 604-05.
56. Id.
57. Id. The court further held that since the consideration given by the plaintiff husband to
the defendant wife in exchange for the release of her marital rights was nominal, there was no
benefit for her to return as restitution.
58. 57 N.C. App. 128, 290 S.E.2d 748 (1982).
59. Id. at 130-31, 290 S.E.2d at 749-50.
60. Id. at 131, 290 S.E.2d at 750. The case exemplifies the general judicial principle that
parents cannot deprive the State of jurisdiction over the welfare of the child. See, e.g., Fuchs v.
Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).
See generally 2 R. LEE, FAMILY LAW § 151 (4th ed. 1980).
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C. Child Support and Custody
In Walker v. Walker61 the court of appeals held that the resumption of
periodic sexual relations between the parties to a divorce will not automati-
cally void a judgment for child support.62 The North Carolina courts in prior
cases have held that the resumption of sexual relations renders alimony
awards void63 and invalidates the executory portions of a separation agree-
ment64-including the provisions governing child support.65 Nevertheless, in
Walker the court drew a distinction between agreements for child support and
judgments for child support. 66 Finding the case of Jackson v. Jackson67 con-
trolling, the court affirmed the lower court decision denying defendant's mo-
tion to have the child support judgment declared void. By refusing to hold
judgments for child support void due to resumption of sexual relations by the
parents, the court recognized that the needs of the children remain unchanged
by the temporary resumption of marital relations. 68
The same policy considerations hold true when the resumption of sexual
relations occurs after the execution of a separation agreement-the needs of
the children remain unchanged. Since the cases are analytically indistinguish-
able, the refusal of the court to extend the reasoning invalidating alimony
awards and child support provisions when the parties resume sexual relations
to cases involvingjudgments for child support denotes an implicit criticism of
that line of cases and casts doubt on their continued authoritative value.
The court of appeals also recommended the use of standardized formulas
for determining the amount of child support to be provided by each parent. In
Hamilton v. Hamilton69 the court expressly recognized the efficacy of using
standard formulas in making just apportionments of the support burden,70
and implied that a "substantial departure" from the standard award must be
supported by specific factual findings justifying that departure.71 The court
61. 59 N.C. App. 485, 297 S.E.2d 125 (1982).
62. Id. at 489, 297 S.E.2d at 128.
63. Id. at 487, 297 S.E.2d at 127. See Hester v. Hester, 239 N.C. 97, 79 S.E.2d 248 (1953);
Pennington v. Pennington, 42 N.C. App. 83, 255 S.E.2d 569 (1979); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 46 N.C.
App. 819, 266 S.E.2d 59 (1980).
64. Walker, 59 N.C. App. at 487, 297 S.E.2d at 127. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C.
390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978); Moore v. Moore, 185 N.C. 332, 117 S.E. 12 (1923).
65. See Campbell v. Campbell, 234 N.C. 188, 66 S.E.2d 672 (1951).
66. 59 N.C. App. at 488, 297 S.E.2d at 127.
67. 14 N.C. App. 71, 187 S.E.2d 490 (1972). In Jackson the court's statement that a judgment
for child support would not be rendered void by the temporary reconciliation of the husband and
wife was dictum. The court had already reversed the lower court decision on the ground that
there was insufficient evidence of defendant's ability to pay child support.
68. 59 N.C. App. at 489, 297 S.E.2d at 128.
69. 57 N.C. App. 182, 290 S.E.2d 780 (1982).
70. Id. at 183-84, 290 S.E.2d at 781. Nevertheless, the court refused to apply a formula in the
instant case because the formulas had not been introduced into evidence at trial and, therefore,
could not be considered on appeal.
71. 57 N.C. App. at 184, 290 S.E.2d at 781. The court stated:
In cases where the trial judge determines, in his discretion, that considerations of fairness
dictate a substantial departure from the standard award, we would recommend strongly
that the court set forth specific findings of fact in support thereof. This would provide
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approved the use of formulas on the grounds that such formulas lend consis-
tency to child support awards.72 Nevertheless, any formula used in determin-
ing the level of child support must take into account the resources and
earnings of both parents and the needs of the children.73 In Fuchs v. Fuchs,
however, the North Carolina Supreme Court had expressly disapproved of the
use of a pro rata formula in setting child support payments.74 Nevertheless,
the holding in Fuchs may not accurately predict the supreme court's ultimate
disposition on the use of formulas in determining child support, since in Fuchs
the needs of the children had not been considered by the lower court.7s
In a case of first impression, the court of appeals upheld a lower court
order requiring a supporting parent to maintain life insurance policies with his
children as beneficiaries. In Loeb v. Loeb76 the court held that when a father
does not dispute an order requiring him to maintain life insurance policies
with his children as beneficiaries, a mother cannot challenge that order.7 7 The
court inLoeb focused upon the father's terminal illness and the need to secure
support for his children should he die prematurely.78 While this reasoning
contradicts the general common-law proposition, which is effective in North
Carolina, that a father's duty of support terminates at his death, several states
have upheld divorce decrees requiring the father to maintain life insurance
policies naming his children as beneficiaries for support and maintenance dur-
ing their minority.79 Further, by limiting the decision to those cases in which
the father consents to the maintenance of a life insurance policy, the court
avoided the contention that the father is being required to build an estate foi
appellate courts with something more than the skeletal findings and conclusions on
which we often must base a review of support orders.
72. Those courts approving the use of formulas have generally relied upon this ground. See
Bragdon v. Bragdon, 393 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. App. 1981) (use of formula is appropriate to set
general guidelines so that consistency and uniformity of support can be achieved); Smith v. Smith,
290 Or. 675, 680, 626 P.2d 342, 345 (1981) (use of formula is proper "to the end that similar cases
will be treated similarly"). But see Lindsey v. Lindsey, 131 So. 2d 601, 602 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978)
(amount of child support to be awarded is determined on facts of each case); Pierce v. Pierce, 241
Ga. 96, 97, 243 S.E.2d 46,48 (1978) (questions of alimony and child support cannot be determined
by mathematical formula). See generally Bair, How Much Temporary Child Support is Enough?, 1
FAM. ADvoc. 37 (1978-79).
73. 57 N.C. App. at 183-84, 290 S.E.2d at 781.
74. 260 N.C. 635, 641, 133 S.E.2d 487, 492 (1963).
75. In Fuchs, the lower court set the level of child support simply by determining plaintiffs
net income and then dividing by the number of people dependent on that income for support. Id.
at 640, 133 S.E.2d at 492.
76. No. 8115DC1386 (N.C. App. Dec. 21, 1982) (unpublished opinion).
77. The court adopted the holdings of Hayn v. Hayn, 162 Kan. 189, 175 P.2d 127 (1946)
(court may order father to maintain life insurance policy with children as beneficiaries when fa-
ther has consented to such an order),and Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1961) (father may be
required to maintain life insurance policy with children as beneficiaries pursuant to statute per-
mitting court to make orders providing for security necessary to ensure payment of child support).
No. 8115DC1386, slip op. at 7.
78. Id
79. See Lincoln Nat'I Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 71 I1. App. 3d 900, 390 N.E.2d 506 (1979);
Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 593,363 P.2d 795 (1961); Morris v. Morris, 13 Wis. 2d 92, 108 N.W.2d
124 (1961). Butsee Calvin v. Calvin, 238 Ga. 421,233 S.E.2d 151 (1977); Wooddy v. Wooddy, 258
Md. 224, 265 A.2d 467 (1970); Ehrler v. Ehrler, 69 Misc. 2d 234, 328 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1972).
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the children against his wishes.80 Nevertheless, by focusing upon the impend-
ing death of the father, the court made a significant step toward holding a
parent responsible after his death for his children's support during their
minority.81
In Dishmon v. Dishmon82 the court of appeals refused to accept plaintiffs
argument that a consent judgment fixing child support was not a "court order"
necessitating a showing of changed circumstances under G.S. 50-13.7(a) before
its modification could be allowed.83 Relying upon Henderson v. Henderson,84
the court held that the adoption of the separation agreement made it an order
of the court requiring judicial compliance with the provisions of G.S. 50-
13.7(a).85 In reaching this holding, the court made no distinction between
merged and approved separation agreements. Rather, it seemed to articulate a
broad rule that consent judgments are always orders of the court in the context
of custody and child support agreements.8 6
In In re Custody of Peal8 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed
the broad discretion granted to trial judges in determining who shall be
awarded custody of a child. The court reversed an appeals court decision that
there had not been sufficient evidence of changed circumstances to support an
order transferring custody from the mother to the father. While expressly
finding that both parents were fit, 8 the court focused upon the desire of the
two children to be together and the increased age of the younger child in de-
ciding to allow custody of the child to be transferred.8 9
By contrast, in Barnes v. Barnes90 the appeals court upheld the dismissal
of a motion for change of custody when the plaintiff mother introduced evi-
dence of her increased ability to care for the child, but no evidence of her
father's unfitness or inability to care for the child.9 1 The court also held that
the terms of a consent judgment regarding child custody cannot be altered
without a showing of changed circumstances as required by G.S. 50-13.7(a). 92
Finally, in Story v. Story93 the court of appeals differentiated between the
80. See Hayn v. Hayn, 162 Kan. 189, 175 P.2d 127.
81. See generally 59 A.L.R.3D 9 (1974).
82. 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.7(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent part: (a) An order
of a court of this state for support of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon
motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested.
84. 55 N.C. App. 506, 286 S.E.2d 657 (1982) afl'd, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983).
85. The court also held that defendant's assumption of the responsibility of supporting an
emancipated child is not, in itself, a sufficient showing of changed circumstances to uphold modifi-
cation of child support payments. 57 N.C. App. at 658-59, 292 S.E.2d at 294.
86. Id. at 661, 292 S.E.2d at 295. See Barnes v. Barnes, 55 N.C. App. 670, 286 S.E.2d 586
(1982) (The terms of a consent judgment regarding child support cannot be altered without a
showing of changed circumstances).
87. 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).
88. Id. at 646, 290 S.E.2d at 668.
89. Id. at 646-47, 290 S.E.2d at 668.
90. 55 N.C. App. 670, 286 S.E.2d 586 (1982).
91. Id. at 672, 226 S.E.2d at 587.
92. Id. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
93. 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).
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modicum of evidence necessary to sustain a temporary custody order and that
required to sustain a permanent custody order. The court upheld a temporary
custody order when the trial court's finding of facts was based upon a verified
complaint, an unverified answer and counterclaim, a verified answer to the
counterclaim, and a bare factual finding by the court that placing the child in
the custody of his mother would be in his best interest.94 By contrast, the court
refused to uphold a permanent custody order based upon the same informa-
tion. The court noted both the need for specific findings of fact in awarding a
permanent custody order and the greater reliability of sworn testimony.95
D. Alimony
In Rowe v. Rowe96 the North Carolina Supreme Court found as a matter
of law that plaintiff had offered proof of changed circumstances sufficient to
support a reduction in alimony payments, despite the inclusion of a
nonmodification provision in his separation agreement.97 Two years after the
divorce was granted, defendant wife sold her stock in a closely-held corpora-
tion and invested in income-producing securities, which increased her monthly
income and decreased her net worth.98 Plaintiff then filed for a reduction in
alimony payments based on a change in circumstances.
Although the trial court found an insufficient change in circumstances to
warrant a modification of alimony payments, the court of appeals reversed,
holding that as a matter of law there was a sufficient change of circumstances
to require modification. 99 The supreme court affirmed, holding that the sup-
port order was modifiable unle-s defendant could prove that the support and
property settlement provisions were inseparable.I°° In a vigorous dissent, Jus-
tice Copeland noted that the consent judgment was contractual in nature and
that the consequence of the decision was to allow a party who had agreed to a
provision to rescind his agreement subsequently.101 He would have allowed
the court to void a "no modification" clause only if unconscionability could be
shown.102
The majority opinion conforms with the practice in North Carolina of
looking to the form of the consent judgment rather than the intent of the par-
94. Id. at 514, 291 S.E.2d at 926.
95. Id. at 515, 291 S.E.2d at 927.
96. 305 N.C. 177, 287 S.E.2d 840 (1982).
97. Id. at 188, 287 S.E.2d at 846-47.
98. Id. at 181, 287 S.E.2d at 843.
99. Id. at 182, 287 S.E.2d at 843-44.
100. Id. at 186, 287 S.E.2d at 846.
101. [lIt must be remembered that a consent judgment, regardless of its legal setting, is
contractual in nature; consequently, its terms should be interpreted according to: (1) the
parties' expressed intent in fight of the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of
entry and (2) the obvious purposes intended to be accomplished by its entry. Any con-
sent judgment should be construed as it is written, and our courts should refrain from
actions which effectively ignore or nullify the language or provisions included therein.
Id. at 190-91, 287 S.E.2d at 848 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 849, 287 S.E.2d at 849 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
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ties.103 Since the court "ordered" alimony, the support provisions were held to
be modifiable in spite of the expressed intent of the parties-judicially noted-
that the provisions be nonmodifiable. Rowe presents a clear case for making
such a determination based upon intent, rather than form. Both parties to the
agreement were wealthy and represented by attorneys throughout negotiations
and no evidence of duress or overreaching was presented. 104 Nevertheless, the
court chose to impose formal rules of construction in determining the nature
of the support provisions and virtually ignored the intent of the parties. Thus,
in balancing the competing policies of the State's inherent interest in regulat-
ing the incidents of marriage and the freedom of parties to negotiate and con-
tract, the court's results lean heavily in favor of the right of the State to
regulate marriage.
The case also illustrates the pitfalls for attorneys in negotiating support
payments. By failing to note the court's distinction between approval of agree-
ments and their adoption, and by permitting the payments to be denominated
as alimony and ordered by the court, the attorneys may dictate the outcome of
later litigation on the nature of suuport payments, regardless of what the par-
ties intended.
In Quick v. QuickI0 5 the supreme court refused to entangle itself in the
difficult problem of enforcing alimony payments during the pendency of an
appeal. The court noted that contempt proceedings at the trial court level are
stayed during an appeal, and that an appeals court cannot hear the matter
because it involves factual findings. Consequently, the supporting spouse is
ensured a lengthy period during which he will not have to pay alimony.1°6
While the court recognized the existence of a problem in this situation, it nev-
ertheless deferred to the legislature to rectify it.10 7
E. Arbitration
In Crutchley v. Crutchley s08 the North Carolina Supreme Court joined the
growing number of courts that recognize arbitration as a valid method of set-
tling domestic disputes.109 While the court was obligated to invalidate the
arbitration award because of the the peculiar interaction between North Caro-
lina law and the facts of the case, it expressly endorsed arbitration as an alter-
native means of settling marital disputes.110
The Crutchleys first brought their divorce action into court in 1977.
103. Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, Private Agreements, and the State,
59 N.C.L. REv. 819, 848-58 (1981).
104. 305 N.C. at 192, 287 S.E.2d at 849 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
105. 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).
106. Id. at 461, 290 S.E.2d at 663.
107. Id. at 462, 290 S.E.2d at 663-64.
108. 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).
109. See, e.g., In re Mesmer's Estate, 94 Cal. App. 97, 270 P. 732 (1928); Masterson v. Master-
son, 22 Ky. Op. 1193, 60 S.W. 301 (1901); Stratton v. Stratton, 77 Me. 373, 52 A. 779 (1885); Carter
v. Carter, 109 Mass. 306 (1872); McAllister v. McAllister, 57 Tenn. (10 Heisk.) 345 (1872).
110. 306 N.C. at 519, 293 S.E.2d at 794.
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Before their case was heard, they agreed to arbitrate their differences, and the
trial judge filed a consent order of their agreement to arbitrate and appointed
an arbitrator.1 11 The Crutchleys divorce was finalized in December 1977, the
same time their arbitration award was confirmed by the court.112 One year
later, Mrs. Crutchley filed a motion for modification of the arbitration award.
Both the trial court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed Mrs.
Crutchley's motions for her failure to meet the ninety-day statute of limita-
tions provided in the North Carolina Arbitration Act."13
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed. Although the supreme
court agreed with the court of appeals that there was "no legislative expression
[in North Carolina's Arbitration Act] . . . that arbitration of [domestic] dis-
putes is against public policy,"'1 4 the court held that once domestic disputes
are before a judge, the judge may not delegate his duty to resolve the disputes
to a third party."I5
The court-ordered arbitration in Crutchley was considered a voluntary
reference under rule 53,116 which does not allow the delegation of suits such as
that of the Crutchleys. 117 Arbitration would have been proper had the couple
either dismissed their court suit prior to the time their arbitration agreement
was ordered by the court, or simply arbitrated without the court's order to do
S0.
1 18
The court did, however, note a a number of advantages to the arbitration
of marital disputes: "reduced court congestion, the opportunity for resolution
of sensitive matters in a private and informal forum by self-chosen judges,
speed, economy and finality."' 19 While the supreme court recognized certain
negative attributes of arbitration, such as the loss of full appellate review and
the protections of state substantive law and rules of evidence,' 20 it ruled that
the scale tipped in favor of allowing arbitration of these matters.
It is important to note that the court in Crutchley stated that only spousal
support may be subjected to binding arbitration;1'2 ' the provisions in an arbi-
tration award for custody or child support remain reviewable and modifiable
111. Id. at 520, 293 S.E.2d at 795.
112. 53 N.C. App. 732, 738, 281 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1981).
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
114. 306 N.C. at 523, 293 S.E.2d at 796.
115. Id. at 522, 293 S.E.2d at 796.
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 53(a)(1) (1969).
117. "Voluntary references" are to be distinguished from "compulsory references." In the
former, the judge has the discretion to appoint a referee or decide the matter himself, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § IA-I, Rule 53(a)(1) (1969); in the latter, the judge must appoint a referee for certain
complex litigation issues, N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I, Rule 53(a)(2) (1969). The court specifically
left unanswered the question whether a compulsory reference would have been a valid method for
the Crutchleys to settle their disputes. 306 N.C. at 525, 293 S.E.2d at 798.
118. 306 N.C. at 523, 293 S.E.2d at 796.
119. Id. An arbitrator is bound by neither.
120. Id. at 524, 293 S.E.2d at 797.
121. Id.
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by North Carolina courts.' 22 The court reasoned that since parties are permit-
ted to settle spousal support by agreement, there was no bar to their effecting
the identical settlement through arbitration. Despite the strong North Caro-
lina policy ofparenspatriae, the court in Crutchley held that the amount of
child support awarded is presumed to be just and reasonable, absent evidence
to the contrary.'23
Crutchley opens a virtual Pandora's box of unanswered problems for
those hoping to use arbitration to settle domestic disputes. It is unclear
whether domestic arbitration awards will be treated as deferentially as com-
mercial arbitration awards are,124 or whether courts will subject them to closer
scrutiny for the fairness and full disclosure ostensibly required in the forma-
tion of a separation agreement.125 Indeed, the court left open the vital ques-
tion of exactly how closely the analogy between separation agreements and
arbitrations awards may be drawn. Similar judicial treatment of separation
agreements and arbitration awards would provide the most consistent public
policy for the state.
F Husband- Wfe Property
In 1982 the legislature passed a bill 126 providing that for conveyances on
or after January 1, 1983, both husband and wife will have equal right to "the
control, use, possession, rents, income, and profits" of land held by the parties
in tenancy by the entirety. 127 The bill reverses the judicial doctrine, firmly
entrenched in North Carolina, providing that the husband has the absolute
right for the duration of the marriage to control, use, possess, and receive rents
and income from land held by the entireties. 128 Thus, North Carolina joins
122. Id. This is the same treatment afforded child support awards in separation agreements.
Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 987 (1963).
123. The scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is very narrow in North Carolina.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See Calvine Cotton Mills v. Textile Workers
Union, 283 N.C. 719, 79 S.E.2d 181 (1953); Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers,
233 N.C. 46, 62 S.E.2d 535 (1950); Pearson v. Barringer, 109 N.C. 398, 13 S.E. 942 (1881); Thomas
v. Howard, 51 N.C. App. 350, 276 S.E.2d 743 (1981).
124. See, eg., Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971); Van Every v. Van Every, 265
N.C. 506, 144 S.E.2d 603 (1965); Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640 (1979).
No separation agreement has ever been declared void because of the inference of fraud or duress,
however. Sharp, supra note 103, at 832.
125. Most problematic is the merger/approval dichotomy existing in the judicial treatment of
separation agreements and the resulting disparate legal effects. For a full discussion of the prob-
lem, see Sharp, supra note 103. It would be most unfortunate for the relatively faster and less
traumatic arbitration method to become burdened with such uncertainties, requiring couples who
had wished to avoid litigation to go into court to battle over the meaning of an arbitration award.
126. Act of June 18, 1982, ch. 1245, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 136 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6(a) (Interim Supp. 1982).
127. Id. § 1 provides:
A husband and wife shall have an equal right to the control, use, possession, rents, in-
come, and profits of real property held by them in tenancy by the entirety. Neither
spouse may bargin, sell, lease, mortgage, transfer, convey or in any manner encumber
any property so held without the written joinder of the other spouse. This section shall
not be construed to require the spouse's joinder where a different provision is made
under G.S. 39-13, G.S. 39-13.3, G.S. 39-39.4, or G.S. 52-10.
128. See, ag., Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 195 S.E.2d 552 (1973); West v. Aberdeen & R.R.
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the majority of states in expounding the "modem view" of the tenancy by the
entirety.' 29
Subsection (1)(b) of the bill provides that a conveyance of real property to
a husband and wife vests title in them as tenants by the entirety unless the
conveyance expressly indicates a contrary intent of the parties.130 Essentially,
the section codifies existing common law principles expounded by the courts
of North Carolian concerning the manner in which real property vests in hus-
band and wife.131
Subsection (1)(c) makes the bill applicable to all conveyances on or after
January 1, 1983 but raises constitutional questions by further providing that
"[flor income tax purposes effective for taxable years beginning on or after
January 1, 1983, the income from property held in tenancy by the entirety
shall be reportable 1/2 (one half) by each spouse regardless of when the con-
veyance was made."' 32 By requiring spouses to report one-half the income
generated by a tenancy by the entirety regardless of when it was created, it
places women in the position of having to pay taxes on property they do not
own and over which they do not have management power, since the bill grants
equal rights to ownership and control only to conveyances after January 1,
1983.133 It seems "unconstitutional for the state to tax the wife with respect to
a half interest in rents and profits she [does] not own."' 134 Yet if the intent of
the bill is to give the wife half ownership regardless of when the conveyance
was made, thus eliminating the taxation problem, a constitutional problem
arises from the husband's perspective, since his property is being taken with-
out due process of law.
G. NORMAN ACKER
CATHERINE DWIGHT HINKLE
Co., 140 N.C. 620,53 S.E. 477 (1906); Hinton v. Hinton, 17 N.C. App. 715, 195 S.E.2d 319 (1973);
Hodge v. Hodge, 12 N.C. App. 574, 183 S.E.2d 800 (1971). See also 2 R. LEE, supra note 60,
§ 115, at 50-58.
129. See C.J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO REAL PROPERTY 233 (1962).
130. Act of June 18, 1982, ch. 1254, § 1(b), 1982 Sess. Laws 136-37 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT § 39-13.6(b) (Interim Supp. 1982)) provides:
A conveyance of real property, or any interest therein, to a husband and wife vests title
in them as tenants by the entirety when the conveyance is to:
(1) a named man 'and wife,' or
(2) a named woman 'and husband,' or
(3) two named persons, whether or not identified in the conveyance as husband
and wife, if at the time of conveyance they are legally married; unless a contrary inten-
tion is expressed in the conveyance.
131. See, ag., Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 145 S.E.2d 228 (1960); Byrd v. Patterson, 229
N.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 45 (1948); Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 118, 100 S.E.
269 (1919). See also 2 R. LEE, supra note 60, § 113, at 38-46.
132. Act of June 18, 1982, ch. 1245, § 1(c), N.C. Sess. Laws 136-37 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36.13.6(c) (Interim Supp. 1982)).
133. For a discussion of the constitutional problems posed by the bill, see Reppy, North Caro.
lina's Tenancy by the Entirety Reform Legislation o/1982, 5 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 16-30 (1982).




In Texaco, Inc. v. Creel' the North Carolina Court of Appeals faced for
the first time the issue of the proper interpretation of a lease provision contain-
ing both an option to purchase at a fixed price and a first refusal option. There
is a split of authority among jurisdictions that have addressed such dual
purchase options;2 North Carolina, at least for the moment,3 is among those
courts that construe such clauses in favor of the lessee.4
The lease in Creel granted lessee (Texaco) an option to purchase property
for the fixed price of $50,000, which could not be exercised until the end of
either the ten-year lease term or any of the four five-year renewal periods.5
The lease further provided for a right of first refusal. Near the end of the
lessee's final extension period, the lessor notified Texaco that he had received
two bona fide offers for the land-each in amount more than triple Texaco's
fixed price option.6 Texaco declined to exercise its first refusal option; instead,
it elected to purchase the property under the fixed price option. The lessor
contended that the lessee's right to exercise the fixed price option expired upon
the receipt of a bona fide offer and refused to convey the property. The trial
court agreed and summarily dismissed the plaintiff lessee's claim for specific
performance.7 The court of appeals rejected the lessor's interpretation of the
dual option clause and granted summary judgment for the lessee8 after exam-
ining two cases from other jurisdictions.
In Texaco, Inc. v. Rogow9 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the
lessor's receipt of a bona fide offer extinguished the lessee's fixed price option.
Under this construction, the lessee must match the first purchase offer or risk
losing the right to purchase the property thereafter. 10 The court of appeals
rejected this reasoning because it renders the fixed price option "completely
1. 57 N.C. App. 611,292 S.E.2d 130 (1982), disc. rev. granted, 306 N.C. 564, 294 S.E.2d 229
(1982).
2. Compare M & M Oil Co. v. Finch, 7 Kan. App. 2d 208, 640 P.2d 317 (1982) (when lessor
is presented with bona fide offer at price higher than fixed option price, lessee must exercise right
of first refusal if he wishes to purchase property) with Crowley v. Texaco, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 871
(S.D. 1981) (lessee's refusal to exercise right of first refusal does not extinguish right to later ex-
ercise fixed price option).'
3. Discretionary review has been granted in Creel See supra note 1.
4. See, ag., Butler v. Richardson, 74 R.I. 344, 60 A.2d 718 (1948); Crowley v. Texaco, Inc.,
306 N.W.2d 871 (S.D. 1981).
5. 57 N.C. App. at 612-14,292 S.E.2d at 131-32. Clause 11 of the lease granted the follow-
ing option to purchase:
Lessor hereby grants to lessee the exclusive right, at lessee's option, to purchase the de-
mised premises .... (a) for the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars .... (b) On the same
terms and at the same price as any bona fide offer for said premises received by lessor
and which offer lessor desires to accept (emphasis in original).
6. 57 N.C. App. at 614, 292 S.E.2d at 132.
7. Id at 615, 292 S.E.2d at 132.
8. Id at 619, 292 S.E.2d at 135.
9. 150 Conn. 401, 190 A.2d 48 (1963).
10. Id at 409, 190 A.2d at 52. The court viewed a contrary interpretation as wholly subordi-
nating the first refusal option and thus "render[ing] virtually inoperative the provision expressly
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meaningless."" The court instead adopted the interpretation of the South Da-
kota Supreme Court in Crowley v. Texaco, Inc.12 as the only construction that
gave effect to the fixed price option.13 Relying heavily on a persuasive quota-
tion from a Rhode Island case, 14 Crowley held that the right of first refusal was
supplemental to the fixed price option and became meaningful only if the les-
sor received an offer for less than the fixed option price.'5 This construction
defines the right of first refusal as a device employed by the lessor to "induce
an acceleration of lessee's decision to purchase by affording [him] an opportu-
nity to purchase at a price more advantageous to [him] than the price fixed in
the option."'16
While the court's holding finds support in other jurisdictions,17 its foun-
dation is not entirely solid. Although the court's construction does not render
the fixed option clause "totally meaningless," the interpretation does render
the first refusal option "totally meaningless" in a practical sense by subordi-
nating it to the fixed price option. 8 Lessors will feel no pressure to solicit
offers for less than a fixed option price simply to accelerate a lessee's decision
to purchase. Moreover, the court's interpretation favors lessees who are clever
enough to include a low option price in a long term lease, by guaranteeing that
they will never pay more than the fixed option price.19 In Creel this interpreta-
tion enabled Texaco to purchase property with a market value of between
$155,000 and $217,000 for just $50,000.20 A contrary interpretation of the dual
option clause would not render the first refusal provision meaningless. Texaco
would still have the first opportunity to acquire a valuable piece of property.
Neither would Texaco be penalized by such an interpretation-it would sim-
ply be required to pay the fair market value for the lessor's property.
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish21 the supreme court clarified the
requirements for proving waiver by estoppel. Plaintiff bank, as executor and
trustee of lessor's estate, initiated a summary ejectment action to regain posses-
sion of the leased premises.22 The bank asserted that the defendant lessee's
according the defendant the unrestricted opportunity to attempt to obtain the fair value of the
property during the first nine years [of the lease term]." Id. at 407-08, 190 A.2d at 52.
11. 57 N.C. App. 611, 617, 292 S.E.2d 130, 133 (1982).
12. 306 N.W.2d 871 (S.D. 1981).
13. 57 N.C. App. at 617, 292 S.E.2d at 134.
14. Butler v. Richardson, 74 R.I. 344, 349-50, 60 A.2d 718, 722 (1948), quotedin Crowley, 306
N.W.2d at 874.
15. 306 N.V.2d at 874.
16. 57 N.C. App. at 617, 292 S.E.2d at 133-34.
17. See supra note 4.
18. See Rogow, 150 Conn. at 407-08 , 190 A.2d at 51-52; Crowley, 306 N.W.2d at 875-76
(Henderson, J., dissenting). In the latter case, Justice Henderson argues that the construction
adopted by the majority (later adopted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals) renders the right
of first refusal meaningless and inquires why the parties would include such a meaningless provi-
sion in their agreement.
19. See 306 N.W.2d at 874, in which Justice Henderson's dissenting opinion suggests that
such an interpretation "is entirely for the benefit of Texaco."
20. 57 N.C. at 614, 292 S.E.2d at 132.
21. 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749 (1982).
22. Id at 418, 293 S.E.2d at 751.
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failure to give timely written notice of his intention to exercise his option to
extend the lease constituted impermissible holding over. Lessee claimed that
plaintiff waived the written notice requirement and was equitably estopped to
demand such notice.2 3 The jury found for the lessee.24 The supreme court
affimed the conclusion of the court of appeals that the jury had sufficient
grounds to find plaintiff estopped to require written notice, but reversed and
remanded for a new trial because the jury had not been properly instructed
and because the issues had not been correctly formulated.25
The supreme court began its review with a careful explication of the doc-
trine of waiver.26 In the context of the landlord-tenant relationship, the neces-
sity of consideration to support a waiver of notice depends upon whether the
waiver occurs before or after notice is due.2 7 Waiver of a substantial right
before performance becomes due must be supported by either consideration or
estoppel. Because the right to renew a lease is a substantial right,28 the lessee
inRubish has the affirmative burden of proving consideration or estoppel suffi-
cient to support a waiver of that right. The court held in Rubish that promis-
sory estoppel was sufficient to support such a waiver, thus relieving lessee of
the burden of proving the elements of equitable estoppel.29
23. Id at 418-19, 293 S.E.2d at 751.
24. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 50 N.C. App. 662, 664, 275 S.E.2d 494 (1981).
25. 306 N.C. 424, 434, 293 S.E.2d 754, 760.
26. Id at 424-29 , 293 S.E.2d at 754-57. Waiver is commonly defined as "the intentional
relinquishment of a known right." Discount Auto Mart., Inc. v. Bank cf N.C., 45 N.C. App. 543,
544, 263 S.E.2d 41, 42 (1980).
27. In Wheeler v. Wheeler, 299 N.C. 633, 263 S.E.2d 763 (1980), the supreme court expli-
cated the elements of "waiver by performance." Such a waiver does not require consideration or
estoppel if-
(1) The waiving party is the innocent, or nonbreaching party, and
(2) The breach does not involve total repudiation of the contract so that the nonbreach-
ing party continues to receive some of the bargained-for consideration.. . . and
(3) The innocent party is aware of the breach, and
(4) The innocent party intentionally waives his right to excuse or repudiate his own
performance by continuing to perform or accept the partial performance of the breach-
ing party.
Id at 639, 263 S.E.2d at 766-67.
28. Id at 426 n.6, 293 S.E.2d at 755 n.6.
29. Id at 427, 293 S.E.2d at 756. In Gladden v. Pargus, Inc., 575 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1978),
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that North Carolina has outlined the elements
of equitable estoppel as follows:
(1) Misrepresentation or concealment of material facts;
(2) Estopped parties' knowledge, either actual or implied, that the representations were
untrue when made;
(3) Lack of knowledge as to the untruth by the party raising the estoppel
(4) Estopped parties' intent or expectation that misrepresentations will be relied upon;
(5) Reliance by party raising estoppel;
(6) Prejudice to party raising estoppel.
Id at 1094.
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 90(1) (1979) defines promissory estoppel as: "[a]
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
Thus, the primary difference between the two types of estoppel is that in proving promissory
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Rubish relaxes the requirements of waiver by estoppel: waiver may now
be established upon proof of an express or implied promise, rather than proof
of an actual misrepresentation. As Justice Exum noted, past cases have recog-
nized the distinction between equitable and promissory estoppel,30 but the use
of estoppel as a ground for waiver has caused confusion "as to exactly what
must be proven by the party asserting the estoppel." 31 The supreme court's
thoughtful opinion should help alleviate such confusion in the future.
In North Carolina a demand for payment of rent is a prerequisite to for-
feiture when the lease does not contain a forfeiture clause for failure to pay
rent. In Snipes v. Snipes32 the court of appeals clarified the requirements of
G.S. 42-3 for such a demand.33 In that case, when lessor attempted to convey
the leased premises, he contended that the lease was terminated by lessee's
failure to pay rent.34 Lessee argued that the lease was still in force and that
such a conveyance violated his first purchase option. The court rejected de-
fendant's argument that informing the lessee of her desire to "get all this busi-
ness settled" constituted a proper demand for payment.35 Because demand
under G.S. 42-3 requires a "clear, unequivocal statement, either oral or writ-
ten, requiring the lessee to pay all past due rent,"' 36 the court reasoned that any
less authoritative demand would fail to put the lessee on notice that the lessor
intended to exercise her statutory right to forfeiture.37
B. Title
Considering the issue for the first time, the court of appeals in Cothran v.
Evans38 held that because North Carolina's registration statutes do not en-
estoppel the lessee need only establish the existence of an express or implied promise; an actual
misrepresentation need not be shown.
30. Rubish, 306 N.C. at 428,293 S.E.2d at 756. See also Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 571, 575,
144 S.E.2d 636, 640 (1965) (lessor was estopped to deny any extension of a lease when he re-
quested and accepted payment of rent for the extended term before expiration date of lessee's
right to give notice of an extension).
31. 306 N.C. at 427, 293 S.E.2d at 755-56. The court observed that defendant had alleged
that plaintiff was equitably estopped, and the trial court instructed on the elements of equitable
estoppel.
32. 55 N.C. App. 498, 286 S.E.2d 591, a.f'dper curiam, 306 N.C. 373, 293 S.E.2d 187 (1982).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-3 provides:
In all verbal or written leases of real property of any kind in which is fixed a definite time
for the payment of the rent reserved therein, there shall be implied a forfeiture of the
term upon failure to pay rent within 10 days after a demand is made by the lessor or his
agent on said lessee for all past-due rent, and the lessor may forthwith enter and dispos-
sess the tenant without having declared such forfeiture or reserved the right of reentry in
the lease.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-3 (1976).
34. 55 N.C. App. at 500, 286 S.E.2d at 592.
35. Id at 504, 286 S.E.2d at 595.
36. Id
37. Id
38. 56 N.C. App. 431, 289 S.E.2d 398 (1982). When, as in this case, state and federal regula-
tions profess to govern the same subject matter, the federal regulations control. See Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 11 (1939) ("otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitu-
tional authority and the State, and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national field").
A federal district court has determined that tobacco allotments are not within the purview of this
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compass tobacco allotments, federal guidelines will govern the validity of
leased allotments, as well as the priority of any liens on land subject to the
allotments. In 1975 plaintiffs conveyed two farms to Whispering Pines, Inc.,
and received in consideration a purchase money note and a deed of trust that
was duly recorded.39 In 1977 defendant and Whispering Pines entered into a
five-year lease of the tobacco allotment on the two farms; the lease option
included an option to purchase.4° Defendant then recorded the lease. In 1978
Whispering Pines fell behind on its note payments and persuaded plaintiffs, as
mortgagees, to agree to a lease of the farm's allotment to defendant.41 Pursu-
ant to federal guidelines, plaintiffs then signed a Record of Transfer of Allot-
ment, in which they agred to a five-year lease between Whispering Pines and
defendant.42 After the deed of trust was foreclosed in 1979, plaintiffs became
record owners of the farms and asked defendant to vacate the lands. When
defendant refused, plaintiffs argued that the foreclosure sale had extinguished
the lease, and brought an action to recover for the value of the allotment for
1980 and to obtain an injunction ordering defendants to transfer the allotment
to them.43
The court determined that the 1977 lease between Whispering Pines and
defendant was invalid, since the parties had not complied with federal require-
ments.44 It concluded, however, that the 1978 lease was valid, and that in
signing the Record of Transfer as mortgagee, plaintiffs had agreed to
subordinate their lien on the farms to defendant's lease.45 As a result, the
foreclosure one year later did not extinguish defendant's lease, and plaintiffs
could not use the farm's tobacco allotment until the lease expired in 1982.46
The result is well reasoned. Plaintiffs had argued that since the lease was
recorded after they had recorded the mortgage and deed of trust, the lease was
state's registration statutes concerning prior encumbrances. See Hart v. Hassell, 250 F. Supp. 893,
897 (E.D.N.C. 1966).
39. 56 N.C. App. at 431, 289 S.E.2d at 399.
40. Id The terms of this lease provided that:
[I]f for any reason Lessor [Whispering Pines, Inc.] should lose the title to the property
where the tobacco allotment is located or for any reason be unable to legally lease the
tobacco allotment for any period during the term of this lease, Lessor shall promptly
repay Lessee [Tildon Evans] on a pro rata basis for any unexpired term of said lease.
41. Id. at 431-32, 289 S.E.2d at 399.
42. Id. at 432, 289 S.E.2d at 399.
43. Id. Plaintiffs sought to recover the value of the tobacco for 1980 because defendant had
continued to farm the land during that year.
44. Id. at 434, 289 S.E.2d at 400. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 provides for the
transfer of farm marketing quotas "only in such manner and subject to such conditions as the
Secretary [of Agriculture] may prescribe by regulations." 7 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1976). The Secre-
tary has required persons seeking to lease their tobacco quotas to execute the lease on a federal
form that is subject to the approval of the county committee. See 7 C.F.R. § 725-72(c)(2) (1982).
The 1977 lease was thus improperly executed.
45. 56 N.C. App. at 434, 289 S.E.2d at 400. Since the parties had agreed to a five-year lease,
federal regulations required the written consent of the plaintiffs. "No transfer of allotment other
than by annual lease shall be made from a farm subject to a mortgage or other lien unless the
transfer is agreed to in writing by the lienholder." 7 C.F.R. § 725.72(0) (1982).
46. 56 N.C. App. at 434, 289 S.E.2d at 401.
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a junior lien and the foreclosure sale thus extinguished it.47 This argument
ignores the federal government's interest in controlling the transfer of tobacco
allotments. To conclude that the foreclosure sale did extinguish the lease
would be tantamount to granting to the state the power to regulate such trans-
fers. In keeping leases of tobacco allotments outside the scope of North Caro-
lina laws concerning prior encumbrances, the court has maintained federal
control of such leases. The requirement of obtaining a lien-holder's consent to
a lease of longer than one year reduces any unfairness that may result to the
lien-holder who later takes record title of the land.
In Simmons v. Quick-Stop Food Mart48 the supreme court applied princi-
ples of agency law and the Uniform Partnership Act in concluding that the
wife of a partner had acquired each partner's one-half interest in a tract of
partnership property, giving her fee simple title. In 1976, Wood and Simmons
Investments, a two-man partnership, owned a tract of land held in the names
of each partner.49 Anticipating immediate dissolution, Wood agreed to con-
vey his one-half interest in the tract to Simmons and Simmons' wife. Ordina-
rily, when one partner conveys partnership property held in the name of each
partner, he passes only the equitable interest.50 Since, however, Wood con-
veyed the property to a fellow partner in anticipation of dissolution, Wood
was not "carrying on the business of the partnership in the usual way."51
Under such circumstances, a partner's conveyance of partnership property
binds the partnership if other partners so authorize.52 As Simmons impliedly
authorized the conveyance by accepting it as grantee, the partnership validly
conveyed Wood's one-half interest to Simmons and Simmons' wife.53
After dissolution of the partnership, the other one-half interest remained
partnership property, and Simmons could still act as agent for the partnership
to convey this one-half interest.54 Thus, when he and his wife executed a sepa-
47. Ordinarily, one who purchases a deed of trust at a foreclosure sale acquires title free from
encumbrances and liens that arose after execution of the mortgage. See Dixieland Realty Co. v.
Wysor, 272 N.C. 172, 175, 158 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1967). Whether the lease of a tobacco allotment
constitutes an encumbrance or lien is a question the Cothran court did not address.
48. 307 N.C. 33, 296 S.E.2d 275 (1982). This action arose from a dispute between the ex-wife
of a partner in an investment partnership and a convenience shop. The ex-wife, having recorded
the deed on November 5, 1979, claimed fee simple title of the disputed property. The shop re-
corded a lease on the property after this date, but maintained that the conveyance to the ex-wife
had been invalid.
49. Id. at 36,296 S.E.2d at 278 (1982). The property had been conveyed to "Johnny L. Wood
and Oscar Harold Simmons d/b/a Wood and Simmons Investments, a Partnership." In deter-
mining that this conveyance created partnership property in the names of each partner, the court
noted that other property was held in the partnership name with no mention of the partners indi-
vidually. Id.
50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-40(d) (1982).
51. 307 N.C. at 40, 296 S.E.2d at 280. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-39(a) (1982) governs acts of a
partner that carry on the partnership's business in the usual way. Section 59-39(b) governs those
acts which appear not to carry on the business in the usual way.
52. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-39(b) (1982).
53. 307 N.C. at 40, 296 S.E.2d at 280.
54. Id at 41-42, 296 S.E.2d at 280-81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-65(a)(1) (1982) provides that




ration agreement conveying the property to his wife, Simmons effectively con-
veyed the remaining one-half interest that the partnership had held, as well as
his share of the one-half interest that he and his wife had held jointly.55 Since
she had acquired all the interests, she then held fee simple title.
C. Mortgages
In In re Bonder56 the North Carolina Supreme Court expanded the scope
of its earlier approval of due-on-sale provisions in real estate loans secured by
a deed of trust. The court held that due-on-sale clauses in residential loan
instruments, as well as in commercial instruments, are valid and enforceable.57
The court also held that the separate components of a due-on-sale provision
need not all appear in the same paragraph of a loan instrument.58
The deed of trust in Bonder contained an agreement that the borrower
would not convey the premises without written consent of the lender. A sepa-
rate clause contained a provision that the entire loan would become due im-
mediately upon the mortgagor's breach of any "agreement or condition" of the
loan instrument.59 The mortgagor (Bonder) sought the mortgagee's written
consent to convey the premises to a third party. The mortgagee acceded to this
conveyance on the condition that the interest rate be raised from 7 % to
12%.60 Although the third party refused the mortgagee's terms, the mortgagor
conveyed the property upon the original loan terms. The mortgagee then de-
manded full payment of the loan.61 When the mortgagor failed to honor this
demand, foreclosure proceedings were initiated. 62 The court of appeals relied
upon Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association63 to affirm the supe-
rior court's authorization of the foreclosure proceedings.
In affirming the court of appeal's decision, the supreme court agreed that
Crockett was "both instructive and controlling."' 4 In Crockett a due-on-sale
clause in a commercial loan agreement was held not to constitute an invalid
restraint on alienation.65 The borrower could avoid the hardship of foreclo-
sure "merely by paying off the loan."' 66 The borrower also had the option of
not selling if his loan became more favorable to him due to changed interest
rates.67 The court, noting that both parties stood on equal footing, declined to
restrict the lendor's exercise of a due-on-sale clause to those situations in
55. 307 N.C. at -, 296 S.E.2d at 281.
56. 306 N.C. 451, 293 S.E.2d 798 (1982).
57. Id at 457, 293 S.E.2d at 802. In Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620,
224 S.E.2d 580 (1976), the supreme court upheld a due-on-sale clause in a commercial lease.
58. 306 N.C. at 458, 293 S.E.2d at 803.
59. Id at 452, 293 S.E.2d at 799.
60. Id at 453, 293 S.E.2d at 799.
61. Id at 453, 293 S.E.2d at 800.
62. Id
63. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
64. 306 N.C. at 455, 293 S.E.2d at 800.
65. 289 N.C. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
66. Id at 625, 224 S.E.2d at 584.
67. Id
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which its security is threatened. 68 Thus, absent a prepayment penalty, the
lender could withhold consent to a property conveyance for the sole purpose
of seeking an increased interest rate.69
After reaffirming Crockett 70 the court disposed of respondent mortga-
gor's two principle contentions. First, the court rejected the claim that Crock-
ett applied only to commercial loan instruments. Refusing to assume that a
residential borrower is less capable than a commercial borrower of under-
standing a loan agreement, the court approved due-on-sale clauses in residen-
tial loans.71 Second, the court dismissed respondent's contention that the
language in its loan instrument did not constitute a due-on-sale clause.72 The
provision in respondent's loan requiring the lender's consent to convey the
secured property did not appear, as it did in Crockett, in the same paragraph
as the provision regarding the borrower's breach and the resulting acceleration
of loan maturity.73 The court held that requiring the two provisions of a due-
on-sale clause to appear within the same paragraph would ignore the sub-
stance of the terms of the deed when read as a whole.74
In his dissent, Justice Meyer compared the pertinent language in the
Crockett and Bonder loan instruments.75 The Bonder instrument, he con-
cluded, required a "patching together of separate parts in order to construct a
due-on-sale interpretation. '76 Therefore, he argued that such a construction
would not correspond to the expectations of the parties when the instrument
was signed.77
Bonder deals North Carolina residential mortgagors a stiff blow. 78 The
court's rationale for upholding a due-on-sale clause in Crockett is undercut in
the context of a typical residential loan agreement.79 The holding in Crockett
was based upon a number of assumptions, none of which characterize the situ-
ation of most home borrowers.80 A residential borrower, unversed in the intri-
cacies of real estate finance, does not stand on equal footing with a savings and
loan institution.8' The court's assumption that the average borrower will be
68. Id at 630, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
69. Id at 631, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
70. 306 N.C. at 457, 293 S.E.2d at 802.
71. Id
72. Id at 458, 293 S.E.2d at 802-03.
73. Id at 452-53, 293 S.E.2d at 799.
74. Id at 458, 293 S.E.2d at 803.
75. Id at 463-64, 293 S.E.2d at 805 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
76. Id at 464, 293 S.E.2d at 806 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
77. Id
78. Compare Note, Real Property Security-North Carolina Deals Mortgagors a Bad Hand,
13 WAKE FOREST REv. 490 (1977) (criticizing Crockett as contrary to basic principles of property
and contract law, and various statutory and equitable considerations) with Note, Mortgages-Use
of Due on Sale Clause by a Lender Is Not a Restraint on Alienation in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L.
REv. 310 (1977) (court commended for "recognizing significant economic policies" in arriving at
correct result in Crockett).
79. 306 N.C. at 466, 293 S.E.2d at 806 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
80. See Note, Real Property Securi y, supra note 78, at 496
81. See Crockett v. First Fed Say. & LoanAss'n, 289 N.C. 620, 632-44, 224 S.E.2d 580, 588-95(1976) (LakeJ., dissenting).
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able to choose not to alienate his property if he enjoys a favorable mortgage
interest rate ignores reality; such a choice is frequently illusory, as when the
homeowner changes job locations.82 Similarly, it is unrealistic to assume that
most homeowners can pay their mortgages in full at will and thus avoid the
hardships of foreclosure.8 3 Finally, as Justice Meyer noted in his dissent, the
majority's treatment of the due-on-sale clause itself is troublesome.8 4 The
court's willingness to pull together various portions of a loan agreement to
create a due-on-sale interpretation invites the type of abuse by unscruplous
lenders that Justice Lake envisioned in his dissent in Crockett:
In the present instance, the accelerating event, as now construed by
the money lender, is a 'sleeper' provision, tucked away in the printed
portion of the deed of trust so that its meaning, as now asserted by
the money lender, would not readily catch the attention of a mortga-
gor, or a subsequent purchaser of the property, reading the deed of
trust.85
In Tech Land Development, Inc. v. South Carolina Insurance, Co. 8 6 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the issue whether a purchasing
mortgagee at a foreclosure sale was entitled to retain the proceeds of an insur-
ance settlement on mortaged property that had been damaged by fire. In a
case of first impression, the court adopted the distinction made in most juris-
dictions87 between foreclosure-after-loss and foreclosure-before-loss.88
To secure a note owed to Northwestern Bank, plaintiff had executed a
deed of trust on a building it owned.89 In compliance with the deed of trust,
plaintiff purchased a fire insurance policy from South Carolina Insurance
Company. When plaintiff defaulted on its mortage, Northwestern initiated
foreclosure proceedings. 90 After Northwestern purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale, a fire damaged the building on the last day of the upset pe-
riod. Northwestern settled with South Carolina Insurance Company for
$67,449.30, and plaintiff sued to determine what portion of the recovery
Northwestern was entitled to retain.91
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that Northwest-
ern was entitled to the entire settlement. The court noted that if the insured
property had been damaged prior to foreclosure, Northwestern's bid would
have represented the value of the damaged property,92 and its retention of the
82. See Note, Real Property Securitysupra note 78, at 496.
83. Id
84. 306 N.C. at 463, 293 S.E.2d at 805.
85. 289 N.C. at 633, 224 S.E.2d at 589 (Lake, J., dissenting).
86. 57 N.C. App. 566, 291 S.E.2d 821, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 563, 294 S.E.2d 228 (1982).
87. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.16
(1979); Note, Foreclosure, Loss, and the Proper Distribution of Insurance Proceeds Under Open and
StandardMortgage Clauses: Some Observations, 7 VAL. U.L. REv. 485 (1973).
88. 57 N.C. App. at 569, 291 S.E.2d at 823-24.
89. Id at 566, 291 S.E.2d at 822.
90. Id at 566-67, 291 S.E.2d at 822.
91. Id at 567, 291 S.E.2d at 822.
92. Id at 569, 291 S.E.2d at 822.
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insurance proceeds in excess of the deficency after foreclosure would amount
to unjust enrichment. 93 Since the property was damaged after the foreclosure
sale and before the expiration of the upset period, Northwestern's bid repre-
sented the value of the undamaged property and the bank was entitled to the
entire insurance settlement.94 This settlement, the court reasoned, represented
the difference in value between the property Northwestern had bid and the
property it had received. 95
D. Joint Ownershio96
In Bridgers v. BridgerS97 the court of appeals construed G.S. 46-25, which
provides for the partition of standing timber on land owned by tenants in com-
mon.98 Plaintiffs, cotenants in remainder of a one-half interest in a tract of
land, petitioned the superior court for sale of the land's standing timber pursu-
ant to section 46-25.99 Defendant, owner of the other half interest in the same
land, counterclaimed for its equitable partition into two shares of equal
value.1°° The superior court found G.S. 46-25 inapplicable and granted de-
fendant's counterclaim.
The court of appeals held that the superior court had misconstrued G.S.
46-25 in two respects. First, G.S. 46-25 does not require all cotenants to have
the same type of interest in land.101 Consequently, a cotenant in remainder
could petition for a sale of standing timber in which the other cotenant has a
present possessory interest. 10 2 Second, a finding that an equitable partition is
93. Id at 569, 291 S.E.2d at 823-24.
94. Id at 569-70, 291 S.E.2d 824.
95. Id at 570, 291 S.E.2d at 824.
96. The court of appeals in Threatte v. Threatte, 59 N.C. App. 292, 296 S.E.2d 521 (1982),
disc rev, granted, 307 N.C. 582, 299 S.E.2d 650 (1983), clarified the type of writing required by
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 to create ajoint bank account with a right of survivorship. Section 41-
2.1 permits a joint account with right of survivorship to be established when "both or all parties
have signed a written agreement... expressly providing for the right of survivorship." The
court of appeals concluded N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1981) would be
satisfied by either a properly executed signature card or a certificate, signed by both parties, that
expressly provided for a right of survivorship. The signature card in question was signed by both
plaintiff and the intestate, and contained language sufficient to create an incident of survivorship.
Thus, the court had little difficulty affirming the lower court's summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff's claim to the proceeds of the account.
97. 56 N.C. App. 617, 289 S.E.2d 921 (1982).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-25 provides:
When two or more persons own, as tenants in common,.., a tract of land,. then in
any such case in which there is standing timber upon any such land, a sale of said tim-
ber trees, separate from the land, may be had upon the petition of one or more of said
owners, or the life tenant,. . . upon such terms as the court may order ..... Provided
further, that prior to a judgment allowing a life tenant to sell the timber there must be a
finding that ie cutting is in keeping with good husbandry and that no substantial injury
will be done to the remainder interest.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-25 (1976).
99. 56 N.C. App. at 618, 289 S.E.2d at 922.
100. Id




impossible is not a prerequisite for granting a partition under G.S. 46-25.103
The court observed that G.S. 46-25, unlike G.S. 46-22104 and G.S. 46-26,105
"makes no mention of a partition of the real estate."10 6 The court concluded
that while G.S. 46-25 was a permissive statute,107 the superior court's miscon-
struction of the statute required that the case be remanded.
E. Eminent Domain
In Long v. City of Charlotte1 0 8 the supreme court further clarified the still
developing law governing airport noise cases. Long, who owned property one
mile from the end of a recently built runway, sought to recover for damage to
his home, possessions, and physical and mental health,10 9 which allegedly re-
sulted from the noise, vibration, and pollution caused by low-flying aircraft
passing over and near his property.' 0 He brought action for inverse condem-
nation, trespass, and nuisance, and further sought punitive damages from de-
fendant city, which had allegedly known of plaintiff's claim prior to
construction of the runway. 1' The trial court dismissed the claims for tres-
pass and nuisance, and struck the allegation of punitive damages.12
The supreme court affirmed the trial court in all respects. According to
the court, trespass and nuisance theories do not protect the landowner's inter-
103. Id at 621, 289 S.E.2d at 923.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-22 provides:
Whenever it appears by satisfactory proof that an actualpartition of the lands cannont be
made without injury to some or all of the parties interested, the court shall order a sale of
the property described in the petition, or any part thereof.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-22 (1976) (emphasis added).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-26 provides:
In case of the partition of mineral interests in all instances where it is made to appear to
the court that it would be for the best interests of the tenants in common, or joint ten-
ants, of such interests to have the same sold, or ifactualpartition of the same cannot be
had without injury to some or all of such tenants [in common], then it is lawful for and
the duty of the court to order a sale of such mineral interests and a division of the
proceeds as the interests of the parties may appear.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-26 (1976) (emphasis added).
106. 56 N.C. App. at 621, 289 S.E.2d at 923.
107. Id The court noted that under section 46-25, a judge's discretionary order is ordinarily
not subject to review unless an abuse of discretion is evident. While there was no such abuse in
this case, the judge had ruled upon section 46-25 under a "misapprehension of the law." Id
108. 306 N.C. 187, 293 S.E.2d 101 (1982). The North Carolina courts last considered the issue
of "a taking by aircraft noise" in Cochran v. City of Charlotte, 53 N.C. App. 390, 281 S.E.2d 179
(1981), cert. denied, 304 N.C. 725, 288 S.E.2d 380 (1982). The supreme court had not considered
the issue since Hoyle v. City of Charlotte, 276 N.C. 292, 172 S.E.2d 1 (1970). Long was consoli-
dated for oral argument with Robinson v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 213, 293 S.E.2d 117 (1982),
and the court's holding in Long determined Robinson.
109. Plaintiff alleged that the aircraft had caused him and his wife "stress, anxiety, fear, an-
noyance and loss of sleep, all resulting in injury to their physical and mental health." 306 N.C. at
192, 293 S.E.2d at 105.
110. 306 N.C. at 191-92, 293 S.E.2d at 105.
111. Id. at 191-92, 293 S.E.2d at 104-05.
112. Id. at 188, 293 S.E.2d at 103. The court allowed plaintifrs petition for discretionary re-
view before the date on which the court of appeals had been scheduled to hear the case, because
the decision in Long would govern approximately 200 similar cases already pending. Id. at 189,
293 S.E.2d at 104.
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA L4W AEVIEW
est in airport noise cases.'1 3 To recover under the tresspass theory, a plaintiff
must show that the planes flew directly over his property, and he must identify
and sue a particular pilot.1 4 The nuisance theory is inadequate "particularly
when there are only infrequent interferences."' 15 Accordingly, the court held
that inverse condemnation is a landowner's sole remedy for injuries resulting
from aircraft overffight. 116 The court also adopted the general rule that absent
express statutory authority, a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages
against a municipality."17
In considering the issue for the first time, the court discussed the historical
concerns of retribution and deterrence as justifications for imposition of puni-
tive damages. It concluded, however, that imposition of punitive damages
upon a municipality satisfies neither of these concerns. First, the guilty officer
does not suffer, rather the governmental entity must pay the award and suffer
any retribution. Secondly, since the individual officer does not pay, the deter-
rent effect is limited. Consequently, punitive damages present a windfall to a
plaintiff, while burdening innocent taxpayers who must pay the damages im-
posed uplon the municipality. Given these considerations, the court properly
chose to follow "overwhelming weight of modem authority" in refusing to
permit imposition of punitive damages upon a municipality." 18
The remainder of the court's decision is somewhat more questionable. In
restricting plaintiff to an inverse condemnation action, 19 the court denied re-
covery for harm to plaintiffs physical and mental health.120 Under this ruling,
courts may consider harm only to the extent that it has diminished the value of
113. Id. at 197, 293 S.E.2d at 108.
- 114. Id. (quoting Kettelson, Inverse Condemnation of.Air Easements, 3 REAL PROPERTY, PRO-
BATE & TRUST J. 97, 97 (1968)). See also Note, Inverse Condemnation and Nuisance: Alternative
Remedies for Airport Noise Damage, 24 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 793 (1973).
115. Long, 306 N.C. at 197, 293 S.E.2d at 108. In order to recover under a nuisance theory in
North Carolina, a party must show a substantial nontrespassory invasion of his interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land. The invasion subjecting a tortfeasor to liability may be either
intentional or unintentional. Liability for an unintentional invasion arises when the conduct is
negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous. Morgan v. High Penn Oil, 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682
(1953).
116. Long, 306 N.C. at 197, 293 S.E.2d at 108. The term "inverse condemnation" designates
"a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has
been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eninent domain has been attempted by the taking agency." City of Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C.
656, 662-63, 140 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1965)(quoting City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.2d 598
(Fla. App. 1964)).
117. Long, 306 N.C. at 206-08, 293 S.E.2d at 113-15. The term "municipal corporation" will
probably be construed to include not only cities, towns, villages, and counties, but also other
political subdivisions such as municipal transit authorities, municipal agencies, and school dis-
tricts. See Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Auth., 237 N.C. 52,74 S.E.2d
310 (1953); Annot., 1 A.L.R.4TH 448, 451 n.3 (1980).
118. Long, 306 N.C. at 206-08, 293 S.E.2d at 114 (citing Annot., 1 A.L.R.4TH 448 (1980)).
119. A condemnation actidon proceeds on the theory that private property has been taken for
public use without compensating the owner. It is interesting to note that North Carolina is the
only state whose constitution does not contain a provision prohibiting the taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation. The supreme court allows recovery for a taking on federal consti-
tutional and common law grounds. See Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Casesin Retrospect andProspect, 71 DICK. L. REv. 207 (1967).
120. Long, 306 N.C. at 204-06, 293 S.E.2d at 112-13.
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a plaintiffs property. 121 Acknowledgment of an action for nuisance would
have allowed landowners to recover both for diminution in property value and
for proximately caused special damages, such as physical distress and mental
anguish. In cases involving a violation of airspace not amounting to a taking,
a landowner still could recover for physical and mental harm. Other courts,
realizing the inadequacy of the inverse condemnation action in such cases,
have permitted nuisance actions as well as inverse condemnation suits.122
Though Long might appear to preclude recovery of special damages for
physical and mental harm, the supreme court noted that it might permit a
nuisance action when low flying aircraft cause a specific bodily injury, "such
as injury to the eardrum affecting hearing." 123 The court specifically men-
tioned in a footnote that it was not deciding this issue. 124 Perhaps a resolution
of this question will become the next development of North Carolina law in
airport cases, "a continually developing area of the law... [that], as of this
date, has not fully evolved." 12
In Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. Irvin 126 the supreme court
applied the traditional measure of damages in eminent domain cases to reach
an arguably unjust result.127 Irvin involved a condemnation action brought
by the Airport Authority in 1975.128 Following discovery and a hearing over-
ruling defendant's defenses, commissioners appraised the value of the prop-
erty as of July 1, 1975, the date the Authority had filed its petition to
condemn. 129 After several appeals, in November 1980 a jury determined the
amount of compensation using the July 1, 1975 date of valuation.' 30 Irvin
argued that the court should have assessed the property value as of the date of
the trial. The court of appeals agreed, considering it "patently unfair" to pay
the landowner in 1980 dollars for damages that were measured in 1975 dollars
of much greater value.131 The court also noted that the purpose of the rule
establishing the date of petition as the valuation date is to prevent a windfall
121. Id.
122. See, eg., Greater Westchester Homowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86,
1303 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Nestle v. City of Santa
Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920,496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233
Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) (cited inLong, 306 N.C. at 197 n.8, 293 S.E.2d at 108 n.8.). Plaintiffs
in Long had sued the Federal Aviation Agency's administration in federal court. The federal
court found that there was no remedy under the Federal Aviation Act, but assumed that plaintiffs
could recover for all injuries under North Carolina law. The court suggested that limiting recov-
ery to the loss in fair market value would be a "harsh and unjust result." 306 N.C. at 202 n.9, 293
S.E.2d at 111 n.9.
123. 306 N.C. at 190 n.4, 293 S.E.2d at 104 n.2.
124. Id
125. Id. at 194, 293 S.E.2d at 106.
126. 306 N.C. 263, 293 S.E.2d 149 (1982).
127. Id. at 274, 293 S.E.2d at 157.
128. Id. at 274, 293 S.E.2d at 151. The development of aviation has forced courts and legisla-
tures to modify the ancient maxim, "he who owns the soil owns it to the heavens." Hoyle v. City
of Charlotte, 276 N.C. 292, 299, 172 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1970).
129. 306 N.C. at 264, 293 S.E.2d at 151.
130. Id. at 266, 293 S.E.2d at 152.
131. Greensboro-High Point Airport Auth. v. Irvin, 54 N.C. App. 355, 357, 283 S.E.2d 171,
172 (1981).
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to the landowner whose property value increases because of the condemna-
tion; in Irvin the increase in property value resulted from general increases in
property values during the five years between petition and trial.132 Finally,
the court noted the Airport Authority's failure to pay the money into court
pursuant to a statute which permits the condemnor to take possession of the
land upon paying the amount of the award.1 33 Had the Authority paid, it
would have been "in possession for the purpose of establishing the valuation
date." 134
The supreme court reversed, strictly applying the rule that the measure-
ment of compensation is the difference in property value immediately before
and immediately after the date of petition.135 The court found that the statute
permitting the condemnor to possess the property upon payment of the award
into court merely offers the condemnor an option, and does not change the
date of valuation.136 Examining the rationale behind assessing the property
value as of the date the petition is filed, the court determined that the rule is
intended to prevent recovery of any appreciation of value after the filing date,
regardless of the cause of such appreciation. 137
G.S. 40A-63 suggests that the legislature may have envisioned a narrower
rationale behind this rule. 138 Although the statute does establish the date of
petition as the valuation date, it also mentions that "except as provided in the
following sections [the valuation] shall not reflect an increase or decrease due
to the condemnation."139 This language suggests a concern that a landowner
should not benefit from the condemnation-it does not necessarily follow that
delays between the filing date and payment of the award should penalize the
landowner. While the court's provision for payment of interest over the years
of delay mitigates this penalty somewhat, 140 the legal rate of interest cannot
compensate for the diminution in the value of the dollar over the same period.




135. Irvin, 306 N.C. at 268, 293 S.E.2d at 153.
136. Id. at 267-68, 293 S.E.2d at 152-53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-19 (1976), repealed by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 40A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981), provides for this "quick take" procedure. In 1981 the
legislature replaced the Chapter 40 statutes governing eminent domain with Chapter 40A, effec-
tive January 1, 1982. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The new quick take proce-
dure states that the condemnor "may" deposit money into court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-28 (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
137. 306 N.C. at 270-71 , 293 S.E.2d at 154-55 (declaring that the court of appeals mistakenly
found room for exceptions in some courts' use of the word "ordinarily" as a preface to the general
rule that petition date is the date of valuation).
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT § 40A-63 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The court could not apply this statute
to this case, however, since this eminent domain proceeding commenced before the statue took
effect. See supra note 136.
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-63 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
140. See 306 N.C. at 272-73, 293 S.E.2d at 155-56. North Carolina courts generally provide
for payment of interest as compensation for delays in paying the award. Interest is paid from the
date the condemnor acquires the right to possession. See City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth, 283
N.C. 316, 196 S.E.2d 231 (1973). In Irvin the condemnor acquired the right to possession on the
date the commissioners assessed the property, a year after it filed the petition to condemn.
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changes in property value that arise after the date of petition. In Department of
Transportation v. Bragg141 the Department brought a condemnation action for
a right of way across Bragg's land. After filing the petition, but before dam-
ages had been determined, the Department excavated a spring that formerly
had drained through a pipeline across Bragg's property. The pipeline broke,
causing water damage to Bragg's motel.142 At trial, the Department filed a
motion in limine requesting the court not to consider the water damages in
determining compensation.143 The trial court granted the motion and the
court of appeals affirmed. 144 According to the court, compensation must be
determined as of the time of taking, which occurred upon filing of the peti-
tion.145 Thus, to recover for water damages to his motel, Bragg was required
to bring a separate action.146
Although the cause of action for inverse condemnation ordinarily accrues
at the time of the alleged taking, North Carolina courts have recognized an
exception to this rule when the state has taken an easement for flooding. 147
In Lea Co. v. North Carolina Board of Transportation14 the court of ap-
peals reiterated that the right of action for such a taking does not arise until
damage has occurred. In Lea Co. the state had built highway structures on the
edge of plaintiffs property. Plaintiff alleged that these structures had
foreseeably increased the level of flooding on its property and thereby caused
substantial damage to its apartments.' 49 Arguing that in building these struc-
tures the state had taken an easement for flooding, plaintiff brought an action
for inverse condemnation.
To recover for such a taking, a landowner must show that the flooding
was (1) "reasonably to have been anticipated by the government," (2) "the
direct result of the structure established and maintained by the government,"
and (3) "an actual permanent invasion of the land, or a right appurtenant
thereto, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an injury to the
property." 150 The court determined that plaintiff had proved these elements,
citing evidence that (1) the flooding was at approximately one hundred year
flood levels, which would have been statisticaly foreseeable by those familiar
with the science of hydrology; 151 (2) the structures "substantially increased"
141. 59 N.C. App. 344, 296 S.E.2d 657 (1982).
142. Id. at 344-45, 296 S.E.2d at 657.
143. Id. at 345, 296 S.E.2d at 657.
144. Id.
145. Id. "Upon the filing of the complaint and the declaration of taking and deposit in court,
... title to said land... together with the right to immediate possession.. . shall vest [as of] the
time of the filing of the complaint ... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-104 (1981).
146. 59 N.C. App. at 346, 296 S.E.2d at 658.
147. See Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d 599
(1963).
148. 57 N.C. App. 392, 291 S.E.2d 844, disc. rev. allowed, 306 N.C. 557, 294 S.E.2d 371 (1982).
149. Id. at 394, 291 S.E.2d at 846.
150. Id. at 396-97, 291 S.E.2d at 847-48 (quoting Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway
Comm'n, 260 N.C. 246, 248, 132 S.E.2d 599, 607 (1963)). Prior to Lee Co., North Carolina courts
had not considered this issue since Midget!.
151. Id. at 397, 291 S.E.2d at 848.
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the level of flooding that would have occurred had they not been built;152 and
(3) the permanency of the foreseeable harm from the structures constituted a
permanent invasion of plaintiffs land.153 The court then observed that al-
though the state had taken an easement for flooding, an inverse condemnation
action for such a taking is grounded in nuisance. 154 Thus, while the state had
taken a right to flood when it first built the structures, defendant could not
recover until actual damage had occurred. 155 Given the problem that flood
easement takings present in proving the dimunition of property value before
actual damage occurs, this rule seems reasonable.
In Department of Transportation v. Harkey156 the court of appeals, relying
upon questionable grounds, denied compensation to a church for impairment
of access. In Harkey, the Department of Transportation had condemned a
strip of church property to construct a highway right-of-way. Access to the
church remained, but the right-of-way required church-goers to travel one
mile further than before, partially through residential streets. The church
sought compensation for this added inconvenience, but the trial court and the
court of appeals held that "reasonable and adequate" access remained after
the condemnation. 157
The court stated that "the main question in cases such as this one con-
cerns the reasonableness of the substitute access provided."' 158 In the 1971
case of Smith Co. v. Highway Commission,'59 the supreme court awarded
compensation for impairment of access when a condemnation resulted in in-
creased travel of less than one mile over residential streets to reach the affected
owner's warehouse. Although the "reasonableness of the substitute access
provided" seems substantially the same, the Harkey court distinguished Smith
on two grounds: (1) inHarkey the Department of Transportation had worked
harder to provide adequate alternative access routes for the church, and (2)
Harkey involved a church, rather than commercial property. 160 Even with the
Department of Transportation's improvements, however, the inconvenience to
the church was no less than that for which the court awarded compensation in
Smith. Thus, the only real distinction between the two cases is that one in-
volved church property, and the other commercial. That such a distinction
should determine whether a compensable taking has occurred is questionable.
Indeed, Justice Webb dissented for that very reason. 161
152. id at 398, 291 S.E.2d at 848.
153. Id at 398-99, 291 S.E.2d at 848-49.
154. Id at 402, 291 S.E.2d 850-51.
155. Id. North Carolina courts have long followed this rule in flood easement takings, though
apparently this situation rarely arises. See Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n,
260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d 599 (1963); Beach v. Wilmington & W. R.R., 120 N.C. 498, 26 S.E. 703
(1897) (railroad discharging drainage ditches).
156. 57 N.C. App. 172, 290 S.E.2d 773 (1982).
157. Id. at 172-73, 290 S.E.2d at 773-74.
158. Id. at 174,290 S.E.2d at 774 (quoting North Carolina State Highway Comm'n v. Rankin,
2 N.C. App. 452, 163 S.E.2d 302 (1968)).
159. 279 N.C. 328, 182 S.E.2d 383 (1971).
160. 57 N.C. App. at 174, 290 S.E.2d at 774.




In Green v. Duke Power Co. 162 the supreme court considered the question
whether a landowner may be held liable for injuries caused by structures
placed by another on his land pursuant to an easement. In Green the plaintiffs
sued Duke Power Co. for injuries received when a five-year old touched an
exposed transformer owned and operated by Duke.163 The transformer was
located on land owned by the Charlotte Housing Authority, which was leasing
the land when the accident occurred. 64 Plantiffs alleged that Duke Power
had negligently failed to keep the transformer locked.1 65 Duke Power filed a
third party complaint against the Housing Authority and its lessee, Eanes, and
sought contribution on ground that the third party defendants knew or should
have known of the dangerous condition, yet did nothing to correct it.
166
In ruling that Duke Power was not entitled to contribution, the supreme
court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for the
Housing Authority and Eanes.167 The court held that in order to find the third
party defendants liable, Duke Power, as owner of the easement, had to show
not only that the third-party defendants knew of the dangerous condition, but
also that they had "a reasonable opportunity to prevent or control such [a
condition]." 168
Eanes knew of the condition, but the court found that the express terms of
the easement had left Eanes and the Housing Authority without control over
the transformer. 169 The easement granted to Duke "the right .. .to con-
struct, maintain and operate [thereon]... transformers... together with the
right at all times to enter said premises .... -17o From these terms the courts
reasoned that interference or tampering with the transformer would constitute
an encroachment upon the rights of Duke Power, and that locking or fencing
the transformer would impair its accessability, contravening the terms of the
162. 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982).
163. Id at 604, 290 S.E.2d at 594.
164. Id
165. Id The general rule in North Carolina is that the owner of the servient tenement is not
responsible for the maintenance of the easement. See Dodds v. St. Louis Trust Co., 205 N.C. 153,
170 S.E. 652 (1933).
166. During discovory, Eanes, the lessee, testified that he had known for some time that the
transformer was unlocked and that he had so informed both Duke Power and the Housing Au-
thority. Duke Power denied having received such information. 305 N.C. at 604-05, 290 S.E.2d at
594.
167. 305 N.C. at 613, 290 S.E.2d at 599. The court of appeals had dismissed Duke Powers
appeal. Green v. Duke Power Co., 50 N.C. App. 646, 274 S.E.2d 889 (1981).
168. 305 N.C. at 611-12, 290 S.E.2d at 598 (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs
§ 27.19, at 1526 (1956)). In setting out this "control test," the court said it was following "the well-
reasoned holding of the Hawaii Supreme Court that in such cases it is the control and not the
ownership which determines the liability." I at 612, 290 S.E.2d at 598 (quoting Levy v. Kimball,
50 Hawaii 497, 499, 443 P.2d 142, 144 (1968)). Actually, the Hawaii rule originated as an explana-
tion for the traditional rule that the owner of an easement is liable for injuries caused by his use of
the land, even though he does not own the land. Because of his control over his use of the ease-
ment, liability attaches to him. See Levy, 50 Hawaii at 498-99, 443 P.2d at 144; Re Taxes Victoria
Ward, 33 Hawaii 235, 236-37 (1934).
169. 305 N.C. at 611, 290 S.E.2d at 598.
170. Id
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easement. Thus bound by the easement provision, the third-party defendants
had no control over the dangerous condition and could not be held liable.
Green suggests that the court will continue to impose liability solely upon
the owner of the easement, unless the owner of the servient tenement has the
opportunity and right to control the dangerous condition or conduct. The case
in which the supreme court first mentioned the "control test" involved the
alleged liability of a property owner for damages resulting from a fire set on
his property by a third party.171 Even if the owner had known of the fire, it is
doubtful he could have controlled it, because winds had blown it to adjoining
property. 172 In Green the third party defendants were capable of physically
controlling the condition, but the court excused their inaction by explaining
that they had no right of control under the terms of the easement. The precise
terms, however, only required that Duke Power have the right to maintain the
transformer and to enter the premises. Locking the transformer would have
caused Duke Power little inconvenience; erecting a warning sign or informing
Duke Power of the condition would not have interfered with the company's
rights in any way. It seems that as a matter of public policy, courts should
require the owner of a servient tenement to take comparable steps to prevent
injury to others when he knows of a dangerous condition on his property and
can reasonably reduce the risk it presents. 173 Considering that the landowner
usually receives compensation for the easements he grants, and consents to the
use that creates the risk, such a limited duty does not seem unduly
burdensome.
In City of Statesville v. Credit & Loan Co. 174 the court of appeals held that
a municipality had not established an aviation easement by prescription, be-
cause it had not shown that planes passing over defendant's property had in-
terfered with the use of the property or endangered the people on it. Plaintiff
had claimed an easement over land it needed for enlargement of its airport.
Because plaintiff did not claim it had taken an easement by eminent domain,
the courts did not apply a Causby analysis of the constitutional dimensions of
airspace; 175 instead, the court applied the North Carolina common and statu-
tory law of easements. In North Carolina, one of the elements of a prescrip-
171. See Benton v. Montague, 253 N.C. 695, 117 S.E.2d 771 (1961) (property owner not liable
for acts of licensee on his property, because he neither knew of nor could control these acts).
172. Id at 701, 117 S.E.2d at 775-76.
173. In this case, Eanes may have met this suggested duty of care, since he had warned plain-
tiff not to play near the transformer, and alleged that he had informed Duke Power of the condi-
tion. 305 N.C. at 604, 290 S.E.2d at 594. The court seemed reluctant to impose any duty of care
under the circumstances of this case, and merely stated that &f sound policy did require imposition
of a duty, Eanes discharged his duty by warning plaintiff not to play near the transformer. Id at
613, 290 S.E.2d at 599. It might be argued that sound public policy in this situation imposes a
greater duty than merely requiring the property owner to warn one child.
174. 58 N.C. App. 727, 294 S.E.2d 405 (1982).
175. Id at 729, 294 S.E.2d at 406. For examples of the analysis under eminent domain ac-
tions, see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Cochran v. City of Charlotte, 53 N.C.
App. 390, 291 S.E.2d 179 (1981). Had the court applied the Causby analysis, plaintiff would have
been required to show that "overflights constite a material interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of [defendant's] property, such that there [was] substantial diminution in fair market value."
Cochran, 53 N.C. App. at 397, 291 S.E.2d at 186.
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tive easement is use of another's property that is adverse, hostile, or under
claim of right. 176 To determine whether the municipality had used defendant's
property in such a manner, the court turned to the statutory law governing the
altitudes at which planes may legally fly.'7 7 Thus, if planes had been flying at
an altitude that did not interfere with defendant's use of the land, threaten the
safety of individuals below, or injure their health and happiness, then the
planes had not entered airspace that the defendant had a right to control, and
plaintiff's use of the land was not adverse. 178 Upon plaintiffs failure to re-
spond to affidavits stating that the manner of flights did not indicate a right of
ownership, and that the land had been used continuously for farming over the
previous twenty years, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue
over the adverse nature of the flights. 179 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment for defendant.180
Thus, in claims for a prescriptive easement over another's land, the statu-
tory law governing lawful altitudes of flight will determine whether a use is
adverse; in eminent domain actions, the constitutional measure of a land-
owner's right to airspace will determine whether there has been a taking. As a
result, a court could rule that a given use of airspace injured the happiness of
people below, and was thus adverse for the purpose of establishing a prescrip-
tive easement, yet conclude that the same use did not materially interfere with
the landowner's use so as to constitute a taking of his airspace. Curiously,
then, the scope of a landowner's interest in airspace depends upon the type of
action brought against him.
G. Zoning
In State v. Jones181 the North Carolina Supreme Court for the first time
176. Statesville, 58 N.C. App. at 729, 294 S.E.2d at 406. In order to acquire an easement by
prescription, plaintiff must show: (1) that the use was adverse, hostile, or under claim of right; (2)
that the use has been open and notorious; (3) that the use has been continuous and uninterrupted
for at least twenty years; and (4) that there is substantial identity of easement claimed throughout
the twenty-year period. Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 666, 273 S.E.2d 285, 287-88 (1981).
The court of appeals applied these principles in considering the validity of alleged prescrip-
tive easements in two other cases in 1982. See Newsome v. Smith, 56 N.C. App. 419, 289 S.E.2d
149 (1982) (reversing trial court's directed verdict for defendant, citing evidence which tended to
show that the disputed driveway was plaintiffs only means of access to their home and that plain-
tiffs and their predecessors had used it continuously for sixty years); Rathburn v. Hawkins, 56
N.C. App. 82, 286 S.E.2d 827 (1982) (reversing trial court's summary judgment for defendant on
grounds that the dispute over whether plaintiff had sought permission to use a roadway over
defendant's land constituted material issue of fact).
177. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-13 (1981), which provides:
Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this state is lawful, unless at such a low
altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water, or the space
over the land or water, is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be injurious to
the health and happiness, or imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on
the land or water beneath.
178. See Statesville, 58 N.C. App. at 729-30, 294 S.E.2d at 406.
179. Id at 730, 294 S.E.2d at 407.
180. Id
181. 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
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authorized zoning based solely upon aesthetic considerations.18 2 The case
arose from the arrest of defendant Jones for violation of a Buncombe County
ordinance requiring opaque fences around junkyards within specified areas of
the county.18 3 Jones argued that in seeking to hide junkyards from public
view, the county pursued a purely aesthetic goal.18 4 Traditionally, courts have
limited exercise of the zoning power to enforcement of ordinances reasonably
designed to promote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.185
Because North Carolina courts had never considered aesthetic objectives to be
within those public goals, Jones filed a motion to quash on grounds that the
courts lacked authority to zone in this manner.'8 6 Thus, Jones argued, to deny
him the desired use of his land constituted a taking without just compensation
in violation of the law of the land clause of the North Carolina Constitution
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 187
The superior court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional and granted the
motion to quash.188 The court of appeals reversed, citing dicta in several
supreme court cases as evidencing a growing tolerance for aesthetic zoning.189
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals, and thereby joined a growing
majority of courts that permit zoning solely for aesthetic considerations.190
In choosing to allow aesthetic zoning, the court applied a balancing test
first announced in a 1979 historic district zoning case, A-S-PAssociates v. City
of Raleigh. 191 This test now limits aesthetic zoning to situations in which the
182. The court first expressly prohibited aesthetic zoning in State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 59-
60, 108 S.E.2d 74, 78 (1959). As recently as 1979 the court had declined "to endorse such a broad
concept of the police power." A-S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 216, 258 S.E.2d
444, 450 (1979). The court of appeals, however, has departed from a blanket prohibition by up-
holding a county ordinance restricting the location of billboards. See Cumberland County v.
Eastern Fed. Corp., 48 N.C. App. 518, 524, 269 S.E.2d 672, 676, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527,273
S.E.2d 453 (1980).
183. 305 N.C. at 521-22, 290 S.E.2d at 676.
184. Id at 523, 290 S.E.2d at 677.
185. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
186. 305 N.C. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 676.
187. Id at 523, 290 S.E.2d at 677. The term "law of the land" is synonymous with "due
process of law" as used in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In re
Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 98, 221 S.E.2d 307, 308 (1976) (citing Surplus Store, Inc v. Hunter, 297 N.C.
206, 129 S.E.2d 764 (1964)).
188. 305 N.C. at 521, 290 S.E.2d at 676.
189. Shugar v. Gill, 53 N.C. App. 466, 277 S.E.2d 126 (1981).
190. Nineteen jurisdictions, including North Carolina, now permit regulation based solely
upon aesthetic concerns; seven prohibit it; sixteen have not answered the question definitively; and
nine have reported no cases. See Note, Property Law-State v. Jones: Aesthetic Regulation-From
Junkyards to Residences?, 61 N.C.L. Rlv. 401, 403 n.23 (1983).
191. 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979) (upholding constitutionality of historic district pres-
ervation ordinance adopted pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-395 to -399 (1982)). In a vic-
tory for preservationists during 1982, the legislature amended the Historic District Zoning Act to
include property owned by the state. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-398.1 (1982). Prior to this
amendment, municipalities could not regulate a publicly owned building unless it had been desig-
nated individualy as historic property. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-399.11 (1982). Publicly
owned buildings located within historic districts were not subject to historic zoning restrictions.
Thus, a municipality could designate an area as a historic district, and seek to renovate or preserve
structures within the district, but the state was free to use its buildings as it pleased, potentially
frustrating the municipality's efforts. This amendment permits municipalities to regulate all
buildings within designated historic districts, including those owned by the state (but excluding
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resulting gain to the public outweighs the diminution in value of the individ-
ual's property. 192 The court of appeals applied this test inkA 0. Givens, Inc. v.
Town of Nags Head, 193 upholding an ordinance that banned off-premises
commercial signs. 194
These decisions allow municipalities greater control in creating and pre-
serving an aesthetically pleasing environment. With elimination of the re-
quirement that aesthetic regulation promote the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare, the control ofjunkyards, billboards, and other eyesores has
become much more feasible. It is hoped, however, that aesthetic zoning will
not become a vehicle for imposing the tastes of some individuals over those of
others in controlling matters of more subjective aesthetic quality. 195
H. Wills, Trusts, and Estates
1. Construction
The case of Adcock v. Perry196 presented the North Carolina Supreme
Court with the problem of determining how to apply properly a statutory pre-
sumption embodied in G.S. 31-38,197 which favors fee simple devises over
lesser estates when construing ambiguous language in a will. The issue inAd-
cock was whether the following provisions of decedent's will operated to give
his widow a fee simple interest or merely a life estate in his property:
Item 2
All.. . my property, real and personal .. I give, bequeath
and devise unto my beloved wife, Annie Perry, and I do hereby give
... to the said Annie Perry the right to sell or mortgage any part of
the real and personal property hereby devised and bequeathed to her
in order to provide funds with which to defray her own necessary
personal expenses, but she is not given the power to sell, dispose of or
mortgage any part of said property for the purpose of aiding or as-
sisting any of her children or any of the members of her family. 9 8
Item 3
After the death of my said wife, I give, bequeath and devise all
of my property remaining to my four children share and share alike
those "of the University of North Carolina, or any of its constituent institutions or agencies").
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160.A-398.1 (1982).
192. 305 N.C. at 530-31, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
193. 58 N.C. App. 697, 294 S.E.2d 388 (1982).
194. Regulation of billboards has been a common objective of local governments; an objective
that surely will continue with the recent decisions permitting aesthetic zoning. A 1982 amendment
to the Outdoor Advertising Control Act, however, limited such regulation. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 136-131.1 (1981), which requires payment ofjust compensation when a local government body
orders the removal of a billboard, for which there is a valid permit, from property adjacent to a
highway on the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways or the Federal-Aid Primary
Highway System.
195. For a more thorough discuission of State v. Jones and its possible ramifications, see Note,
supra note 9.
196. 305 N.C. 625, 290 S.E.2d 608 (1982).
197. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
198. 305 N.C. at 626, 290 S.E.2d at 610.
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199
In construing the provisions of the will, the court was bound to apply the rule
of G.S. 31-38, which provides:
When real estate shall be devised to any person, the same shall
be held and construed to be a devise in fee simple, unless such devise
shall, in plain and express words, show, or it shall be plainly in-
tended by the will, or some part thereof, that the testator intended to
convey an estate of less dignity.20°
Plaintiffs argued that because of the statute the will operated to vest a fee
simple interest in the testator's widow, which she in turn devised to them. De-
fendants (children of the testator) contended that Item 2 of the will gave the
widow a life estate only, and that Item 3 gave them the fee simple interest in
remainder. The majority of the supreme court agreed with defendants and
held that, in this case, the presumption raised by G.S. 31-38 had been fully
rebutted.20 1 Justice Mitchell, dissenting, submitted his opinion 202 that the pre-
sumption could only be rebutted by "plain and express words, show[ing],...
that the testator intended to convey an estate of less dignity. '20 3 Since no
plain and express words limiting the widow's interest to a life estate could be
found in Item 2 of the will, Justice Mitchell believed the statutory presumption
was not rebutted.2°4
The dissenting opinion correctly examined the actual language of the stat-
ute to determine whether the presumption has been rebutted, but incorrectly
focused on only that portion of G.S. 31-38 which permits "plain and express
words" to rebut the presumption. 205 The statute provides a second method for
rebutting the presumption: when no "plain and express words" limiting the
devise to a life estate can be found in the sentence containing the disputed
devise, if a reading of the whole instrument shows that the testator "plainly
intended by the will or some part thereof to convey an estate of less dignity
[than a fee simple], '206 the devise should not be presumed to be in fee. The
majority opinion correctly noted that an examination of decedent's entire will
compelled the conclusion that his "clear intent" was to devise to his wife a life
estate only. If it were otherwise, a majority of the will's provisions would be
rendered void as repugnant to the presumed absolute devise.207 Since the life
estate construction corresponded to the "clear intent" of the will, the statutory
presumption was properly held to have been rebutted.208
The majority opinion in Adcock seems to reach the correct result: the
199. Id
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-38 (1976).
201. 305 N.C. at 631, 290 S.E.2d at 611.
202. Id. at 632, 290 S.E.2d 613 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
203. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
204. 305 N.C. at 632, 290 S.E.2d at 613.
205. See id
206. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
207. 305 N.C. at 630, 290 S.E.2d at 612.
208. Id at 631, 290 S.E.2d at 611.
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statutory presumption embodied in G.S. 31-38 should not be permitted to de-
feat the testator's intent. Justice Mitchell's contrary reading of G.S. 31-38 may
may be viewed as evidence that the statute, more than the will, was in need of
judicial construction in this case.
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Livengood, 209 the issue was not whether
the testator intended a devise in fee simple, but whether he intended his devi-
sees to take per capita or per stirpes. The will in question created a testamen-
tary trust for the benefit of the testator's sisters and sister-in-law,210 then
provided for distribution of the trust corpus in the following manner: "(2)
Upon the death of the last suvivors of my sisters. . . and my sister-in-law...
this trust shall terminate and be paid over in equal shares to my nieces and
Nephews per Stripes [sic]." 2 11 Both the trial court and court of appeals were
of the opinion that the testator's use of the words "per Stripes" (sic) meant that
he intended the distribution to be made to the devisees per stirpes rather than
per capita.212 If distribution were made per capita, each devisee would receive
a 1/6 share; 13 but if the distribution were made per stirpes, one of the devi-
sees would receive a 1/3 share, three devisees would each receive a 1/9 share,
and the two remaining devisees would each receive a 1/6 share.214
Two common law rules of construction were consulted by the courts to
determine which method of distribution should control. First, the general rule
provides that when a devise or bequest is to a class (such as nephews and
nieces), the devisees take per capita unless it clearly appears that the testator
intended a different division.215 The other rule provides that when a testator
uses technical words or phrases (such as "per stirpes") in disposing of prop-
erty, it is presumed that he used them in their well-known legal or technical
sense unless in some appropriate way in the instrument he indicates other-
wise.216 Ultimately, the supreme court held that the testator's use of the words
"in equal shares" (which indicate a per capita distribution) was an appropriate
way for the testator to indicate that the words "per Stripes" (sic) were not
intended to require a true per stirpes distribution.2 17
The court's solution ordering the trust corpus to be distributed on a per
capita basis, appears fair in this particular case, but it leaves some questions
unanswered. If one of the nieces in Livengood had died before the trust termi-
nated, and had left issue surviving her, would her issue be entitled to share in
the distribution by representation (per stirpes), or would they be excluded
from the distribution entirely? A strict per capita distribution would require
209. 306 N.C. 550, 294 S.E.2d 319 (1982).
210. Id.
211. Id at 550, 294 S.E.2d at 320 (emphasis added).
212. Id at 552, 294 S.E.2d at 320. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981-
Property, 60 N.C.L. Rnv. 1450-51 (1982).
213. Livengood, 306 N.C. at 551, 294 S.E.2d at 320.
214. Id.
215. Id at 552, 294 S.E.2d at 320.
216. Id.
217. Id at 553, 294 S.E.2d at 321.
1983] PROPER TY 1193
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
exclusion of the grandnieces and grandnephews, but the better approach, not
mentioned by the Livengood court, would permit the grandnieces and grand-
nephews to divide the share their parent would have received if she were still
alive.2 18 It is at least arguable that the latter approach describes precisely
what the testator in Livengood intended when he directed that the trust fund
be paid over "in equal shares to my nieces and Nephews per Stripes [sic]." 2 19
Perhaps he was trying to say "in equal shares to my nieces and nephews but if
any niece or nephew dies leaving issue surviving on the date of distribution,
the issue shall take their ancestor's share per stirpes." Unfortunately, the ac-
tual will contained no language that could be used to harmonize the conflict-
ing terms.
The result reached by the supreme court in Livengood reflects an honest
attempt to determine the testator's intent, but it is by no means clear that the
testator's true intent could be determined from an examination of the language
employed in the will. Since the words "in equal shares" and "per stirpes" are
directly contradictory, any interpretation of the testator's intent amounts to
little more than a judicial guess as to which phrase the testator intended to
control the distribution of the trust assets.
2. Equitable Remedies
(a) Resulting Trusts and Presumptive GIs
The opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Aims v. Mims 220
may well contain the year's most significant development in North Carolina
property law.221 In Mims the court prospectively changed a sexually discrimi-
natory rule of law relating to presumptive gifts and purchase money resulting
trusts in interspousal property disputes, 222 and held that, henceforth, in all
cases not governed by the Equitable Distribution of Marital Property Act,22 3
the same presumption of gift that has for decades arisen in favor of wives who
acquire title to real estate with funds provided by their husbands224 shall also
218. E.g., Dew v. Shockley, 36 N.C. App. 87, 243 S.E.2d 177, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246
S.E.2d 9 (1978); Roberts v. Northwestern Bank, 271 N.C. 292, 156 S.E.2d 229 (1967); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bryant, 258 N.C. 482, 128 S.E.2d 758 (1963);see also Survey of Developmemis
in North Carolina Law, 1981-Property, 60 N.C.L. Rnv. 1451 n.231-32 (1982).
219. See supra note 211.
220. 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982).
221. See Note, Property Law-Minis v. Mires: North Carolina Eliminates Presumption of
Purchase Money Resulting Trust For Wives, 61 N.C.L. REV. (1983).
222. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §460 (rev. 2d ed.
1977); 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMmY LAW §113, at 45 (4th ed. 1980); 1 H. TIFFANY, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §272 (3d ed. 1939); Comment, Husband's Acquisition ofTitle with Funds
Furnished by Wife.- Resulting Trust or Presumption of Gift, 74 DICK. L. REv. 455, 463-65 (1970);
Comment, Resulting Trusts in Entireties Properly fhen HWfe Furnishes Purchase Money, 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 415, 422 (1981). All authorities cited here advocate uniform application of the
presumptive gift doctrine whenever one spouse acquires title to property paid for by the other
spouse, regardless of the gender of the spouse furnishing the purchase price.
223. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, -21 (Cure. Supp. 1981). The holding of Mims is limited to
cases not governed by this Act. 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787.
224. See, ag., Honeycutt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 89 S.E.2d 598 (1955); Shue v.
Shue, 241 N.C. 65, 84 S.E.2d 362 (1954); Carlisle v. Carlisle, 225 N.C. 462, 35 S.E.2d 418 (1945).
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operate in favor of husbands who are named as grantees in deeds for which
their wives furnished the consideration.225 The effect of the Mires decision is
to remove the common law presumption that a wife who purchases property
with her own funds and places the title in her husband's name is entitled to a
resulting trust in the property,226 and to replace that presumption with a rule
providing that if either spouse furnishes consideration for a conveyance vest-
ing title in the other spouse, there is a presumption that the conveyance of title
was intended as a gift.227 The presumption of gift may be rebutted by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence,2 8 and if rebutted successfully will entitle the
party who provided the consideration for the conveyance to a jury trial on the
issue of the purchaser's intention.229 If the jury determines that no gift was
intended, the purchaser is entitled to the benefit of a resulting trust in the
property.230
The circumstances giving rise to the original lawsuit in Mires were as fol-
lows: Mr. Mims furnished the entire purchase price for a house and lot titled
in the names of both spouses as tenants by the entireties and used by the par-
ties as a marital home.231 After the couple separated, he instituted an action
seeking reformation of the deed and a declaration that he was the sole benefi-
cial owner of the real estate.232 Mr. Mims theorized that, since he had allowed
the deed to be drawn in both names only because of a mistaken notion that
North Carolina law required it,233 he lacked the donative intent necessary to
See generally R. LEE,, supra note 222, at 44; WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
§111 at 112 (rev. ed. 1981); Comment, Husband'sAcquisition of Tidle with Funds Furnished by Wye
Resulting Trust or Presumption of Gift, 74 Dicy. L. REv. 455, 456-57 (1970); Comment, Resulting
Trusts in Entireties Property When Wife Furnishes Purchase Money, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 415,
417 (1981).
225. Mims, 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787.
226. See infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text. A resulting trust is an intent effectuating
device and should be distinguished from a constructive trust, see supra notes 312-28 and accompa-
nying text, which may operate regardless of the parties' intentions. The constructive trust enjoys a
broader range of application because it may be invoked whenever it is inequitable for a title
holder to retain ownership of a piece of property. The resulting trust, however, is generally con-
fined to instances in which the form of the original conveyance did not conform to the purchaser's
intention. The trust is raised in order to effectuate that which the law presumes to have been the
intention of the party supplying the consideration for the conveyance.
The classic example of a resulting trust is the purchase-money resulting trust. In
such a situation, when one person furnishes the consideration to pay for land, title to
which is taken in the name of another, a resulting trust commensurate with his interest
arises in favor of the one furnishing the consideration. The general rule is that the trust
is created, if at all, in the same transaction in which the legal title passes, and by virtue of
the consideration advanced before or at the time the legal title passes. Cline v. Cline, 297
N.C. 336, 344, 255 S.E.2d 399, 404-05 (1979).
Mins, 305 N.C. at 46-47, 286 S.E.2d at 784. See also Wilkie v. Wilkie, 58 N.C. App. 624, 629,294
S.E.2d 230, 232 (1982).
227. 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787.
228. Id
229. Id at 56-61, 286 S.E.2d at 789-91.
230. E.g., Wilkie v. Wilkie, 58 N.C. App. 624, 628, 294 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1982).
231. 305 N.C. at 43-45, 286 S.E.2d at 782-83.
232. Id at 43, 286 S.E.2d at 782.
233. Id at 59, 286 S.E.2d at 791.
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give his wife a vested interest in the property.234 Mrs. Mires, contending that
she was lawfully seized of an entireties interest in the home by way of gift,235
moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court and af-
firmed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. 236 The North Carolina
Supreme Court granted discretionary review and reversed.237 Explaining that
the common-law doctrine of presumptive gift (upon which Mrs. Mims strongly
relied) is rebuttable by "clear, cogent and convincing evidence," 238 the court
held that Mr. Mims had met the burden of rebutting the presumption, 239
thereby raising a genuine issue of material fact for the jury and rendering
summary judgment improper.24°
Had the court's opinion stopped there, it would have clarified existing law
without changing it. But the significance of Mimns is that the court saw fit to
change prospectively the law relating to presumptions in interspousal property
disputes. Having disposed of the very narrow issue before it,241 the court went
on to declare that, thenceforth, in all cases not controlled by the Equitable
Distribution Act,242 the presumption of gift rule would not run solely in favor
of wives, but would also inure to the benefit of husbands holding title to prop-
erty purchased by their wives.2 43 By declaring that the presumptive gift rule
must be applied uniformly between marital partners without regard to the
gender of the spouse providing purchase money funds, the court in Mims re-
moved a substantial advantage formerly enjoyed by any wife who sought to
establish sole beneficial ownership of realty titled in her husband's name (or in
their joint names) when she had provided the purchase price for the prop-
erty.244 Prior to Mims the common law in North Carolina clearly weighed in
favor of the wife when title to realty purchased by either spouse was in dis-
pute. If a husband purchased realty during coverture and the wife was named
as a grantee in the deed, the law presumed that the husband intended to make
a gift of the property to his wife245 to the extent evidenced by the deed itself2 46
(in this case an entireties interest). However, if the roles were reversed and the
234. 305 N.C. at 45, 286 S.E.2d at 783.
235. Id at 43-44, 286 S.E.2d at 782.
236. Id at 43, 286 S.E.2d at 781-82.
237. Id at 43, 286 S.E.2d at 782.
238. Id at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787.
239. Id at 59, 286 S.E.2d at 791.
240. Id at 46, 286 S.E.2d at 783.
241. The narrow question before the court was whether the parties' evidentiary showing enti-
tled the wife to summary judgment. Id at 43, 286 S.E.2d at 781-82.
242. N.C. GEN. STAT. §52-20, -21 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The Equitable Distribution of Marital
Property Act does not govern disposition of property in divorce actions filed prior to October 1,
1981, nor does it apply to property disputes arising among the heirs or devisees of a titleholding
decedent. See infra notes 262-75 and accompanying text. See generally Sharp, Equitable Distribu-
tion of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysi, 61 N.C.L. Rv. 247 (1983).
243. Mins, 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787.
244. See'infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
245. Tarkington v. Tarkington, 301 N.C. 502, 505, 272 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1980), overruled by
Mins, 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
246. R. LEE, supra note 222, at 44; Comment, Resulting Trusts in Entireties Property IWhen fr'e
Furnishes Purchase Money, 17 WArE FOREST L. Rv. 415, 417 (1981).
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wife supplied the consideration, no presumption of gift operated in favor of
the husband.247 Instead, if a wife could prove that she supplied the considera-
tion for the deed, the law would presume that she did not freely intend to
make a gift to her husband, but participated in the transaction as a result of his
influence and coercion.248 In court, the effect of the presumption of coercion
was to prevent the husband from acquiring any beneficial estate in the prop-
erty as a matter of law, unless he could prove by clear, strong, and convincing
evidence that, at the time of the transaction, his wife freely intended for him to
take a beneficial estate by way of gift.249 If the husband failed to rebut the
presumption of coercion, he merely held title to the property in a resulting
trust for the wife, who alone was seized of the beneficial estate.250
The Mires decision abolished the presumption of coercion and estab-
lished the presumptive gift rule for uniform application between spouses, re-
gardless of the gender of the spouse furnishing consideration.25' In the course
of explaining the reasons for the new rule, the court stated:
The primary focus of our common law rules is to determine ben-
eficial ownership of property acquired during marriage by giving ef-
fect to what was intended at the time the property was acquired.
What the payor intended at the time of acquisition is controlling, no
matter the context in which the dispute arises. . . . [W]e believe the
presumptive gift rule, being more in accord with the probabilities of
the marital state, is a better procedural device that the presumptive
trust rule for ascertaining the truth. s2
By declaring that the presumption of gift rule must be applied uniformly
between marital partners without regard to the gender of the spouse providing
purchase money funds, the Mis court adopted a simple, sensible, nondis-
criminatory rule that comports with our society's current philosophical val-
ues.253 But because of the 1981 enactment of North Carolina's Equitable
Distriubution of Marital Property upon Divorce Act,2s4 the Minms decision
will have only limited influence in property disputes arising in the context of
247. 305 N.C. at 47, 286 S.E.2d at 784; R. LEE, supra note 222, at 43; J. WEBSTER, supra note
224, at §507 n.92; Comment, Resulting Trusts in Entireties Property When Jfe Furnishes Purchase
Money, 17 WAKE FOREST L.REv. 415, 417 (1981).
248. 305 N.C. at 48-49, 286 S.E.2d at 785; Sprinkle v. Spainhour, 149 N.C. 223, 226, 62 S.E.
910, 911 (1908); Comment, Resulting Trusts in Entireties Property When Wfe Furnishes Purchase
Money, 17 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 415, 421 (1981).
249. Tarkington v. Tarkington, 301 N.C. 504, 507, 272 S.E.2d 102, 199 (1981), overruled by
Mines, 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787 (1982). See Comment, Resulting Trusts in Entireties
Property When ife Furnishes Purchase Money, 17 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 415, 422 (1981). Cf.
Wright v. Wright, 305 N.C. 345, 353, 289 S.E.2d 347, 352 (1982) ("where one party furnishes the
purchase price but has title placed in the name of another, these facts, standing alone, create a
rebuttable presumption that a resulting trust was intended. The presumption may be rebutted by
showing that, in fact, no trust was intended").
250. Tarkington v. Tarkington, 301 N.C. 504, 507, 272 S.E.2d 102, 199 (1981).
251. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
252. Mines, 305 N.C. at 54, 286 S.E.2d at 788 (emphasis added).
253. See id at 49-51, 286 S.E.2d at 785-86.
254. See supra note 242.
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divorce,255 and will soon be applicable only in familial property disputes aris-
ing upon the death of one of the marriage partners.256 The Equitable Distri-
bution Act governs disposition of all property disputes arising out of divorce
actions filed on or after October 1, 1981. 257 The Act prescribes a method for
distinguishing between "separate" and "marital" property, and permits the
court to make an equitable division of the "marital" property after a final
divorce decree is entered.258 "Separate" property is not subject to the court's
distribution power.259 Separate property is defined as follows:
(2) "Separate property" means all real and personal property ac-
quired by a spouse before marriage or acquired by a spouse by be-
quest, devise, descent, or gift during the course of the marriage.
However, property acquired by gift from the other spouse during the
course of the marriage shall be considered separate property only if
such an intention is stated in the conveyance. Property acquired in ex-
change for separate property shall be considered separate property re-
gardless of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wfe or
both. 260
Since Mr. Mires furnished the entire purchase price for the property titled
to himself and his wife, their marital home would have been his separate prop-
erty if the Act had been in effect when the Mines' divorce action was filed. Mr.
Mins would not have been required to rebut the presumption of gift or prove
his intent to a jury's satisfaction in order to regain full beneficial ownership of
the property. Instead, he would only have been required to prove that he pro-
vided the purchase money out of his separate property and that the instrument
of conveyance lacked any statement that he intended for his wife to hold her
title as "separate" property.261
The facts of another 1982 case, Wilkie v. Wilkie, 262 exemplify the applica-
tion of the Mims rule in circumstances in which the Equitable Distribution Act
is inapplicable because the property dispute does not arise in the context of
divorce.263 In Wilkie, the titleholding husband died and was survived by a
wife who actually paid for the acquisition of the property and the construction
of improvements thereon.264 The wife's evidence tended to prove that when
she purchased the property she intended to take title jointly with her husband
255. The Equitable Distribution Act applies to all divorce actions filed on or after October 1,
1981. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, §7, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1184, 1186. Thus, all divorce
actions filed on or after October 1, 1981, may not be subject to Minis' presumptive gift rule. But
see Sharp, supra note 242, at 268.
256. See infra notes 262-69 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 255.
258. See Minis, 305 N.C. at 54,286 S.E.2d at 788; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp.
1981).
259. 305 N.C. at 54, 286 S.E.2d at 788.
260. N.C. GEN. STAT. §50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
261. Id
262. 58 N.C. App. 624, 294 S.E.2d 230, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 752, 272 S.E.2d 764 (1982).
263. The Wilkie opinion never expressly refers to Minis, filed seven months earlier, but Wilkie
does seem to apply the Mines rule properly. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
264. Wilkie, 58 N.C. App. at 625, 294 S.E.2d at 230.
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as tenants by the entireties.265 When her husband died intestate, she discov-
ered that the deed to the property was drawn solely in the decedent's name.2 6 6
His children by a prior marriage claimed to have inherited the fee simple title,
and the widow sued for imposition of a resulting trust in her favor.267 Mrs.
Wilkie was ultimately successful in her suit,268 but because the marriage
ended without divorce, she was required to rebut the presumption of gift and
to prove to the jury's satisfaction that a tenancy by the entireties was in-
tended.269 If the marriage had ended in divorce instead of death, and the
divorce action action had been filed after the effective date of the Equitable
Distribution Act, Mrs. Wilkie could have accomplished the same result merely
by proving that she furnished the purchase price for the property from her
own separate funds and that the deed bore no statement of an intention to
permit Mr. Wilkie to hold the property as his separate property.270
In the final analysis, the ownership of real estate in North Carolina de-
pends largely upon how the marriage ends-by death or divorce. If it ends in
a divorce action filed after the effective date of the Equitable Distribution
Act,271 title acquired by one spouse with funds furnished from the separate
property of the other spouse will vest no estate at all in the nonpaying spouse,
in the absence of a statement of intent to make a gift of separate property in
the instrument of conveyance. 272 If the marriage terminates by the death of
either spouse, however, the nonpaying spouse will be presumed to hold an
absolute estate by way of gift, regardless of the absence of any statement of
intent in the deed.273 The presumption of gift is strong and is rebuttable only
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, 274 which may be much more diffi-
cult to marshall in the context of death than in the context of divorce.275
When read together, the Equitable Distribution Act and Mins form a new
rule that is intrinsically illogical: any spouse may make a valid gift to the
other spouse by purchasing property and naming the nonpaying spouse as
265. Id at 628, 294 S.E.2d at 232.
266. Id
267. Id at 625, 294 S.E.2d at 230.
268. Id at 630-31, 294 S.E.2d at 233.
269. Id at 628-30, 294 S.E.2d at 232-33.
270. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 255.
272. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 243 & 269 and accompanying text.
274. Mirs, 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787.
275. See, eg., Wilkie, 58 N.C. App. at 626-27, 294 S.E.2d at 230-31. In ,ilkie, defendants
argued that the surviving spouse should not be permitted to introduce evidence of statements
made by the decedent to support her claim to a resulting trust. Although the "dead man's stat-
ute," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51, does preclude an interested witness from testifying at trial about
personal transactions or communications between the witness and decedent when either the wit-
ness or the person he is testifying against derives his interest or title from, through or under the
decedent, 58 N.C. App. at 626, 294 S.E.2d at 230-31, the court admitted the testimony into evi-
dence on the grounds that defendants had waived the protection of the dead man's statute by
eliciting the incompetent evidence through the use of pretrial interrogatories. Id at 626-27, 294
S.E.2d at 231. It appears from the Wilkie opinion that if defendants had not sought discovery of
the incompetent evidence, plaintiff could not have introduced it at trial, and likely would not have
succeeded in her claim. Id
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grantee without including in the deed any statement reflecting a donative in-
tent, but if the marriage ends in divorce, the gift will be a nullity. In view of
the current state of North Carolina property law, perhaps the best advice an
attorney can give his married clients is to examine their existing instruments of
ownership, evaluate the effect of divorce or the death of one spouse on the
ownership of their property, and consider executing either a new deed reciting
their intention to hold their interests as "separate" property,276 or a contract 277
that would govern disposition of the property in the event of dissolution of the
marriage by death or divorce.
(b) Unjust Enrichment and Equitable Liens
If a coin were minted with the facts of Mims v. Mims 278 appearing on one
side, the facts of Wright v. WNight 279 would appear on the other. In Mims a
husband, who never intended to give his wife an estate in the property he
purchased, permitted a deed to be drawn in favor of himself and his wife as
tenants by the entireties, but in Wrght280 the husband complained that his
wife had promised to convey to him an estate in her property, then failed to
execute a deed carrying out the promise. Mr. Wright claimed that his wife had
induced him to expend his separate savings and to perform labor in remodel-
ing her house by orally promising to convey the property into their joint
names.281 The promise, he claimed, was made prior to their wedding, and the
improvements were finished after the marriage ceremony.282 About a year
after the improvements were completed, and largely as a result of the couple's
arguments over how the home should be titled, the parties separated,283 and
thereafter plaintiff-husband instituted this action.
Because the wife's alleged promise was oral, it was unenforceable under
North Carolina law.284 Since plaintiff could not sue to compel the convey-
ance,285 he opted to sue for damages to be secured by an equitable lien.2 8 6
276. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
277. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides:
(d) Before, during or after marriage the parties may by written agreement, duly
executed and acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 52-10 and 52-10.1,
or by a written agreement valid in the jurisdiction where executed, provide for distribu-
tion of the marital property in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable and the
agreement shall be binding on the parties.
278. 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982); see also supra text accompanying notes 231-40.
279. 305 N.C. 345, 289 S.E.2d 347 (1982).
280. Id at 346, 289 S.E.2d 348.
281. Id at 345, 351, 289 S.E.2d 347, 351.
282. Id at 347, 289 S.E.2d at 349.
283. Id
284. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1965) provides, "All contracts to sell or convey any lands, tene-
ments or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them... shall be void unless said con-
tract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be put in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10(a) (Cure. Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent
part, "No contract or release between husband and wife made during their coverture shall be valid
to affect or change any part of the real estate of either spouse... unless it is in writing and is
acknowledged by both parties before a certifying officer."
285. 305 N.C. at 350, 289 S.E.2d at 350.
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Plaintiff relied upon the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment and argued
that because he was induced to make the improvements by defendant's prom-
ise, it would be unjust to permit her to retain their benefit without paying for
them.28 7 He sought an equitable lien, enforceable by foreclosure,288 if defend-
ant refused or could not pay for the improvements.
The equitable lien theory is a sound and well established remedy,289 but
courts have had difficulty deciding what facts plaintiff must prove in order to
obtain it. Is it enough for plaintiff to prove that he did not intend to make a
gift to his spouse,290 or will a "good faith belief' that an estate in the property
was promised him suffice?291 Or must plaintiff prove that the promise was
actually made?292 In Wright plaintiff was unable to prove the promise 293 but
did present evidence of his own "good faith belief' in the promise.294 The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that plaintiff must actually prove the
promise, and must do so with clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, if he is to
prevai. 295 In so holding, the supreme court overruled a line of court of ap-
peals' decisions that had required only a good faith belief in the existence of
the promise,296 and extended the presumptive gift rule announced in Mims v.
MiMS 2 97 to apply to interspousal unjust enrichment cases such as Wright.298
286. Id at 354-55, 289 S.E.2d at 353.
287. Id at 350, 289 S.E.2d at 350.
288. See id at 354-55, 289 S.E.2d at 353. See generally 4 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUrY
JURISPRUDENCE §1233 (5th ed. 1941); 5 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 454.7 n.l (3d ed. 1967);
Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1455 (1934).
289. The general rule is that if one is induced to improve land under a promise to convey
the same to him, which promise is void or voidable, and after the improvements are
made he [the promisor] refuses to convey, the party thus disappointed shall have the
benefit of the improvements to the extent that they increased the value of the land.
Wrigt, 305 N.C. at 351-52,289 S.E.2d at 351 (quoting Jones v. Sandlin, 160 N.C. 150, 154,75 S.E.
107, 1077 (1912)).
290. See 305 N.C. at 349, 289 S.E.2d at 350.
291. Id at 353, 289 S.E.2d at 352-53.
292. Id at 353-54, 289 S.E.2d at 352-53.
293. Id at 348, 289 S.E.2d at 349 (jury's verdict).
294. See id at 347, 289 S.E.2d at 349 (plaintiff's testimony).
295. Id at 354-55, 289 S.E.2d at 352-53. The requirement that plaintiff must prove the express
promise is partly due to the special husband-wife relationship existing between the parties. An
implied promise to pay is not sufficient to support an unjust enrichment action between parties
with a special relationship, but it may be sufficient to support such claim between parties without
such a relationship. Id at 354, 289 S.E.2d at 353. See e.g., Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C.
467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (1966); Rhyne v. Sheppard, 224 N.C. 734, 32 S.E.2d 316 (1944).
296. 305 N.C. at 353, 289 S.E.2d at 352, overruling Parslow v. Parslow, 47 N.C. App. 84, 89,
266 S.E.2d 746, 749 (1980) and Clontz v. Clontz, 44 N.C. App. 573, 261 S.E.2d 695, cert. denied,
300 N.C. 195, 269 S.E.2d 622 (1980). In Parslow, as in Wrght, the adversaries were marital part-
ners, while in Clontz the disputing parties were brothers. It is arguable that the "good faith belief"
standard of proof might be appropriate if the parties were unrelated by blood or marriage. Less
intimate acquaintances are less likely to make improvements on one another's lands without an
actual arm's length transaction and exchange of promises. Consequently, a mere acquaintance's
good faith belief in a promise of conveyance, corroborated by his expenditure of money to im-
prove another's property, may be strong evidence that a promise was actually made and relied
upon. See supra note 295.
297. "In all cases ... to which the statute [An Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital
Property Act] is not applicable the rule shall be that where a spouse furnishing the consideration
causes property to be conveyed to the other spouse, a presumption of gift arises, which is rebutta-
ble by clear, cogent and convincing evidence." Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 53, 286 S.E.2d 779,
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Consequently, the current state of North Carolina law in interspousal un-
just enrichment cases is that any spouse who improves property belonging to
the other spouse is presumed to have intended to make a gift to the title-
holder.299 This presumption of gift must be rebutted by clear, strong, and
convincing evidence. 30° If the claimant's grounds for rebutting the presump-
tion of gift is that the titleholder promised to convey him an estate in exchange
for the improvements, the claimant must prove that the promise was actually
made.301 Apparently, proof of only a good faith belief in the promise is insuf-
ficient to rebut the presumption because it does not meet the "clear, cogent,
and convincing" standard. As justification for requiring such a strict standard
of proof in interspousal affairs, the court noted:
Not every enrichment of one by the voluntary act of another is un-
just. "Where a person has officiously conferred a benefit upon an-
other, the other is enriched but is not considered to be unjustly
enriched. The recipient of a benefit voluntarily bestowed without so-
licitation or inducement is not liable for their value." Rhyne v.
Sheppard, 224 N.C. 734, 737, 32 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1944). This rule is
particularly applicable where a husband makes improvements to his
wife's land because of the presumption that the improvements consti-
tute a gift. 30 2
Although the court's opinion in IWright never mentions the recently en-
acted Equitable Distribution of Marital Property Act,30 3 Wright should be
read with the Act in mind. If the Wrights' divorce action had been filed after
October 1, 1981, the provisions of the Act would have been consulted in reso-
lution of their property dispute.3°4 The Act, however, does not expressly men-
tion the use of one spouse's separate property (Mr. Wright's premarital life
savings) to increase the value of the other spouse's separate property (Mrs.
Wright's real estate). The only portions of the Act that appear to be pertinent
are:
(b)(2) The increase in value of separate property.., shall be
considered separate property.
787 (1982). See Note, Property Lawn-Mims v. Mints: North Carolina Eliminates Presumption of
Purchase foney Resulting YTustfor ives, 61 N.C.L. Rav. 566 (1983); see also infra notes 220-61.
298. "[W]e conclude ... because of all the reasons we gave in Mims, that the same presump-
tion of gift should apply whichever spouse furnishes improvements on the other spouse's land."
Wright, 305 N.C. at 355, 289 S.E.2d at 354.
299. 1d
300. See supra note 297.
301. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
302. 305 N.C. at 350, 289 S.E.2d at 351 (final citations omitted).
303. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§*52-20, 21 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
304. The provisions of the Act were inapplicable to the facts of Wright because the parties'
divorce action was filed prior to the effective date of the Act. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, §7, 1981
N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1184, 1186, provides, "This act shall become effective October 1, 1981,
and shall apply only when the action for an absolute divorce is filed on or after that date."
The actual date on which the Wrights' divorce action was filed is unknown, but their divorce
decree was rendered on February 6, 1978. See Record on Appeal at 15, Wright v. Wright, 305
N.C. 345, 289 S.E.2d 347 (1982). Mr. Wright's suit seeking imposition of an equitable lien was
filed on October 14, 1977 (prior to the divorce decree), but the case was not adjudicated until
August 15, 1979 (one and one half years after the divorce decree). See id at 2 & 22.
1202 [Vol. 61
PROPERTY
(c) There shall be an equal division by using net value of marital
property unless the court determines that an equal division is not
equitable. If the court determines that an equal division is not equi-
table, the court shall divide the marital property equitably. Factors
the court shall consider under this subsection are as follows:
(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate
property which occurs during the course of the marriage.305
The question that remains unresolved by Wright is: will the provisions of
the Act be applied to the exclusion of existing equitable remedies? Arguably,
the answer should be "no." By its own terms the Act authorizes distribution of
only marital property?016 Separate property, even though its value may have
been increased by a spouse who did not own it, is not subject to distribution by
the court.30 7 Consequently, if the value of the distributable marital prop-
erty308 is insufficient to reimburse one spouse for his improvements to the
other spouse's separate property, an exclusive application of the Equitable
Distribution of Marital Property Act will not satisfy his claim. If such a
spouse could meet the evidentiary requirements set forth in Wright,309 he
should not be denied an equitable lien on his wife's separate property merely
because that property is unavailable for direct distribution under the Act.
(c) Constructive Trusts
Resulting trusts and equitable liens310 are but two equitable devices avail-
able as remedies for fraudulently induced transactions. A third device, the
constructive trust, was examined by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
its review of Ferguson v. Ferguson.311 A constructive trust is an equitable de-
vice to prevent unjust enrichment and to remedy the acquisition of property
through fraud312 or through the violation of some duty.313 It may also be
imposed upon one whose retention of property is inequitable, though the
305. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Cune. Supp. 1981).
306. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20(a), (c) (Cum. Supp. 1981); see also Sharp,.EquitableDistri-
button of Property in North Carolina? A Preliminary Anaysis, 61 N.C.L. REv. 247, 249 nn. 11-12
(1983); Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1379, 1396 (1982).
307. Support for this statement is implicit within the scheme of the Act See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (defining separate property); see also supra note 307.
308. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §50-20(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981)(defining marital property).
309. See supra notes 295, 298-302, and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 278-305 and accompanying text.
311. 55 N.C. App. 341, 285 S.E.2d 288, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 383, - S.E.2d - (1982).
312. Whitman v. Forbes, 55 N.C. App. 706, 712, 286 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1982). See Bowen v.
Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 14, 84 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1954); Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288, 292, 199
S.E. 83, 87 (1938).
313. E.g., Whitman, 55 N.C. App. at 713, 286 S.E.2d at 894 (since real estate broker stands in
fiduciary relationship with the seller, proof that broker, by purchasing the property in a business
capacity, violated his fiduciary duty would be sufficient to entitle seller to constructive trust). See
N.C. Real Estate Licensing Bd. v. Gallman, 52 N.C. App. 118, 277 S.E.2d 853 (1981).
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property was originally acquired without fraud.314 Essentially, a constructive
trust arises whenever one is obliged by equitable principles to convey property
to another.3 15 The person so obliged is deemed to be a trustee, and his only
duty as trustee is to convey the property to the beneficiary.3 16
In Ferguson 17 the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's imposition of a constructive trust upon a son's title to property con-
veyed to him by his mother. Mrs. Ferguson (plaintiff) feared that her owner-
ship of a tract of land would prevent her from qualifying for governmental
financial assistance if she should become ill and incur substantial medical
bills.3 18 In order to preserve her property for the benefit of her children and
still qualify for government aid during a serious illness, plaintiff conveyed the
property to her son upon her son's promise to hold the title for the benefit of
plaintiff and all her children.319 The son and his wife later breached the
promise by mortgaging the land and appropriating the funds to their own
use.320 The jury found that defendants had promised to hold the land for the
benefit of plaintiff or her children, but had not intended to comply with the
promise when they made it. The jury also found that plaintiff reasonably re-
lied on defendant's promise, and the trial court imposed a constructive trust
upon the transaction.3 21
Defendant argued, among other things, that plaintiff had conveyed the
property for the purpose of defrauding future creditors or secreting funds from
government agencies, and therefore lacked the "clean hands" necessary to
qualify for an equitable remedy.3z2 Significantly, the court refused to permit
the doctrine of clean hands to prevent plaintiff's remedy.
The doctrine of clean hands is not one of absolutes that applies
to every unconscionable act of a party. Whether plaintiff committed
an unconscionable act and whether her actions were more egregious
than those of defendants, are questions of material fact to be decided
by a jury and not by the court.323
[If] the [plaintiff] did anything inequitable - and this is a mate-
rial issue of fact for trial - it was not against defendants but against
[a party] not involved in the property dispute in any way. A person
is not barred from his day in court in a particular case because he
314. Whitman, 55 N.C. App. at 712, 286 S.E.2d at 893. See Teachey, 214 N.C. at 288, 292, 199
S.E. at 83, 87 (1938).
315. "A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expres-
sion. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title
may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee." 4 A.
Scorr, THE LAW OF TRusTs § 462 at 3413 (3d ed. 1967) (quoting Judge Cardozo); see also infra
note 316.
316. See R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TRusTs §§ 10b, 13a (1958); 4 A. Scorr, supra
note 315, at 3413.
317. 55 N.C. App. 341, 285 S.E.2d 288 (1982).
318. Id at 342, 285 S.E.2d at 290.
319. Id at 342-43, 285 S.E.2d at 290.
320. Id at 343, 285 S.E.2d 290.
321. Id
322. Id at 346-47, 285 S.E.2d at 292.
323. Id (citations omitted).
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acted wrongfully in another unrelated matter or because he is gener-
ally immoral.324
The foregoing quotations are likely to draw criticism from commentators
since they seem to imply that even if the mother conveyed the property upon a
secret trust in order to defraud future creditors, her hands might still be clean
enough to invoke the equity powers of a court. The court's view that equity
will tolerate a minor fraud if it is unrelated to the subject matter of the dispute
may be good law, but it is disturbing to note that the court of appeals appar-
ently believed that Mrs. Ferguson's scheme to qualify for government aid
while retaining the benefits and enjoyment of property ownership was suffi-
ciently "unrelated" to the son's fraud to entitle her to a constructive trust.
The practical result of imposition of a constructive trust in this particular
case accomplishes a proper objective: as constructive trustees defendants are
required to reconvey the property to plaintiff,325 thus restoring the record title
to plaintiff, and at least temporarily preventing her from sidestepping govern-
mental eligibility requirements for aid. When plaintiff recovers the property,
however, there is nothing to prevent her from using the same trick again with a
different grantee who may be more likely to abide by their secret pact. The
court's opinion does nothing to discourage a grantor from conveying property
on a secret trust to avoid complying with regulations for obtaining government
aid. In fact, the opinion encourages such secret trusts by providing a remedy if
the secret trustee fails to abide by his secret promise.
Perhaps the better solution would be to deny imposition of a constructive
trust in such circumstances and force the plaintiff to sue on a theory of express
parol trust. Since parol trusts are enforceable in North Carolina,326 the court
could specifically enforce the trustee's promise to hold the land for the benefit
of the plaintiff (thereby remedying the grantee's fraud), and could file its offi-
cial judgment, reciting the terms of the trust in the county's public records
among the deeds and deeds of trust (thereby exposing the secret trust and rem-
edying plaintiffs fraud). The trust would not be then extinguished by the ad-
judication, and plaintiff could not reconvey the property to a new grantee in a
second attempt to avoid governmental eligibility requirements.
3. Statute of Limitations
In Tyson v. North Carolina National Bank 327 the North Carolina Supreme
Court had occasion to consider a question of first impression: in an action
against an executor serving without bond for breach of his fiduciary duty,
which statute of limitations should apply? Faced with three alternatives, 328
none of which clearly applied to the facts of the case, Justice Carlton, writing
324. Id (quoting High v. Parks, 42 N.C. App. 707,257 S.E.2d 661), disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C.
806, 262 S.E.2d 1 (1979).
325. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
326. Ferguson, 55 N.C. App. at 341, 344, 285 S.E.2d at 288, 291.
327. 305 N.C. 136, 286 S.E.2d 561 (1982).
328. The first alternative, N.C. GEN.STAT. § 1-52(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981), provides, "Within
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for a unanimous court, 3 2 9 chose to apply G.S. 1-52(1),330 which provides a
three-year period within which an action may be brought "upon a contract,
obligation or liability arising out of a contract, express or implied."' 33 1 The
difficulty with the court's holding is the simple fact that Tyson involved no
contract whatsoever. 332 While recognizing that "there exists no contract,
either express or implied, between the parties to this action," the Court stated
that the lack of a contract was not determinative of the statute's applicabil-
ity.333 The determinative factors, it concluded, lay in the nature of the overall
transaction, the attendant rights and duties,334 and the remedy335 sought by
the plaintiff. The remedy sought by the plaintiff in Tyson was money damages
for failure to exercise reasonable care in marshalling the assets of an estate.3 3
6
Plaintiff was the widow of a man who died leaving a will that named
defendant's predecessor 337 as executor (of decedent's estate) and trustee of two
testamentary trusts. 338 At his death, plaintiff's decedent owed debts totalling
over $80,000, a substantial portion of which were owed to the same bank that
was named as executor of his will.339 The bank qualified as executor and
marshalled the assets of the estate, but initially failed to discover that the dece-
dent's house was titled solely in his name.340 The will had not made an ex-
press disposition of the house,34 1 and the executor simply assumed that the
house was owned by the entireties. 342 Consequently, the executor neither in-
cluded the property in its initial accounting 343 nor applied it toward the pay-
three years an action--(l) Upon a contract, obligation or liability arising out of a contract, express
or implied, except those mentioned in the preceding sections or in G.S. 1-53(1)."
The second alternative, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981), provides, "Within six
years an action--(2) Against an executor, administrator, collector, or guardian on his official
bond, within six years after the auditing of his final account by the proper officer, and the filing of
the audited account as-required by law."
The third alternative is a ten year "catch-all" statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-56 (1969), which
provides, "An action for relief not otherwise limited by this subchapter may not be commenced
more than ten years after the cause of action has accrued."
329. Justice Copeland did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. "305
N.C. at 143, 286 S.E.2d at 565.
330. See su.pra note 328.
331. N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-52(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
332. 305 N.C. at 142, 266 S.E.2d at 565.
333. Id
334. "The overall transaction, and the attendant rights and duties, is [sic] clearly contractual in
nature.... [A]ny failure to perform in compliance with the duties as a fiduciary is tantamount to
a breach of contract." Id
335. "The remedy sought by this action is... to recover damages for breach of fiduciary
duty." Id at 141, 286 S.E.2d at 564 (emphasis in original).
336. Id
337. The testator named State Bank & Trust Company as the executor of his will. State Bank
& Trust Company merged with North Carolina National Bank in 1969. Id at 137 n.l, 286 S.E.2d
at 562 n.l.
338. Id at 137, 286 S.E.2d at 562. The two trusts were created primarily for plaintiff's benefit.
id
339. Id
340. Id at 137-38, 286 S.E.2d at 562.
341. Id at 137, 286 S.E.2d at 562.
342. Defendant Appellee's New Brief at 3, Tyson, 305 N.L. 136, 286 S.E.2d 561.
343. 305 N.C. at 137-38, 286 S.E.2d at 562.
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ment of decedent's debts. Instead, the bank sold two other parcels of
decedent's real estate and used the proceeds to satisfy his debts.344 One of
these parcels was the only significant income producing asset in the estate, and
would have provided income for the widow and children if it had been re-
tained as a trust asset.345 Approximately one year after the sale of these lands,
the widow attempted to sell the house, only to discover that it was not owned
by the entireties. The executor then sold the house for $60,000.346 Plaintiff
brought her action against the executor approximately ten and one-half years
after the executor's qualification, nine and one-half years after discovering the
omission, and six years and nine months after the final accounting was
fied.
3 4 7
Plaintiff contended that the executor should have discovered that the
house was an estate asset and should have sold the house, rather than the
income producing property, to pay decedent's debts.348 By not doing so,
plaintiff argued, the executor failed to exercise reasonable care in marshalling
and preserving the assets of the estate, thereby breaching its fiduciary duty.
349
Defendant set forth the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.
350
Thus, the only significant issue addressed in the court's opinion was which
statute of limitations applied.
Of the three statutes of limitation available for the court's inspection,
351
G.S. 1-50(2) received the least scrutiny. That statute provides a six year limita-
tion period, running from the date of filing a final accounting, for actions
"against an executor, administrator, collector, or guardian on his official
bond. '352 Although the court noted this statute,353 it refused to explain its
inapplicability. Its reasoning was presumably that G.S. 1-50(2) speaks of an
action on an official bond, and the executor in Tyson served without posting a
bond.
3 5 4
344. Id at 138, 286 S.E.2d at 562.
345. Id at 138, 286 S.E.2d at 563.
346. Id
347. See Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at 23-24, Tyson, 305 N.C. 136, 286 S.E.2d 561.
348. 305 N.C. at 138, 286 S.E.2d at 563. It is worth noting, however, that even if the executor
had sold the house rather than the farm, the debts could not have been satisfied. The executor
would have had to sell or mortgage additional property to extinguish the total indebtedness. See
supra text accompanying notes 338 & 345.
349. 305 N.C. at 141, 286 S.E.2d at 564.
350. Id at 140, 286 S.E.2d at 564. Defendant could find no statute of limitations expressly
governing this type of action, but argued that the three-year contract statute, G.S. 1-52(l), was
intended to control. In the alternative defendant argued in favor of applying G.S. 1-50(2), the six-
year limitation period for actions on an executor's official bond. Under either statute plaintifs
claim would be barred. Plaintiff contended that G.S. 1-56, the ten year "catch all" statute of
limitations, should apply. See supra note 327.
351. See supra note 327.
352. See supra note 327.
353. 305 N.C. at 140-41, 286 S.E.2d at 564.
354. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 21, Tyson. Although the existence of a six-year limitation
period for actions on an executor's official bond might lead one to expect that a shorter limitation
period was intended to apply if the executor served without bond, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-19-
3(i) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (six-month limitation period provided by N.C. GEN. STAT. 28A-19-3(a)
(1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981) for presentation of claims to the personal representative of a decedent's
estate does not bar plaintitfs claim to the extent that decedent or personal representative is pro-
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Plaintiff argued that G.S. 1-56, 355 which provides a ten-year period for
filing actions, was the proper statute to apply in an action for breach of fiduci-
ary duty when no bond is involved. 356 This statute is a "catch-all" limitation,
establishing a deadline for filing claims in all cases not otherwise provided for
by statute.357 Since the two other statutes examined in the opinion do not
expressly apply to executors or breaches of fiduciary duties, this argument
seems reasonable.358 The six-year statute speaks only of actions involving an
official's bond, 359 and the three-year statute appears to apply solely to actions
concerning a contract? 60
The supreme court, however, rejected plaintifis argument and held that
G.S. 1-52(1), the contract statute, is the proper statute to follow in cases involv-
ing any money damage claim based upon an executor's breach of fiduciary
duty.361 Reasoning that the nature of the remedy sought (money damages)
together with the "attendant rights and duties" of the parties, gave the "overall
transaction" a contractual flavor, the court held that the three-year statute of
limitation on contract actions applied even though no contract, express or im-
plied, existed in fact.362 To support its conclusion, the court drew an analogy
between the executor appointed by will in the instant suit and a trustee serving
under an express trust?363 Since earlier cases had already held that the three-
year contract statute of limitations governs claims arising out of breach of an
express trust,364 and since one statute was found to imply a legislative intent to
give identical treatment, at least in certain respects, to trustees of express trusts
and personal representatives of estates, 365 the court's application of the con-
tract statute to the Tyson facts is defensible. It is not, however, immune to
criticism.
The Tyson holding and rationale are subject to two fundamental criti-
cisms. The first, which has already been mentioned,366 is that the court should
tected by insurance coverage with respect to claim), no other statute expressly governing actions
brought against an executor for breach of his fiduciary duty has been found in the North Carolina
General Statutes.
355. See supra note 327.
356. 305 N.C. at 141, 286 S.E.2d at 564.
357. Lattimore v. Loews Theatres, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
358. For this reason, the North Carolina Court of Appeals believed that plaintif's claim was
timely. Tyson v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 53 N.C. App. 189, 191, 280 S.E.2d 478, 479-80
(1981), a f'don other grounds, 305 N.C. 136, 286 S.E.2d 561 (1982).
359. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
361. 305 N.C. at 142, 286 S.E.2d at 565.
362. Id
363. Id at 141-42, 286 S.E.2d at 565.
364. Eg., Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge, 247 N.C. 310, 101 S.E.2d 8 (1957); Teachey v. Gurley,
214 N.C. 288, 199 S.E. 83 (1938). But see New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Waller, 301 F.2d 839
(4th Cir. 1962) (examining Teachey and other North Carolina opinions, which seem to indicate
that the remedy of resulting trust or constructive trust causes ten-year statute to apply).
365. N.C. GEN. STAT. §28A-13-10(c) (1976) provides in pertinent part, "If the exercise of
power concerning the estate is improper, thepersonalrepresentative is liable for breach of fiduciary
duty to interested persons for resulting damage or loss to the same extent as a trustee of an express
trust." (emphasis added). See also Tyson, 305 N.C. at 142, 286 S.E.2d at 565.
366. See supra notes 328-30 and accompanying text.
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not apply a contract statute of limitations to a cause of action in which no
contract existed. Nothing in the language of G.S. 1-53367 would put a poten-
tial noncontract litigant on notice that her cause of action must be brought
within three years or be forever barred. By interpreting the contract statute as
encompassing this noncontract action, the court violated one of its own rules
of statutory construction: "The statute of limitations. . . is not such a merito-
rious defense that either the law or the facts should be strained in aid of it."'368
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the court's description of the na-
ture of the remedy369 should have no bearing upon the issue of which statute
of limitations applies.370 It has been observed that one wrong may give rise to
a choice of remedies.37 1 Thus, a breach of contract may permit a plaintiff to
sue for expectancy damages, specific performance, or restitution.372 Yet re-
gardless of the remedy sought, the three-year contract statute of limitations373
would seem to apply. Similarly, a fraudulent transaction may be remedied by
reformation, money damages, equitable lien, or constructive trust.374 In either
event, the statute of limitations applicable to actions founded upon fraud
should govern.3 75 If this were not the rule, the purpose of the statutes376 could
be avoided merely by framing one's prayer for relief to invoke the longer limi-
tation period.377 Finally, the language of the statutes themselves seems to de-
367. See supra note 327.
368. Hardbarger v. Deal, 258 N.C. 31,35, 127 S.E.2d 771,774 (1962) (quoting Rochester v.
Tup, 54 Wash. 2d 71, 74, 337 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1959)).
369. See New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Wailer, 301 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1962). NewAmster-
dam sifts through several North Carolina Supreme Court cases to determine whether it is the
cause of action or the remedy that determines the applicability of a statute of limitations. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined both of the cases principally
relied on in the Tyson opinion, Jarrett v. Green, 230 N.C. 104, 52 S.E.2d 223 (1949), and Teachey
v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288, 199 S.E. 83 (1938), before reaching the following conclusion in New
Amsterdam:
We find nothing in any North Carolina decision suggesting that the courts of that
state, for purposes of limitations, classify a cause of action by reference to the courts'
remedial power to grant redress.... For purposes of limitations, however the North
Carolina Court has looked to the nature of the right of the litigant which calls for judicial
aid, not to the nature of the remedy to rectify the wrong.
301 F.2d at 842 (emphasis added).
370. See infra notes 371-73 and accompanying text.
371. 12 S. WILLISTON, ATREATisE ONTHE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1454n. 5 (3d ed 1970); 11 S.
WILLISTON, A Ta.ATISE ON THE LAW OF CoTRr, Acrs §§1338, 1418 (3d ed. 1968).
372. N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-52(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
373. See supra notes 220-327 and accompanying text; see also New Amsterdam Casualty Co.
v. Wailer, 301 F.2d 839 (action to impress constructive trust); Stewart v. Salisbury Realty & Ins.
Co., 159 N.C. 230, 74 S.E. 736 (1912) (money damages).
374. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981) provides, "Within three years an
action--(a) For relief on the ground on fraud or mistake; the cause of action shall not be deemed
to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake." See supra note 329 and accompanying text. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Waller,
301 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1962) focuses mainly on this statute.
375. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Waller, 301 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1962).
376. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to afford security against stale claims and not to
deprive anyone of his just rights by lapse of time. Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508
(1957); Congleton v. City of Asheboro, 8 N.C. App. 571, 174 S.E.2d 870 (1970).
377. Since a statute of limitations has been characterized as providing a right not to be sued
beyond the time limited, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 663, 194 S.E.2d 521, 535
(1973), the purpose of the statute is not fulfilled if, as a result of one wrong against one potential
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mand the conclusion that it is the nature of the right, rather than the nature of
the remedy, that determines which limitation period shall apply to a claim 378
The statutes are phrased in such terms as "contracts,"3 79 "trespass,"380
"fraud,"381 and "personal injury,"382 not "money damages" or "constructive
trust. ' 383 Since the classification system in the limitations statutes is based
upon the substantive nature of the plaintiff's right, rather than his remedy,
Tyson may be criticized for permitting plaintiffs prayer for a particular rem-
edy to influence the court's determination of the applicable statute. Despite
the foregoing criticisms, the holding in Tyson is now the law of North Caro-
lina. Unless that holding is overruled by future North Carolina Supreme
Court action or by legislative enactment, plaintiffs' attorneys should beware
the holding in Tyson: G.S. 1-52(1) 38 is construed to provide a three-year limi-
tation on any action for money damages against an executor serving without
bond for breach of his fiduciary duty in marshalling the assets of his dece-
dent's estate and paying the decedent's debts.3 85
4. Ilegitimate's Right To Inherit From Putative Father
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Herndon v. Robinson386 held
that an illegitimate child who seeks to share in his intestate father's estate by
relying upon the putative father's acknowledgment of paternity, rather than a
judicial decree establishing paternity, must strictly comply with the require-
ments of G.S. 29-19.387 In the absence of either a formal acknowledgment of
paternity executed by the father for the purpose of establishing an heir and
filed in the clerk of court's office during the father's lifetime, or judicial decree
establishing paternity, no informal acknowledgment by the father will permit
the child to inherit.3 88 The court in Herndon refused to accept "numerous
written documents, signed by Mr. Herndon, which clearly acknowledge[d] pa-
plaintiff, the statute gave defendant repose from a suit for money damages on one date, but still
permitted plaintiff to sue him for a different remedy for several years after the money damages
limitation date had passed.
378. See supra note 369.
379. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981), quoted supra note 327.
380. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(3) (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
381. See supra note 374.
382. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
383. See Tyson, 305 N.C. at 141-42, 286 S.E.2d at 564-65.
384. See supra note 327.
385. 305 N.C. 136, 286 S.E.2d 561.
386. 57 N.C. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 305 (1982).
387. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981) provides that an illegitimate child
may inherit from his putative father if proof of paternity has been established by any one of the
following methods: (1) a judicial decree entered during the life of the putative father, (2) the
father's written admission of paternity "executed or acknowledged before a certifying officer
named in G.S. 52-10(b) and filed during his own lifetime and the child's lifetime" in the appropri-
ate office of the clerk of superior court; (3) the father's acknowledgment of paternity in hs duly
probated will. At common law an illegitimate child had no right to inherit from his putative father
at common law. See Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965).
388. 57 N.C. App. at 321, 291 S.E.2d at 307. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206,254 S.E.2d 762
(1979), is the leading case in North Carolina on this topic.
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temity" 389 as satisfying the statute for purposes of intestate succession. The
court rejected plaintiffs theory of "constructive compliance" 390 with the stat-
ute, holding that "just as a father must act to exclude a legitimate child from
sharing in his estate, he must also act to include an illegitimate child."'3 9 ' The
court's observation is not entirely accurate, however: a father whose paternity
is established by judicial decree certainly does not have to do any act in order
to permit his illegitimate child to take a share of his estate.392 In fact, such a
father would have to act to exclude his illegitimate child just as he would have
to act to exclude his legitimate child.
The court's imprecise statement of the law may be a fortunate error, for it
calls attention to the need for thoughtful judicial inquiry into the legistature's
purposes in enacting G.S. 29-19. The opinion in Herndon rests on the court's
belief that the statutory provision requiring an acknowledgment filed in the
local clerk's office was enacted to ensure that the acknowledging father in-
tended for his illegitimate child to inherit from him in the event of intestacy.
In the court's view, the statute requires an acknowledgment made for thepur-
pose of permitting the child to inherit.393 Since the documents offered by the
illegitimate child in Herndon had been executed by the father when he had
some other purpose in mind, they were rejected by the court.394
Nevertheless it is doubtful that the legislature meant to require a father to
have such a purpose in mind at the moment of acknowledgment. More likely
the draftsmen's immediate concern was for the financial protection of illegiti-
mate children whose deceased fathers, while living, had been unable or un-
willing to make regular child support payments without official prodding. The
judicial decree of paternity and the voluntary paternity acknowledgment de-
scribed in G.S. 29-19 are devices widely utilized by child support enforcement
officers to establish a father's obligation to support his illegitimate children
during the father's lifetime. G.S. 29-19 essentially provides that documenta-
tion of paternity sufficient to justify the issuance of a child support order dur-
ing the father's lifetime is also sufficient to permit the child to inherit from his
father's estate. Nothing in the statute indicates a legislative intent to disqual-
389. 57 N.C. App. at 320, 291 S.E.2d at 307. The documents included an application for an
insurance policy on plaintiffs life and an employment application. Other unsigned documents
indicating that plaintiff was the decedent's natural son included plaintiff's school records and the
1950 federal census. In addition to these documents, plaintiff offered substantial proof that the
decedent, who had no legitimate children, openly acknowledged the illegitimate plaintiff as his
son, permitted plaintiff to live in his home, provided financial support for plaintiff and plaintiffs
mother, and requested that plaintiff adopt his father's last name. Although the decedent never
filed a formal acknowledgment of his paternity, it seems likely that plaintiff was an object of the
decedent's bounty. No judicial decree or voluntary acknowledgement of paternity was ever
sought, probably because the decedent did not deny that he was plaintiffs father.
390. Id See Note, Judicial Impairment of the Illegitimate's Paternal Inheritance Rights in
North Carolina-Mitchell v. Freuler, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 205, 216 (1930) (theory of con-
structive compliance with G.S. 29-19(b)(2) should be adopted to prevent inequity and to promote
the remedial purposes of the statute).
391. 57 N.C. App. at 321, 291 S.E.2d at 307 (emphasis in original).
392. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b)(1) (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
393. 57 N.C. App. at 320-21, 291 S.E.2d at 307.
394. Id
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ify a paternity acknowledgment procured by a child support enforcement of-
ficer and executed for purposes of acknowledging parental responsibility
rather than for the purpose of establishing an heir for the future. The issue
whether the father's acknowledgment is made for the purpose of signifying the
father's recognition of his duty to provide support, or for the purpose of ensur-
ing the child's inheritance right, should be deemed irrelevant under the terms
of G.S. 29-19.
The ultimate aim of the statute seems to be to place legitimate and illegiti-
mate children on equal footing for purposes of intestate succession whenever
reliable proof of paternity is available, regardless of the putative father's intent
to permit or deny inheritance rights to the illegitimate child. If this is the aim
of the statute, its weakness is that it fails to provide inheritance rights for the
illegitimate child whose father has openly acknowledged his paternity and has
responsibly provided voluntary support for the child without judicial interven-
tion. 395 Although it seems improbable to assume that the legislature meant to
grant inheritance rights to a child whose lineage was established in an adverse
judicial proceeding against an uncooperative father, but to deny them to an
openly, albeit informally, acknowledged child of a responsible, affectionate
father, the decision in Herndon reaches exactly that result.
The court of appeals' strict construction of G.S. 29-19 appears to be a
harsh and unwarranted application of the common-law rule that statutes in
derogation of the common law should be strictly construed.396 Where, as in
Herndon, there can be no serious doubt that the claimant is the decedent's
child,3 9 7 there should be no obstacle to the child's right to inherit from his
father. Should the North Carolina Supreme Court have the opportunity to
review the court of appeal's decision, it is hoped that the supreme court will
adopt the plaintiffs theory of "constructive compliance" with the statute and
reverse the lower court's holding in this case.
I Real Estate Brokers398
Two cases decided by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in 1982,
395. Eg., Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979); Herndon, 57 N.C. App.
318, 291 S.E.2d 305 (1982).
396. See Note, supra note 390, at 212-13 nn.63-66 (1980).
397. The court of appeals admitted that "there is little doubt that plaintiff is, in fact, the natu-
ral son of Gartha Hemdon." 57 N.C. App. at 321, 291 S.E.2d at 307.
398. In Reidy v. Macauley, 57 N.C. App. 184, 290 S.E.2d 746 (1982), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a real estate broker is but an "incidental" beneficiary of a contract of
sale executed between the purchaser and seller, and therefore may not maintain an action against
the purchaser for recovery of her sales commission if the purchaser breaches the sales contract by
failing to consummmate the sale. Relying upon the holding in Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 277
N.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970), the court of appeals drew a distinction between an "intended"
beneficiary (one for whose direct benefit the contract was made) and an "incidental" beneficiary
(any beneficiary other than an intended beneficiary), and held that unless a broker can show that
the parties to the sales contract executed it for the purpose of benefiting the broker, the purchaser's
breach does not entitle the broker to recover his lost commission. Reidy, 57 N.C. App. at 186-87,
290 S.E.2d at 747-48.
In The Property Shop v. Mountain City Inv. Co., 56 N.C. App. 644,290 S.E.2d 222 (1982), a
North Carolina real estate broker was permitted to recover the amount of her c6mmission plus
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Gower v. Strout Realty, Inc. ,399 and Short! v. Knob City Investment Company,
Inc. , 4 answered questions of first impression on the subject of real estate
broker's commissions. In Gower4°1 the court construed a North Carolina stat-
ute4°2 prohibiting an unlicensed agent from engaging in the occupation of real
estate broker or salesman to mean that it is unlawful for an out-of-state broker
who is unlicensed in North Carolina to enter into a "finder's fee"4 3 agreement
with a licensed listing agent in North Carolina. It is not unlawful for that
same out-of-state broker to purchase the listed property on his own account,
take a share of the North Carolina broker's commission by prior agreement,
and then resell the property to his own prospects in the state where he is
licensed.405
The suit was instituted by two California real estate brokers who operated
a brokerage business in partnership form in California.4°6 They sued a North
Carolina licensed broker for recovery of money damages on two theories.
First, plaintiffs alleged that they had entered into a co-brokerage agreement
with defendant whereby defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs an amount equal to
one-half his real estate commission if plaintiffs procured a ready, willing, and
able buyer for the North Carolina property. Plaintiffs claimed that they were
entitled to recover the "finder's fee" because they had produced such a buyer,
but the owner refused to sell the property.4°7 Plaintiffs second theory of recov-
accrued interest from a seller who had entered into an oral brokerage contract with plaintiff
whereby plaintiff was to receive a six percent commission if she procured a purchaser ready,
willing, and able to buy a certain North Carolina motel After entering into the oral brokerage
agreement, plaintiff contacted a broker in the state of Georgia, and through him procured a
purchaser for the motel The Georgia broker accompanied the purchaser on a trip to North
Carolina to inspect the property and to meet with the sellers. The purchaser bought the property,
but the sellers refused to pay plaintifi's commission. After ajury trial resulted in a verdict for the
plaintiff, the sellers appealed. The central issues on appeal were: (1) if a seller and purchaser
negotiate a sale without a broker present, but the seller knows or ought to know that his broker
procured the purchaser, is the broker entitled to his commission? and (2) if the broker is entitled
to a commission, but the purchase price in the sales contract is lower than the price at which the
broker listed the property, what is the measure of the broker's recovery? The court of appeals
answered the first question in the affirmative, and adopted as the proper measure of the broker's
commission the rate specified in the original listing agreement. "[Als a general rule when a sale is
made by the owner at a price less than the broker is authorized to offer, the commission allowed is
the contract rate on the actual sale price." Id at 652, 290 S.E.2d at 227. If no particular rate of
commission is specified in the listing agreement between seller and broker, the broker is entitled to
recover in quantum mendt for the reasonable value of his services. Id
399. 56 N.C. App. 603, 289 S.E.2d 880 (1982).
400. 58 N.C. App. 123, 292 S.E.2d 737 (1982).
401. 56 N.C. App. 603, 289 S.E.2d 880.
402. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-1 (1981) provides:
[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, association or corporation in this State
to act as a real estate broker or real estatd'salesman, or directly or indirectly to engage or
assume to engage in the business of real estate broker or real estate salesman . . .
without first obtaining a license issued by the North Carolina Real Estate Licensing
Board ....
403. "[A] finder's fee contract is an arrangement by which an intermediary finds, introduces,
and brings together parties to a real estate transaction, leaving the ultimate transaction and con-
summation of the transaction to the broker." Gower, 56 N.C. App. at 605, 289 S.E.2d at 882.
404. Id at 605, 289 S.E.2d at 882.
405. Id at 606, 289 S.E.2d at 882.
406. Id at 603, 289 S.E.2d at 881.
407. Id
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ery alleged that their ready, willing, and able buyer was one of the plaintiff
brokers, and that the purchasing partner had tendered the purchase price for
the property, but the owner had cancelled the listing agreement. 40 8
Plaintiffs first theory of recovery presented a question of first impression
in the North Carolina appellate courts. Consequently, the court of appeals
consulted the law of various other jurisdictions before concluding that:
There is a split of authority on the question of whether a "finder's
fee" contract is invalid because it violates licensing law. See Annot.,
24 A.L.R.3d 1160, 1172, et seq. We find the better view to be that,
though the finder or originator does not assist in the ultimate negoti-
ations of sale, the real estate licensing statutes would become mean-
ingless if unlicensed parties were able to carry on traditional
brokerage activities under a finder's fee contract.40 9
The court then went on to hold that a finder's fee contract between an unli-
censed person and a licensed broker violates G.S. 93A-1 and is invalid.410
Having held the finder's agreement invalid, the court examined the ques-
tion raised by plaintiffs second theory: whether an out-of-state broker may
contract to purchase in-state property through a North Carolina licensed bro-
ker and split the North Carolina broker's sales commission.411 The court of
appeals stated that the answer to this issue was provided by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in MeArver v. Gerukos.412 Quoting dcArver the court of
appeals held that the type of agreement alleged by plaintiffs second claim for
relief does not violate the licensing statutes, G.S. 93A-1,-2:
Thus it is clear that the Legislature did not intend for this act to
apply to a person, partnership or association who purchases land for
his or its own account, even though such purchase isfor resale. There-
fore, a contract by one who is not a licensed real estate broker or
salesman with another person to buy land, or an option thereon, for
their own account and, thereafter, to resell such land, or option, and
divide the profits would not be a contract to do an act prohibited by
this statute.413
This passage from McArver convinced the court of appeals that plaintiffs sec-
ond theory of recovery was not unlawful under the North Carolina licensing
statute.414
The court could have distinguished McArver from the instant case on the
grounds that McArver validated a contract to split the purchaser's future prof-
its if he were successful in reselling the property,415 while the Gower contract
contemplated splitting the in-state broker's commission earned on the first
408. Id at 603-04, 289 S.E.2d at 881.
409. Id at 605, 289 S.E.2d at 882.
410. Id
411. Id at 603-04, 289 S.E.2d at 881.
412. 265 N.C. 413, 144 S.E.2d 277 (1965).
413. 56 N.C. App. at 606, 289 S.E.2d at 882 (quoting McArver v. Gerukos, 265 N.C. 413, 418,
144 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1965)) (emphasis added).
414. 56 N.C. App. at 606, 289 S.E.2d at 882.
415. Id
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sale.4 16 Such a distinction, however, would not be helpful in resolving the
issue before the court. The real issue at the heart of Gower is how a North
Carolina licensed broker may deal with an out-of-state broker unlicensed to
do business in this state? The answer given in Gower seems to be that a li-
censed broker may deal with an unlicensed one only in the same manner in
which he may deal with any other prospective purchaser. He may offer to sell
the property to him for the price authorized by the seller, and he may en-
courage the prospect's acceptance by agreeing to split his commission with the
buyer.417 However he may not make an enforceable "finder's fee" agreement
with one who is not purchasing the property on his own account.
418
One difficulty with the Gower rule is that an out-of-state broker, licensed
in his own state but unaware of the law in North Carolina, may readily agree
to enter into such a "finder's fee" contract and may fully perform his part of
the bargain by procuring a ready, wiling, and able purchaser who consum-
mates the sale. If the North Carolina broker makes and honors such an agree-
ment, he violates North Carolina law. If the North Carolina broker refuses to
honor the agreement, he will be unjustly enriched by the value of the finder's
services, but, under the rule of Gower, he cannot be successfully sued in North
Carolina by the out-of-state broker who actually procured the purchaser.
Such a result is inequitable when considering the fact that the party most
likely to be aware of the unlawfulness of the finder's fee agreement (the North
Carolina broker) stands to benefit first by ignoring the law when he needs help
in locating a purchaser, then by invoking the law's protection once that pur-
chaser is found.
In Shortt v. Knob City Investment Co. 419 the court of appeals faced the
question whether a sale of one hundred percent of the outstanding shares of
the seller corporation to a person procured by the seller's real estate broker
constituted a sale of the corporation's property entitling the agent to his con-
tractual commission.420 Knob City Investment Co. (defendant) entered into a
sales agency contract with plaintiff, whereby plaintiff was authorized to offer
all defendant corporation's real estate and improvements, fixtures, and sup-
plies located thereon (which was all the tangible property belonging to the
corporation)42 1. Under the terms of the contract, if the property did not sell
before the expiration date of plaintiffs listing, but was sold within the follow-
ing six months to a purchaser to whom plaintiff had submitted the offer during
the term of the listing, plaintiff would be entitled to a commission of ten per-
cent of the sales price.422 Within six months after the listing expired, a person
to whom plaintiff had submitted the offer of sale bought one hundred percent
of the outstanding stock of the defendant corporation. The sale of the stock
416. See supra text accompanying notes 406-09.
417. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 402 & 403 and accompanying text.
419. 58 N.C. App. 123, 292 S.E.2d 737 (1982).
420. Id at 127, 292 S.E.2d at 739-40.
421. Id at 125, 292 S.E.2d at 738.
422. Id at 125, 292 S.E.2d at 738-39.
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was accomplished in one transaction in which the corporation's four share-
holders simultaneously transferred all their shares to the purchaser.423 Be-
cause the sale was accomplished by a transfer of stock, no deed of conveyance
of real estate was executed. The court of appeals held that the sale of the stock
was a sale of the property within the terms of the exclusive sales agency
contract.424
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals found no precedent in North
Carolina law. Relying heavily upon the reasoning in an opinion from the
Georgia Court of Appeals, Kingston Development Co. v. Kenery, 425 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals quoted with approval authorities cited therein:
The sale of all of the stock of the corporation was in legal effect a sale
of all of its assets, and the mere fact that the parties found it more
convenient to transfer all of the stock rather than to make a convey-
ance of its assets does not change the substance of the transaction
[A] broker who is employed to procure a purchaser of all the
company's property earns his commission when he procures a pur-
chaser for all of the stock of the corporation. . . . [Furthermore,]
where the corporation contracts with the broker. . . it is the corpora-
tion as contracting party-not its stockholders as individuals that
would be responsible for commission.426
The holding of Shortt adopts a sound, practical approach to the problem
of determining whether a sale of stock may constitute a sale of real estate
under the terms of a broker's listing agreement. By focusing upon the effect of
the stock transfer (the property is controlled by a different entity) rather than
itsform (the property remains titled to the same corporate name)427, the court
of appeals permitted the seller and purchaser to use the mode of transfer they





423. Id at 127, 292 S.E.2d at 739.
424. Id at 128, 292 S.E.2d at 740.
425. 132 Ga. App. 346, 208 S.E.2d 118 (1974).
426. Id at 351-52, 208 S.E.2d at 122.




The controversy in In re Southern RailwayI centered on the appraisal of
railroad property for ad valorem tax purposes.2 These appraisals, which focus
on the property as a system or unity,3 are made by theAd Valorem Tax Divi-
sion of the Department of Revenue4 and are subject to review by the Property
Tax Commission.5 The value of railroad property is generally determined on
the basis of income-earning capacity.6 Although the income approach is rela-
tively simple in design, the required calculations are extremely complicated.
The appraiser must determine the normal income the railroad is capable of
earning on the date of appraisal and then capitalize that income at an appro-
priate rate of return.7 The object is to establish the "true value" or "market
value" of the property.8
The taxpayers in Southern Railway challenged various aspects of the ap-
praisal methods employed by the Department of Revenue in making the nec-
essary calculations of income and rate of return.9 The first challenge
concerned the appropriateness of adding deferred income tax expenses to the
capitalizable income. The railroads, in accordance with generally accepted
accounting procedures, had established reserves for deferred income taxes
arising from accelerated depreciation of capital assets. 10 The reserves were
deducted from current income as an operating expense." The Department of
Revenue, however, adjusted the railroads' income records by re-adding the
amounts previously deducted.12 On appeal from an adverse decision by the
Property Tax Commission, the railroads argued that deferred income taxes
have no value and would not be regarded as income by a potential buyer or
seller.13 The court of appeals disagreed. 14 Citing the notion that future in-
come taxes represent a contingency, not an outstanding indebtedness,' 5 the
1. 59 N.C. App. 119, 296 S.E.2d 463 (1982).
2. Railroads are classified as "public service companies" under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
333(14) (1979).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-335(a) (1979).
4. Id.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-222 (1978).
6. See 59 N.C. App. at 126, 296 S.E.2d at 469. Other appraisal methods focus upon the
market value of the company's stock and debt, and the book value of the company's assets. See
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 105-336(a) (1979).
7. See 59 N.C. App. at 126-27, 296 S.E.2d at 469.
8. Id. at 126, 296 S.E.2d at 469.
9. The case also raised a question concerning the proper role of the Property Tax Commis-
sion in hearing appeals of the ad valorem tax appraisals from the Department of Revenue. The
administrative issues, however, are beyond the scope of this section.
10. 59 N.C. App. at 127, 296 S.E.2d at 469. Under the accelerated method, the taxpayer's




13. Id. at 127-28, 296 S.E.2d at 469.
14. Id. at 128, 296 S.E.2d at 470.
15. Id. at 128, 296 S.E.2d at 469-70.
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court stated that establishing a reserve for deferred taxes simply "anticipates a
tax that may never become due." 16 Consequently, deducting the reserve from
current income results in an undervaluation of the railroads' property. 17
Thus, the court agreed with the Department of Revenue that the reserve
should be included in income for purposes of the ad valorem tax appraisal.18
Other questions raised on appeal focused upon the determination of base
value, the interest rates on indebtedness, and the rate of return on equity. The
court held that the Department of Revenue could use the preceding year's
income, rather than an average of the past five years' income, to establish base
value.19 In dictum, the court indicated that income averaging might be appro-
priate if the railroads' income has not increased yearly.20 The court also held
that the Department need not substitute current market interest rates for the
embedded cost 21 of the debt.2 The court feared that difficult questions of fact
could arise in establishing the current interest rates a particular taxpayer could
obtain.23 Finally, the court held that the actual rate of return on equity capi-
tal, based only upon past income, was an appropriate means of determining
the rate of return a potential investor would demand.24 The railroads argued
unsuccessfully that the rate of return should be based upon the average rate of
return, at current market cost for capitalization, for all railroads. 25 The court,
apparently unable to marshal arguments strictly in favor of using the actual
rate of return, concluded simply that the question was largely a matter ofjudg-
ment, not law, and should not be set aside absent bad faith, unreasonableness,
or arbitrariness. 26
B. Local Charges
In Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette27 the supreme court considered the
question whether a municipal body can increase its sewer rate to reflect the
expense of a new waste water treatment plant before the new system begins
operation. The statutory authorization for establishing water and sewer rates
provides that "[a] city may establish and revise from time to time schedules of




20. Id. Thus, if there have been alternate years of profit and loss, income averaging would be
an appropriate method of establishing a realistic base value. See Id. The question remains, how-
ever, whether income averaging would be mandatory in such a situation.
21. The "embedded" cost is the interest rate expressed on the face of the debt instrument. Id.
at 129, 296 S.E.2d at 470
22. Id.
23. Id. The difficulty of the determination, however, probably should not be controlling.
From beginning to end, the appraisal involves many complicated factual questions. The Ad
Valorem Tax Division and the Property Tax Commission presumably possess the expertise neces-
sary to resolve such questions.
24. Id. at 130, 296 S.E.2d at 470.
25. Id. at 129-30, 296 S.E.2d at 470-71.
26. Id. at 130, 296 S.E.2d at 471.
27. 305 N.C. 248, 287 S.E.2d 851 (1982).
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rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use or the services furnished by
any public enterprise. '28 Bissette argued that, under the language of the stat-
ute, a town may not charge for services to be rendered in the future.29 The
supreme court, in dictum, agreed with that proposition.30 The court disagreed,
however, that construction of the new water treatment plant resulted in the
rendition of new services. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Branch ob-
served, "When the new plant went into operation, the customers received
nothing they had not theretofore received; thus, the increase in the rate did not
reflect any services yet to be furnished, but merely the same service which had
been previously furnished, ie., the efficient removal of waste water."3' Char-
acterizing the new plant as a necessary improvement to the existing sewer sys-
tem,3 2 the court held that the municipality could reflect the expense of
constructing the new plant in its current water and sewer rate consistent with
G.S. 160A-314(a).33
Justice Exum, dissenting, drew a distinction between charges to cover the
expense of constructing the new plant and charges intended to pay for mainte-
nance of the facility.3 4 The latter costs, he argued, could not be charged to the
taxpayers until the plant actually went into operation.35 The apparent basis
for the distinction is that maintenance costs, unlike construction costs, are not
actually incurred until the plant begins operation.3 6 The majority opinion did
not address the point.
C. Use Tax
In Deep River Farms, Ltd v. Lynch 37 the court of appeals held38 that a
hydroponic growing system did not constitute a machine or machinery for
purposes of the partial exemption from use tax provided by G.S. 105-
164.4(1)(g).39 The taxpayer's system was similar to a greenhouse,4° and con-
tained various moving parts, such as furnaces, pumps, and fans.41 The statute
provides that the term "machines and machinery" includes:
all nonvehicular implements and mechanical devices designed and
sold for any use defined in this subdivision, which have moving
parts, or which require the use of any motor or animal power, fuel, or
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-314(a) (1982).
29. 305 N.C. at 251, 287 S.E.2d at 853.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 252, 287 S.E.2d at 853.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 255-56, 287 S.E.2d at 854-55 (Exum, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 256, 287 S.E.2d at 855 (Exum, J., dissenting).
36. Id. Justice Exum did not explain why actual incurrence of the costs should control in
determining whether the increase in rates exceeds the statutory authorization. The connection,
while not entirely tenuous, is far from axiomatic.
37. 58 N.C. App. 165, 292 S.E.2d 752 (1982).
38. Id. at 168, 292 S.E.2d at 754.
39. N.C. GEN. STAt. § 105-164.4(l)(g) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
40. 58 N.C. App. at 168, 292 S.E.2d at 754.
41. Id.
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electricity in their operation but shall not include nonvehicular im-
plements which have no moving parts and are operated wholly by
hand.42
The system's basic similarity to a building did not preclude application of
the lower tax rate, since structures such as kilns and freezers have been held to
constitute machinery for purposes of federal tax exemptions.43 The court, cit-
ing Endres Floral Co. v. United States," held that the crucial factor in deter-
mining whether structures can be classified as machines is the amount of
human activity involved in the operation of the system.45 The court character-
ized the human activity required by the hydroponic growing system as "sub-
stantiar' and refused to classify it as a machine.46 The court noted that
defining a greenhouse as a machine would "allow any building or structure
within which there are moving parts, systems or devices powered by machines
to be classified as a machine. Such an interpretation would lead to absurd
results not intended by the Legislature." 47
D. Income Tax
G.S. 105-15948 requires a taxpayer to file a new return with the Secretary
of Revenue whenever the taxpayer's net income for any year is corrected or
changed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any other authorized
federal officer.49 The new return must be filed within two years after receipt of
the federal agent's report.50 Failure to do so constitutes an attempt to evade or
defeat income taxes under G.S. 105-236(7).51
Although the tax evasion statute clearly provides a three-year limitations
period,52 the running of the statute presents a special problem when the at-
tempted evasion consists of a failure to file a new return under G.S. 105-159.
Suppose, for example, that on April 29, 1977, the taxpayer receives notice from
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the taxpayer's net income for the
years 1971, 1972, and 1973 has been corrected. The taxpayer fails to file a new
return with the Secretary of Revenue within the two-year period provided by
G.S. 105-159. Does the statute of limitations begin to run in 1971, 1972, and
1973, respectively, or on April 29, 1979, when the two-year period for filing a
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(1)(g) (Cun. Supp. 1981).
43. See Endres Floral Co. v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 16, 24 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
44. Id.
45. 58 N.C. App. at 170, 292 S.E.2d at 755.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-159 (1979).
49. The purpose of the statute, of course, is to allow the Secretary of Revenue to assess addi-
tional state income taxes on the basis of the corrected net income. See State v. Patton, 57 N.C.
App. 702, 704, 292 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1982).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-159 (1979).
51. Id.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-236(7) (1979).
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new return expired?53 In State v. Patton54 the court of appeals held on these
facts that the statute began to run not when the taxes fell due, but when the
taxpayer failed to fie a new return within the prescribed period.55 The court
reasoned that the offense, the act of evasion, occurred at the later date.56 As a
practical matter, any other interpretation of G.S. 105-159 would lead to absurd
results, because the filing of the initial return, the audit by the federal govern-
ment, the notice of corrected net income, and the lapse of the two-year period
for filing a new return with state authorities would rarely transpire within
three years after the taxes originally fell due. Therefore, acceptance of the
taxpayer's argument in Patton would have eviscerated G.S. 105-159 by mak-
ing enforcement virtually impossible.
E Unemployment Tax
Under the Employment Security Law, employers are not required to
make contributions to the Unemployment Insurance Fund on wages arising
out of services performed "by a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed
minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry or by a member of a reli-
gious order in the exercise of duties required by such order. . . -57 InBaptist
Children's Homes v. Employment Securit Commission5 8 the court of appeals
announced the appropriate test for determining whether the services of a min-
ister are performed "in the exercise of his ministry" and thus beyond the scope
of the statute.59 Baptist Children's Homes, a North Carolina corporation that
provides shelter and services for homeless and dependent children and their
families,60 employed an ordained minister as a house parent.61 The home
treated the minister as self-employed and did not report his wages for the pur-
poses of unemployment insurance coverage. 62 The Employment Security
Commission, focusing upon the nature of the work performed, argued that the
mere fact that an individual is an ordained minister does not bring all services
performed by the individual within the scope of the ministerial exemption.63
Under the Commission's view, it is the job, not the employee, that must qual-
ify for the exemption. Since the position itself involved no ministerial func-
tions,64 no person so employed, whether an ordained minister or not, could
qualify.
53. Another way of phrasing the question is to ask whether the offense relates back to the
year in which the taxes fell due.
54. 57 N.C. App. 702, 292 S.E.2d 172 (1982).
55. Id. at 704, 292 S.E.2d at 174.
56. Id.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-8(6)k.15(ii) (Cure. Supp. 1981).
58. 56 N.C. App. 781, 290 S.E.2d 402 (1982).
59. The court made no decison on the merits, but remanded the case to the Employment
Security Commission to make necessary findings of fact. See infra note 65.
60. 56 N.C. App. at 782, 290 S.E.2d at 403.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 783, 290 S.E.2d at 404.
64. Id. at 782, 290 S.E.2d at 403. In fact, most of the house parents were not ordained minis-
ters. Id.
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Adopting the language of regulations interpreting analogous federal stat-
utes,65 the court of appeals disagreed and decided that the appropriate test for
determining whether services performed by a minister are "in the exercise of
his ministry" is "whether the employer is itself a religious organization under
the authority of a religious body constituting a church or church denomination
or, if not, whether the employer is operated as an integral agency of such a
religious organization."66 Thus, the proper test focuses upon the character of
the employer, rather than upon the nature of the position held. Unfortunately,
however, the court provided no guidelines for determining whether a given
employer is an "integral agency" of a religious organization;67 consequently,
application of the "integral agency" test will undoubtedly spawn further
litigation.
F Inheritance Tax
InHolt v. Lynch 68 the supreme court held that interest on funds borrowed
to pay federal estate taxes and state inheritance taxes is deductible from the
decedent's gross estate as a cost of administration.69 More importantly, the
court held that the cost-of-administration deduction embraces not only interest
on money borrowed to pay the taxes, but also interest expenses incurred on the
taxes themselves.70 Resolution of the second issue involved a complicated
construction of G.S. 105-241.1(il), 7 1 which provides the following definition of
a "tax": "Tax' and 'additional tax,' for the purposes of this Subchapter and
for the purposes of Subchapters V and VIII of this Chapter, include penalties
and interest, as well as the principal amount of such tax or additional tax."
The Revenue Commissioner argued on the basis of this definition that interest
on a tax is itself a tax.72 Therefore, the interest payments in question, if re-
garded as a tax, cannot be deductible, since G.S. 105-9(5) allows a deduction
only for "taxes paid to other states, and death duties paid to foreign coun-
tries."73 The court of appeals found two major flaws in the Commissioner's
reasoning. First, the court rejected the assumption that the statutory definition
65. Id. at 785-86, 290 S.E.2d at 404-05.
66. Id. The court did not have sufficient facts before it to determine the status of the em-
ployee under the newly enunciated test. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Commission for
a determination whether Baptist Children's Homes is an "integral agency" of the Baptist State
Convention. The court noted that there was uncontested evidence upon which the Commission
could base a finding of "integral agency" status. Id. at 786, 290 S.E.2d at 405.
67. Presumably, courts will have no difficulty determining whether an employer is a "reli-
gious organization under the authority of a religious body constituting a church or church denom-
ination." Id. at 785, 290 S.E.2d at 405.
68. 307 N.C. 234, 297 S.E.2d 594 (1982).
69. Id. at 237, 297 S.E.2d at 596.
70. Id. at 240-41, 297 S.E.2d at 598. Examples of interest on the tax itself include interest
incurred as a result of federal estate tax deficiencies, deferred installments of federal estate tax,
and state inheritance tax deficiencies. Id. at 234, 297 S.E.2d at 594-95. All of these costs represent
interest, not on debt created to pay the tax, but rather on the tax itself. See Id. at 239, 297 S.E.2d at
598.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-241.1(il) (1979).
72. 307 N.C. at 238-39, 297 S.E.2d at 597.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-9(5) (1979).
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of "tax" extends beyond purposes of administration to purposes of determin-
ing deductibility.74 Second, assuming that for purposes of determining de-
ductibility, interest on a tax is "something in addition to the tax,"'75 the court
saw no reason to distinguish between interest on a debt created to pay the tax
(which the court had already held deductible) and interest on the tax itself.76
G. Statutory Developments
North Carolina corporations that have income subject to taxation in an-
other state are required to apportion and allocate income in accordance with
G.S. 105-130.4(b).77 The General Assembly sought to clarify the situations in
which apportionment is required by rewriting the test for determining when a
corporation is deemed taxable in another state.78 The new provision reads as
follows:
For purposes of allocation and apportionment, a corporation is taxa-
ble in another state if (i) the corporation's business activity in that
state subjects it to a net income tax or a tax measured by net income,
or (ii) that state has jurisdiction based on the corporation's business
activity in that state to subject the corporation to a tax measured by
net income regardless whether that state exercises its jurisdiction. For
purposes of this section, "business activity" includes any activity by a
corporation that would establish a taxable nexus pursuant to 15
United States Code section 381.79
In other legislative action, the General Assembly encouraged the use of
alternative energy sources by creating corporate and personal income tax cred-
its for the construction of peat facilities;80 eliminated the requirement of certi-
fication by the Department of Natural Resources and Community
Development from the property tax exclusion for real and personal property
used solely for air cleaning or to abate, reduce, or prevent the pollution of air
or water,8 ' created a tax refund of eleven cents per gallon for taxpayers who
transport taxpaid motor fuel to another state for sale or use in that state;82
extended the foreign income exclusion to residents "living abroad," thereby
bringing it in accordance with the federal exclusion;8 3 raised the ceiling on the
74. 307 N.C. at 239, 297 S.E.2d at 597.
75. Id. at 240, 297 S.E.2d at 598.
76. Id.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130A(b) (1979).
78. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1212, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws, (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-1340A(b) (Interim Supp. 1982)).
79. Id.
80. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1204, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws, (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 105-130.27A and 105-151.6A (Interim Supp. 1982)). "Peat facility" is defined as "a facil-
ity which uses peat as the feed stock for the production of a commercially manufactured energy
source to replace petroleum, natural gas or other nonrenewable energy sources ... ." Id
81. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1244, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws, (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-275(27) to -275(28) (Interim Supp. 1982)).
82. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1219, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws, (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-446.6 (Interim Supp. 1982)). The new law applies to purchases of motor fuel made on
or after July 1, 1982. Id
83. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1205, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 105 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C.
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exemption of gain from the sale or exchange of a residence from eighteen
months to two years;84 provided that only funds actually received (rather than
merely made available) from employee trusts must be reported as income;85
created an inheritance tax exemption for survivor annuities receivable by a
beneficiary under a federal employee retirement program to which the em-
ployee made contributions during his working years;86 created a similar ex-
emption for lump sum distributions that formerly did not qualify for tax-
exempt treatment;8 7 eliminated reporting requirements for estates under
$75,000;88 and repealed the privilege tax on issuers and redeemers of trading
stamps,89 coal and coke dealers, 90 merchants buying or selling commodities on
commission,91 junk dealers,92 and manufacturers and sellers of monuments
and gravestones.93
PAUL ABBOTr PARKER
GEN. STAT. § 105-141(b)(22) (Interim Supp. 1982)). The same bill repealed G.S. 105-147(1)f,
which had allowed a deduction for expenses of state residents living abroad.
84. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1208, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 106 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-144.2(a) (Interim Supp. 1982)).
85. Law of June 18, 1982, ch 1222, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws, 112 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-142(d) (Interim Supp. 1982)).
86. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1218, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 111 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-3(8) (Interim Supp. 1982)).
87. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1220, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 112 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-3(5) (Interim Supp. 1982 )).
88. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1221, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 112 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 105-22, 105-23, and 28A-21-2(a) (Interim Supp.)).
89. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1227, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 118 (Reg. Sess.) (repealing N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-92 (1979)).
90. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1228, 1982 Sess. Laws 118 (Reg. Sess.) (repealing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-44 (1979)).
91. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1229, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 118 (Reg. Sess.) (repealing N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-68 (1979)).
92. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1230, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws, 119 (Reg. Sess.) (repealing N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-102 (1979)).
93. Law of June 18, 1982, ch. 1231, 1982 N.C. Sess. Laws 119 (Reg. Sess.) (repealing N.C.




In Martin v. Smith2 the Federal District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina addressed the concept of "crashworthiness" -an issue on
which two federal appellate courts had recently reached conflicting conclu-
sions regarding North Carolina law. 3 Martin involved an action for wrongful
death arising from an automobile accident in which plaintiffs' decedents were
fatally burned. Plaintiffs sued the driver of the other car for negligence, and
the manufacturer of their own car for wrongful design and construction. Cit-
ing Wilson v. Ford Motor Co. ,4 defendant manufacturer moved for dismissal.
Wilson, decided in 1981 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, held that North Carolina would not recognize the crashworthiness
doctrine, which allows damages against a defendant whose negligent design
aggravates injuries, but is not the cause of the original impact.5
The district court in Martin attacked the Wilson rationale as disharmoni-
ous with North Carolina law.6 North Carolina, the court said, recognizes that
there may be more than one proximate cause for an injury,7 and the actor
whose negligence is a proximate cause of any part of the injury is liable for
that part.8 Stating that the manufacturer's negligence could be seen as a proxi-
mate cause of the injuries, and that the issue should go to the jury,9 the court
noted that there is a split among the federal district courts: two having upheld
such liability, and two having denied it. The court distinguished Martin from
cases, such as Wilson, denying liability for aggravation of injuries because in
Martin the fatal injuries resulted from burning. This factor, the court said,
was a difference of kind, rather than simply of degree. 10 The court thus de-
nied defendent manufacturer's motions to dismiss and stated that the issue
whether defendant manufacturer's negligence was a proximate cause of the
injuries should be submitted to the jury.II
1. In McCollum v. Grove Mfg. Co., 58 N.C. App. 283, 293 S.E.2d 632 (1982), the court of
appeals affirmed that North Carolina applies the "patent danger" rule. This rule, rejected in most
jurisdictions, states that no warning of an obvious danger is required. The rule's rationale is that
failure to warn is not the proximate cause of the injury. The court also said that although North
Carolina recognizes strict liability in exceptional cases, the crane that caused plaintiffs injury in
McCollum was not a dangerous instrumentality, and that therefore strict liability did not apply.
2. 534 F. Supp. 804 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
3. In Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1981), the court predicted that
North Carolina would adopt the crashworthiness doctrine, while Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 656
F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981), predicted that North Carolina would not. SEE Survey of Developments in
North Carolina Law, 1981-Torts, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1159, 1468-71 (1982).
4. 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981).
5. Id
6. 534 F. Supp. at 806.
7. Id (citing Hester v. Miller, 41 N.C. App. 509, 255 S.E.2d 318 (1979)).
8. Id
9. 534 F. Supp. at 807.
10. Id at 806.
11. Id at 807. The court also stated that in this case plaintiffs alleged wanton and malicious
concealment by the manufacturer of crash-test results. Regardless of the outcome of the
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In Bolick v. American Barmag Corp. 12 the supreme court interpreted G.S.
1-50(6), 13 the statute of limitations for product liability cases. In Bolick plain-
tiff was injured at work by a yam-crimping machine purchased from defend-
ant manufacturer. Plaintiff sued, alleging negligent design and manufacture,
as well as breach of warranty. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that
G.S. 1-50(6) barred recovery in suits fied more than six years after the original
purchase.14 The trial court allowed the motion, but was reversed by the court
of appeals, which held section 1-50(6) unconstitutional on its face.' 5
The supreme court, following the reasoning of Smith v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp. ,16 determined that section 1-50(6) was not merely a
procedural rule, but a substantive requirement for the bringing of the statuto-
rily created cause of action.17 Therefore, in a suit to which section 1-50(6)
applies, plaintiff must prove as a condition precedent that the action is brought
within six years after the initial purchase.' 8 The statute, said the court, is more
properly considered a "statute of repose" rather than a "statute of limita-
tions." 19 Because section 1-50(6) created substantive changes in the conditions
precedent when it became effective in 1979, the court reasoned that the legisla-
ture did not intend that it be applied retroactively.20 Since plaintif's injuries
"crashworthiness" debate, the court felt that these allegations of intentional wrongdoing consti-
tuted sufficient grounds to warrant submission to the jury. Id
12. 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982). See Dworkin, Product Liability ofthe 1980s: "Re-
pose is Not the Destiny of Manufactuers," 61 N.C.L. Rlv. 33, 62 (1982).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides, "No action for the recovery of
damages, personal injury, death, or damage to property based upon or arising out of any alleged
defect or any failure in relation to a product shall be brought more than six years after the date of
initial purchase for use or consumption."
14. The machine was purchased on April 6, 1971, plaintiff was injured on June 3, 1977, and
suit was filed after October 1, 1979 (the effective date of § 1-50(6)) but before three years had
passed since the date of injury. 306 N.C. at 365, 293 S.E.2d at 417.
15. Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981). The court
stated that by barring some actions before they accrued, the statute violated N.C. CONsT. art 1,
§ 18, which guarantees a right to seek redress in the courts. See Survey of Developments in North
Carolina Law, 1981-Constitutional Law, 60 N.C.L. Rav. 1272, 1285-86 (1982).
16. 38 N.C. App. 457, 248 S.E.2d 462 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 33 (1979).
The case involved N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (Cum. Supp. 1981), a statute similar to § 1-50(6), but
related to injuries caused by unsafe conditions on real property.
17. A statute of limitations should be differentiated from conditions which are annexed
to a right of action created by statute. A statute which in itself creates a new liability,
gives an action to enforce it unknown to the common law, and fixes the time within
which that action a statute of creation, and the commencement of the action within the
time it fixes is an indispensible condition of may be commenced, is not a statute of limi-
tations. It is the liability and of the action which it permits. The time element is an
inherent element of the right so created, and the limitation of the remedy is a limitation
of the right.
306 N.C. at 369, 293 S.E.2d at 419 (quoting 34 Am. JuR., Limitation of Actions § 7 (1941)).
18. 306 N.C. at 370, 293 S.E.2d at 420.
19. Id at 366, 293 S.E.2d at 417-18. The distinction is that a statute of limitations establishes
a period of time within which a cause of action must be brought after its accrual-usually the time
of the discovery of the injury. A statute of repose, however, adds the additional requirement that
the action be brought within a certain length of time after some act by the defendant, such as the
sale of the defective item or the rendering of the injurious service. It is this definite limit to the
cause of action that gives potential defendants "repose' and attributes the substantive quality to
such statutes.
20. Id at 371, 293 S.E.2d at 420.
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had occurred before the effective date of the statute, the court looked to the
statute previously in effect,2 1 which provided that an action could be filed
within three years of the injury. To do otherwise, the court said, would allow
section 1-50(6) to destroy plaintiff's cause of action, which had vested before
the statute became effective.
2 2
In a case decided the same day as Bolick, the supreme court considered
related issues concerning section 1-50(6). In Bernick v. Jordan23 a hockey
player was injured when his mouthpiece broke. Alleging defective manufac-
ture, the hockey player sued the manufacturer. Defendant argued that the
claim was barred by G.S. 25-2-725,24 which contains a four-year staute of lim-
itations applicable to UCC transactions and states that the cause of action
accrues when the breach of warranty occurs. Rejecting this contention, the
court stated that G.S. 1-15(b),25 a more specific statute of limitations pertain-
ing to claims for personal injury or property damage, was in effect at the time
of the injury.26 Plaintiff asserted, however that G.S. 1-50(6) was the applicable
statute, since section 1-15(b) was superseded in 1979 when section 1-50(6)27
became effective. The court, applying the rule in Bolick, stated that since
plaintiff's cause of action accrued before the effective date of section 1-50(6),
the court would employ the statute in effect at the time of the injury.28 Since
section 1-15(b) provided that the cause of action accrued when the injury was
discovered or reasonably discoverable, the cause of action in Bernick was
allowed.2 9
B. Wrongful Death
In Carver v. Carver,3 0 the North Carolina Court of Appeals construed for
the first time the North Carolina wrongful death statute in light of G.S. 1-
539.21,31 which abolished parent-child immunity. G.S. 28A-18-2(a) autho-
rizes actions for wrongful death only in cases in which the deceased would
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-52(1), (5) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
22. 306 N.C. at 371, 293 S.E.2d at 420-21.
23. 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-725 (1965 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (repealed by Act of May 28, 1979, ch. 654, 1979 N.C. Sess.
Laws 687, (Ist Sess.)
26. 306 N.C. at 447, 293 S.E.2d at 411-12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (repealed 1979) pro-
vided in pertinent part:
[A] cause of action ... having as an essential element bodily injury to the person... is
deemed to have accrued at the time the injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought
reasonably to have been discovered by him...; provided that... the period shall not
exceed 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.
27. See m.ra note 13.
28. Bernick, 306 N.C. at 447, 293 S.E.2d at 413.
29. Id
30. 55 N.C. App. 716, 286 S.E.2d 789 (1982).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Cum. Supp. 1981). That section provides, "The relationship
of parent and child shall not bar the right of action by a minor child against a parent for personal
injury or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by
such parent."
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have had a cognizable claim, had he lived.32 Because the rule of parent-childimmunity was in effect prior to the enactment of G.S. 1-539.21, representatives
of the estates of unemancipated minor children were barred from bringing
wrongful death actions against such children's parents.33 In 1976, however,
the General Assembly abolished that immunity in cases involving injury aris-
ing out of the operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the parent.34
In Carver the court interpreted the law to allow the estate representative of a
minor child to sue the child's mother for negligently causing the child's death
by automobile accident.3 5
In Burci v. North Carolina Baptist Hospital, Inc. 36 the supreme court con-
sidered the issue whether a foreign administrator could qualify as an ancillary
personal representative after the running of the statute of limitations, and
thereafter maintain a cause of action for wrongful death. Because a foreign
administrator lacks the "capacity to sue" in a wrongful death action in North
Carolina,37 it had been the rule that if a wrongful death action was brought by
a foreign personal representative who had failed to qualify locally before the
limitations period ended, the complaint could not be amended: the action
would be dismissed as untimely filed.38 This result was considered proper be-
cause bringing suit in a different capacity was seen as tantamount to instituting
a new cause of action.3 9
In 1967, however, North Carolina adopted rules of civil procedure pat-
terned after the federal rules.4 North Carolina rule 15(a) now allows a party
to amend his pleadings, rule 15(d) allows supplemental pleadings, and rule
15(c) states that the amendments relate back to the time of the original com-
plaint unless there is prejudice to the defendant because of lack of notice.
Rule 17 provides that an action shall not be dismissed on the ground that it is
not brought in the name of the real party in interest, until reasonable time has
been given to join or substitute the real party in interest. Because the North
Carolina rules are patterned after the federal rules, the supreme court looked
to federal precedent, and determined the controlling issue to be whether the
original pleading gave notice of the events involved to the defending party,
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another,
such as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action for dam-
ages therefor, the person or corporation that would have been so liable, . . shall be
liable to an action for damages, to be brought by the personal representative or collector
of the decedent ....
33. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Cure. Supp. 1981).
35. 55 N.C. App. at 724, 286 S.E.2d at 804. Because the mother could not receive a damages
award, she could not testify as to loss of comfort and companionship. Id
36. 306 N.C. 214, 293 S.E.2d 85 (1982).
37. Monfils v. Hazlewood, 218 N.C. 215, 216, 10 S.E.2d 673, 673 (1940).
38. Hall v. Southern Ry., 149 N.C. 108, 62 S.E. 899 (1908).
39. 306 N.C. at 219-20, 293 S.E.2d at 89 (citing Bennet v. North Carolina R.R., 159 N.C. 345,
74 S.E. 833 (1912)).
40. Act of June 27, 1967, ch. 954, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1274 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ lA-1 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981)).
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thereby avoiding prejudice. 41
In Burcl the court determined that defendants had full notice of the
events within the original period of limitations, and therefore reversed the trial
court's denial of plaintiffs motion to file a supplemental pleading to show her
qualification as ancillary administrator. This holding brings North Carolina
in line with the majority view, and reflects a sound policy: the defendent is not
prejudiced, and the plaintiff is not deprived of a legitimate claim because of a
technicality.
4 2
In Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc.43 decedent's administratrix sued the
driver-owner of a commercial vehicle for the wrongful death of decedent.
Defendant filed a third-party complaint against the North Carolina Depart-
ment of Transportation, to which the State responded with motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of
jurisdiction based upon sovereign immunity. The supreme court upheld the
trial court's denial of the motions, and determined that the General Assembly,
in its 1975 addition of subsection (c) to rule 14 of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, 44 intended that the State could be a proper third-party de-
fendant, both for contribution and indemnification. 45
In a case of first impression, Harris v. Hodges6 presented the court of
appeals with the issue of self-defense in a civil suit for wrongful death. Citing
Dean Prosser for the proposition that in this context "tort rules are apparently
completely identical with those of the criminal law,"47 the court stated that the
use of deadly force in self-defense was proper when it appeared necessary to
41. 306 N.C. at 228, 293 S.E.2d at 93.
42. Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292,293 S.E.2d 675 (1982) (citing with approval Force v.
Anderson, 56 N.C. App. 423, 289 S.E.2d 56 (1982)) (failure to file claim (against the defendant
administrator or executors estate) within six-month statute of limitations contained in G.S. 28-19-
3 did not bar recovery in wrongful death action when plaintiffsought to collect damages under an
automobile liability insurance policy).
43. 306 N.C. 324, 293 S.E.2d 182 (1982).
44. N.C.R. Civ. P. 14(c) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Tort Claims Act, the State of North Carolina may
be made a third-party plaintiff under subsection (a) or a third-party defendant under
subsection (b) in any tort action. In such cases, the same rules governing liability and the
limits of liability of the State and its agencies shall apply as is provided for in the Torts.
Claims Act.
The court construed this language as containing a clerical error, and stated that the term "third-
party plaintiff" should read "third party" or "third-party defendant." This interpretation was
made in order to harmonize the section with the 1981 Act "to make clear that the state may be
either a third-party plaintiff or defendant in certain actions." 306 N.C. at 330, 293 S.E.2d at 186
(quoting Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 810, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1182 (amending N.C.R1 Crv. P. 14(c),
codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-l, Rule 14(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
45. Burc, 306 N.C. at 332, 293 S.E.2d at 187. The court also determined that state court is
the proper forum for such actions, whereas direct suits against the State must be brought before
the Industrial Commission. Id Because of this conclusion, the pleadings need not conform to the
Industrial Commission's requirements. Id at 333, 293 S.E.2d at 187.
The court left undecided the issue whether sovereign immunity affected personal or subject
matter jurisdiction, and used its supervisory jurisdiction under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981) to
hear the issues decided.
46. 57 N.C. App. 360, 291 S.E.2d 346 (1982).
47. Id at 361,291 S.E.2d at 347 (citing W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 19,
108 n.12 (4th ed. 1971)).
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protect against death or great bodily harm.48 The trial court, therefore, had
not erred in submitting a self-defense issue to the jury.49
InScallon v. Hooper5" the court of appeals adopted the majority view that
it is reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury that damages
awarded in a wrongful death action are tax-exempt.51 Similarly, the court
ruled that since it was improper to mention insurance during the trial, it was
also impermissible for the defendant's counsel in his argument to the jury to
state that defendant "would be legally obligated to pay every single dollar of
[the] verdict," as the jury could thereby infer that defendant was uninsured.5 2
C. Medical Malpractice
McPherson v. Ellis 3 involved a girl who was permanently paralyzed after
receiving an arteriogram. Plaintiff claimed that the physicians involved had
not informed her of the risk and alleged that the doctors negligently failed to
obtain her informed consent. The North Carolina Supreme Court cited a Cal-
ifornia case to define "informed consent": "a physician 'violates his duty to
his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the pro-
posed treatment."' 54 The supreme court held that the plaintiff's uncontro-
verted expert testimony, if believed, established that the neuroradiologists'
failure to disclose the risk of paralysis was not in keeping with the standard of
practice in the same or similar community.55
The court then considered whether an objective or subjective standard
should be applied in determining whether the failure to disclose was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. In the past, North Carolina courts have applied an
objective standard and have excluded testimony of the plaintiff concerning
whether, if properly informed, he would have undergone the operation. 56 In
McPherson, however, the court said that because a subjective standard takes
48. The court relied on State v. Clay, 297 N.C. 555, 256 S.E.2d 176 (1979).
49. 57 N.C. App. at 362, 291 S.E.2d at 347.
50. 58 N.C. App. 551, 293 S.E.2d 843 (1982).
51. Id at 556, 293 S.E.2d at 845.
52. Id at 556-57, 293 S.E.2d at 845-46.
53. 305 N.C. 266, 287 S.E.2d 892 (1982).
54. Id at 270, 287 S.E.2d at 895 (quoting Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees,
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957)). Because the trial court heard testimony from
a number of experts, the court expressed no opinion on the issue whether expert testimony was
necessary to determine the scope of the duty of disclosure, and therefore let stand the court of
appeals' implicit determination that it was unnecessary. Id
In Nelson v. Patrick, 58 N.C. App. 546, 293 S.E.2d 829 (1982), the court of appeals observed
that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (1975), which requires that the action of the health care provider
in obtaining consent accord with the professional standards among doctors of similar training and
experience in the same or similar communities appeared to require that expert testimony be intro-
duced by the party seeking to establish the standard. Id at 550, 293 S.E.2d at 832. In Nelson, the
court determined that an action for failure to disclose was grounded in negligence, not battery;
therefore the three-year statute of limitations applied, rather than the one-year statute of limita-
tions for battery.
55. 305 N.C. at 270-71, 287 S.E.2d at 895-96.
56. Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964).
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into account the "quirks and idiosyncracies of the individual," it is more ap-
propriate because it avoids the dilemma of forcing one's decisions to be judged
by an objective standard set by others.57 The court, therefore, reversed prior
law and applied a subjective standard.58
Because the General Assembly had passed G.S. 90-21.13, 59 effective July
1, 1976, requiring an objective standard standard of informed consent, the Mc-
Pherson decision produces an anomalous result. Actions that arose before
July 1, 1976 have been litigated under an objective standard, as were those
causes of action arising after that date. But causes of action arising before the
effective date of section 90-21.13, and coming to trial after McPherson, will be
governed by a subjective standard. Particularly in light of the legislature's
disavowal of this standard, this result seems most irregular.60
D. Contractors
In Sullivan v. Smith61 the North Carolina Court of Appeals discussed the
duty of care required of a general contractor in supervising the work and
materials of a subcontractor. The court reversed the trial court's grant ofjudg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant, the general contractor, and
held that plaintiff had presented evidence that could justify a verdict in his
favor.62 In the process the court clarified the evidentiary weight to be given a
contractor's showing of adherance to customs in the trade.63 The court held
that such evidence does not constitute conclusive proof of lack of negligence,
and also held that the duty of care owed by a general contractor to supervise
the job's subcontractors is an independant duty, the breach of which could
make the general contractor and the subcontractor joint tortfeasors.
57. 305 N.C. at 273, 297 S.E.2d at 897.
58. In Simons v. Georgiade, 55 N.C. App. 483, 286 S.E.2d 596 (1982), the court of appeals
applied the objective standard, citing Watson, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 tQ exclude plaintiff's
testimony. Watson was later expressly disapproved in McPherson, 305 N.C. at 273, 287 S.E.2d at
897.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(a)(3) (1981) provides:
No recovery shall be allowed against any health care provider on the grounds that the
health care treatment was rendered without the informed consent of the patient...
where: A reasonable person, under all the surrounding circumstances, would have un-
dergone such treatment of procedure had he been advised by the health care provider in
accordance with the [other] provisions... of this subsection.
60. The court cited the statute and acknowledged that several of the principles set forth in the
opinion are superseded by the statute. 305 N.C. at 269 n.l, 287 S.E.2d n.l.
61. 56 N.C. App. 525, 289 S.E.2d 870, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 392, 294 S.E.2d 220 (1982).
62. Id at 530, 289 S.E.2d at 873. As the court noted:
A directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. for a defendant is improper when a plaintitfs
evidence, taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to him, with all infer-
ences made and contradictions resolved in his favor, is sufficient as a matter of law tojustify a verdict for plaintiff.
Id at 526, 289 S.E.2d at 871 (citations omitted).
63. An earlier ruling had established that a contractor was to be held to the standard of a
reasonable and prudent contractor under the same or similar circumstances. The decisions did
not indicate what weight was to be given evidence that defendant followed the custom of local
builders. See Lindstrom v. Chesnutt, 15 N.C. App. 15, 189 S.E.2d 749, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 757,
191 S.E.2d 361 (1972).
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Plaintiff alleged that faulty construction of a fireplace and chimney
caused the partial destruction of his house.64 Plaintiff initially sued both the
general contractor and the subcontractor-mason who built the fireplace, but
subsequently released the mason. Plaintiff's allegations of the general contrac-
tor's liability were based upon his failure to disclose and correct the faulty
construction of the fireplace. The general contractor defended by claiming that
his supervision was the same as that of other builders in his area. A jury
returned a judgment against the general contractor in the amount of $10,000,
although the evidence showed damages of over $100,000. The trial court
granted the general contractor's motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, and conditionally granted plaintiffs motion for a new trial solely on the
issue of damages should the court of appeals reverse the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict.
On appeal, the court of appeals considered two issues. First, the court
dealt with the standard of care required of a general contractor in supervising
his subcontractors. The court refused to equate the standard of care followed
by other builders in the area with the behavior of a reasonably careful and
prudent contractor under the same or similar circumstances. Quoting from
Dean Prosser,65 the court held that evidence of custom was not conclusive of
the issue of duty of care, and that in certain instances "what everyone else does
may be found to be negligent .... ,,66
Second, the court considered the effect of plaintiff's release of the subcon-
tractor on the liability of the general contractor. Defendant general contractor
claimed that the release deprived him of the right to indemnification, and thus
warranted his dismissal from the case.67 The court noted, however, that a
right to indemnification arises when there exists either passive negligence by
the employer and active negligence by the employee, or a single act of negli-
gence by one whose negligence is imputed to another.68 The court held that a
general contractor has an independant duty of supervision that can be actively
violated,69 and that a general contractor is not vicariously liable for the torts of
an independant subcontractor.70 As a result, no right of indemnification ex-
isted between the defendants, and the release of one did not discharge the
64. A structural engineer who examined the fireplace and chimney testified that the interior
fireplace bricks did not constitute "solid masonry construction" because of many gaps in the mor-
tar. 56 N.C. App. at 526-27, 289 S.E.2d at 871.
65. 56 N.C. App. at 529, 289 S.E.2d at 873 (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 47, § 33, at 167-
68 (4th ed. 1971)).
66. W. PROSSER, supra note 47, § 33, at 168.
67. 56 N.C. App. at 530, 289 S.E.2d at 873. 73. See Brown v. Town of Louisburg, 126 N.C.
701, 36 S.E.2d 166 (1900)(plaintifls release of defendant who was primarily liable destroyed a
secondarily liable defendant's right of indemnity, and thus barred plaintifi's recovery of damages
from the latter defendant).
68. 56 N.C. App. at 531, 289 S.E.2d at 874. See Edwards v. Hamill, 262 N.C. 528, 531, 138
S.E.2d 151, 153 (1964).
69. 56 N.C. App. at 531-32, 289 S.E.2d at 874. See Lindstrom v. Chesnutt, 15 N.C. App. 15,
189 S.E.2d 749, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 757, 191 S.E.2d 361 (1972).
70. 56 N.C. App. at 532, 289 S.E.2d at 874. See Hendricks v. Leslie Fay, Inc., 273 N.C. 59,
62, 159 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1968).
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other from liability.71
In Cowan v. Laughridge Construction Co. 72 the court of appeals discussed
the evidentiary weight accorded to OSHA violations in a court's determination
of negligence per se. The court reversed the trial court's directed verdict for
defendant and held that OSHA regulations are evidence of custom in the con-
struction industry.73 Defendant's violation of the regulations thus provided
some evidence of negligence that should have precluded the directed verdict.
The court further noted that violation of the Rules of the North Carolina
Commission of Labor,74 which incorporate the OSHA regulations, could con-
stitute negligence per se, but only if the noncompliance were criminal.75 Non-
compliance with the Rules is criminal only if the violation causes the death of
an employee;76 otherwise, the sanction is a lesser penalty assessed by the
Commissioner.77
E. Innkeepers and Guests
In Urbano v. Days Inn ofAmeica 78 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
discussed the duty of care required of an innkeeper to protect his guests from
the criminal acts of third persons on the premises. The court reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment, holding that there was evidence that
could allow a finding of defendant's breach of duty.
Plaintiff alleged in his negligence claim that defendant breached a duty of
care to him by failing to provide adequate lighting in the parking lot, allowing
unrestricted access to the motel, neglecting to warn plaintiff of previous acts of
violence on the premises, and failing to provide adequate security for the
guests in the mote. 79 Defendant denied the claims and asserted an affirmative
defense of intervening wrongful acts of third persons as the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs injuries.
On appeal, the court considered the question of the innkeeper's negli-
71. The release is instead governed by the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act,
which states in pertinent part:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good
faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury...
(1) it does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability for the injury
... unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the
extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of
the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § IB-4 (1969).
72. 57 N.C. App. 321, 291 S.E.2d 287 (1982).
73. 57 N.C. App. at 325, 291 S.E.2d at 290. See National Marine Serv., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co.,
433 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. La. 1977), af'd, 608 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1979).
74. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 95-131(a)(1981).
75. 57 N.C. App. at 325, 291 S.E.2d at 289. See Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131
S.E.2d 601 (1963).
76. 57 N.C. App. at 325, 291 S.E.2d at 289-90, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-139 (1981).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-139 (1981).
78. 58 N.C. App. 795, 295 S.E.2d 240 (1982).
79. Id at 796, 295 S.E.2d at 241.
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gence. The court cited Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture80 as recognizing
a shopping center's duty to exercise reasonable care to protect its business inv.-
tees from the criminal acts of third persons on the premises. The court in Fos-
ter recognized that "foreseeability" was the crucial element in defining the
extent of the duty.8' Foster also recognized that a parking lot provided by a
business owner for the use of his invitees is part of the business premises.82
The court of appeals in Urbano extended the principle of the Foster decision
to innkeepers. The court of appeals, following the Foster rationale of foresee-
ability, gave great weight to evidence showing forty-two incidents of criminal
activity at the motel during the three years prior to plaintiffs injury.8 3 The
court noted that despite these occurrences, defendant had taken no extra pre-
cautions to ensure guests' safety, such as providing fencing, extra lighting in
the parking lot, or a security guard. Instead, defendant unreasonably contin-
ued to rely solely upon routine visits by the police.84 This evidence convinced
the court that, under the general rules of Foster, a jury might reasonably find
that defendant should have foreseen the potential for injury to its guests from
criminal acts of third parties, and that failure to take any steps to prevent such
injury would be a breach of duty to plaintiff.
InHockaday v. Morse8 5 the court of appeals discussed the legal status of a
visitor of a registered guest in a motel. The court noted that North Carolina
follows the traditional, majority view86 that a visitor at the motel "who is there
for a lawful purpose, at a proper time, by the guest's express or implied invita-
tion, and who remains within the boundaries of the invitation, is an invitee, to
whom the innkeeper owes the duty of exercising reasonable care, the same
duty owed to registered guests."87 As the court in Hockaday noted, such an
extensive list of restrictive qualifications has spawned a body of case law illus-
trating the exceptions and obscuring the rule behind them.88
In Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp. ,9 a multiple party wrongful death
suit, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's rulings on
motions for summary judgment.90 The court discussed the duty of care and
80. 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981). See Note, Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture:
Dqty of Mall Owners to Take Measures to Protect In vtees from Criminal Acts, 60 N.C.L. REv.
1126(1982).
81. 303 N.C. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39.
82. Id at 638, 281 S.E.2d at 38.
83. 58 N.C. App. at 798, 295 S.E.2d at 242.
84. Id
85. 57 N.C. App. 109, 290 S.E.2d 763, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 384, 294 S.E.2d 209 (1982).
86. 57 N.C. App. at 111, 290 S.E.2d at 765; see J. SHERRY, THE LAW OF INNKEEPERS § 9.2
(rev. ed. 1981); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1202 (1958).
87. 57 N.C. App. at 111, 290 S.E.2d at 765.
88. 1d See, e.g., Jones v. Bland, 182 N.C. 70, 108 S.E. 344 (1921) (hotel owner had no duty to
guest's visitor who fell down elevator in a part of hotel outside the scope of guest's invitation);
Money v. Travelers' Hotel Co., 174 N.C. 508, 93 S.E. 964 (1917)(same).
89. 55 N.C. App. 686, 286 S.E.2d 876 (1982).
90. The court granted summary judgment to the architects of the building (another party in
the case) and that order was appealed by plaintiff pursuant to N.C.R Civ. P. 54(b). In its discre-
tion, the court of appeals also considered the other appeals from the trial court's denial of the
remaining defendants' summary judgment motions. 55 N.C. App. at 690, 286 S.E.2d at 880.
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status of guests in ruling on the motion of defendant innkeeper, Wedgewood
South Corporation. Hilton Inns, defendant-franchis.r, presented the court
with an issue of first impression in North Carolina--tort liability of a
franchisor to a third person.91
Plaintiff alleged that defendant Wedgewood, the owner of the inn, was
negligent in maintaining a window without sufficient strength or protective
devices to prevent one from falling through it. Allegations of liability of de-
fendant Hilton were based on one or both of two theories: an agency relation-
ship, or Hilton's failure to properly supervise Wedgewood's maintenance
procedures. The trial court denied the summary judgement motion of both
Hilton and Wedgewood, and they appealed.
Two issues were of primary significance on appeal. First, the court of
appeals discussed the duty of care that Wedgewood, as innkeeper, owed to the
deceased guest. Wedgewood contended that summary judgment was appro-
priate because the deceased had been a trespasser at the time of his death, and
thus defendant was obligated only to avoid willfully or wantonly injuring
him.92 No evidence of willful or wanton behavior by the defendant was before
the court. The evidence showed that the deceased had met a performer (a
singer) in the hotel bar early on the night of his death. When he attempted to
visit the singer in her room and was denied entry, a struggle ensued that
moved from the room into the hall and ended with the deceased falling
through a hall window to his death. The court acknowledged that the de-
ceased may have been a trespasser initially while in the singer's room, but that
when the fracas moved into the hall, the deceased regained his status as an
invitee. As an invitee, the deceased was owed a duty of reasonable care, and
the court found sufficient evidence to permit a finding that Wedgewood vio-
lated that duty by failing either to replace the glass or to construct a protective
device in front of the window.93
A second issue concerned the liability of the franchisor, Hilton, to the
deceased. The court refused to hold a franchise agreement, which stated that
Wedgewood was not an agent of Hilton, to be determinative on the question
of agency. Instead, the court noted that the agreement gave Hilton the right to
inspect the premises of the inn in order to determine if Wedgewood operated
in accordance with the Hilton operating manual. Based upon this clause, the
court held that a jury might reasonably find that Hilton either controlled
Wedgewood sufficiently to establish an agency relationship, or sufficiently
controlled the maintenance of the inn to be liable, independently of any negli-
gence, for not making sure that proper windows were installed.
94
91. 55 N.C. App. at 692, 286 S.E.2d at 88. For a detailed discussion of other jurisdictions'
rulings on the subject, see Comment, Liability ofa FranchisorforActs ofthe Franchisee, 41 S. CAL.
L. REv. 143 (1967); Comment,A Franchisor Liabilityfor the Torts of His Franchisee, 5. U.S.F.L.
Rv. 118 (1970).
92. 55 N.C. App. at 691, 286 S.E.2d at 880; see generally 62 AM. JUR. 2D, Premises Liability
§ 54 (1972).
93. 55 N.C. App. at 692, 286 S.E.2d at 881.
94. Id at 692-93, 286 S.E.2d at 881.
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Clauses such as the right of inspection clause emphasized by the court in
Wedgewood are boilerplate language in most franchise agreements. The po-
tential for basing an action for franchisor liability for negligent construction or
maintenance upon such an ubiquitous clause, and upon nothing else, may
greatly expand franchisor liability in North Carolina.
F Public Utility's Duty To Maintain Attractive Nuisance
In Green v. Duke Power Co. 95 the Supreme Court of North Carolina dis-
cussed the duty of care owed by an occupant or owner of land to protect third
parties from hazardous conditions that were not created or maintained by the
owner or occupant. The court also discussed the applicability of the attractive
nuisance doctrine to owners or occupants of property on which power com-
pany equipment is located pursuant to a valid easement.
Plaintiffs in Green sued Duke Power for negligence after their child
touched an exposed, electrified portion of a ground level transformer. The
transformer was located on land owned by defendant Housing Authority and
leased by defendant Henry Thomas Eanes. Eanes testified during discovery
that he knew the transformer was unlocked and that he had telephoned the
Housing Authority to inform it of the dangerous condition. Upon learning of
this testimony, Duke Power filed third-party actions against Eanes and the
Housing Authority, seeking contribution based upon their failure to take any
action to correct the hazardous condition. The trial court granted summary
judgment for third-party defendants Eanes and Housing Authority; Duke
Power appealed.96
On appeal, Duke Power claimed a right of contribution from third-party
defendants based on their alleged liability under the attractive nuisance doc-
trine. Duke Power cited two New Jersey cases holding landowners or occu-
pants liable under this doctrine for injuries to children resulting from
dangerous conditions known to the owner or occupant but not created or
maintained by them.97 The court in Green distinguished these cases by noting
that defendants there had "knowingly suffered [the dangerous conditions] to
continue."9 8 The court also cited North Carolina authority that demands a
95. 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982).
96. Id at 605, 290 S.E.2d at 594. The court of appeals had denied Duke Power's right to an
immediate appeal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment for third-party defendants.
Green v. Duke Power Co., 50 N.C. App. 646, 274 S.E.2d 889 (1981). The appeal to the supreme
court was solely on the issue of Duke Power's right to immediate appeal, but the court, pursuant to
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981), elected to hear the merits of the case as well.
97. Simmel v. New Jersey Coop Co., 28 NJ. 1, 10, 143 A.2d 521, 526 (1958); Lorusso v.
DeCarlo, 48 NJ. Super. 112, 136 A.2d 900 (1957). Both cases involved fires set on a landowner's
property by third persons in which infant trespassers were injured. The landowners' failure to
extinquish the fires after learning of them comprised a "toleration" of the condition. The Green
court contrasted those cases by noting that it appeared that defendants were free to take action to
eliminate the hazard. The holding in Green implies that in order to "suffer a condition to con-
tinue," a defendant must first have the capability to eliminate the condition directly, rather than
contact those who might do so.
98. 305 N.C. at 609, 290 S.E.2d at 597 (quoting Benton v. Montague, 253 N.C. 695, 704, 117
S.E.2d 771, 777 (1961)).
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"knowing sufferance" before the impositon of liability.99 The court inter-
preted "knowingly suffered to continue" as requiring the landowner or occu-
pant to tolerate or acquiesce in the continuance of the dangerous condition. l ° °
The court then noted that third-party defendants in Green had no right to
deny access to the transformer, 101 nor was it reasonably practical for either
third-party defendant to render the transformer harmless.10 2 Because of Duke
Power's control over the easement, the court found that Duke Power had the
sole duty to keep the transformer safe.10 3 In order to knowingly suffer a haz-
ard to continue, a defendant must first possess the potential to correct the dan-
ger and then fail to do so. The landowner's or occupant's knowledge of the
hazard is irrelevant to the question of their own liability if they have no con-
trol over the hazard. The court further held that Eanes and the Housing Au-
thority had no duty to inform Duke of the danger even though "it may be said
that such notification would be reasonably calculated to prevent injury."'14
The decision of the supreme court in Green should clearly establish that
holders of easements with exclusive control over the property are solely re-
sponsible for correcting hazards on the property. The attractive nuisance doc-
trine will not impose joint liability upon the owner or occupant of the
subservient tenement, even if the owner or occupant has knowledge of the
situation, but did not create the hazard and has no control over its continu-
ance. For purposes of argument only, the court addressed the issue of impos-
ing upon a landowner a duty to inform the easement holder of any danger of
which the landowner has knowledge. The court's application of the evidence
in Green to such a hypothetical duty indicated that the obligation could be met
rather easily.'0 5
In Beck v. Carolina Power & Light Co. 1O6 the court of appeals discussed
the duty of care imposed upon electric utilities. The court reaffirmed that utili-
ties are held to a "highest degree of care"10 7 standard, but observed that such a
standard does not comprise a separate rule of negligence for utilities.
99. Benton v. Montague, 253 N.C. 695, 704, 117 S.E.2d 771, 777 (1961).
100. Green, 305 N.C. at 610,290 S.E.2d at 597-98 (citing Simmel v. New Jersey Coop Co., 28
NJ. 1, 11, 143 A.2d 521, 526 (1958)).
101. "Any interference,... would clearly encroach upon the rights granted to Duke by the
easement." 305 N.C. at 611, 290 S.E.2d at 598.
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id at 612, 290 S.E.2d at 599.
105. The court found that, assuming arguendo an obligation were imposed upon landowners
or occupants to take steps reasonably calculated to prevent injury, defendant Eanes might have
met this obligation by warning children away from the transformer. 305 N.C. at 612, 290 S.E.2d
at 599.
106. 57 N.C. App. 373, 291 S.E.2d 897, af'dper eurian, 307 N.C. 267, 297 S.E.2d 397 (1982).
Although the supreme court's per curiam opinion does affirm the court of appeals decision, it
expressely states that the court of appeals opinion "stands without precedential value." 307 N.C.
at 268, 297 S.E.2d at 398. Justice Harry Martin, a newcomer to the supreme court bench, did not
participate in the decision because he had participated (by dissenting) at the court of appeals level
Without his participation, the supreme court was evenly divided. The decision to affirm is without
precedential value because Justice Martin's participation would likely have led to a reversal of the
court of appeals opinion.
107. Id at 377, 291 S.E.2d at 900.
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At trial the judge had correctly instructed the jury on the "highest degree
of care" standard, but characterized the standard as a separate rule that ap-
plied to utilities. The court of appeals held that the higher standard is not a
separate rule of negligence, but rather results from the general rule requiring
the care that a prudent man ought to use under like circumstances.108 The
court noted that the higher standard stemmed from a judicial recognition that
electricity is inherently dangerous, and reaffirmed the "highest degree of care"
standard. It also found that the trial judge's incorrect characterization of the
higher standard was not prejudicial in the light of his accurate description of
that higher standard, and therefore affirmed the decision of the lower court.
G. Parental Supervision
In Moore v. Cruampton 109 the Supreme Court of North Carolina discussed
a parent's duty to exercise reasonable control over a child's behavior. While
upholding defendant parents' summary judgment at trial, the court explicitly
recognized and clarified the circumstances under which a parent's failure to
supervise may result in his liability for damages that result from the child's
behavior.
Plaintiff in Moore was a rape victim who sought damages from the par-
ents of her seventeen year-old assailant. Plaintiff claimed that defendants' lia-
bility resulted from their alleged failure to take reasonable steps to exercise
control over their child's behavior. Defendants' answer and supporting affida-
vits established that psychiatric counselors had advised the parents that there
was no reason to foresee that their son would be harmful to himself or others.
For this reason, numerous experts had indicated to the parents that their son
could not be involuntarily committed.
Based on the forecast of evidence in the pleadings, the trial court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment' 0 and held that parents are not liable for the wrongful acts of their
children unless there exists: (1) an agency relationship; (2) parental encour-
agement of the wrongful act; or (3) injury resulting from a dangerous instru-
mentality entrusted to the child by the parent."'
On appeal, the supreme court concluded that the court of appeals applied
the wrong rule of law. While acknowledging that certain earlier decisions
could be read as limiting a parent's liability to those situations enumerated by
the court of appeals," 2 the court overruled the earlier cases on that point, and
108. Id
109. 306 N.C. 618, 295 S.E.2d 436 (1982).
110. Moore v. Crumpton, 55 N.C. App. 398, 285 S.E.2d 842 (1982).
111. Id at 407, 285 S.E.2d at 847.
112. E.g., Hawes v. Haynes, 219 N.C. 535, 14 S.E.2d 503 (1941)(parents not liable for son's
negligent operation of automobile); Robertson v. Aldridge, 185 N.C. 292, 116 S.E. 742
(1923)(whether parent was negligent in entrusting automobile to reckless son was question for
jury); Linville v. Nissen, 162 N.C. 95, 77 S.E. 1096 (1913)(parent not liable for son's negligent
operation of automobile unless, at time of accident, son was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment at his father's business); Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N.C. 299, 66 S.E. 129 (1909)(parent not
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proceeded to clarify the circumstances under which parental liability might be
found.
The court first held that a parent's liabilty for failure to reasonably con-
trol his child results from the independent negligence of the parent and not
from the imputed negligence of the child.113 A finding of such independent
negligence requires that the parent have the ability and the opportunity to
control the child, and that the parent know or should have known of the neces-
sity for exercising such control. 14 To be liable, the parent need not be aware
of the potential for the exact harm in question in a particular case. Instead, it
must be shown only that generally harmful consequences are reasonably fore-
seeable in the behavior of the child.1 15
The supreme court applied this modified rule to the facts of the case and
affirmed the summary judgment of the lower courts. The court thus recog-
nized a broad, general legal duty of the parent to supervise the behavior of his
child. The extent of the duty is "in the final analysis... [a question] whether
the particular parent exercised reasonable care under all of the circum-
stances."'1 16 The particularly relevant circumstances are the foreseeability of
the child's injurious behavior and the parent's ability to actually control such
behavior.
The decision in Moore obviously expands the potential for parental liabil-
ity for failure to supervise. The court's refusal to remand the case for submis-
sion to a jury, however, indicates that future plaintiffs must go to great lengths
to show both the foreseeability of the child's injurious behavior and the obvi-
ous necessity for and ability of the parent to control such behavior.
H. Mental Distress
In Wyatt v. Gilmore 117 the court of appeals held that a plaintiffs special
physical susceptibility to fright did not preclude recovery for physical injuries
resulting from mental distress, even though the injuries were due in part to
plaintiffs special condition.' 1 8 Defendant in Wyatt negligently crashed his car
into a tree in plaintiffs front yard. As a result of fright induced by the loud
crashing noise, plaintiff suffered a heart attack. 1 9 There was no physical im-
pact on plaintiffs person,120 no risk of direct physical injury to plaintiff,121
liable for customer's injury, inflicted by son, unless son was agent or servant of the parent, or
parent approved of the action).
113. 306 N.C. at 623, 295 S.E.2d at 440; Anderson v. Butler, 284 N.C. 723, 202 S.E.2d 585(1974).
114. 306 N.C. at 623, 295 S.E.2d at 440.
115. Id at 624, 295 S.E.2d at 440.
116. Id
117. 57 N.C. App. 57, 290 S.E.2d 790 (1982).
118. Id. at 60, 290 S.E.2d at 792.
119. Id. at 57, 290 S.E.2d at 791.
120. Courts have granted damages for mental distress more readily when an actual physical
impact upon the plaintiff resulted directly from the defendant's negligence. See W. PRossER,
supra note 47, § 54, at 330-32 (4th ed. 1971). North Carolina decisions are in accord. See, eg.,
Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 503, 112 S.E.2d 48, 52 (1960).
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and no injury would have occured to a normal person. Nevertheless, the court
reversed defendant's summary judgmment and remanded for a jury determi-
nation on the issue of proximate cause.122
North Carolina courts allow recovery for physical injury or disease result-
ing from fright or nervous shock caused by negligent acts. 123 Some courts and
the Restatement of Torts, however, qualify this rule by denying recovery when
the physical consequences from emotional stress occur only because of plain-
tif's special susceptibility to injury.124 Prior to Wyatt, North Carolina courts
had never expressly rejected the Restatement rule.' 25
In Williamson v. Bennett'26 the supreme court implied that a special sus-
ceptibility would not preclude recovery for injuries from emotional distress.
In that case, plaintiff was driving her car when it was struck by defendant's
car. Because of a preexisting neurosis, plaintiff feared that she had hit a child
on a bicycle. This fear precipitated a neurotic reaction, causing plaintiff severe
physical and emotional distress.' 27 The court stated the peculiar susceptibility
rule and denied recovery on the ground that the harm was too remote to be
compensable. 128 Since the court denied recovery on grounds of proximate
cause, the holding implied that the plaintiff had stated a legally cognizable
cause of action, even though a normal person would not have been injured. 129
This interpretation of Williamson was not certain, however, since the court
may have regarded the collision with plaintif's car to be a physical impact that
opened the door to mental distress damages.' 30
Wyatt expressly rejected the Restatement rule on the rather nebulous
ground that it places the issue of foreseeability within the scope of duty, 3 1
rather than placing the issue of foreseeablity within the scope of proximate
cause.' 32 The difficulty with this approach is that the Restatement rule can be
framed equally well in terms of proximate cause: a physical injury that results
from a person's peculiar physical susceptibility to emotion is, as a matter of
121. North Carolina courts have also been more willing to allow recovery for physical injuries
resuliting from mental distress when the tortfeasor's conduct risks direct physical injury to the
plaintiff. See, ag., Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
122. 57 N.C. App. at 63, 290 S.E.2d at 794.
123. See Byrd, 1?eco very for Mentallnguish in North Carolina, 58 N.C.L. REv. 435 (1980).
124. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRis § 313 comment C (1965) provides that when fright is
unintentionally caused liability exists only if physical injury would result to a normal person. See,
,,g., Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605 (1981)(defendant's con-
duct did not as a matter of law create the unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm necessary to
recover damages for mental or emotional disturbance); McMahon v. Bergeson, 9 Wis.2d 256, 101
N.W.2d 63 (1960)(no recovery for emotional distress due to preexisting susceptibility to emotional
disturbance not present in normal person).
125. See Byrd, supra note 123, at 464-65.
126. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
127. Id. at 500-01, 112 S.E.2d at 49-50.
128. Id at 507-08, 112 S.E.2d at 54-55.
129. See Byrd, supra note 123, at 446-47.
130. Id
131. For example, the rule can be viewed as imposing a duty only to avoid conduct that can
injure ordinarily susceptible persons.
132. 57 N.C. App. at 60-61, 290 S.E.2d at 792-93.
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law, outside the bounds of proximate cause. 133 Nonetheless, the Restatement
position has been expressly rejected. The new boundary for recovering for
physical injuries resulting from emotional stress, as set by Wyatt and William-
son, lies somewhere between a neurotic response to a phantom child on a
nonexistent bicycle and a heart attack caused by a startling noise.
Z Statute of Limitations
In what appears to be an issue of first impression, the court of appeals in
Selby v. Taylor'34 held that the three-year statute of limitations for trespass
upon real property, 135 rather than the one-year statute of limitations applica-
ble to actions for personal libel and slander, controls actions for slander of
title.136 In Selby the former owner of a plot of land that was to be sold at a
foreclosure sale alleged that defendant maliciously and fraudulently "pub-
lished a paper writing" which stated that defendant was owner of the land and
that anyone bidding on the land would do so at his peril. When the notice was
read at the foreclosure sale, it discouraged others from bidding, causing plain-
tiff a loss. 137 The trial judge ruled that the action was not barred by the statute
of limitations for personal slander, but dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. 138
On defendant's cross-appeal, the court of appeals characterized an action
for slander of title as protection from interference with a sale of real property
or from interference with a proprietary right. 139 Accordingly, the action is
more appropriately grouped with trespass to real propbrty than with personal
slander. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the three-
year statute of limitations for trespass controls slander of title actions.' 4°
This decision clearly conforms with the North Carolina statutory scheme.
The statute of limitations places an action for personal slander with other torts
directed at the person.141 On the other hand, slander of title provides protec-
tion against an invasion to a property right. While courts in other jurisdictions
have reached a contrary result, the division can usually be explained by a
comparison of their differing statutory schemes. 142
133. See W. PRossEm, supra note 7, § 42, at 244-45, for a discussion of the interchangability of
duty and proximate cause.
134. 57 N.C. App. 119, 290 S.E.2d 767, cer. denied, 306 N.C. 387, 294 S.E.2d 212 (1982).
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(3) (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(3) (1979) provides for a one-year limitation applicable to actions
"for libel, slander, assault, battery, or false imprisonment."
137. 57 N.C. App. at 119, 290 S.E.2d at 768.
138. Ad at 120, 290 S.E.2d at 768.
139. Id at 122, 290 S.E.2d at 769. The court relied on Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 272 P.
1045 (1928), in which slander of title was characterized as protection against an injury to real
property.
140. 57 N.C. App. at 123-24, 290 S.E.2d at 770.
141. See supra note 137.
142. See Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Indus., 68 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1953) (no special statute of
limitations for injuries to real property); Walley v. Hunt, 212 Miss. 294, 54 So. 2d 393 (1951)
(statute applies to actions for slander of person or title). But see McDonald v. Green, 176 Mass.
113, 57 N.E. 211 (1900) (classifying slander of title with personal slander).
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The court of appeals also found that a cause of action had been stated in
Selby. Although defendants conceded that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged
publication of false words with malicious intent, 143 they contended that plain-
tiff had not sufficiently alleged special damages. The court found that the dis-
couragement of prospective purchasers' bidding at a public sale, with the
resulting monetary loss to plaintiff, met the special damages requirement. 144
There is disagreement among jurisdictions whether the injured party must
identify a particular purchaser who was prevented by the slander from
purchasing the property.' 45 Due to the paucity of slander of title cases in
North Carolina, the courts have not yet addressed this issue. Since plaintiff in
Selby had alleged that Weyerhauser Corporation, among others, was discour-





143. 57 N.C. App. at 120-21, 290 S.E.2d at 768-69. For a discussion of the elements of slander
of title, see Cardon v. McConnell, 120 N.C. 461, 27 S.E. 109 (1897).
144. 57 N.C. App. at 121, 290 S.E.2d at 769. For a comprehensive review of the special dam-
ages requirement of slander of title, see Annot. 4 A.L.R.4th 532 (1981).




To recover under the North Carolina Worker's Compensation Act,1 a
claimant must show that an injury or death resulted from an accident 2 arising
out of and in the course of his employment.3 By liberally construing the "aris-
ing out of' and the "in the course of" employment requirements in several
cases in 1982,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court further broadened the com-
prehensive coverage given employees for work-related injuries.
In Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co. 5 the decedent, a cull brick stacker
employed by defendant, was killed in a forklift accident. The decedent's job
required him to work at a specific station in defendant's brickyard to remove
imperfect bricks from a conveyor and band them in the form of a box. A
forklift operator periodically removed the culls from the decedent's station.
Defendant had issued strict instructions prohibiting the operation of forklifts
by unauthorized personnel. Although decedent was not authorized to operate
forklifts, evidence showed that on two separate occasions prior to the accident,
decedent was observed by supervisors operating a forklift to move bricks.6 On
each occasion, decedent was reprimanded, reminded of the rule against unau-
thorized operation of the forklifts, and warned that if caught again he would
be disciplined.7 On the night of the accident, the forklift operator told de-
ceased that he could use the forklift to move his bricks. Decedent loaded his
stack of culls and removed them from his station. He was found later that
evening in a storage warehouse, pinned under the overturned forklift. 8
Decedent's children filed a claim for death benefits under G.S. 97-38 and
97-39.9 The Industrial Commission found that the accident did not arise in
I. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1979).
2. For purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act, an accident is a separate event preced-
ing and causing the injury, Porter v. Shelby Knit, Inc., 46 N.C. App. 22, 24, 264 S.E.2d 360, 362
(1980), and involves an interruption of the work routine and the introduction of unusual condi-
tions likely to result in unexpected consequences. Thus, employees who sustain injury while per-
forming their usual jobs in the usual manner are generally denied recovery. See Davis v. Raleigh
Rental Center, 58 N.C. App. 113, 292 S.E.2d 763 (1982); Trudell v. Seven Lakes Heating & Air
Conditioning Co., 55 N.C. App. 89, 284 S.E.2d 538 (1981); Dyer v. Mack Foster Poultry & Live-
stock, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 291, 273 S.E.2d 321 (1981); Porter v. Shelby Knit, Inc., 46 N.C. App. 22,
264 S.E.2d 360 (1980).
North Carolina's adherence to the usual/unusual distinction reflects a minority position to-
day. See lB A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 38 (1982) (hereinafter cited as A.
LARSON). Cf Comment, Injury byAccident in Worker's Compensatiorn Alternatives to an Outmo-
dedDoctrine, 59 N.C.L. REv. 175 (1980).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6)(Supp. 1981). See infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
4. See Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 295 S.E.2d 473 (1982); Hoyle v.
Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 293 S.E.2d 196 (1982); Felton v. Hospital Guild of
Thomasville, 57 N.C. App. 33, 291 S.E.2d 158 (1982).
5. 306 N.C. 248, 293 S.E.2d 196 (1982).
6. Id. at 249, 293 S.E.2d at 197.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 250, 293 S.E.2d at 197.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (Supp. 1981) provides for payment of death benefits to an em-
ployee's depedents. N.C. GEN STAT. § 97-39 (1979) defines the class of dependents who may
receive benefits.
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the course of decedent's employment and denied compensation.10 The court
of appeals affirmed the Commission's decision, and held that deceased's oper-
ation of the forklift, in light of prior warnings and rules prohibiting the prac-
tice, constituted a departure from the job for which the deceased had been
employed. 1
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court began its analysis
with a construction of the statutory language "arising out of and in the course
of employment." The court concluded that an injury arises out of employ-
ment when:
it is a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employ-
ment and a natural result of one of its risks so that there is some
causal relation between the injury and the performance of some serv-
ice of the employment. An accident arises out of and in the course of
the employment when it occurs while the employee is engaged in
some activity or duty which he is authorized to undertake and which
is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer's
business.12
After construing the statutory language, the court surveyed the case law
and found two decisions especially convincing. In Parsons v. Swift & Co.13 an
employee was killed when the tractor he was operating overturned and
crushed him. Although the employee's job was simply to haul filler in a
wheelbarrow, the court awarded death benefilts and noted that even though
there existed a company rule prohibiting him from operating the tractor, the
employee's conduct was in furtherance of his employer's business. 14 The evi-
dence showed that the tractor was blocking decedent's path and that two trac-
tor operators had refused to move it when asked by decedent. 15 In Henste, V.
Carsweil Action Committee 6 an employee was cutting weeds around a lake.
Against his employer's specific instructions not to go into the water, the em-
ployee attempted to cross the lake to cut some weeds and drowned. The court
reversed the Commission's denial of death benefits and held that, since dece-
dent's conduct was in furtherance of his employer's business, his disregard of
orders was not a deviation from his employment sufficient to destroy the
causal connection between the accident and his employment. 17 The Hoyle
10. 306 N.C. at 250, 293 S.E.2d at 198.
11. Id See Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 55 N.C. App. 675, 681, 286 S.E.2d 830, 834-
35 (1982).
12. 306 N.C. at 252, 293 S.E.2d at 198-99 (quoting Clark v. Burton Lines, 272 N.C. 433, 437,
158 S.E.2d 569, 571-72 (1968)). See Barham v. Food World, hIc., 300 N.C. 329, 266 S.E.2d 676
(1980); Brown v. John Brown Serv. Station, 45 N.C. App. 255, 262 S.E.2d 700 (1980). Although
the "arising out of' and the "in the course of' employment requirements are distinct elements of
an accident, they are not applied entirely independently of one another. Deficiencies in one ele-
ment may therefore be bolstered by strengths in the other. 306 N.C. at 252,293 S.E.2d at 199. See
LARSON, srupra note 2, at § 29.10.
13. 234 N.C. 580, 68 S.E.2d 296 (1951).
14. Id. at 582-83, 68 S.E.2d at 299.
15. Id. at 582, 68 S.E.2d at 297.
16. 296 N.C. 527, 251 S.E.2d 399 (1979).
17. Id. at 529, 251 S.E.2d at 402.
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court found Hensley and Parsons dispositive of the question whether an em-
ployee's deviation from "the confines of a narrow job description" is in itself
sufficient to bar recovery.18 The court concluded that as long as the em-
ployee's conduct was in furtherance of the employer's business, such a devia-
tion was not an absolute bar to recovery even if it had been prohibited by the
employer.' 9 Because decedent in Hoyle was acting in furtherance of his em-
ployer's business, the court held that his operation of the forklift was not a
deviation from his job sufficient to remove decedent from the Act's coverage.20
AlthoughHoyle is consistent with the current, liberal interpretation of the
statute, the decision leaves an important question unanswered. The Act was
designed in part to eliminate the employee's fault as a basis for denying recov-
ery.2 ' This purpose is reflected in the court's willingness to interpret the stat-
ute expansively, ensuring coverage for many employee accidents that may be
related only remotely to employment. 22 In cases in which coverage is ex-
tended to an employee whose conduct contravenes express rules and policies
of the employer, the employer becomes in effect a "guarantor" of the em-
ployee's safety.23 As a counterweight to the imposition of such liability, the
18. 306 N.C. at 259, 293 S.E.2d at 203. See also Hartley v. Prison Dep't., 258 N.C. 287, 128
S.E.2d 598 (1962) (employee injured while climbing fence on shortcut to his employment post in
violation of prison rules); Taylor v. Dixon, 251 N.C. 304, 111 S.E.2d 181 (1959) (employee injured
while operating tractor against express orders of then present supervisor); Teague v. Atlantic Co.,
213 N.C. 546, 196 S.E. 875 (1938) (employee killed while riding conveyor belt meant to carry
crates between floors at employer's building).
19. 306 N.C. at 259-260, 293 S.E.2d at 202-03.
20. Id at 260, 293 S.E.2d at 203. The court stated:
[When there is a rule or prior order and the employee is faced with the choice of re-
maining idle in compliance with the rule or order or continuing to further his employer's
business, no superior being present, the employer who would reap the benefits of the
employee's act if successfully completed should bear the burden of injury resulting from
such acts.
Id. at 259, 293 S.E.2d at 202. See Guest v. Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 452, 85 S.E.2d 596,
600 (1955).
In dissent, Justice Meyer concluded that the majority placed too much emphasis upon the
question whether, even in defying specific instructions, the employee was still acting in further-
ance of the employer's business. 306 N.C. at 262,293 S.E.2d at 204-05 (Meyer, J., dissenting). He
criticized the majority's rule that no order of prohibition is effective unless that order is given by a
supervisor who is present at the time of the accident. Id. at 261, 293 S.E.2d at 204. Noting that the
realities of the workplace mandate that a supervisor cannot be present at all times, Justice Meyer
urged that holding the employee's activity, even though prohibited, within the course of his em-
ployment for purposes of the Act denies the employer any ability to protect his employees "from
the danger of, and himself from liability for such activity." Id Cf A. LARsON, supra note 2, at
§ 31.14.
21. Hoyle, 306 N.C. at 256,293 S.E.2d at 201; Hartley v. Prison Dep't., 258 N.C. 287, 290, 128
S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962).
22. The potentially large liability of an employer is frequently justified as a cost of doing
business. See Hoyle, 306 N.C. at 254, 293 S.E.2d at 202. See also LARSON, supra note 2, § 31.14.
23. There are, however, some qualifications to this proposition. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12
(1979) provides that:
[When the employee's injury or death is caused by the willful breach of any rule or
regulation adopted by the employer and approved by the Commission and brought to
the knowledge of the employee prior to the injury, compensation shall be reduced by ten
percent.
Section 97-12(3) also provides that "No compensation shall be payable if the injury or death
of the employee was proximately caused by. . . (3) His willful intention to injure or kill himself
or another." In Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 295 S.E.2d 458 (1982), decedent
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employer should be able to exercise some degree of control over the perform-
ance of his employee's work. Because the employer's control will naturally be
based upon work policies and regulations, some conduct which contravenes
employment rules must fall outside of the scope of employment, even if that
conduct indirectly benefits the employer.24 The Hoyle decision, however,
failed to address the question whether, and to what extent, an employer may
exercise such control in order to protect himself from liability.
In Felton v. Hospital Guild of Thomasville25 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals construed the "arising out of' and "in the course of' employment
requirements in the context of the "special errand" rule.26 As a part of her
duties as hospitality shop manager, claimant purchased food and other items
that were sold in the shop. On the day of the accident, claimant phoned a
local bakery with her order, intending to pick it up on her way to work. On
the way to her car, less than thirty feet from her front door, claimant slipped
on a thin layer of ice and fractured her hip.2 7
The Commission denied recovery and found that although claimant was
preparing to undertake a special errand for her employer, the mission began at
"the time plaintiff physically left her property or premises."' 28 On appeal, the
court found that the Commission erred in its adoption of a "bright line" test to
was stabbed to death by a co-worker in the parking lot of her employer's plant. The evidence
showed that decedent and her co-worker had been arguing, that decedent challenged the co-
worker, that she waited outside the plant for her, and then pushed her up against a car. Id. at 708,
295 S.E.2d at 460. A struggle ensued and decedent was stabbed. Id. Noting that G.S. 97-12(3)
provided an affirmative defense to a claim under the Act, the court found that decedent's em-
ployer had produced sufficient evidence to show that decedent had the willful intention to injure
another. Id. at 710-11, 295 S.E.2d at 461. Because the evidence also showed that decedent's death
was "proximately caused by" an act resulting from such intent, recovery was denied.
The court dismissed the argument that G.S. 97-12(3) required that the claimant's intent to
injure another be the "sole" proximate cause of her death. Id. at 711-12, 295 S.E.2d at 462. Not-
ing that use of a sole proximate cause standard would virtually emasculate the statutory defense
(the actions of an employee's intended victim could always be "one" cause of injury), the court
expressly held such a standard inapplicable. Id.
24. If an employee were given unchecked discretion and allowed to justify himself in all
cases with the plea that his conduct benefitted his employer, the coverage of the Act would
amount to an imposition of strict liability. The court in Hoyle implicityly recognized that a line
must be drawn, but failed to consider how far the "in furtherance of employer's business" justifi-
cation could extend. Rather, it stated only that in order to break the causal connection that autho-
rizes coverage under the Act, the employee must have violated a prohibition or warning issued by
a supervisor present at the time of the accident. 306 N.C. at 259,293 S.E.2d at 202. There remains,
however, need for a more concrete definition of the scope of the employer's control. For a more
comprehensive discussion of this problem, see A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 31.
25. 57 N.C. App. 33, 291 S.E.2d 158 (1982).
26. The "special errand" rule represents an exception to the general rule that an injury suf-
fered by an employee while going to and coming from work is not an injury arising out of and in
the course of employment. Id. at 34, 291 S.E.2d at 159. See Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306
N.C. 728, 295 S.E.2d 473 (1982); Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 802 (1959). Thus, if an
employee is engaged in a special errand on his employer's behalf, the "coming and going" rule
will not bar recovery for his injuries suffered in route so long as the injuries arose out of the
employment. Once it is established that the employee is engaged in a special errand, "the declared
policy of the state requires a liberal construction in favor of the employee." Felton 57 N.C. App, at
35, 291 S.E.2d at 160. See Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 188 S.E.2d 281 (1972).




be used in determining when a special errand commences.2 9 Thus, the ques-
tion remained whether plaintiff's accident arose out of her employment. The
court concluded that an accident arises out of employment when it occurs in
the course of employment and "the conditions or obligations of the employ-
ment put the employee in the position or at the place where the accident oc-
curs."'30 Since the obligations of plaintiff's employment required her to be in
the place where the accident occurred, and since plaintiffs special errand had
begun before she was injured, the court determined that her accident arose out
of and in the course of her employment. 31
Despite its equitable result, the court's decision in Felton is problematic.
The court in effect substituted one bright line test for another, narrowing the
Commission's "boundaries of the claimant's property" test to a "boundaries of
the claimant's home" test for purposes of the "in the course of employment"
requirement. 32 The most troublesome aspect of Felton, however, is the court's
interpretation of the "arising out of employment" requirement. In North Car-
olina, a compensable injury cannot arise from "a hazard common to others."'33
To be compensable, an injury must result from a risk peculiar to or incidental
to the claimant's employment.34 In Felton, plaintiffs injury was not the result
of a risk peculiar to her employment. As Judge Whichard observed in dissent,
29. Id. (citing Massey v. Board of Educ., 204 N.C. 193, 197-98, 167 S.E. 695, 698 (1933)).
The Commission's test was used to determine that plaintiff had not entered the course of employ-
ment at the time the accident occurred. The court of appeals held that, on these facts, plaintiffhad
begun her special errand. Id. at 35, 291 S.E.2d at 160.
30. Id. at 35, 291 S.E.2d at 160. Cf. Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731, 239 S.E.2d 243 (1977)
(although employee's injury occured on employer's private road, recovery denied because the
risks encountered on the road were no different from those encountered on a public highway). See
infra note 33 and accompanying text.
31. 57 N.C. App. at 35, 291 S.E.2d at 160.
32. The court emphasized that once plaintiff had left the safety of her house, she entered the
course of her employment. Id. (citing Charak v. Leddy, 23 A.D.2d 437, 261 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1965)).
See also Safeway Stores v. Worker's Compensation Advisory Bd., 104 Cal. App. 3d 528, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 750 (1980) (plaintiff working late attacked by assailant as he entered his house; court
awarded benefits, noting that because plaintiff had not yet reached the safety of his house, he had
not left the course of his employment).
33. 57 N.C. App. at 39, 291 S.E.2d at 162 (Whichard, J., dissenting). For an accident to arise
out of employment, "the causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the
neighborhood." Id. (quoting Bryan v. T.A. Loving Co., 222 N.C. 724, 728, 24 S.E.2d 751, 754
(1943)). See Brannon v. Westchester Academy, 42 N.C. App. 58, 60, 255 S.E.2d 613, 614 (1979).
The test excludes an injury caused by a hazard to which the workman would have been equally
exposed apart from the employment. See Bartlett v. Duke Univ., 284 N.C. 230, 200 S.E.2d 193
(1973).
In dissent, Judge Whichard considered the following hypothetical:
Plaintiff and her next door neighbor are employed as comanagers of the hospitality
shop .... It is plaintiffs duty to go by the bakery on the way to work one morning, and
the neighbor's duty the next, on a continuing alternating basis. On the morning in ques-
tion plaintiff and the neighbor while proceeding simultaneously toward their respective
cars to depart, plaintiff for the bakery, and the neighbor directly for the hospital, fall
simultaneously on the ice and sustain identical injuries. Under the majority's reasoning,
plaintiff recovers, and the neighbor does not. I find neither logic nor justice in such a
result.
57 N.C. App. at 40, 291 S.E.2d at 162 (Wichard, J., dissenting).
34. See Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731, 239 S.E.2d 243 (1977); Watkins v. City of Wilming-
ton, 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976); Bartlett v. Duke Univ., 284 N.C. 230, 200 S.E.2d 193
(1973),Lee v. F.M. Henderson & Assocs., 284 N.C. 126, 200 S.E.2d 32 (1973).
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plaintiffs injury was the result of a hazard encountered by everyone venturing
outdoors on the morning in question, whether or not they were employed by
defendant.35
. Occupational Diseases
For purposes of the Act, the disability of an employee "resulting from an
occupational disease described in G.S. 97-53 shall be treated as the happening
of an injury by accident."'36 To prove a claim for occupational disease bene-
fits, a claimant must show that he suffered injury from an occupational dis-
ease37 that causes disability.38
In Frady v. Groves Thread39 the North Carolina Court of Appeals con-
strued the term "last injurious exposure" for purposes of G.S. 97-57.40 Plaintiff
in Frady worked twenty-three years in the cotton twisting department of an-
other company before joining defendant in 1966 as an employee in a similar
capacity. After six months with defendant, plaintiff obtained a new job with
United Spinners Co. During six years with United Spinners, plaintiff was ex-
posed only to synthetics dust.4 1 Plaintiff alleged a claim under the Act for
35. 57 N.C. App. at 39, 291 S.E.2d at 162.
Compare Felton with Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 295 S.E.2d 473 (1982).
Plaintiff in Powers was a mortician and embalmer, on call twenty-four hours a day. His duties
included calling on bereaved families and preparing bodies for burial. On the night of the acci-
dent, plaintiff was called to collect a body. After embalming the body, plaintiff returned home to
shower and ready himself for other duties. The exigencies of the employment required plaintiff's
return home since the funeral home was without shower facilities. Plaintiff was severely injured
when his car, parked in his driveway, suddenly began roiling and hit him.
The court rejected the conclusion that plaintiff's "special errand" ended when he returned to
his own property, and observed that plaintiff's duties had not ended upon his return home. Id. at
731, 295 S.E.2d at 475. Because plaintif's employment required him to be at the place where he
was injured, "subjecting him to additional risks thereto," the court held that his injury "arose out
of" employment. Id. at 731-32, 295 S.E.2d at 475-76 (citing Clark v. Burton Lines, 272 N.C. 433,
150 S.E.2d 569 (1968); Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957)).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1979).
37. See Taylor v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 97, 265 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1980); Lumpkins
v. Fieldcrest Mills, 56 N.C. App. 653, 656, 289 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1982). G.S. 97-53 contains a fist of
twenty-seven specific diseases and one catch-all provision, subsection 13, which provides coverage
for any disease "proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar
to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to
which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment." On the question of proof
of a disease under subsection 13, see Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101,
106 (1981); Lumpkins v. Fieldcrest Mills, 56 N.C. App. 653, 658, 289 S.E.2d 848, 851-52 (1982).
38. Disability is defined as the incapacity due to injury to earn the wages the employee was
receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9)
(1979). See Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982); Hundley v.
Fieldcrest Mills, 58 N.C. App. 184, 187, 292 S.E.2d 766, 768 (1982). The test for disability is
whether and to what extent earning capacity is impaired. Robinson v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 57 N.C.
App. 619, 623, 292 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1982); Lucas v. Burlington Indus., 57 N.C. App. 366, 368, 291
S.E.2d 360, 361 (1982); Mills v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 53 N.C. App. 341, 343, 280 S.E.2d 802, 803
(1981).
39. 56 N.C. App. 61, 286 S.E.2d 844 (1982).
40. The statute provides in part: "In any case where compensation is payable for an occupa-
tional disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposedto
the hazards of such disease ... shall be liable." N.C. GEN STAT. § 97-57 (1979).
41. 56 N.C. App. at 63, 286 S.E.2d at 845.
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damages resulting from byssinosis42 against defendant and United Spinners.
Medical testimony indicated that plaintiffs respiratory disease was caused pri-
marily by cigarette smoking and cotton dust exposure. 43 The court found that
the evidence justified the Commission's conclusion that defendant was plain-
tiffs employer at the time of his last injurious exposure.44 The court con-
cluded that although plaintiffs exposure to synthetics dust may have played a
part in plaintiffs condition, plaintiff failed to prove that employment involving
the handling of synthetics was associated with any occupational disease.45
Thus, the court denied plaintiffs claim against United Spinners.46
In Taylor v. Cone Mills Corp .47 plaintiff sought an award for occupational
disease, alleging that he contracted byssinosis during his employment with de-
fendant from 1949-1963. The evidence showed that plaintiff suffered from a
respiratory disease "due to a long-term exposure to cotton trash dust."'48 At
the time of plaintiffs disablement in 1963, however, the Act did not provide
for compensation of disability caused by byssinosis. Thus, plaintiffs only ave-
nue of recovery lay in G.S. 97-53(13), 49 the 1963 version of which50 allowed
compensation for "infection or inflammation of the skin or eyes or other exter-
nal contact surfaces or oral or nasal cavities due to irritating oils, cutting coin-
42. Byssinosis is defined as "cotton-mill fever, an occupational respiratory disease of cotton,
flax, and hemp workers. It is characterized by symptoms (especially wheezing) most severe at the
beginning of each work week." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICrIONARY 207 (4th unabr. lawyer's ed.
1976).
43. 56 N.C. App. at 63, 286 S.E.2d at 845. A conclusion that plaintiffs condition was due in
part to cigarette smoking is not in itself sufficient to bar recovery for a compensable disease. See
infra note 46. The general rule is that an employer takes his employee as he finds him and will be
liable for the full extent of his employee's compensable injury even though a pre-existing condi-
tion contributes to the degree of injury. Id at 65, 286 S.E.2d at 845. See Robinson v. J.P. Stevens
& Co., 57 N.C. App. 619, 622,292 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1982); Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C.
1, 18, 282 S.E.2d 458, 470 (1981).
44. 56 N.C. App. at 65, 286 S.E.2d at 847.
45. Id. Plaintiff therefore failed to prove that his occupational disease arose out of his em-
ployment with United Spinners. See Brown v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 49 N.C. App. 118, 270 S.E.2d
602 (1980); Moore v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 47 N.C. App. 744, 269 S.E.2d 159 (1980). The Supreme
Court of North Carolina only recently authorized apportionment of damage awards in disease
cases in which only a portion of the injury is due to work-related exposure. In Morrison v. Bur-
lington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981), the court stated:
When a claimant becomes incapacitated for work and part of that incapacity is caused,
accelerated or aggravated by an occupational disease and the remainder of that incapac-
ity for work is not caused, accelerated or aggravated by an occupational disease, the
[Act] requires compensation only for that portion of the disability caused, accelerated or
aggravated by the occupational disease.
Id. at 18, 282 S.E.2d at 470.
On the question of causation generally, see Walston v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 670, 285.
S.E.2d 822 (1982); Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981); Harrell v.
Yarns, 56 N.C. App. 697, 289 S.E.2d 846 (1982); Lumpkins v. Fieldcrest Mills, 56 N.C. App. 653,
289 S.E.2d 848 (1982).
46. 56 N.C. App. at 68, 286 S.E.2d at 847.
47. 306 N.C. 314, 293 S.E.2d 189 (1982).
48. Id. at 315, 293 S.E.2d at 190.
49. See supra note 7.
50. It is generally agreed that the statute in effect at the time of disability governs. See Wood
v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 645, 256 S.E.2d 692, 698 (1979). For a more comprehensive
discussion, see 4 A. LARSON, supra note 2, § 95.
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pounds, chemical dust... and any other materials or substances." 5' The
Commission concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff did not suffer from a
compensable disease because the respiratory surfaces of the lung were not "ex-
ternal contact surfaces." 5 2 The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's
denial of benefits.5 3
The supreme court reversed on the ground that the court of appeals erred
in construing the term "external contact surfaces" in accord with its ordinary
and common meaning.54 The court concluded that for purposes of the Act the
term was technical and that expert medical testimony was essential for its defi-
nition.5 5 Because medical evidence at plaintiffs hearing tended to prove that
the respiratory surfaces of the lung were external contact surfaces, and because
such evidence was uncontroverted, the court held that plaintiffs claim was
included in the statute's coverage.56
AlthoughFrady and Taylor do not in themselves represent any significant
changes in occupational disease coverage under the Act, they remain impor-
tant as illustrations of the North Carolina courts' willingness to construe the
statutory provisions liberally in favor of compensation. Apart from the mani-
festations of the judiciary's liberal position, however, the case law in the occu-
pational disease area appears to have become settled.57 Thus the courts' tasks,
as in Frady and Taylor, will become increasingly those of refining settled prin-
ciples and closely construing statutory language.
51. (emphasis added).
52. 306 N.C. at 318, 293 S.E.2d at 191.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 318-19, 293 S.E.2d at 194.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 324, 293 S.E.2d at 195. Because the court held that G.S. 97-53(13), as it stood in
1963, governed the claim, the issue whether Chapter 1305 of the 1979 North Carolina Session
Laws applied was not addressed. The Deputy Commissioner cited Chapter 1305 and awarded
plaintiff $7,000 under G.S. 97-31(24), which allows recovery for injury to an "important external
or internal organ." 306 N.C. at 317, 293 S.E.2d at 191. Chapter 1305 provides m part:
AN ACT TO PROVIDE THAT BYSSINOSIS, KNOWN AS 'BROWN LUNG DIS-
EASE,' SHALL BE DEEMED AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE WITHIN THE
MEANING OF G.S. § 97-53(13) FOR PURPOSES OF WORKER'S COMPENSA-
TION CLAIMS REGARDLESS OF THE DATE THE DISEASE ORIGINATED.
1. Claims for "brown lung disease," which can be proved under G.S. § 97-53(13) shall
be compensable regardless of the employee's date of last injurious exposure.
Act of June 25, 1980, ch. 1305, 1979 N .C. Sess. Laws 217 (Reg. Sess.). The full Commission and
the court of appeals agreed that Chapter 1305 was inapplicable to the case. 306 N.C. at 318, 293
S.E.2d at 191-92.
57. One question that may come to the forefront in the near future is how to apportion dam-
ages in occupational disease cases. See su ra note 46. See also Survey of Developments in North
Carolina Law, 1981-Administrative Law, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1194-97 (1982). In Morrison, Justice
Exum (joined by Justice Carlton) urged in dissent that the majority's authorization of apportion-
ment was improper.
An occupational disease need not be the sole cause of a worker's incapacity for work in
order for the worker to be compensated to the full extent of such incapacity. If an occu-
pational disease combines or interacts with certain pre-existing physical infirmities as to
render the worker totally incapacitated for work, our statutes permit an award for total
incapacity where, as here, the pre-existing, non-job-related physical infirmities in them.
selves and absent the occupational disease, are insufficient to cause any incapacity for
work.
Morrison v. Brulington Indus., 304 N.C. 24, 282 S.E.2d 473 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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C Procedure and Terminology
The principle that the Industrial Commission, as a "creature of the Gen-
eral Assembly," has only those powers delegated to it by statute 8 was the
primary focus of 1982 procedural developments under the North Carolina
Worker's Compensation Act.59 The General Assembly breathed additional
vigor into its "creature" by vesting the Industrial Commission and its ap-
pointed deputies with the power to "hold persons, firms or corporations in
contempt as provided in Chapter 5A of the General Statutes .... 60
The courts have seemed inclined to leave procedural expansiveness to the
legislature. In Buck v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co. 61 the court of
appeals held that the certification process, whereby the court certified to the
Industrial Commission the court's opinion denying plaintif's attorneys' fees
incurred on appeal, did not constitute a "hearing on review." Accordingly, the
Commission lacked the authority under G.S. 97-88 to award plaintiff these
fees. 62 This decision is hardly surprising, since a contrary result would have
given the Commission the power to reverse decisions of the court of appeals.
In Sparks v. Mountain Breeze Restaurant & Fish House, Inc.63 the court of
appeals adopted a narrow test64 in limiting the Commission's authority to
award attorneys' fees when a hearing has been "defended without reasonable
ground."6' 5 The facts of the case 66 were held sufficient to raise a credibility
issue, which in turn justified characterizing the defense as "not without rea-
son."67 The result of the court's holding is that a defendant who can reason-
ably attack a claim's credibility can defend without incurring liability for
58. Bowman v. Comfort Chair Co., 271 N.C. 702, 704, 157 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1967).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -101 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
60. Act of June 18, 1982, ch. 1243, 1982 N.C. Sess. 135 (Reg. Sess.) (amending N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-79(6), -80(a) (1979)). N.C. GEN. STAT. 97-79(b) now provides:
The Commission may appoint deputies who shall have the same power to issue subpoe-
nas, administer oaths, conduct hearings, hold persons, firms or corporations in contempt
as.provided in Chapter 5A of the General Statutes, take evidence, and enter orders,
opinions, and awards based thereon as is possessed by the members of the Commission,
and such deputy or deputies shall be subject to the State Personnel System.
N.C. GEN. STAT. 97-80(a), in pertinent part, now provides as follows:
The Commission may make rules, not inconsistent with this Article, for carrying out the
provisions of this Article. Processes and procedure under this Article shall be as sum-
mary and simple as reasonably may be. The Commission or any member thereof, or any
peron deputized by it, shall have the power, for the purpose of this Article, to tax costs
against the parties, and to subpoena witnesses, administer or cause to have administered
oaths, hold persons, ims or corporations in contempt as provided in Chapter 5A of theGeneral Statutes, and to examine or cause to be examined such parts of the books and
records s to a proceeding as relate to questions in dispute.
61. 58 N.C. App. 804, 295 S.E.2d 243 (1982).
62. Id. at 807, 295 S.E.2d at 245.
63. 55 N.C. App. 663, 286 S.E.2d 575 (1982).
64. "The test is not whe ethe defense prevails, but whether it is based in reason rather than
in stubborn, unfounded litigiousness." Id. at 665, 286 S.E.2d at 576.
65. N.C. GuN. STAT. § 97-88.1 (1979).66. The claimant had not reported the alleged accident when it occurred, nor did he report it
two days later when he phoned his employer. The employer received no notice of the accident
until nineteen days after it allegedly occurred.
67. 55 N.C. App. at 665, 286 S.E.2d at 576.
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attorneys' fees. The statute provides that the Commission make the determi-
nation whether the defense was "without reasonable ground. ' 68 Sparks draws
into question the degree of latitude the appellate courts will allow the Com-
mission in making that determination.69
The courts' approach has been more expansive, however, when the legis-
lature has amended an applicable statute between the time the claim was filed
and the time the appeal was heard, perhaps reflecting the courts' awareness of
a shift in state policy.70 In Smith v. American & Efird Mills71 the supreme
court interpreted the provision in the relevant version of G.S. 97-59 that re-
quired that all treatment for occupational disease "be first authorized by the
Industrial Commission after consulting with the Advisory Medical Commis-
sion."'72 Noting that a strict reading of the statute would require a claimant to
make an accurate self-diagnosis of his condition because treatment expenses
prior to consultation with the Advisory Medical Commission would not be
compensable, the court rejected a strict construction. Instead, the prior ap-
proval requirement was held to apply only to cases in which it is "reasonably
practical to seek such prior approval. ' 73 The present version of G.S. 97-59
does not call for prior authorization, but requires only that medical bills be
approved by the Commission.74 The court took note of this change in reach-
ing its conclusion.75
Finally, in Gantt v. Edmos Corp. ,76 the court of appeals reaffirmed that an
informal letter may sometimes serve as the filing of a claim, but that the letter
in the instant case fell far short of minimal compliance with the statute.77
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-88.1 (1979).
69. See, eg., Robinson v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 57 N.C. App. 619, 292 S.E.2d 144 (1982), in
which the denial of attorney fees was held to be properly within the Commission's discretion;
Cloutier v. North Carolina Division of Prisons, 57 N.C. App. 239, 291 S.E.2d 362 (1982) (error for
the Commission not to approve a reasonable fee agreement (one-third of claimant's recovery)), In
Cloutier, travel expenses which claimant's attorney incurred in taking a necessary deposition in
Florida were held properly taxed to defendant. Id. at 248, 291 S.E.2d at 368.
70. This type of expansiveness is not limited to procedural issues. In Taylor v. Cone Mills
Corp., 306 N.C. 314, 293 S.E.2d 189 (1982), the supreme court defined "external contact surfaces"
under G.S. 97-53(13) to include the respiratory surface of the lungs of certain byssinosis claimants.
See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
71. 305 N.C. 507, 290 S.E.2d 634 (1982).
72. Act of March 26, 1935, ch. 123, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130 (Codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-59 (Supp. 1981)).
73. 305 N.C. at 514, 290 S.E.2d at 638-39. The court had used similar logic in Taylor v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 265 S.E.2d 144 (1980), in interpreting the time of disablement require-
ment of G.S. 97-58.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-59 (Supp. 1981).
75. 305 N.C. at 514, 290 S.E.2d at 639.
76. 56 N.C. App. 408, 289 S.E.2d 75 (1982).
77. Id. at 410-11, 289 S.E.2d at 77. Compare Gantt with Cross v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 19
N.C. App. 29, 198 S.E.2d 110 (1973) in which the timely letter from claimant's counsel to the
Commission specifically requesting a hearing on claimant's alleged injury constituted a "rather
minimal compliance" with the filing requirements of G.S. 97-24. Id. at 30-31, 198 S.E.2d at 112.
In Gantt the letter contained no request for a hearing and no assertion that claimant was demand-
ing compensation. 56 N.C. App. at 410, 289 S.E.2d at 77. The letter was addressed to the insur-
ance carrier, with a copy to the Commission, and it implied that matters concerning the injury
were already being handled adequately, without the Commission's involvement. Id. at 409, 410-
11, 289 S.E.2d at 76, 77.
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Several 1982 decisions considered the definitions of particular terms of
the Act. The courts construed "change of condition," 78 "accident,"' 79 "em-
ployee,"80 "important internal organ," 8' "loss of important internal organ,"82
and "external contact surfaces."83
Only Taylor8 4 significally expanded the law, but the expanded definition
of "external contact surfaces" is not likely to have a great impact because the
legislature has already amended the Act to expand coverage for byssinosis
claims.85 In Taylor the surfaces of the lungs were held to be "external contact
surfaces" within the meaning of the pre-1963 version of G.S. 97-53(13). Be-
cause only a limited number of potential claimants would be likely to remain
outside the "gap" of a pre-1979 loophole8 6 in the Act's coverage, the present
impact of Taylor is minimal.87 The current version of G.S. 97-53(13) does not
refer to "external contact surfaces" (in reference to occupational diseases or
inflammations), but rather to "[any] disease" (except hearing loss) attributable
to the employment, to which the general public is not exposed.88
78. See McLean v. Roadway Express, Inc., 307 N.C. 99, 296 S.E.2d 456 (1982) (a change in
the doctor's opinion concerning the claimant's pre-existing condition based upon a subsequent
examination and a deterioration of physical condition is a "change of condition" for purposes of
warranting a change of disability rating under G.S. 97-47).
79. See Daniels v. Swofford, 55 N.C. App. 555, 286 S.E.2d 582 (1982). In Daniels the court
held that an assault by employer's president on an employee who had just been terminated was an
"accident" as defined by the Act. Id. at 558, 286 S.E.2d at 584. Because co-employee immunity
under G.S. 97-9 was held inapplicable to an intentional assault, plaintiff could maintain both a
Worker's Compensation claim against the employer and a tort action against the fellow employee.
Id. at 560, 286 S.E.2d at 586. Because the co-employee, president of the company, was held not to
be the alter ego of the employer, plaintiff was barred by the exclusivity provision of G.S. 97-10.1
from bringing an assault action against the employer. Id. at 561, 286 S.E.2d at 585-86.
80. See Turner v. Epes Transp. Sys., 57 N.C. App. 197, 290 S.E.2d 714 (1982). In Turner
claimant had a contract with defendant employer for the transportation of goods. The contract
referred to claimant as an independent contractor, and claimant was not subject to any significant
day-to-day supervision. Nevertheless, the court held that defendant's issuance of an Interstate
Commerce Commission franchise sticker to claimant created an employer-employee relationship
so that claimant was an "employee" for purposes of the Act. Id. at 198-99, 290 S.E.2d at 715.
81. See Cloutier v. North Carolina Div. of Prisons, 57 N.C. App. 239, 291 S.E.2d 362 (1982)
(sinuses).
82. See id. at 241, 291 S.E.2d at 364 (loss of taste and smell).
83. See Taylor v. Cone Mills Corp., 306 N.C. 314, 293 S.E.2d 189 (1982) (respiratory surface
of the lungs).
84. Id.
85. The Act was amended in 1963, 1971, and 1979 to bring byssinosis claims fully within the
statute. For a discussion of the interplay between the three amendments, and the reasons why all
three were needed, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980--Workers' Compensa-
tion, 59 N.C.L. Rnv. 1033-34 (1981).
86. The claim in Taylor, filed in 1975, fell into a noncoverage "gap" in G.S. 97-53(13), a
loophole closed by the 1979 amendment. The loophole prevented post-1971 claimants whose last
exposure had been pre-1963 and whose disability had been pre-1971 from receiving compensa-
tion. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980-Administrative Law, 59 N.C.L
REv. 1017, 1033-34 (1981).
87. Curiously, post-1971 byssinosis claimants whose last exposure and disablement both oc-
curred between 1963 and 1971 would have two theories of recovery under the Act, because byssi-
nosis could be deemed an inflammation of "an internal or external organ or organs" or of an
"external contact surface." Becapse claimants must file within two years of disablement, these
theories would apply only to still-unresolved pre-1973 claims, certainly a rare or extinct breed.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1979).
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D. Availability of Ben qits
In Deese v. Southeastern Lawn & Tree Expert Co. 89 the supreme court
reviewed the amount of compensation to which a deceased worker's widow
and three minor children were entitled under the Act.90 The issue was
whether G.S 97-38 required reapportionment among the remaining dependent
children of the share of a child who reached majority after the expiration of
the initial compensation period of 400 weeks. 91 The court held that the Act
fixes a recipient's share at the time of death of the worker. Reapportionment
of the share of a child who reaches majority occurs only if the child reaches
majority within the initial 400-week compensation period.92
In dissent, Justice Mitchell, joined by Justices Exum and Carlton, stated
that the court's construction was needlessly harsh and inequitable.93 The mi-
nority would have liberally construed the statute to provide for reapportion-
ment of the award among remaining eligible recipients. 94
It is difficult to comprehend how the court's opinion follows the "sound
rules of statutory construction" that the Act "should be liberally construed,
whenever appropriate, so that benefits will not be denied upon mere technical-
ities or strained and narrow interpretations of its provisions."95 The majority's
holding, although not illogical, was certainly not compelled, given the ambigu-
ity of the statute. The legislature, in expanding the benefits available under
G.S. 97-38, showed no intent to create the inequities that may arise under the
court's interpretation. 96
In Smith v. American & Efird Mis 97 the supreme court held that the more
specific statutory provision requiring an employer to provide treatment to an
89. 306 N.C. 275, 293 S.E.2d 140 (1982). This same issue was considered in Chinault v. Pike
Electrical Contractors, 306 N.C. 286, 293 S.E.2d 147 (1982).
90. 306 N.C. at 277, 293 S.E.2d at 142. The relevant portion of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38
(Cum. Supp. 1981) reads as follows:
If death results proximately from the accident... the employer shall pay.., to the
person or persons entitled thereto as follows: (1) Persons wholly dependent for support
upon the earnings of the deceased shall... be entitled to receive the entire compensa-
tion payable share and share alike to the exlusion of all other persons. If there be only
one" person wholly dependent, then that person shall receive the entire compensation
payable .... Compensation payments due on account of death shall be paid for a
period of 400 weeks from the date of the death of the employee; provided, however, after
said 400-week period... compensation payments due a dependent child shall be con-
tinued until such child reaches the age of 18.
91. 306 N.C. at 277, 293 S.E.2d at 142.
92. Id. at 279-80, 293 S.E.2d at 144.
93. Id. at 284, 293 S.E.2d at 147 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 277, 293 S.E.2d at 142-43.
96. The dissent observed that the total amount paid to the dependents of a worker making
$270 per week before his death would vary in relation to the number of dependents and their ages.
If the worker were survived by a single one-year-old child, the total compensation paid to that
child would be $40,560 greater than the total compensation paid to three minor children aged one,
five, and ten years surviving an identical worker. Id. at 283, 293 S.E.2d at 146 (Mitchell, J.,
dissenting). These inequities would not occur if the total award were reapportioned whenever a
minor child reaches majority.
97. 305 N.C. 507, 290 S.E.2d 634 (1982).
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employee in the event of disability from occupational disease9 8 controlled over
the more general provision99 regarding medical supplies. 1°° Accordingly, in
the event of disability from occupational disease, 101 the employer must pay for
medical treatment whenever such treatment would "tend to provide needed
relief."10 2 In Smith it was held to be error to limit the award of medical ex-
penses to the period during which disability payments were provided.10 3
In Buie v. Daniel International Corp. 14 punitive damages for retaliatory
discharge were denied because G.S. 97-6.1(b) limits recovery to damages "suf-
fered by the employee." 10 5 The court reasoned that punitive damages are not
"suffered" by a claimant and rejected the argument that public policy would
be better served by the threat of punitive damages.' 0 6 G.S. 97-6.1(b) was en-
acted in response to the court of appeals' holding in Dockery v. Lampart Table
Co. 107 that no private cause of action existed for a claimant seeking redress for
a retaliatory discharge that occurred after filing a compensation claim.108 Ar-
guably, the legislature intended to create a new "tort" to further the public
policies of the Act. If so, the statute should have been construed more
liberally.
KEN R. BRAMLETT, JR.
DAVID G. UFFELMAN
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-59 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The statute provides:
Medical, surgical, hospital, nursing services, medicine, sick travel, rehabilitation services
and other treatment as may reasonably be required to tend to lessen the period of disa-
bility or provide needed relief shall be paid by the employer in cases in which awards are
made for disability or damage to organs as a result of an occupational disease ....
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1979).
100. 305 N.C. at 512, 290 S.E.2d at 638.
101. Plaintiff in Smith was partially disabled from 1970-78 and became totally disabled in
1978. Id. at 508-09, 290 S.E.2d at 636-37. G.S. 97-29 was amended in 1973, three years after
plaintiff's partial disability began, to increase eligibility for totally disabled claimants. Act of
April 12, 1974, ch. 1308, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 609. Because plaintiffhad no right to recover for
total disability until 1978, his claim vested at that time, and the version of G.S. 97-29 in effect at
that time (the 1973 version) was properly applied. 305 N.C. at 511, 290 S.E.2d at 636.
The court followed the line of cases following Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256
S.E.2d 692 (1979), to dispose of a constitutional objection to the court's purportedly retroactive
application of substantive law. This potential constitutional issue was previously identified in
Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1980-Administrative Law, 59 N.C.L. REv. 1017,
1034-36 (1981).
102. 305 N.C. at 513, 290 S.E.2d at 638.
103. Id. at 513, 290 S.E.2d at 636-37.
104. 56 N.C.App. 445, 289 S.E.2d 118 (1982).
105. Id. at 447, 289 S.E.2d at 119 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1(b) (1979)).
106. Id at 447, 289 S.E.2d at 119.
107. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978).
108. 56 N.C. App. at 446-47, 289 S.E.2d at 119. For a discussion of the enactment of the
retaliatory discharge provision in response to Dockery, and an analysis of the possible scope of the
provision, see Note, Worker's Compensation-Retaliatory Discharge-The Legislative Response to
Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 58 N.C.L. Rav. 629 (1980). The note did not identify the punitive
damages issue, perhaps assuming that the new "tort" would include the right to seek punitive
damages.
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